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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis deals with the notion that individuation in drawing provides visible evidence of 
experiential cognition as embodied action. It asserts that trait as enaction signifies 
constructive and inventive processes that involve the body-mind. Trait emerges as non-
representationist, non-expressive component of drawing that marks the pre-conceptual as 
conceptual. Therefore, drawing functions as a complex interface between drafter and 
world that unifies antimonies such as inside and outside; convention and invention; 
remoteness and intimacy; body and mind; and subject and object.  
 
The thesis outlines drawing as a self-reflexive research process that constructs and invents. 
An understanding of trait as invention, the thesis proposes, can aid the drawing facilitator at 
higher education level to develop individual student drafters’ creativity. The thesis therefore 
argues for a form of drawing facilitation that is responsive to the complex interaction 
between the self and the world. Responsive mediation develops and celebrates diversity in 
socio-cultural heritage, personal history, and individual differences.  
 
 
OPSOMMING 
 
Die idee dat verpersoonlikte trekke in tekenkuns sigbare aanduiding van enaktiewe vergestalting 
van kognisie is, vorm die onderwerp van hierdie tesis. Die tesis stel dit dat vergestaltende 
ervaringskognisie, as die tekenaar se ervaringsbetrokkenheid, geïndividueerde begrip, 
vaardigheid, sintese en betekenisvorming moontlik maak en ontwikkel. Verpersoonlikte trekke in 
tekenkuns blyk van non-representatiewe en non-ekspressiewe oorsprong te wees aldaar dit die pre-
konseptuele as die konseptuele merk. Dit ondersteun die gedagte dat tekenkuns as ’n komplekse 
koppelvlak tussen tekenaar en omwêreld funksioneer. As koppelvlak word die tekenkuns 
verwesenlik as ’n sigbare samevloeiing van dualiteite soos binne en buite, die gewone en verdigting, 
afstand en intimiteit, subjek en objek, liggaam en gees.  
 
Ingevolge ’n enaktiewe beskouing van die tekenkuns kan die tekenhandeling beskryf word as ’n 
selfrefleksiewe navorsingsproses wat kreatiwiteit ondersteun. Sodanige beskouing van die 
tekenkuns, lui die argument, kan die fasiliteerder op ’n hoër onderwysvlak help om individuele 
tekenstudente se kreatiwiteit te bevorder. Daaruit vloei die voorstel vir ’n vorm van fasilitering wat 
gevoelig is vir die ingewikkelde interaksie tussen die self en die omgewing. ’n Vorm van mediasie 
wat dit in ag neem, skep nie alleen ruimte vir diversiteit wat betref sosio-kulturele herkoms, 
persoonlike geskiedenis en individuele verskille nie, maar ontwikkel en vier ook dié soort diversiteit. 
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 1 
THE MARK OF A SILENT LANGUAGE: THE WAY THE BODY-MIND1 DRAWS. 
 
 
 
 
PREFACE 
 
 
 
The language of drawing is a quiet language, its silence borne by the muteness of 
gesture. While distinct from the clamour of voice and speech, it corresponds to these 
in source and in resource, springing, like speech, from our interaction with the world. 
It exceeds word in effectiveness since, while it functions equally well to denote and 
connote meaning with grace and eloquence, revealing the mind’s extensive range of 
perceptualising and conceptualising capabilities, it is, unlike words, capable of 
disclosing the unsayable. 
 
If drawing, as medium for the creation of metaphor, allegory, analogy, or 
homology, is a product of the versatility of the human mind, its genesis deserves 
regard. In an educational context, drawing demands understanding of the range of 
visual expression it can produce at every phase of its development. In this thesis, I 
propose that drawing interfaces between soma, intellect, emotion, psyche, and 
environment, always offering the potential for developing a personalised, yet 
diverse, grapheme in making sense of lived ‘reality’. The thesis reveals, tracks, and 
documents those conductive paths that intermediate between the drafter, her world, 
and drawing. This implies that the language of drawing is a language of 
individuation,2 speaking of the self and its personal history, milieu and socialisation, 
aesthetic, knowledge, understanding, and experience.3 Through these processes, I 
                                                       
1 This term dispels a mind and body dualism, in which mind is regarded as superior to body. I explain 
this in more detail under ‘body-mind’, ‘non-dualist’, and ‘non-representationist’ in the Glossary 
(Addendum B) and also in Chapters 1 & 2. 
2 As I explain in the Glossary of key words (Addendum B), I apply ‘individuation’ consistently to 
suggest the developmental dynamics and generative modes in which a drafter unconsciously 
maintains identity in drawing and which defines difference between the drawings of two or more 
drafters. 
3 ‘Experience’, in this context, refers to a personalised history of social and cultural interactivity that 
contributes to human understanding of lived ‘reality’ and that, as I will argue, would ultimately 
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argue, it also promises navigation across cultures, class, and gender in a far more 
accessible way than spoken language. As a visible text of individuation, drawing 
can provide an efficient vehicle for those interactive dynamics that communicate 
across social and cultural boundaries. 
 
A viewing audience that stringently adheres to an ‘ideal’ vision (sourced from a 
single culture), as the only existing standard for appraising drawing, will disregard 
the numerous and compounded significations of a diverse range of individual 
consciousness and their discrete chapters of development. Likewise, in an 
educational context, an assessor who rigidly adheres to her own vision and abilities 
as the only existing measures for evaluating the drawings of a diverse range of 
drafters4 will become blind to the multiple significations that accompany 
individualised experience in drawing.5 I propose that a teacher who perpetuates 
emulative frameworks hinders the creative cerebration that drawing facilitates – a 
creativity that, I argue, creates and renews its own norms continuously and 
dynamically.  
 
While evaluation of drawing in the institutional context is not my primary concern, 
the thesis nonetheless points at a central problematic in the ways we teach drawing 
at tertiary institutions. I propose that limited and conventionalised expectations 
manifest in the criteria that we employ when we evaluate drawing. Some 
contentious issues regarding evaluation are inconsistencies and discrepancies 
between the expectations of educators and those of student drafters.6 Situations in 
which the particular aesthetic sensibility of an examiner functions as a closed 
                                                                                                                                                          
contribute to the conception of form in a durational drawing process. See also ‘Experience’ in the 
Glossary of key words (Addendum B). 
4 I apply the word ‘drafter’ consistently throughout the thesis to denote a person who draws. I use it 
to avoid the gender specific discrimination suggested by ‘draftsman”, and to avoid the awkwardness 
of the neutral but lengthy ‘draftsperson’. 
5 ‘Experience’ suggests the “real-time process” that Norman Bryson (1983: 117) discusses in The Gaze 
and the Glance. I argue in the thesis that the drafter’s experiencing of drawing contributes to her 
conception of form “as matter in process ... the impress on matter of the body’s internal energy, in the 
mobility and vibrancy of its somatic rhythms; the body of labour, of material practice” (Bryson. 
1983: 131). See also ‘Experience’ in the Glossary of key words (Addendum B). 
6 Robert Sternberg (1997: 12) describes a similar discrepancy between the Learning and Thinking 
Styles of learners and teachers, “As a society, we repeatedly confuse styles with abilities, resulting in 
individual differences that are really due to styles being viewed as due to abilities. The result is that 
people whose styles don’t match the expectations of their parents, spouse or lover, colleagues, or 
boss are derogated for all the wrong reasons. What is seen as stupidity or intransigence may 
actually be nothing more than the style of another”.  
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aesthetic system7 (and, by extension, knowledge system) that pre-determines criteria 
for evaluating drawing, could have unfortunate results. Not the least of these is that 
students tend to suppress individuated self-consciousness and distinctiveness in 
gestural expression, resulting in the concomitant suppression of the desire to 
experience first hand, to experiment, or to explore by investigating varied options. 
Students prefer, in fact seek out, to work according to a single canon, conveniently 
provided by the assessors’ regular critique8 on their work, in which she articulates 
her own restrictive preferences, which results in the misconception amongst students 
that only one ‘correct’ manner of working is acceptable. Students quickly reconstruct 
this perceived ‘correct’ manner of working into a convenient formula that guarantees 
success and high marks.9 This type of negative dynamic inevitably becomes a 
counterproductive force in a learning process where actualisation of individuated 
consciousness, creativity, versatility, and diversity10 are essential goals; indeed the 
very goals any balanced drawing programme should nurture. 
 
It is my opinion that, if applied as a closed system,11 normative12 evaluation can 
become a form of exclusion, which perpetuates a relentless elimination of diverse 
aesthetic or cultural input. Evaluation that excludes in this way, upholds formulae for 
successful performance in the drawing studio. Such a situation leads to 
institutionalised dogma and mannerisms that obstruct rather than advance the 
development of creativity in a diverse student profile. This leads to stagnation and 
persistent frustration for those students of drawing who still find themselves 
categorised not only as ‘below standard’, and also implicates non-conforming 
students as ‘other’. In such cases, ‘the other’ is not necessarily distinguished according 
                                                       
7 Bourdieu (1996: 286) explains this problem with reference to the art analyst, “This means that they 
[the analyst] effect, unwittingly, a universalization of the particular case, and in the same way 
constitute a particular experience, situated and dated, of the work of art as a transhistoric norm of 
all artistic perception”. In the context of this thesis, I relate the notion to evaluators or examiners of 
art in educational institutions. Note that Bourdieu contrasts ‘particular experience’ with ‘norm’. 
8 By this, I do not shun ‘in general’ critique of the work of student drafters. I am, however, critical of 
critique that dictates canonised method, or that dictates at all. 
9 I must point out that I refer here to my subjective experience. If these observations assume negative 
criticism, it is intended only towards my own facilitatory experiences and myself. I elaborate on these 
observations in Chapter 1. 
10 Variability in form, quality, appearance. See also the Glossary of key words (Addendum B). 
11 ‘Closed’ not only as an assessor- or institution-centred aesthetic, but also as a system of knowledge 
and skills. 
12 Where an assessor- or institution-centred aesthetic (rather than drawing and/or drafter-centred 
learning) serves as a norm against which the assessor formulates criteria and evaluates drawings. 
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to race,13 but according to the particularities and individuation of their style 
language in drawing. Divergences between the assessor’s enclosed expectations 
and those of the student drafter often determine the judgement. Divergence, in this 
context, pertains to the difference14 between the stasis of enclosure and the 
dynamic and sanguinity of disclosure. 
 
A more encompassing form of instructional mediation15 that accommodates a varied 
spectrum of cultural input has become necessary for additional reasons. The 
increasingly diverse student profile that is becoming the norm in university art 
programmes is also potentially a fertile source for the advancement of more visual 
art forms and the development of a diversified identity in our national visual art 
expression. To accomplish this, it would be necessary to revisit the potential of the 
art of drawing as an intermediary that influences emergent visual art. The 
cultivation of derivative or emulative drawing practices sacrifices the ability to 
conceptualise visually through drawing, and reflects institutionalised expediency at 
the cost of student drafters. If not encouraged to make connections between the 
varied devices and the underlying dynamics immanent in the act of drawing – 
between experience and thought – student drafters will acquire little ability to 
synthesise; they will obtain minimal analytical or critical skills, and will fail to 
understand or create even the most basic dimensions of connotative meaning 
attainable in drawing. These abilities are essential to visual literacy in the higher 
educational context of extended visual art practices.  
 
The extent to which first year university students lack proficiency16 in drawing is 
evident in the drawings that applicants submit annually for admission to this 
                                                       
13 Although race, as signified through socio-cultural norms in South Africa, is often implicated. 
14 I apply the word ‘Difference’ to suggest its general meaning as something displaying 
“characteristics that distinguishes it from another” (Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary. 1979: 315), 
rather than intending any philosophical connotations.  
15 I use the word ‘mediation’ to deliberately imply the role of a drawing teacher as someone who 
functions in an intermediary fashion between the student and her drawing practice, a teacher who 
facilitates, rather than dictates. Therefore, I often use the terms ‘mediator’ or ‘facilitator’ to replace 
‘teacher’ or ‘lecturer’. See ‘mediation’ and ‘facilitation’ in the Glossary of key words (Addendum B). 
16 Given the diversity of first year visual arts students in South Africa, in the context of this thesis, 
‘proficiency’ denotes meaning as wide as the grace of any god. It enfolds all individual and 
collective levels of competences that could be subjectively associated with and objectively aligned to 
all different levels of knowledge, intelligence, ability, and skill as these attributes relate to age and 
socio-cultural background.  
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university’s17 art programme. These drawings show that photographic and digital 
images often enjoy preference as source material. The admission portfolios also 
display an indiscriminate repetition of content, style, and manner and copying or 
tracing of existing images in drawing (and other visual art disciplines) as generally 
accepted practice. Apparently, current systems of assessment in schools legitimise 
such practices to the extent that they become the norm. To my mind, they represent 
poor substitutes for the gradual accrual of convincing drawing skill, which is a far 
more difficult and demanding process both in facilitation18 and in execution. 
Unfortunately, teachers allow these examples of emulative practices in drawing 
before the individual drafter attains a reasonable degree of skill.  
 
Apart from the fact that such an approach to teaching displays indifference towards 
drawing’s potential function as a key initiator of individuated visuality and its 
potential significance, I also perceive it as an enduring disregard for the notion that 
the process of learning to draw is centred in the individual drafter. Furthermore, it 
disregards those processes and dynamics that inform not only skills-development in 
drawing, but also creativity in the visual arts domain.  
 
The armature of this study comprises the student drafter, her drawing and her 
world, and the relationship between them. The individual student is the centre of 
cognition and perception in this relationship and, therefore, necessarily also central 
in her development in drawing. Issues around individuation and its import in 
reflexivity19 are clearly also relevant. An indisputable relationship between 
individuation and development suggests generative interactivity20 as central aspect 
of drawing. In an educational environment, acknowledgement and understanding of 
the entire progressive path of interactivity that operates between an encompassing 
socio-cultural space (world) as source and resource, the drafter, and the 
                                                       
17 Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, South Africa. 
18 The term ‘Facilitation’ replaces ‘teaching’ in the educational system known as ‘Outcomes Based 
Education’. Since my intention is not necessarily to propose the principles of this specific educational 
system as ideal, I use ‘facilitation’, ‘mediation’, and ‘teaching’ interchangeably. Please refer to 
‘facilitation’ and ‘mediation’ in the Glossary of key words (Addendum B). 
19 Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary  (1979: 964) explains the word as the concept of being 
“directed or turned back on itself”, and “relating to, characterised by, or being a relation that exists 
between an entity and itself”. Please refer to the Glossary of key words (Addendum B) for further 
explanations of its usage in the context of this thesis. 
20 I intend the meaning of ‘interaction’ as it is explained in WNCD (1979: 596), namely as “a mutual 
or reciprocal action or influence”. Please refer to the Glossary of key words (Addendum B) for an 
indication of the evolvement of this word’s meaning in the context of this thesis.  
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cerebrative21 processes behind her particular drawing mark, emerges as a crucial 
concern. As I will explain in the Introduction, this armature delineates the scope and 
context of the inquiry. The difference between an emulative and a reflexive 
framework for the teaching of drawing outlines the central problematic that the 
thesis deals with. 
                                                       
21 Synonym for generative. I apply the two words interchangeably through-out the thesis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Problem statement and goals 
 
 Problem 
As an experienced drawing teacher, I have come to believe that the legitimisation 
of emulated style language in drawing represents a problematic foundation for the 
development of drawing as a constructive rather than mimetic process. I argue that, 
for the art of drawing to accomplish its key functions as generator of creative 
ability and an efficient visuality,22 its teaching requires the acknowledgement and 
implicit harnessing of individuation in drawing. This problem underscores the 
principal questions that I pose: Where do we find the genesis of individuation (trait) 
and why would its genesis be of any consequence in the drawing of student 
drafters? What are the processes that give body to trait and what are the 
processes that erode it? Does trait hold any significance for the development of 
creativity or skills-development in drawing?  
 
Focus 
The problem statement poses a key concept, namely individuation in drawing (trait), 
which becomes the focus of this inquiry. Individuation in students’ drawing entails 
personalised stylistic aspects that reveal as visual ‘difference’ between the works of 
individual student-drafters (see Addendum A, Illustration 3, and Illustrations i(a) & 
i(b) in Chapter 1). I explain my perception of individuation in drawing in Chapter 1. 
  
 Scope 
In order to understand the origin of trait in drawing, I must form an understanding of 
how and why drafters register, process, construct, and represent differently: in other 
words, why they deviate even from their own preferred ways of drawing. To my 
mind, these questions point primarily to those processes of perception, conception, 
and synthesis through practice that could also possibly underscore unpremeditated 
drawing form (trait) and conversion of the gestic into visible form that drawing 
                                                       
22 ‘Visuality’ refers to the ability to convert understanding, observation, and experience, whether real 
or imagined, concrete, abstract, material, or immaterial, into visual form. 
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facilitates. These processes therefore determine the scope of the study and delimit 
discussions to the originative and formative aspects of drawing-trait. Discussions 
largely exclude the meaning- or language-related aspects of trait, which would 
involve its symbolicity, connotative, and semiotic value. I do not deny or refute the 
inseparability between trait’s symbolicity and its originativity, but the thesis does not 
enter into, for example, analyses or descriptive dissections of style languages, since 
the language of trace23 as representation would merit enough material for a second 
thesis. 
 
In summary, the pervasive appearance of trait in the drawing of students defines 
the scope of the style-related categories of drawing that I relate. This scope is 
encompassing – it does not isolate, nor fixate only on, for example, observational 
drawing, or only on imaginative drawing. With the exception of two instances 
(Illustration ii, and Illustration 10 in Addendum A), I limit my discussion of specific 
drawings to the scope that student drawing offers and then only to selected 
drawings that I obtained from the drawing programmes that I teach. 
 
 Goals 
Given the central problem, and its focus, an imperative of the study, then, is to 
explore the above-mentioned processes of perception, practice, and production that 
support and realise individuation in drawing. I presume that those interactivities of 
the conscious and unconscious that seat perception also seat ability and creativity 
and this notion suggests another imperative of the study. I set as overarching goal 
an exploration of the relationship between individuation in drawing (trait) and the 
development of skill in drawing, as well as the development of creativity.  
 
Individuation in drawing consistently stands as one tier in more relationships, 
because the notion of difference in drawing suggests facilitatory acknowledgement 
of diversity in both the student-drafters’ personal histories and socio-cultural 
backgrounds, as well as in the experiential cognition that constitutes individuated 
visual registration and drafteric construct during the act. Further aims, therefore, are 
                                                       
23 Drawing marks. Refer to the Glossary (Addendum B), (under ‘trace’ and ‘trait’) for further 
explanations regarding the distinctions I make. 
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to explore the role that the individual drafter’s current and historical socio-cultural 
engagement plays in her experiential cognition in drawing.  
 
In a tertiary educational context, these goals necessitate the exploration of a form 
of facilitatory mediation that would bring the potential of individuation in drawing 
to fruition. The ‘potential of individuation’ – the significance of trait – that which its 
materialisation involves, but can also conceal or erode, is one of the main concerns 
of this thesis. I aim to find not so much a new way of drawing, or a new programme 
for teaching drawing, as an effective approach to its facilitation that would 
promote and maximise creativity. It follows from this that I should consider an 
instructional method that could indirectly employ individuation in drawing,24 
provided the thesis finds the significance of trait. 
 
Rationale 
 
I demarcate individuation in drawing as object of study with a view to finding an 
appropriate approach for the facilitation of drawing on tertiary educational level – 
an approach that would be encompassing insofar it effectively reaches a diverse 
student profile. I anticipate that such an approach potentially would embrace not 
only the diversity that individuated drawing implies, but also diversity in relation to 
socio-cultural background. Diversity – in more than one sense of the word – remains 
a loaded issue in South Africa. Notwithstanding, a diverse student profile that 
represents a wide range of socio-cultural origin continues to necessitate, for 
example, shifts in the assessment of portfolios that students annually submit for 
admission to tertiary level courses in the visual arts. From experience, I know that 
such shifts are not forthcoming as a matter of course, while they remain essential to 
the administrative systems that facilitate admission, which in the South African milieu 
also serve socio-cultural representativity in the tertiary student profile.  
 
An implication that flows from the goals I set out above, is that the 
acknowledgement of what is often called ‘a personal voice’ (trait) in drawing can 
support culturally diverse students in not only developing creativity, but also in 
                                                       
24 It must be noted, however, that The Art of Drawing, as knowledge discipline, does not ‘contain’ 
individuation as concrete and explicit subject content and that I do not intend articulating it as such. In 
any form of mediation, individuation is either encouraged or discouraged.  
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accomplishing recognition of their full status and potency as drafters. The 
implications of this idea in the context of a culturally diverse student profile could be 
significant.  
 
Furthermore, if the originative processes of personalisation in drawing produce 
unforeseeable form (given a blind, yet individuated hand in their emergence), I 
argue that they also will not repeat the norms that institutionalised style poses, nor 
will they necessarily obey the restraints of acceptability in any context. The study, 
therefore, also implies individuation as a form of deviation from institutional norm 
that challenges its constancy, while bringing renewal. 
 
Context 
 
The context of my delineations, which entails first year level of tertiary studies, 
implies a particularly susceptible phase in the development of drawing ability for 
the rebellious nature of individuated drawing to be effective. All South African first 
year students, although diverse in socio-cultural background and origin, have a 
number of disadvantages in common. An unexplained, hidden and general purpose 
of the first year projects (Addendum A, Illustrations 1-6, 8 & 9) is to break 
through those forms of acceptable drawing that got them through high school and 
admitted into higher art education. This happens at a time when all first year 
student drafters are equal in the sense that they share total unfamiliarity with the 
course content that I offer, with the demands of the course, with the medians of a 
new institution, and with each other’s abilities. Another undisclosed purpose – and 
one that flows from this stripped state that renders all equally vulnerable – pertains 
to the construction of a road that leads to discovery of a personal voice in their 
drawing. Notwithstanding their various cultural or educational backgrounds, 
drawing habits, and ingrained aesthetic, drawing ability or prior skill and learning, 
all perform on a clean slate. Such a clean slate also enhances their potential 
receptiveness. 
Methodology and the theoretical framework 
 
The goals that I set above indicate three fields of study, namely drawing, 
philosophy, and sociology that could provide material appropriate to the problem. 
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These divergent fields of study suggest the employment of research methods that 
interrelate and complement each other – in other words, an interactive methodology 
(Maxwell. 1994). In the following section, I list the fields of study that I select for this 
purpose, with the exception of drawing, which I discuss later. I explain what I select 
from the fields of study that do not fall within the visual arts domain of knowledge. I 
explain how I perceive their involvement to function in generating reflection and 
discussion in relation to the constructive processes of drawing.  
 
Philosophy 
The directness of drawing – a practice that necessarily involves and utters sensory, 
somatic, intellectual, and psychological experiencing – resonates in some of the 
expositions that both phenomenological and cognitivist philosophies dealing with 
perception offer. Some of the expositions of phenomenology and cognitivism reflect 
on the ways in which things are presented in perception. In other words, they deal 
primarily with direct human perceptual experiencing of the world (Mautner. 2005: 
464), which intones experiential cognition and, consequently, enaction25. In this field, I 
have chosen to concentrate on Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a phenomenologist, and 
Francisco Varela, a cognitivist, for reasons that I discuss in due course.  
 
 Sociology 
To my mind, it is impossible to ignore the irretrievable involvement of historical, 
socio-cultural, and lived-world mediation in perception and in experiential cognition, 
and therefore by extension, in drawing. This notion justifies exploration of the 
related expositions that sociology offers. In this field, I have chosen to concentrate 
on Pierre Bourdieu, a sociologist. 
 
Rationale for adopting an interactive methodology 
The reasons for adopting these diverse fields to compose a framework are simple. 
Although none of the relevant landmark texts offered me a pertinent explanation of 
the origin of trait per se during my preparatory research, intersections between their 
                                                       
25 Francisco Varela (1992: 173): “The enactionist approach consists of two points: (1) perception 
consists in perceptually guided action and (2) cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent 
sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided”. It is necessary to distinguish 
between ‘enactment’ and ‘enaction’. ‘Enaction’ involves the direct utterance that a conflation between 
action and perception brings forth and it is non-representational. ‘Enactment’, a different concept, 
suggests a pre-existing ‘script’ – that of personal, societal, or cultural code and memory – that 
interferes also during enaction and that is representational, or interpretational.  
 12 
various contributions regarding perceptual processes in practices hold potential 
answers to the central questions. Bourdieu, for example, claims the origin of the self 
in habitus, which leads me to speculate that the individual self, in complicity with the 
particularities of her embodied dispositional make-up, could plausibly shape trait in 
drawing. A possible inseparable tie between the individual self and the dispositions 
she expresses during her practices emerges as a pivotal notion that leads to 
Varela’s notion of the self-as-being versus the self-as-nothing. The complexity of 
such ties soon becomes evident and they circle out to incorporate a distinction 
between representationist and non-representationist concepts, as well as between a 
dualist and non-dualist understanding of body and mind.  
 
Moreover, habitus enfolds the embodied self and her enactions, concepts that 
Francisco Varela focuses on and that represent his contribution to finding the origin 
of trait. In particular, disposition enfolds embodiment, while dispositional practice in 
part relates to enaction, all of which indicate the complex unions of trait’s 
originative playing grounds. The alignment of their theories with the terms of 
psychology, leads Bourdieu and Varela to confirm that habitus and enaction function 
in the unconscious, rather than only in the conscious. Therefore, the seemingly 
unconscious, unthinking and almost automatic way in which trait irrupts in drawing 
promises to be explained by habitus, embodiment, and enaction, which both support 
self-originativity, thus supporting a close tie between the self and drawing trait. I 
consolidate this close tie in Chapter 3. 
 
As such, an interactive methodology generates insights that come from the process 
of finding some intersections between Bourdieu and Varela’s thinking. Because such 
insights can be unexpected, they also challenge the pre-planned structuring of the 
thesis and can therefore be valued for their generativity. In the end, these 
intersections also support the collaborative and unifying role of drawing (as labour) 
between drafter, world, and experience. Hence, the tripartite approach, as well as 
the emphasis on theoretical intersections and convergences. 
 
At the same time, although not overtly, I perceive the selected landmark texts to 
also plot a path towards postmodernist thinking where Jacques Derrida (1993) 
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pertinently offers an exposition on the origin of drawing, which casts light on the 
origin of trait (as I perceive it).  
 
An interactive methodology 
My employment of an interactive methodology (Maxwell. 1994) firstly entails a 
selective extraction of salient aspects from the above-mentioned fields, such as 
cognition, perception, and societal interaction. As becomes clear in my brief 
demonstration above under Rationale for adopting an interactive methodology, I 
relate intersections between these fields to drawing in order to articulate my 
understanding of drawing’s constructive processes. Therefore, the methodology also 
entails a close reading of contemporary discourses in drawing that concern visual 
perception and conception, and the effects that societal interaction has on drawing’s 
constructive facilities. 
 
Finally, the methodology entails reflection on and consideration of drawing practice 
that I indirectly draw from my drawing practices (as a more tacit and perceptive 
source of knowledge) and more explicitly derive from my teaching experience. In 
this leg of the methods I combine, students’ drawings play a key role, which I 
explain later in the Introduction. I largely rely on my experiential knowledge of 
drawing in a self-reflexive fashion, a reliance that determines decision-making. 
‘Relating’ the above-mentioned salient and intersecting aspects involves their 
‘superimposition’ on the act of drawing in order to begin to understand the 
individual drafter’s experiential engagement with the world.  
 
A three-tiered methodology allows a recursive26 accrual of understanding (through 
inevitable yet incremental repetition) of those theories dealing with the interactionist 
relationship between individual (drafter), environment (world), and practice 
(drawing).  
 
As a theoretical framework, my selections from philosophy and sociology reference 
a number of theories with interactionism as common denominator, which supports the 
play and movement between the respective members in such a relationship. Self-
reflexivity and the notion of interactivity central to it become possible in such a 
                                                       
26 Please refer to the Glossary, Addendum B. 
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framework. These facilities both determine and regulate the three-tiered 
methodology, because it supports while it structures them. In this sense, the 
methodology resembles the process of drawing, which accrues to reveal and does 
not spurn decentred reiteration, because with each echo exponential, if 
unpredictable, proliferation ensues. It does so not with the stripped articulation of 
positivist and scientific texts, nor with the linear and logical elegance of a 
philosophical text, nor with the orderly eloquence of academic rigour. Rather, the 
method actively engages and functions with the disruptive labours of revelatory 
accumulation. Such accumulation inevitably involves fragmentation and discontinuity, 
yet its durational harnessing is generative. This implies that the method stacks, 
collapses into each other, and layers those conventions of academic writing that 
order, systemise, categorise, and reduce. I deliberately employ the methods of 
drawing, which coat and recoat to gain nuance and palimpsest.  
 
An interactive methodology necessarily makes for an unconventional thesis that 
amasses while it awaits – indeed, relies on – insights to materialise from the process 
of writing itself, which entails a form of production that closely nestles next to 
drawing. Thus, the writing process in itself – with which I literally replace drawing – 
in a reflexive fashion brings intuitive, tacit, and pre-conceptual understandings to 
conceptualisation.  
 
Graeme Sullivan describes such a methodology in the visual arts – which this study 
after all comprises – as “reflexive research practice” (2005: 100). Sullivan explains 
that reflexive research practice entails the simultaneous utilisation of various 
research methods. Such an endeavor, exactly because of the intricacies and 
struggles it durationally provokes, necessarily has to garner, connect, and sanction 
the strains and pulls between reflection, labour, and production. According to 
Sullivan, such a methodic generates the probability of considering experiences in 
new ways (2005: 100), which in the case of this study involves considering drawing 
(as experience) in new ways. By literally replacing the drawing process with a 
reflexive writing process, I hope to uphold the notion that drawing, as much as 
writing (both productive acts that convert the pre-conceptual into the conceptual) 
constitutes a research process that produces new knowledge. 
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In summary, my explorations are interactive, emergent, and revelatory. As such, 
discussions accrue along the way, but emphases are non-linear, even chaotic, and 
full of discontinuities and discordant interrupting of the self. Although it eventually 
distills, discourse traces an open-ended or even interminable path from the chaos of 
not knowing to coming to know. Therefore, the strain and voice of the discourse is 
one of reflection, speculation, probing, and searching, certainly more so than of 
linear logic, conclusive argumentation, or debate.  
 
Defining the theories that constitute the framework 
The following section provides definitions of and preliminary amplifications on some 
of the central concepts that also decisively establish the theoretical framework. 
Reviewing the relevant literature inevitably intrudes upon the following discussion, 
because I begin to indicate how I believe each thinker possibly contributes to 
answering my questions. These indications further explain my rationale for adapting 
such a tripartite approach. This section also begins to demonstrate how the 
methodology allows for recursive accrual.  
 
The three components of Bourdieu’s theoretical structure that I select as relevant to 
the concerns of the thesis, Varela’s notion of enaction, and Merleau-Ponty’s notion of 
reflexivity (or reversibility) warrant brief definitions at this point, because, as I 
explain above, they demarcate a theoretical framework. I discuss these selected 
components more extensively in Chapter 2 and in Addendum B. In these definitions, I 
also continue to point out intersections pertaining to interactivity. Furthermore, the 
following section introduces the primary texts – both verbal and visual – that I utilise 
as source material. 
 
Habitus 
‘Habitus’ constitutes generative ‘schemata’ of classification, perception, and 
discrimination that, in interactive processes of socialisation, become embodied as 
dispositions in individuals. As a result, people exhibit those dispositions in their 
behaviour and physical and mental practices (Nash. 1999: 176). Bourdieu defined 
habitus as follows: “The habitus is a system of durable, transposable dispositions 
which functions as the generative basis of structured, objectively unified practices” 
(1979: vii).  
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Field 
Bourdieu defines his idea of ‘field,’ as “any structure of social relations” (1996: 
181). A subject (or ‘knowledge discipline’) such as the art of drawing in the visual 
arts would qualify as field. Individuals, by means of competitive practice, position 
themselves in a field, thus establishing the legitimacy or value of their practices, 
while they also develop competence in such practices. Depending on the field in 
which it exists, the products of their practices can be simultaneously valuable and of 
no value at all (Mahar et al. 1990: 8-10). The concept of ‘positioning’ oneself in a 
field by means of practices as the vehicles of participative involvement and 
experience in objective structures is of particular relevance, since it alights on the 
concept of interactivity between subject and object.  
 
Practice 
I interpret Bourdieu’s idea of ‘practice’ to imply those practices and activities that 
allow such participation to materialise as the means and products of interaction. As 
such, the act of drawing, I believe, represents a practice in which the drafter, 
leagued with her socio-cultural voice and history, is central to the creation of the 
product, to its nature, material form, standard, and quality. Drawing as act 
conflates the concepts of practice and production27 in one process, a process that, I 
argue, mediates “internalization of externality and externalization of internality” 
(Bourdieu. 1977: 72). This notion binds interaction and enaction so that it would be 
truthful to say they necessarily function in tandem, an understanding I explain in 
Chapter 3. 
 
Rationale: Bourdieu’s contributions to the thesis 
In search of the origin of trait, I set out by exploring Pierre Bourdieu’s habitus 
theory, because it seems to offer explanations for the forming (in a socio-cultural 
context) of the habits, preferences, dispositions, and tendencies of humans. I closely 
(and in self-reflexive partisanship) associate ‘habit’, ‘tendency’, and ‘disposition’ – 
characteristic manner – with trait. I therefore interpret habitus (Bourdieu’s 
contribution to possible resolutions on the central questions) to conceivably indicate 
                                                       
27 I therefore use the word ‘practice’ (in relation to drawing) consistently in the thesis to include and 
signify both production (poiesis) and practice (praxis). 
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an explanation for the origin of trait and the processes that construct its 
materialisation.  
 
More importantly, however, Bourdieu poses his habitus theory as a generative 
structure and this notion serves as a central motivation behind my employment of the 
theory. Generativity suggests creativity, which is an imperative in drawing, and 
possibly in the genesis of trait. Bourdieu’s theory of habitus comprises more such 
crucial concepts that could develop the study and underpin my argumentation. I 
superimpose the theory’s integration of interactivity between habitus, field, and 
practice, onto those interchanges that flow back and forth between drafter, her 
sensory experiencing, socio-cultural history, environment, and the in-phase 
experience of drawing. I argue that if the drafter internalises externality by means 
of interaction, drawing (as reflexive practice) presents an authentic and visible 
externalisation of that internality, because the drafter enacts her disposition (habitus) 
in reversibility. This argument proposes the genesis of individuated drawing partly in 
socio-cultural history, which does not exclude world, and partly in durational 
perceptual experiencing by the self, who is necessarily centred in the drafter as 
body-mind, yet cannot exclude world.  
 
Practice, which Bourdieu’s expositions clarify extensively, constitutes drawing in the 
context of the thesis, thus forming another contribution. The principle of drawing as 
core and common practice amongst a group of diverse individual drafters, 
interacting with habitus and interfacing reflexively between habitus, experience, 
and objective structures, is an obvious imperative in the thesis.  
 
Enaction 
The concepts of interactivity and the centrality of a person in her practices and 
actions are crucial to Varela’s concepts of embodied action and enaction. The concept 
of interaction in itself suggests two-way activity – active reciprocality between at 
least two entities that implies a form of shared engagement between them. Neither 
perceiver, nor world, exists independently from one another – the one shapes the 
other. To explain his theories, Varela (1992: 172-173) states that “cognition28 
depends upon the kinds of experience that come from having a body with various 
                                                       
28 Refer also to the Glossary of key words (Addendum B) for further explanations on the word. 
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sensorimotor capacities” and “these individual sensorimotor capacities are 
themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological, and 
cultural context”. Moreover, with the inseparability of perception and action as 
premise, Varela’s concept of cognition enfolds the notion of an autogenous 
production through enaction in practices. He formulates enaction as “perceptually 
guided action”, where perception constitutes “cognitive structures that emerge from 
the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided” 
(Varela.1992: 173).  
 
Rationale: Varela’s contribution to the thesis 
The notion of perceptually guided action directs my understanding of perception – 
and the nature of its functioning during the act of drawing – to a non-
representationist29 hypothesis, which I clarify in Chapter 1, further discuss in Chapter 
2, and consolidate in Chapter 3. Varela states, “the reference point for 
understanding perception is no longer a pregiven, perceiver independent world, but 
rather the sensorimotor structure of the perceiver (the way in which the nervous 
system links sensory and motor surfaces)” (1992: 173). In other words, if applied to 
observational drawing, for example, the drafter’s perception would primarily 
determine a drawing’s outcome in self-originative stylistic structures too, rather than 
the world she observes determining its outcome in representationist structures. 
Perception does not recover pre-given properties from the world; rather, it enacts 
the perceiver’s understanding of the world. A concept that is crucial to the 
development of the thesis emerges from this, namely that the drafter is the locus of 
her perception of that world. 
 
Reflexivity 
Varela’s non-representationist approach in understanding perception as embodied 
action resonates in the thinking of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Although I employ only 
one aspect of his work in the thesis, it is significant that interaction and enaction have 
much in common with his theories regarding visual perception. He defines the 
interactive events of sensory experiencing (such as sight, hearing, taste, and touch) 
                                                       
29 See also the Glossary of key words (Addendum B). 
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as “reversibility”30 or a “lateral transcendence” between world and human 
(Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 131, 227-228) (Evans. 2008: 188).  
 
Merleau-Ponty’s expositions on visual perception present it as a reflexive activity 
that binds viewer and world – a bond that constitutes circular interaction. He 
develops the idea that “our bodies and the world are two aspects of a single 
reality” (Evans. 2008: 188), where the seer passes into the visible and the visible 
into the seer, a notion of reversibility or reflexivity31 that finds resonance in 
Bourdieu’s notion of “the internalization of externality and the externalization of 
internality” (1977: 72). Reversibility and reflexivity as interactivities constitute a 
central concept common in the thinking of Bourdieu, Varela, and Merleau-Ponty, 
despite their relatively divergent fields of study.  
 
Rationale: Merleau-Ponty’s contribution to the thesis 
Merleau-Ponty’s contribution entails a particular explanation of perception as 
reversibility that confirms as foundation for Varela and Bourdieu’s theories 
regarding reflexivity. Reflexivity, and in particular self-reflexivity, is an 
irretrievable component of drawing. I explore its relation to individuation in 
drawing.  
 
Moreover, Merleau-Ponty’s thinking forms a link between representationist and non-
representationist, as well as modernist and postmodernist thinking. The words of 
Thomas Baldwin (2004: 28) suggest this link:  
So we see Merleau-Ponty, … poised to move beyond ‘modern’ thought to 
postmodernism – but not quite taking the step. But to say this is not to say that 
these lectures do not present, in the incomplete and sketchy way of modern 
art, a sketch of a philosophy whose value is ‘solid and lasting’. 
                                                       
30 In this thesis, the term specifically refers to the notion of perceptual experience bending back on 
itself as in Bourdieu’s phrase ‘the internalisation of externalities and the externalisation of 
internalities’. Merleau-Ponty (1968: 131) reflects the notion of reversibility in his words “My body 
model of the things and the things model of my body”, as I explain in Chapter2 (See also the 
Glossary of key words (Addendum B)).  
31 ‘Reflexivity” refers to the concept that habitus turns back on itself. As I explain in Chapter 2, 
habitus contains consciousness of one’s own existence - the locus of self. Essentially, such locus refers 
back to itself in understanding of self. While habitus is central in constructing self, it also grasps those 
formations that constitute its existence and its development recursively and reflexively. Also, see 
‘Reversibility’ and ‘Reflexivity’ in the Glossary of key words (Addendum B). 
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Merleau-Ponty, according to Baldwin, upheld “his existentialism” as absolute – “a 
truth of all time” – denying any possibility of error in his resolves (2004: 28), 
thereby refusing to acknowledge the revocability of his thinking, and by 
extension, any potential development beyond its resolutions. In this, Merleau-
Ponty differs from Bourdieu and Varela, because he perpetuates in Derridian 
terms the ‘metaphysics of presence’, while Bourdieu and Varela settle securely in 
the open-endedness of postmodern thinking and the ‘metaphysics of difference’. 
Apart from informing my understanding of that small window of immediate, 
reciprocal, and simultaneous confrontation between eyes, hand, mind, and world, 
it would be fair to say that Merleau-Ponty, through this difference, also 
contributes by directing my searches to Jacques Derrida. In this way, he 
orchestrates a shift that has significant influence on the thesis’ evolvement. 
 
Implications: bonding dualities 
The above definitions and their embedded concepts put forward some implications 
that have bearing. Because of interactivity between subject and object, habitus also 
envelops field in cultural space. Cultural space constitutes the habitus of culture and 
environment. This notion, as I explain in Chapter 2, dispels a subject–object duality.  
 
Mark Johnson completely erases a duality between body and culture in the notion 
of ‘the cultural body’. He asserts that, “Our environments are not only physical and 
social”. Cultural artifacts, practices, institutions, rituals, and modes of interaction that 
transcend and shape any particular body and any particular bodily action 
constitute them also. “These cultural dimensions include gender, race, class, aesthetic 
values, and various modes of bodily posture and movement” (Johnson. 2007: 277). 
Similarly, Merleau-Ponty’s notion of ‘flesh’ invokes a similar lateral mutuality 
between body-mind (as subjectivity) and culture, society, or world (as objectivity). 
 
To summarise, only intersecting aspects of relevant selections from Bourdieu, 
Merleau-Ponty, and Varela form the main theoretical frame of the thesis. While I 
draw on an eclectic array of theories for this thesis, they all share a non-dualistic32 
                                                       
32 As I explain in the Glossary (Addendum B), the word refers to the belief that dualisms such as (for 
example) mind-over-body, form and content, concepts and intuitions, being and becoming 
 21 
conception of body-mind and a non-representationist theory of mind that sustain 
interaction and reflexivity. A number of additional sources, which I list and briefly 
discuss below, relate. 
 
Additional contributors 
I refer in the thesis to two of Jacques Derrida’s texts, namely Memoirs of the blind, 
the self-portrait and other ruins (1993) and The truth in painting (1987). Derrida 
regarded phenomenology as “metaphysics of presence”33 and its stress on the 
“immediacy of experience” as “the new transcendental illusion”34 (Reynolds. 2002, 
citing Derrida. 1967: 66-68). The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, according to 
Derrida, assumes the likelihood of a complete subjectivity, which would attach 
primacy to immediacy, or to the ‘now’ moment. As an alternative, Derrida argued 
that vestiges of prior experience always compromise the experience of a ‘now’ 
moment and that such vestiges always divide the self. Therefore, we are always 
barred from being in a completely self-contained moment (Reynolds. 2002, citing 
Derrida. 1967: 68). Our grasp of ‘reality’ differs from ‘reality’, because we can 
never subsume it with unswerving continuity. The systems of language, schemata of 
representation, beliefs and ideologies, accumulated knowledge, the political and 
cultural structures of society, and so forth, constantly interfere. Moreover, the 
unconscious and the conscious, being separate spheres of the mind, divide the self. 
Although constantly together, the unconscious and the conscious do not share the 
same rhythms and therefore are not always in a constant and unifying harmony with 
one another.  
 
Insofar as I understand the particular selections I draw from Bourdieu and Varela, 
however, they do not deny or contest such a divided self, nor indeed the vestiges of 
prior experience. On the contrary, Bourdieu (1991: 39-45) declares the self a 
                                                                                                                                                          
(Blackburn. 2008: 104), and object and subject are, when thought of as separate entities, 
misconceptions. Please refer to the Glossary for further explanations. 
33 According to Mautner (2005: 388), ‘metaphysics of presence’ is an “expression used by Derrida 
for an assumption which is said to underlie the Western philosophical tradition, viz. that ultimately 
reality is a unity, and that differences are not ultimately real. This view, which implies that (ultimately) 
everything is identical with everything else, is rejected by Derrida. But his rejection of this view seems 
also to include a rejection of the entirely different (and entirely plausible) view that everything is 
identical with itself. The two views are not equivalent”. 
34 According to Mautner (2005: 623), ‘transcendental illusion’ can be defined as “the illusions of 
traditional metaphysics; they are illusions, natural and inevitable (in the same way as the large 
appearance of the moon at its rising), arising from the inherent tendency of human reason to trespass 
beyond its boundaries. The aim of the Transcendental Dialectic is to expose their illusory character”. 
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social construct that retains the vestiges of prior experience in a habitus, an 
internalised personal history, or in the tales that one tends to tell of oneself in efforts 
to capture and assert the self, which usually proves to be a rather elusive entity.  
 
We will see that Varela’s notion of enaction does not advocate complete 
subjectivity. Varela (1992: 63-70) divides the human sense of ‘having’ a self into 
“five aggregates that constitute the psychophysical complex”: – forms, feelings 
sensations, perceptions, dispositional formations, and consciousness. Varela’s 
expositions on cognitivism and human experience clearly reveals that,  
(1) Cognitivism postulates mental or cognitive processes of which we are not 
only unaware but of which we cannot be aware, and (2) cognitivism is thereby 
led to embrace the idea that the self or cognizing subject is fundamentally 
fragmented or nonunified (Varela. 1992: 48). 
As I explain above, Merleau-Ponty asserts the notion of ‘flesh’ (body-between), 
which indicates a reversible mutuality between self and world. Yet, as I understand 
it, the self and world ‘contain’ one another, which does not imply that they are 
identical or that they resemble one another. The self is in the other and the other is 
in the self – always divided, never springing from a single centre. Such mutual 
containment – “intertwining” – between the self and world leads me to understand 
that, although the world enfolds our bodies and our bodies enfold the world, body 
and world remain different entities (Diprose & Reynolds. 2008: 187). While one 
cannot be perceived without the other, each remains identical to itself. As I 
understand it, they have existence in common. The self recognises her existence in the 
existence of the other. The fact that both exist, does not imply they are the same. 
 
Whether such thinking adheres to the metaphysics of presence rather than to the 
metaphysics of difference35 requires a more in-depth understanding and knowledge 
of philosophy than the deliberately selective and rather discriminatory incorporation 
of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology into this thesis warrants. What does concern my 
                                                       
35 Being not even mildly acquainted with these foibles of philosophy, I nevertheless provide the 
explanations of Mautner (2005: 160-161) in this regard too: The notion challenges similarity and 
identity as priority in the Western metaphysical tradition. As example, Mautner poses the apparent 
fact that Plato positions “the self-identity of the Forms” as “basic”, while “empirical reality is 
understood in terms of its difference from these ultimate realities. Deleuze and Derrida, drawing 
upon Nietzsche, Heidegger and Freud, have sought to displace this ‘metaphysics of identity’ (or 
‘presence’) in favour of a metaphysics of difference”. 
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discussions, however, is that, despite his avowed adherence to the metaphysics of 
difference (Mautner. 2005: 160-161) rather than to phenomenology’s metaphysics 
of presence, Derrida36 acknowledges the influence of Merleau-Ponty’s theories of 
visual perception on his own thinking in Memoirs of the Blind (1993: 51, 52, 53). This 
acknowledgement alone leads to incorporating Merleau-Ponty and Derrida into my 
discussions on the drawing process, especially in Chapters 5 and 6. Derrida’s 
acknowledgement of Merleau-Ponty, to my mind, signals interconnectedness 
between modernist and postmodernist thinking that I mention above and which the 
thesis employs. 
 
Notwithstanding the philosophers’ grappling with its metaphysics, ‘difference’ in the 
context of this thesis denotes a very ordinary meaning – namely that of 
dissimilarities between the characteristic drawing of student drafters. Yet, such 
dissimilarities denote differences that do not imply irreconcilability between viewer 
and drawing, nor between drafter and doing (Mautner. 2005: 160). Similarly, the 
word ‘presence’ mostly denotes its ordinary meaning in this context, namely that of 
‘being there’, or ‘being in place’, rather than identicalness.  
 
At this point, I speculate that drawing trait, as utterance of difference, constitutes the 
multiplicity of performance (enaction) between drafter and world. This speculation 
warrants investigation. The material matter – mark, line – of its representation alone 
hardly defines trait in drawing. We cannot reduce trait to only being evident in 
mark making. Rather, I would speculate at this point that the various configurations 
between making, seeing and thinking, the union by which differences come into 
being, might prove to give a facetted body to trait as difference. Therefore, rather 
than asking ‘what is trait?’ my central question addresses the whereabouts, 
playgrounds, and makings of its beginning. Even emulation of style language in 
drawing, in other words, inevitably involves these unions of difference. 
 
Varela (1992: 3, 4, 15, 19-20) (2002: 106, 122, 129, 131, 276) and Mark 
Johnson (2007: 4, 20, 79, 264, 275) – another philosopher that features in my 
                                                       
36 Note that Derrida refers extensively to Merleau-Ponty in Memoirs of the blind (1993: 51 – 53), 
where, despite his criticisms of phenomenology and its adherence to ‘metaphysics of presence’, he 
proposes a “program for an entire rereading of the later Merleau-Ponty” (1993: 52). In this thesis, I 
discuss these concepts in more detail only insofar they relate to my propositions regarding drawing 
and its facilitation.  
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discussions – also note the invaluable contribution of Merleau-Ponty’s body-mind-
based phenomenological approach on their fields. Added to this, I interpret Norman 
Bryson’s insights regarding visual perception and vision in drawing to intersect with 
Bourdieu’s theories. Bryson (1983: 174, notes 3 & 4), an art historian and theorist, 
specifically positions the habitus theory of Bourdieu as foundation for his reflections 
on naturalisation in vision.  
 
Bryson (1983: 14-18) directs my probes away from “naturalisation in vision” as 
feasibly encompassing explanation for individuation in drawing, to also include the 
enactionist, non-representationist theories of Varela. Bryson purports that the 
relational method of verification that sociology depends on to prove its theories of 
naturalisation, is not adequate for explaining the varied effects that individuated 
chronicling has on image making (Bryson. 1983: 15). Nor can cultural relativisation 
entirely explain the effects of the drafter’s individuated manner in utilising the 
technical means of a material practice such as drawing (Bryson. 1983: 15-17). Such 
relativisation, he claims, “has no means of testing whether the image in fact 
represents that which the theory of naturalisation claims it does, a view of the 
habitus from the inside” (Bryson. 1983: 17).  
 
Society and culture alone are not accountable for the renewal that drawing brings 
to the visual arts. If drawing can afford us a glimpse of “the habitus from the inside” 
(Bryson. 1983: 17), understanding how the body-mind of the drafter functions in 
drawing, is imperative. I address this imperative in Chapter 4. Recent literature on 
drawing suggests the feasibility of this notion. 
  
To investigate current discourses in drawing and to track drawing’s faculty for self-
originitive renewal, I incorporate relevant literature on drawing. Apart from Bryson 
(1983, 2003) and Derrida (1993, 1987), I mainly refer to Simon Downs et al 
(2007), Catherine de Zegher (2003), and Laura Hoptman (2002). Derrida 
resonates in the writing of all these contributors, as he does in my own reflections on 
drawing. In the later chapters that specifically focus on drawing, I mainly apply 
Jacques Derrida and Norman Bryson’s models of drawing processing to formulate 
drawing as a possible common measure, but also as an understanding of drawing 
that presupposes the drafter to freely deviate from derivative style languages. The 
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notion of drawing as common practice37 places the germination of individuation in 
drawing as act through drawing as subject of learning,38 thus inextricably linking a 
characteristic mark to drawing processing, which includes processes that generate 
understanding and syntheses (or learning).  
 
I refer to instructional literature on the art of drawing that specifically emphasises 
an approach to teaching drawing that bases its mediation and task design on self-
affirmation through independent production, self-reliant problem solving, and peer-
critique (Betti and Sale. 1997). It is my opinion that the approach of Betti and Sale 
supports the cultural and individual responsiveness that Ian Moll (2004: 4-7) 
explains.  
 
To further illustrate individuation in drawing, I include drawings by students in 
Addendum A. These drawings serve as primary material that originally elicited my 
interest, but in the thesis underpin my arguments. I collected all the drawings with the 
exception of those in Illustrations 7 and 10 from the first two projects I set first 
year student drafters. A post-graduate student made the drawings in Illustration 7. 
Illustration 10 shows two of my own drawings and their photographic source 
material to demonstrate difference between image and field of observation.  
 
I selected the drawings in Addendum A to illustrate the concepts and processes that 
I discuss in the thesis, such as, for example, individuation, accrual, withdrawal, 
recursivity, erasure, and development. All the drawings in my selection illustrate 
what I perceive as trait – distinctive qualities that render the drawings identifiable 
with an individual and specific student drafter. I selected the drawings in a spirit of 
indifference to trend and acceptability that institutional trends may possibly dictate. 
Availability of work, rather than highest quality and standard, determined my 
selections. 
 
As the volume and variety of primary sources on drawing suggests, it is crucial to 
understand that, although I find aspects from the different fields that intersect to 
shape a theoretical framework, the study remains firmly seated in the visual arts, 
                                                       
37‘Common practice’ refers to drawing as practice amongst a group of diverse student-drafters in an 
educational environment. 
38 Drawing as knowledge discipline, an external structure. 
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and particularly, in drawing. In other words, this is not a study of philosophy, 
sociology, or cognitive science. I do not apply their respective methods. It is a study 
of drawing, and specifically, of trait in drawing as personalised form that displays 
as difference. Therefore, I choose to apply an interactive methodology and 
theoretical framework that would integrate theory and practice, as would be 
appropriate and relevant in the visual arts. 
 
 
Theoretical point of departure 
 
The theories comprising the theoretical framework hold forceful implications, namely 
those of the active reciprocalities – such as enaction, interaction, reversibility, and 
reflexivity – that mobilise and aid generativity, as it would relate to a driving 
motivation in drawing.  
 
The reversible or reflexive aspect of the habitus triad lies in the argument that, if 
habitus generates practice, the possibility that practice provides verification for 
habitus follows – an understanding that obviously points towards reflexivity.39 To 
explain, or even demonstrate, such inherent reflexivity in the habitus, field, and 
practice triad, Bourdieu (1977: 72) literally reflects the notion of ‘bending-back-on-
itself’ in his words “internalization of externality and externalization of internality”. 
Such reflexivity occurs between the individual (agent) and her environment 
(structure) through shared interaction. Interaction seats itself in practices, actions, 
sensory experiencing, and their accompanying perceptualisation and 
conceptualisation, as would be the case in drawing. Thus, this interactive aspect of 
the habitus, field, and practice theory, with emphasis on its inherent reflexivity, 
serves as premise for the study.  
 
The theoretical framework that I outline above and the premise that underpins my 
inquiry support my argument that drawing represents visual materialisation of 
interactivity between diverse habituses in a field (drawing) to achieve diverse but 
non-conformist drawing as both outcome and verification of habitus. 
                                                       
39 In other words, we see the person in her practices, the way we recognise an artist in her mark, or a 
person from her handwriting.  
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Consequently, my positioning of habitus – inclusive of interaction, reflexivity, 
reversibility, and enaction – as source and genesis of individuation in drawing and 
of diversity in “the cultural heritage of different ethnic groups”, allows my argument 
that socio-cultural background inevitably becomes “legacies that affect learning” 
(Moll, 2004: 5).  
 
Based on these arguments, I assert that a critical viewing audience can recognise the 
significance of individuation in drawing, because it is possible to verify trait 
(individuation) as inextricable emanation from habitus. I argue that individuation in 
drawing, as such, and as unpremeditated and unpredictable, yet constructive 
contributor to style language, diversify to create an open system of practice and of 
knowledge. I propose that it is possible to achieve such an open system through an 
instructional approach of deliberate responsiveness40 to individual student drafters. 
The implicit recognition of the habitus, a generative structure, in enaction and in 
applying abilities becomes a self-affirmative legitimisation of student drafters’ 
individual visualities. In the multi-cultural South African context, this approach could 
result in interesting expression through drawing that could also feed into the 
broader visual art domain. My assertion is that the most appropriate means and 
place for cultivating such an interactive and generative visuality, is in the art of 
drawing. This positions drawing as a vital practice in the generation of non-
conformist visual art.  
 
Chapter layout 
 
Chapter 1 
The chapter regards the following question: what is the origin and nature of the 
central problem that I pose in the thesis? I explain why and how the central problem 
stems from my experiences as a drawing teacher. I describe the relevant problems 
of student drafters that I encounter, thus explaining my thinking behind how the 
overarching questions were formulated.  
 
                                                       
40 ‘Responsiveness’ denotes its general meaning, but also refers to Curricular Responsiveness. Please 
refer to ‘responsiveness’ in the Glossary (Addendum B). 
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These discussions lead to discussions on the focus of the thesis, namely trait. In this 
regard, a question regarding the nature of trait pertains (what is trait?). I explain 
my understandings of trait and the emulation of style language as contrast, and 
define them as they apply in context.  
 
Explaining the object of study of the thesis automatically defines by omission what I 
do not address, such as the narratives and rhetoric of trait, its symbolicity or 
signification as language, and the intentionality of the drafter (hence, the 
inappropriateness of, for example, purely phenomenological, or semiotic 
frameworks and methods). 
 
As regards the facilitation of drawing and in accordance with my explications 
above, I address the contrast between drawing- and drafter-centred originativity 
on the one hand, and the emulation of style languages in the work of student 
drafters on the other hand. The purpose of such juxtaposing is to continuously filter 
those constructs that I perceive as trait in drawing – thus beginning to craft a 
eventual discovery of the originative playgrounds of trait. Additionally, such initial 
positioning of these contrasting poles introduces and sets the scene for carrying the 
problematic forward into the following chapters.  
 
I include in this chapter reflections on relevant literature on drawing in order to align 
my research problem with current drawing discourses. To ensure the bearing and 
pertinence of the facilitatory contributions I wish to develop, it is imperative to 
determine the viability of the central problem I pose against the wider sphere of the 
work that contemporary visual art practitioners produce, their approaches to 
drawing, and the range of issues they deal with. I also include an extended review 
of literature that relate research in the wider applications of drawing, such as 
drawing and visual perception, drawing and cognition, drawing and education, and 
instruction in drawing. 
 
Chapter 2 
In opening the central question that regards the genesis of trait, I introduce and 
explain in this chapter the theories that also frame ensuing discussions. The purposes 
of the chapter are to explain the critical framework, to inform, and thus, to 
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demarcate the scope of the thesis. The chapter initiates a generative device or 
method, namely the superimposition of drawing (as I understand it) on the 
theoretical foundation with a view to finding the drafter’s play between the 
conscious and unconscious, a play that constitutes the constructive facilities of 
drawing. 
 
Chapter 3 
This chapter poses a question regarding the intimate relationship between the self 
and trait. Its purpose is to interpret the buildups of the preceding two chapters in 
order to discover the nature and possible intimacy of such a relationship. Thereby, 
the chapter conclusively establishes those interpretations that address the central 
questions. In other words, as an interpretative act that also consolidates, this chapter 
functions to incorporate my reflexive processing of the relevant theoretical 
delineations and the accruals they orchestrated. To an extent, it serves as a bridge 
between the divergent fields of study that I demarcated as framework on the one 
hand, and the art of drawing on the other hand. Therefore, the chapter informs 
further discussion and focus. I address the role of the self in drawing. Thus, and in 
conjunction with the preceding two chapters, this chapter introduces and begins to 
address a non-representational theory of mind as basis for discovering the origin of 
trait and for exploring the drawing process. 
 
Chapter 4 
In this chapter, discussion shifts exclusively to drawing, the perceptual processes, and 
the reciprocities that the drawing act involves, thus largely leaving the theorists 
behind and only incorporating what I gleaned from them. The chapter poses the 
question, how does trait emanate from body-mind, or how does trait formation 
involve body-mind? Answering this question begins to craft possible answers to the 
second central question, namely, what is the significance of trait? 
 
In particular, a purpose of the fourth chapter is to represent in descriptive terms the 
perceptual processes that support cerebration or generativity in the act of drawing. 
As I explain above, my own experience as a drafter implicitly contributes here to 
consolidate the theoretical accumulations from former chapters. The chapter distills 
trait in relation to a non-representational theory of mind and body. As such, it 
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discusses mind and body as unified entity that shapes understanding as anterior to 
trait-formation in drawing. The reciprocities that facilitate development in drawing 
relate, because a thorough understanding there-of is necessary for forming an 
appropriate drawing facilitatory approach.  
 
Chapter 5 
In this chapter, I continue to address the question I pose in Chapter 4, regarding the 
‘how’ of trait realisation in drawing. I address the problems around such realisation. 
I also discuss shifting passages from the unconscious to the conscious, or the 
discontinuities and dissonances between the two that prevail during the drawing 
process. The purpose of the chapter is to discover the turning point in which the 
student drafter turns away from emulation towards self-originativity and its 
implications regarding invention, diversity, and renewal. Additionally, I reflect on 
the advent of trait as new form in the context of a self-reflexive research process. 
Discussion in this chapter enables my conclusive interpretation of the genesis of trait. 
 
Chapter 6 
In Chapter 6, I pose the following question: how does the teacher facilitate the 
realisation of trait in students’ drawing? Answering this question provides more 
answers to the second central question, namely what is the significance of trait? I 
present an interpretative synthesis that I derive from all former reflections. Such 
interpretation articulates the foundation (drawn from previous discussions in all 
former chapters) and nature of the drawing instruction I present in class. The chapter 
serves to motivate, if not substantiate, the credibility of such instruction. Discussion in 
the chapter culminates in consolidating the significance of trait. 
 
Chapter 7 
In Chapter 7, I speculate on a way forward by proposing an additional answer to 
the question I pose in Chapter 6. I focus on Ian Moll’s notion of responsiveness in 
mediation and facilitation. I explain my interpretation of Curricular Responsiveness 
and I show how it relates to mediation in drawing. I speculate on how, and to what 
effect, responsiveness would accommodate and deploy self-reflexive drawing. A 
purpose of this chapter is to suggest scope for studies that could emanate from this 
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one. The applicability of the notions that I propose in Chapter 6 within the 
framework of Curriculum Responsiveness indicates their soundness. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
FACADES: EMULATION OR SELF-ORIGINATIVITY 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I set as purpose the identification of problems in the field of drawing 
facilitation. The question therefore, regards the origin and nature of the central 
problem. To this, I add the questions, what is trait, what erodes it, and how does my 
problem relate to current practices in drawing in the context of contemporary visual 
arts?  
 
I draw from observations and experience that I have accumulated over a period of 
twenty-five years as drawing facilitator at further and higher educational levels, 
and as a drafter in own right. I centre on trait as a personalised stylistic aspect41 of 
drawing that counteracts effacement42 of individuation in style language. I also 
centre on a phenomenon that is often encouraged in the facilitation of drawing, 
which I perceive and think of as re-utilisation (as opposed to creation) of style 
language. I position here the latter aspect as a pivotal problem that can motivate 
shifts in facilitation.  
 
Conventions of facilitation 
Conventionally, the main frameworks for defining the importance of drawing in 
educational visual arts programmes entail the norms of perceptualist, conceptualist, 
or formalist approaches. A ‘perceptualist’ facilitatory framework poses drawing as 
a descriptive process particularly applied in figurative work. It requires the 
mastering of formal drawing conventions to describe material ‘reality’. A second 
                                                       
41 In this instance, and even generally in the context of the thesis, the word ‘aspect’ refers to ‘a 
specular’ (‘a-spect’). In other words, in this instance, it refers specifically to the visible evidence of 
style in drawing. 
42 ‘Effacement’ is a concept that I borrow from Norman Bryson (1983: xiii, 87-131, 88, 89) who 
argues that “Western painting is predicated on the disavowal” of self-reflexivity in a 
“disappearance of the body as site of the image”, thus effacing all signs of self and its body in mark 
making to rather paint with “bardic disengagement”. 
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facilitatory framework acknowledges the facility of drawing to transcribe 
information that is not necessarily tangible, but ‘conceptual’. This framework still 
utilises the formal conventions of drawing to represent idea. A formalist framework 
emphasises the formal elements (line, colour, tone, texture, shape) of drawing as 
devices that the drafter manipulates. In any of these frameworks, the drafter could 
learn to represent the material world by applying appropriate formulas for its 
description. If this occurs, a style language, as objective structure, largely determines 
the outcome of images.  
 
The problem that I pose is that in all these approaches, the style languages or 
modes of dominant style categories – their mere facades – seem to have also 
become the object of perpetuation in the facilitation of drawing. These approaches 
promote mimesis of style, rather than experiential cognition or durational 
experience,43 or at the very least, mimesis of cognition.44 The chapter also deals 
with a general discussion on contemporary drawing practices that delineates further 
development of the thesis. 
 
1.1 Problems in drawing facilitation 
 
False divides 
In my experience as drawing facilitator, I perceived conflictive perspectives where 
none probably existed. This perception silenced alternative and more conciliating 
                                                       
43 Although I base formulation of this problem on personal observation over a period of many years 
as facilitator in a number of South African institutions, I do not produce concrete evidence in the form 
of drawings of learners or students, reserving the right not to do so on ethical grounds. However, 
Norman Bryson (De Zegher. 2003: 154 – 155) attests to the same phenomenon in his discussions on 
the work of Alexander Cozens. He describes a “set of templates or hieroglyphs” that serve as 
received schemata, mainly provided by “the academy”, and collectively agreed upon as legitimate 
visual language. Consequently, Bryson purports, “all academies look very much the same”. Downs et 
al (2007: xi) also differentiates two forms of mimesis that supports my observation, “The first relates 
to perception and to the habitual modes of mimesis that imitate appearance via observation. The 
second relates to thinking: the rational and the aesthetic concept” of drawing. The problem, as I 
perceive it, arises when student drafters imitate the appearance of style via observation, in other 
words, they copy style, thereby largely bypassing conceptualisation and demonstrating Bryson’s 
further observation, “Such glyphs emanate from no one’s inner sensorium” (2003: 155). Discussions on 
mimesis and the fine line between mimesis of objectivities as style or as lived experience come to 
fruition in Chapter 5 of this thesis and trait proves to play an interesting role in a somewhat 
subversive conceptualisation of mimesis, deviating possibly also from the ‘cognitive mimesis’ that 
Downs et al. put forward. Such subversion is one that the thinking of Derrida reveals (1993: 45). 
44 Downs et al. asserts the notion of “cognitive mimesis” (2007: xx), denoting the process in which the 
dynamic of drawing depends on the cognitive operation of the drafter, which occurs in splintered 
and intermittent actions of seeing, tracing, and thinking. 
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possibilities to develop in my mediation. Misconstruing the relationship between 
denotation and connotation as discordant rather than as emerging from unifying 
processes of interactivity that yield renewal, I perceived a discourse of opposition. 
Posing denotation and connotation in conflictive stance influenced my methods of 
facilitating drawing as knowledge discipline.  
 
On the one hand (and in very broad terms), I perceived denotation as the 
perceptual recording facility of drawing, and as having to do with perception alone. 
I associated this category with Perceptualism, which, as I saw it, concerned the 
development of drawing skill and refined observation in descriptive representation. 
In such Perceptualism, visual description and the appearance of objects would fit 
each other like a glove. Such a fit, as sole objective and outcome, would also be 
sufficient as regards the student’s accomplishment.  
 
On the other hand, I perceived the connotative as the ‘conceptual’ aspect of 
drawing, seeing it as skill in conceptualisation, which I categorised as Conceptualism 
and as the ‘environment of the mind’ alone. In this environment, the drawing student 
could engage only in the immaterial world of ideas.  
 
Thus, I perceived perceptualisation and conceptualisation as mutually exclusive, 
assigning separately defined languages of style to each. As a result, I permitted an 
implicit divide to develop in my facilitation of drawing. In this divide, one voice 
dismissed the other as anachronistically conservative and conformist, or as 
anachronistically grandiose and abstruse. One voice accused the other of adhering 
to conventions of a removed objectivity in representation, and of perpetuating an 
obsolete45 Perceptualism that can only apply formalist language, while the other 
was accused of adhering to obscure and elitist content, doggedly perpetuating the 
polished, inaccessible ‘narcissism’ of Conceptualism.  
 
The dilemma was enhanced by the situation here, on the southern tip of Africa, 
where I perceived another discourse that accused the distinctive visual modes and 
norms of both so-called perceptualist and conceptualist approaches as rarefied 
                                                       
45 This is an allusion to Modernism as progressive revolt against mimesis, which culminated in a lasting 
suspicion of Perceptualism as conservative stronghold. 
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(Eurocentric) languages of exclusion that sustained only elitist drawing practices. To 
my mind, the divide came to carry innuendos of insularities and a ‘neo-segregation’ 
that, with South Africa as its political and social space, also presented the danger of 
perceiving its manifestations as well as possible resolutions along cultural and racial 
lines. Such a perception would deny the potential that a drafterically46 diverse 
student profile could pose.47 
 
Facades: style languages 
An observation drawn from this divide between perceptualisation and 
conceptualisation triggered an impetus that would also challenge its validity. I 
realised that since both ‘conceptualist’ and ‘perceptualist’ drawing provided clearly 
defined style languages – the properties of which are easy to imitate – the 
facilitation of drawing could realise the superficial copying of style language, rather 
than the creation of style language. Such emulation of style language, rather than a 
divide between perception and conception, presents a serious problem to consider 
in devising appropriate facilitation. Yet, the notion that some relationship exists 
between stylistic emulation and the perceptualist and conceptualist divide remained 
mysterious and therefore provocative. 
 
Any style (whether it be Formalism, Conceptualism, Perceptualism, Realism, or 
Expressionism), as a coded visual language, becomes a contained set of 
configurations that are decipherable and therefore easy to re-utilise and represent 
for any reasonably talented art student or learner. In his essay The Expressive 
Fallacy, Hal Foster (1990) discusses the same issue with reference to Expressionism. 
He states:  
As specific styles, German and abstract expressionism can now be used by 
artists chiefly in two ways – conceptually as second-degree image-
                                                       
46 With reference to drawing, regarding drawing, or in relation to drawing. 
47 Here I allude to the debate that positions, on the one hand, the idea that university courses should 
become “less embedded in and referenced against international academic debates, and more 
responsive to putatively unique African realities” (Moll in Griesel. 2004: 12 – 13, recounting Bodibe, 
1992, 1996). Moll is critical of this point of view. Such a viewpoint, according to Moll, likens 
“‘universal’ with ‘Eurocentric’ or ‘Western’ knowledge claims”. On the other hand, the debate 
positions a call for indigenisation in knowledge disciplines that “cut across national borders” as 
paradoxical. “Indigenisation does not have to invoke and adopt the ethnocentrism that it seeks to 
destroy” (Mashegoane, 1998: 60, cited by Moll in Griesel. 2004: 13). Rather, one should attempt to 
find a way of inserting indigenous experience into universal theory, a viewpoint that this thesis 
supports.  
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repertoires, or ahistorically in a way that betrays false consciousness (Foster. 
1990: 60). 
He poses ‘using’ – secondhand utilisation – against sincere ‘consciousness’, which I 
construe as also referring to a mediated in-phase consciousness that functions during 
the process of drawing. Such consciousness, his words suggest, would necessarily 
influence style. 
  
The facilitation of drawing accommodates – and legitimises – the emulation of style 
language, since such emulation expedites production in situations where limited time 
is a real problem. The only stylistic aspect of drawing that does not emulate is its 
individuated quality, or drawing-trait – in other words, the visible difference 
between a self-originative style language and an emulation of it. It would therefore 
be necessary to discover the genesis of drawing-trait to devise appropriate or 
improved facilitation.  
 
Drawing-trait – characteristic form – can only be ascribed to an individual drafter. 
Already at this point it is possible to say that trait does not adhere with coherency 
or consistency to the characteristics of any particular art ‘Style’ (such as 
Expressionism, Impressionism, or Illusionism), or to any particular genre of drawing 
(such as illustration, or informational, schematic, pictorial, and so-called objective 
and subjective drawing) (Betti & Sale. 1997: 13-19). Although drawing marks 
express, drawing-trait is not necessarily always expressionistic; although it can 
establish itself with the least possible means in drawing, it cannot be labeled as 
minimalist. Trait does not answer to the requirements that would label it as any 
specific style language, yet it always characterises style languages. As such, it is 
possible for a drafter to draw in any style of her choice, yet it will be possible to 
distinguish any one drafter’s expressionism or minimalism from that of another. Trait 
is what makes a drawing identifiable with an individual drafter. 
 
The notion that drawing-trait emanates from a drafter-centred, yet hidden sphere 
that does not necessarily ‘express’ is not implausible, because before appearing in 
a drawing as ‘individuation’, it has no visible match – not even as ‘mind-picture’ – in 
the same way that the ‘inner mind’ of the drafter has no visible match. Yet, it is 
important to understand that I do not perceive trait as unmediated. The notion that 
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trait is a drafter-centred emanation does not suggest that it originates from a 
completely enclosed, undivided self as ‘inner sensorium’ that constructs the world. 
Drawing-trait, as I perceive it, does not suggest or enclose a complete subjectivity.48 
If so, and if it has no resemblance to anything that exists in a ‘concrete reality’, 
“independent from our perceptual and cognitive capacities” (Varela. 1992: 172), 
drawing-trait does not represent an independent world. If it cannot be said to 
originate from objective structures, it cannot be explained as objectivist either.49 
Drawing-trait, if considered by its operational closure,50 seems to only originate 
from the individual. The notion of trait as representation or as expression therefore 
becomes questionable. Both representation and expression require scripts that 
forego them, be it in the form of subjective structures such as emotion or notion, or in 
the form of objective structures such as the material world. 
 
This notion steers me towards the enactionist view of Francisco Varela, a biologist 
and cognitive scientist.51 Enactionism, although only partly consistent with the 
phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and with the sociological views of Pierre 
Bourdieu, similarly offers a middle way between objectivism and subjectivism. Such 
a middle way involves, as reference point for understanding perception, the 
sensorimotor structure of the perceiver. Although it originally was Norman Bryson’s 
notion of the durational activity of the drafter’s “inner sensorium” (De Zegher. 2003: 
155) that motivated my first probes into an ‘inner mind’ as origin of trait, my 
searches were soon directed towards a middle way that explains experiential 
cognition, since mark making tracks cognitive experiences durationally. Drawing-
trait, as mark and as a product of drawing (which is a practice), and of the 
individual drafter, directed my searches to Pierre Bourdieu. 
 
                                                       
48 A completely enclosed subjectivity refers to the notion that the human mind is the only and ultimate 
ground for constructs of the world. In other words, subjectivity suggests an understanding of the world 
as ‘inside’, independent of the “surrounding biological and cultural world” (Varela. 1992: 172). I 
discuss the relevance of the subjectivity/objectivity and subject/object antinomies in due course. 
49 Varela explains objectivism as the notion in which “the world out there has pregiven properties. 
These exist prior to the image that is cast on the cognitive system, whose task is to recover them 
appropriately (whether through symbols or global subsymbolic states)” (1992: 172). 
50 Varela explains that “A system that has operational closure is one in which the results of its 
processes are those processes themselves” (1992: 139). It remains to be seen whether the irruption of 
drawing-trait can be categorised as such. 
51 Before his death in 2001, Francisco Varela was Director of Research at the Centre National de 
Recherché Scientifique and Professor of Cognitive Science and Epistemology, CREA, at the Ecole 
Polytechnique in Paris. 
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Bourdieu puts forward the notion that interchange brings about assimilations 
between the individual agent, lived ‘reality’ or ‘world’, and practice. Such 
interchange, according to Bourdieu, is generative (Bourdieu in Mahar et al. 1990: 
33-34). Mahar explains that Bourdieu wished to “apprehend and reintroduce the 
practice of the individual as well as the capacity for individual invention and 
improvisation” (1990: 35). She states further that,  
Bourdieu’s concern was to develop a method which could show active intention 
and inventiveness in practice; to recall the creative, active, generative 
capacity in individual social life and to demonstrate that the subject of 
practice was not as a transcendental subject in the idealist tradition (Mahar et 
al. 1990: 35). 
These readings supplemented those notions above with the concepts of inventiveness, 
generativity, and improvisation. The notion that, in a drawing process that entails 
little more than the regurgitation of a style language, the generative properties of 
the drafter’s body-mind in interchange with world largely remains under-utilised or 
unrevealed, constitutes a central concern. At a time in the student drafter’s 
development when the ability to synthesise is crucial, skill in the highly complex 
processes of creative invention or the creation of new form, is neglected. This 
concern elicits the notion that the practice of emulating style language effaces 
(rather than empowers) the student drafter. No personal voice develops and the 
student drafter sacrifices individuation – the drafter ‘hides’ her face. The result is 
stasis, rather than the renewal that emerges from a multi-facetted drawing process 
that directly engages in the mediations of act, the self, and world.  
 
Hal Foster (1999: 60-61) confirms that the practice of emulating style language 
effaces, and that this phenomenon occurs in both objectivist and subjectivist frames: 
According to Louis Martin, the material elements in classical painting 
(especially, the traces of the artist) tend to be “concealed by what the 
painting represents, by its ‘objective reality’”. In expressionist painting, 
another type of transparency is operative: the material elements tend to be 
subsumed by what the painting expresses, by its subjective reality. Both types 
of representation are codes: the classical painter suppresses nonnaturalistic 
marks and colors so as to simulate (a staged) reality; the expressionist “frees” 
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such marks and colors of naturalism so as to simulate direct expression. And as 
codes both types are based on substitution (and thus on absence). 
 
 
Effacement 
In the academic drawing studio itself, in critique, studio discussion, and practical 
production, more examples of ‘substitution’ and its accompanying effacement 
appear. Students strive towards achieving some mythical correct answer, or one 
perfect way of resolving a drawing. Overnight, they want to accomplish a satiated 
state where they will have mastered drawing ability that is wholly complete and 
final. What is more, they believe the facilitator or institution determines this state of 
sated accomplishment as constant norm that is securely defined and cast in concrete. 
Implicit to this, is the perception of student drafters that the facilitator carries this in 
her mind as the norm. As facilitator, someone who purportedly has already 
accomplished repletion, she represents an official and therefore greater norm. Such 
norm is already legitimised by the visual arts academic society and by the wider 
field of visual arts in which they will one day have to perform. The facilitator, 
student drafters believe, measures all efforts against this legitimised norm as an 
absolute. They find unfathomable the notion that they can create or develop norms 
themselves. To attain the ‘perfect picture’, the one solution, an entirely accomplished 
quality, therefore becomes the students’ single aim. Upon finding such endeavour to 
be ever elusive, their dejection becomes a destructive force.  
 
The ease with which students adopt the facilitator’s drawing style supports this. To 
avoid this, I often refrain from using my habitual drawing style in demonstrations, 
only to find that students just as easily appropriate any alternative manners as 
‘ideal’. Copying style language becomes habit and in the process, student drafters 
never develop their own ways of working. 
 
The impulse to conceal one’s own personal style as inferior to another’s sanctioned 
style also emerges when most students in a group start to work in the manner of a 
fellow student whose work has been praised by the facilitator as exemplary or 
good. If the facilitator admires diverse student-drawings that display divergent 
styles or content as equally good, confusion reigns amongst those members of the 
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group who need predetermined and proven external structures to copy and who 
could only deal with one such structure at any given time of drawing. Their confusion 
does not necessarily compel self-reliance and the potential disclosure of an ‘inner 
sensorium’ grows more remote. 
 
Self-origination versus self-effacement; trait versus emulation  
From the above discussion, I derive the issue that the thesis will deal with: the 
copying of style language and the effacement that such practice brings about. To 
my mind, the difference between copying a style language and creating it suggests 
individuation (trait) in drawing as a possible indication of the ‘individual invention 
and improvisation’ that Bourdieu explained. As I suggest above, this notion opens a 
possibility that pertains to the durational experience immanent in the labour of 
drawing as the basis for emergent stylistic endeavour.  
 
The facilitator faces a choice between perpetuating stylistic effacement on the one 
hand, and, on the other hand, implementing a process of facilitation that would 
deliberately nurture the status of the individual student in the drawing process. If 
copying impedes the development of a personalised style, the student drafter’s full 
potency in self-origination of personalised stylistic practice should receive 
recognition and legitimisation. 
 
It would be reasonable to assume that skills-development in stylistic endeavour 
forms part of processes of synthesis in drawing. The gravity of this notion – its 
implications for the development of drawing skill – may sway the facilitator to 
challenge existing conventions in drawing facilitation.  
 
1.2 Focus: trait 
 
Drawing-trait, as a stylistic aspect of drawing, constitutes a common factor between 
some of the relative elements, which I earlier introduced (individuation, durationality, 
experience, practice). The notion that drawing-trait is ‘enaction’, as opposed to 
‘address’ – primary, rather than linguistic – necessitates exploration. I propose that 
trait in drawing indicates an appropriate entry point and directive in considering 
more options for the facilitation of drawing, because it demands understanding of 
the distinctions I discuss above. Drawing style, and in particular trait, becomes the 
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focus of the thesis. To amplify my discussion above (under Facades: style 
languages), I now provide a description of what I perceive trait to be, or what its 
materiality visibly constitutes.  
 
 Trait versus emulation: what is trait? 
Trait, in the context of the thesis, constitutes idiosyncratic stylistic manifestations in 
drawing that the drafter seems to unwittingly shape – without premeditation or 
conscious manipulation. The provocative notions that trait has no script or blueprint 
and that it therefore does not represent or express anything – not visible 
information drawn from lived ‘reality’, nor the drafter’s emotions or thoughts – 
confound. If the viewer perceives trait to express or represent, the perception 
prevails in the eye of the beholder.  
 
Any effort to define trait conclusively in verbal terms, seems to only demonstrate its 
elusiveness and its intangibility as form, as well as its contradictory complexities. My 
personal idea of what trait in drawing is would be best explained by example. In 
the context of the thesis, I limit the meaning of the word trait to denote what I 
illustrate and explain here. 
 
The illustrations below demonstrate individuation (See Illustrations i(a) & i(b), below) 
and emulative style language (See Illustration ii, below). I suggest that the drawings 
of Thokozani Mpotsha and Nathan Gates (Illustration i(a) and i(b)), both South 
African visual arts students, display individuation (trait). These drawings were the 
products of the same line exercise, done in the same medium, although subject 
matter differed. Yet, they visibly display differences in line character, line 
application, selections for notation, degrees and quality of constructive figuring, and 
rhythms between mark and non-mark, or regard and disregard. Thokozani, for 
example, more willingly explores inner contours, while Nathan prefers to 
concentrate on outer contours. Nathan’s hesitance and uncertainty is evident in rigid 
and separated limbs, while Thokozani integrates the flow of line with the organic 
animation that his facial features hold. 
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Illustration i(a) Thokozani Mpotsha. 2009. Blind contour line exercise. Charcoal on notebook paper. 
Illustration i(b). Nathan Gates. 2008. Blind contour line exercise. Charcoal on paper. 
Illustration ii. Anne-Marie Schneider. 2005. Vertige d’Amour. Graphite on paper (Downs et al. 2007: 81). 
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It comes as a surprise to see that their work seems to stylistically resemble the 
drawing of Anne-Marie Schneider (Illustration ii), a presumably accomplished and 
sophisticated European artist. At the same time, it is possible to identify differences 
between the line-work in Schneider’s work and that of the two students. I will allege, 
for argument’s sake, that Schneider’s work demonstrates emulation of style 
language, but that trait even surfaces in emulated work, although to a lesser 
degree.  
 
I admittedly presume a deliberately deskilled grapheme in Schneider’s work – a 
conscious ‘miming’ of the crude qualities that an unskilled drafter would 
demonstrate. (Of course, Schneider has never seen the work of these specific 
students, but a deskilled grapheme is easily sourced from the depths of our earliest 
memories to make marks during infancy. It is a style language in itself, and easy to 
affect for the mature drafter). This miming of a style language enables a stylistic 
consistency in each new drawing, while such consistency would also enable the 
drafter to ‘hide’ (efface) a more naturally informed and versatile hand. The stylistic 
simplicity and crudeness of Schneider’s drawing has also become her ‘signature’ (see 
more of her drawings in Downs et al. 2007: 80-83) – she has appropriated stylistic 
elements as a ‘style language’ to the extent that she can effortlessly repeat it. In 
other words, Schneider has learnt it.  
 
‘Signature’, therefore, does not wholly constitute trait, nor does trait wholly constitute 
signature. However, we will see that signature can contain trait, and trait can 
influence signature, as well as ‘autobiographic mark making’. The discerning eye will 
also find differences between Schneider’s line work and that of Gates or Mpotsha. 
Such differences could afford the viewer glimpses of Schneider’s individuated 
drawing form. Such paradoxical inherency makes it difficult to conclusively define or 
isolate trait. Although Schneider’s emulations are similar to the line-work of Gates 
and Mpotsha, they are not wholly similar. Furthermore, her work differs in content 
and meaning, thus rendering imperfect (different) even the similarities between their 
line-work. 
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For the purposes of this thesis, the differences between the drawings of any two 
drafters, notwithstanding corresponding style languages, subject matter, intention, or 
purpose, constitute trait. As such, the differences between the drawings of the two 
students (Illustrations i(a) & i(b) above), as well as between their work and 
Schneider’s (Illustration ii), demonstrate trait. Trait is perhaps more evident in the 
student drafter’s drawings because of absence of emulation during the process of 
making them. The nature of the drawing exercise52 prevents emulation, since it 
places no emphasis on style language whatsoever. In oblique fashion, it begins to 
direct the drafter’s awareness of her own hand and eventually it directs her focus 
towards trait.  
 
Based on the above comparisons, I will continue to contrast the unpremeditated or 
self-originative shaping of drawing form (which I call ‘trait’) against the conscious 
emulation of style language (See Illustration ii, above). I do this, because such 
juxtaposing visibly reveals – and to an extent clarifies by means of degrees of 
effacement – individuated drawing form. From experience, I also know that in 
teaching drawing an emphasis on trait prevents emulation.  
 
Implications of style language in context 
Upon viewing these drawings, some implications of style language in different 
contexts come to the fore. In an educational context, what I call individuation in the 
student drafters’ drawings also could be perceived as a lack of drawing skill. 
Therefore, it is interesting to note that, despite the visible stylistic resemblance 
between Schneider’s and the student drafters’ work, their drawing could cost them 
high marks in the examination, or worse, entry into tertiary educational institutions. In 
stark contrast, Schneider’s drawing gained publication in a reputable European 
academic journal and numerous exhibitions in Europe as a respected artist (Downs et 
                                                       
52 The particular drawing exercises shown in Illustrations i(a) & i(b) entail the deliberate bracketing-
out of viewing and reviewing of the drawn display. In this exercise, the eyes remain constantly on the 
field of observation. The drafter synchronises the speed at which the eyes move with the line’s 
progress. The movements of the drafter’s eyes lead line. The technique dispels the conscious 
interferences of forethought, deliberation, and negotiations between correctness and wrongness. As a 
result, their distortions are not deliberate, nor pre-planned, and the hand finds its paths in isolation 
from sight – hand and line are ‘blind’. One of the functions or purposes of the exercise is to make the 
student aware of the fact that our already integrated understandings of what we represent influence 
our drawing by imposing their doctrines as corrections of the hand’s wayward movements. I will 
discuss this notion in more detail in Chapter 6. 
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al. 2007: xxiv, 80-83). Schneider’s work is in the public domain, a context that 
symbolises acknowledgement, respect, success, admiration – and exactly for these 
reasons, drawing teachers could easily justify teaching Schneider’s style language. I 
argue that, by doing so, they opt for fostering in the student drafter the 
achievement of a superficial and mimetic drawing process rather than the ability to 
source drawing’s constructive facilities.  
 
I draw several questions from the implications of this observation. In the context of 
South African art education, should students not develop a degree of “visual 
literacy” (Betti & Sale.1997: 4) and productive drawing ability that would enable 
them to jump between style languages to their heart’s desire? Would such 
proficiency not also enable them to gain the recognition that Schneider enjoys, as 
well as the fulfillment of their various but obvious desires to become artists? What 
quality or standard of work at entry level indicates the potential for developing 
such degrees of visual literacy?  
 
More to the point, however, would be the question whether the pre-advent 
unknowability of trait could drive the arrival of advanced proficiency, ability, and 
standard in student drafters’ work. Could those aspects of Mpotsha and Gates’ 
work that label it as lacking skill and ability (when viewed in the traditionally 
Western critical framework that we tend to apply) not also form guidelines along 
which the drawing teacher could facilitate the particularity of their development? It 
is surely impossible to predict where their work could go and what their advanced 
levels of proficiency could turn out to be. This notion implies the possibility of yet 
unknown paradigms of the nature, standards, and assessment of South African 
students’ art. Therefore, to my mind, an understanding of individuation in drawing 
seems vital. 
 
Although the thesis will not attempt direct answers to all the tributary questions that 
the above illustrations elicit, the reasonable surfacing of such questions reveals the 
potential and gravity of their footing – namely, the problem and consequent area 
of focus that I delineate in the Introduction.  
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Divergence from norm 
I propose that, instead of consigning the idiosyncrasies of individuation in drawing 
to “the underside” (Bryson. 1983: 87-89) of facilitation, it might be worthwhile to 
investigate its potential for challenging the stasis that institutionalised redistribution 
of style language creates. If individuated drawing constitutes an enactionist reflex 
that is mediated by personal history and in-phase53 labour, a diverse student-
profile should bring about unpredictable renewal in the visual arts. Drawing-trait 
could serve as an individual student drafter’s departure from institutionalised norm.  
 
Furthermore, I propose that the repression of personalised manner counteracts 
productive processes. The obliteration of all signs, for example, of struggling in 
drawing, a process that is typically marked by dense labour, destroys any 
possibility of disclosing the unknown, unpredictable potentialities that the drawing 
process holds. A drawing in which the drafter strives for an ideal by erasing 
mistakes, would never develop a palimpsest narrative of its own. If mistakes are not 
erased, the drawing partakes in a dialogue with the drafter, because it holds such 
narratives. These narratives reveal drawing’s processes and history of making as 
much as it reveals the student’s development (see Addendum A, Illustration 2).  
 
If the student drafter can grasp that the drawing is capable of eliciting responses in 
its maker, she also becomes aware of additional discursive pathways that the act of 
drawing enfolds and that I explain in Chapters 3 and 4. Such awareness could 
direct the development of the drawing away from deliberate and inhibitive 
concealment of personalised marks. In other words, if the student allows the drawing 
to take one of the leading roles in its own creation and knows its labour to be 
another partaker in a reciprocal discourse between herself, world, and her own 
emerging inscriptions, a palimpsest, revelatory drawing emerges.54 Instead, self-
effacement erases all significant participants in a circularity comprising self, 
practice, and product. 
 
                                                       
53 ‘In-phase’ refers to durational doing and production in drawing. Please refer to the Glossary of 
key words (Addendum B). 
54 It must be noted, however, that palimpsest, currently made fashionable by the internationally 
renowned South African artist, William Kentridge, could easily become a style language in itself. 
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Facilitatory shift 
For the facilitator, this understanding significantly shifts emphasis away from style 
language as facilitatory framework or reference. Drawing as a drafter-centred, 
self-originative process comes to the fore. This emphasis would involve the potency 
of the individual drafter’s self, as well as her enactionist and reflexive labour as 
generative of mark. If this seems self-evident, why do style languages, as objective 
structures of meaning, so easily replace both knowledge disciplinary content and 
self-originative mark making? I accept as given the “apparatus and discipline of 
drawing” (Bryson in De Zegher. 2003: 152-155) as a constant component and 
content of facilitation, but a possibility of facilitating the drawing process as 
formative instrument in the development of individuated creativity, suggests the 
realisation of dimensions beyond the disciplinary aspect of drawing. At the very 
least, it elevates drawing beyond the mechanical execution of technique and 
beyond the reductive objectives of mechanical representation or emulation of style.  
 
Since the insecure student herself upholds the tendency towards self-effacement, an 
attempt to bolster the student’s own and full status as self-reliant drawing individual 
and cerebrative agent is valid. Moreover, the notion of self-effacement in drawing 
compels the question: How would drawing be self-revelatory rather than self-
effacing? In the context of this discussion, ‘self-revelation’ infers the potential of the 
drafter and her drawing process to reveal the ‘self’ of the drafter as drawing-trait, 
rather than self-expression.  
 
1.3 Contemporary discourses in drawing 
 
A purpose of the following discussions is to substantiate the delineation of drawing-
trait as focus. Contemporary drawing is very diverse in scope and characterised by 
an unprecedented heterogeneity in content and style. Literature on drawing reflects 
this diversity and is often contradictory as regards interpretation of the quirks and 
idiosyncrasies of the practice. 
 
Relevant texts 
I therefore glean from writings on contemporary drawing only those features that I 
deem salient to my thesis. The publication titled The Stage of Drawing: Gesture and 
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Act, edited by Catherine de Zegher (2003) includes essays by Norman Bryson and 
De Zegher that contribute profoundly to the development of the thesis. Another 
publication that I employ is, for example, the MOMA publication titled Drawing 
Now: Eight Propositions, edited by Laura Hoptman (2002). This publication should 
not be confused with the publication titled Drawing Now: Between the Lines of 
Contemporary Art, edited by Downs, Marshall, Sawdon, Selby and Tormey (2007), 
which I also interpret extensively. These three publications prove to be crucial to the 
thesis. While Hoptman presents some contrasting views, I largely rely on and 
endorse the views of De Zegher (2003) and Downs et al. (2007), with particular 
reference to those views pertaining to drawing as an enduring metaphorical and 
representational medium of constant renewal.  
 
Contradictions that provide range and variety 
In viewing the drawings in these recent publications, it becomes clear that 
contemporary drawing wears many masks. Viewing audiences are presented with 
representational art ranging from hyperrealism to naturalism. Contemporary 
drawing is projective of imagination, while it also generates out of process. Its 
languages convey ambiguous pensiveness and laborious attentiveness, sparseness, 
and excess with equal ease, eliciting significations that compel and bore, touch and 
rebuff, grasp and purge.  
 
Such heterogeneity and diversity is characteristic of postmodernism, which 
appropriates indiscriminately from past and contemporary forms. Downs et al. 
states that contemporary drawing “reflect[s] postmodern preoccupations of 
appropriation, fragmentation and indeterminacy... express [-ing] in contrasting ways 
through gesture and allegory and ... challenge [-ing] what might be considered 
aesthetic” (2007: ix). 
 
Despite this heterogeneity, however, writers agree about the primacy55 of drawing. 
They regard primacy as an essential factor that enables immediacy in 
communicating the in-phase experience of the drafter. 
                                                       
55 ‘Primacy’ refers to the facility of drawing to “make us grasp ‘reality’ in an immediate way” 
(Downs et al. 2007: x), as opposed to what Deanna Petheridge describes as “a dumb line”, meaning 
“a line which is not eloquent in the language of drawing” in The Primacy of Drawing (1991: 52 cited 
in Downs et al. 2007: x). 
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Rebel 
Drafters explore the practice with involvement that ranges from intense obsession to 
lighthearted frivolity, in ways that might seem contradictory, yet reveal the variety 
of human experience while providing the practice with its reputation of 
rebelliousness. Indeed, an important justification for viewing drawing as formative 
instrument in the development of individuated creativity is the notion that “drawing 
provides an opportunity to escape traditions of both mode and language” (Downs 
et al. 2007: ix-xi). Although drawing integrates itself seamlessly into the visual arts 
as a mediator of thinking, planning, and developing ideas for employment in the full 
range of art-making processes, and as autonomous genre in itself, it also succeeds in 
detaching itself selectively (with both undiscerning indifference and deliberate 
rebelliousness) from discourses of contemporaneity56 or tradition. While it values 
(even relishes) its integration into the visual arts field, it also protects its roles as 
jester, devil’s advocate, and dissenter.  
 
Discipline 
Having long ago renounced its inherited roles as perceptual scribe and as studious 
and astute rhetor, drawing still does not deny its properties as “a discipline, a set of 
methods and procedures, an apparatus” (Bryson in De Zegher. 2003: 152). This 
adherence to its disciplinary conventions has different consequences. Drawing can 
find fruition through processes of laborious effort and industry while, in contrast to 
this, it can compel to equal measure with minimalist sparseness and swiftness. Downs 
et al. concede that drawing possessively maintains its reputation as discipline upon 
which “deliberations of technique and complexities of medium intrude minimally” 
(2007: x). 
 
Drawing upholds more contradictions through the variedness of its denotations. In 
this era of technological ultra-sophistication, drawing teases with allusions to a 
technology-as-other that can draw (Downs et al. 2007: x-xi). In other words, we see 
in contemporary drawing a machine-like ‘other-of-mind’ that disturbingly has 
mastered some abilities of mind (Downs et al. 2007: x-xi). At the same time, 
contemporary drawing poses in jealous pride as the anti-form of the barren and 
                                                       
56 I apply the word ‘contemporaneity’ to suggest a narrative that exists or occurs in the same period 
of time as when ‘drawing detaches or distantiates itself’ from such narrative by, for example, 
ignoring it or challenging it through disinvestment from trend. 
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alien elegance of technology. In its dialectic between the sophistry of technological 
aid, intervention, or reproduction, and the comparative rawness and ease of 
facture,57 drawing reveals its facilities for relating the variability of the thinking and 
cognitive experience of drafters. In the process, drawing reiterates its distinctive 
attributes (Downs et al. 2007: x-xx) as much as it reveals the drafter’s hand. As 
such, drawing often displays both a deliberately deskilled grapheme and extremes 
in obsessive and pristine skill-of-hand. In both instances, drawing counteracts the 
expediency of technology.  
 
Interface 
The tendency for drawing to range widely in simplicity and in complexity richly 
furnishes and contradicts its facility for primacy and directness (Downs et al. 2007: 
x-xi). This paradox realises in the uncanny ability of drawing to make furtive and 
elusive ideas visible and understandable by formulating them in visible constructs – 
the complexity of which equals and even exceeds that of speech and language. As 
such, drawing facilitates a transformation from the gestic to inscription. This notion 
suggests drawing as an interface between drafter and world. This facility of 
drawing tantalises with allusions to a peculiar intimacy between the drafter and her 
mark.  
 
Deviational function 
The ability of drawing to challenge while it explores, implies that drawing upholds 
its contradictory searches as a form of deviation from norm. It often seems to 
confirm current thinking and trends in the visual arts, while denying or challenging 
them at the same time, which has a particularly deconstructive effect. This notion is 
confirmed by the two publications Drawing Now: Between the lines of contemporary 
art (Downs et al. 2007: x-xi) and Hoptman’s Drawing Now: Eight propositions 
(2002).  
 
Through their similar titles (‘Drawing Now’), both publications implicitly claim 
contemporaneity and the representativity of their collections, but for different 
reasons. They underscore their claims with different typicalities in their two 
collections. According to Downs et al. (2007: ix-xx), it is possible to regard 
                                                       
57 The ‘hand-made’ quality of drawing. 
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contemporary drawing as “particularly suited to contemporary aesthetic 
assumptions as its characteristics are typically poststructural”. Downs et al. assert 
typical qualities such as ambiguity, doubt, dissent from collectivity, denotation of 
dissimilarity, divergence from universal values, an obstinate rejection of enclosed 
resolution in form and integration of the concept of unmarking (erasure) as 
characteristics that assigns to contemporary drawing a post-structuralist aspect. 
These qualities render contemporary drawing suitably versatile and flexible to 
justify its simultaneous accommodation of contradictory ideologies (Downs et al. 
2007: ix-xx). 
 
By contrast, Laura Hoptman, editor of Drawing Now: Eight Propositions (2002: 15-
28), does not hesitate to publish a collection of drawings that propose documentary 
description of the outer appearance of things in exaggerated realism as a 
contemporary occupation of drawing. According to Hoptman, these drawings impart 
a denunciation of process (2002: 15-28). In contrast to the drawings in Drawing 
Now (Downs et al. 2007), the drawings in Hoptman’s publication display kinship with 
nineteenth-century drawing. The drawings were deliberately selected for their 
obstinate adherence to finish and representation. Therefore, and in very general 
terms, the drawings in her collection differ distinctly from those in the Downs et al. 
collection. The difference between their underlying processes of making can explain 
this distinction, which also explains the difference between projective generativity 
and process-based generativity as ‘in-the-act’ drawing.  
 
In the introduction, Hoptman clearly states that the drawings in her book are 
“projective” in their depictions of imagery that had been conceived before they 
were drawn, “as opposed to being found through the process of making” (2002: 
12). Her statement also serves as definitions of the two processes as conceptually 
separate from one another.  
 
In ‘projective drawing’, the drafter describes a pre-conceived image unassisted by 
durational observation of concrete ‘reality’. Thus, the drafter necessarily employs 
the configurations of a known, mastered visual language. In a process-generated 
drawing, the drafter would allow durational experience, perception, visibility, and 
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memory58 to participate in shaping visuality in unpremeditated fashion. If, in 
drawing, the re-utilisation of a ‘mastered’ language necessarily implies emulating 
the conventions, norms, and even formulae of a visual language, the drafter 
becomes a historian, telling of the experiences of other drafters. This notion recalls 
Foster’s statement above regarding the regurgitation of expressionism “conceptually 
as second-degree image-repertoires, or ahistorically in a way that betrays false 
consciousness” (1990: 60).  
 
The drawings in Hoptman’s publication share qualities of projectivity, probably 
because they are extracted from a variety of sub-fields in drawing – namely from 
scientific illustration and architectural drafting, ornamental design, argotic59 
illustration, comics, animation, and fashion illustration (Hoptman. 2002: 167). Each 
category, therefore, provides series of formulae for acceptable execution. Such 
formulae enable categorisation in the confines of sub-fields, as much as it provides 
the appropriate language for execution.  
 
Yet, in many ways, these drawings challenge conventional categorisation of drawing 
as either part of the so-called higher echelon of a mainly fine art genre, or as a 
service discipline in which technical drafting, ornamentation, and illustration would 
occupy lower ranks as ‘inferior’ subcategories. Although I do not dispute their equal 
status in a non-hierarchical categorisation, I do note projectivity in these drawings as 
a generative process that necessarily requires the mediation of a known (and often 
formulaic) language to happen at all. To my mind, projective drawing that 
necessitates the re-employment of formulae, would also lend itself more easily to 
stylistic repetition, which more easily disallows the effects of durational experiencing 
on drawing.  
 
I must note that although I draw from these publications the notion that drawing 
upholds flexibility and tolerance, which enable divergence from norm (if it ever 
                                                       
58 ‘Memory’: Throughout the thesis, I intend the word to denote “The power or process of reproducing 
or recalling what has been learned and retained especially through associative mechanisms; the 
store of things learned and retained from an organism’s activity or experience as evidenced by 
modification or structure of behavior or by recall and recognition” (WNCD. 1979: 710).  
59 I interpret the displays of vernacular or ‘argotic’ illustration to convey the “slang, idiom, or jargon 
of a particular group or class” in society, thereby defining and asserting their status as subculture 
(ODE. 2005: 83). See for example the work of Barry Mcgee, Yoshitomo Nara, and Takashi 
Murakami in Drawing Now: Eight Propositions (2002: 129-165), where Hoptman indeed categorises 
their work as a “subculture” (2002: 128). 
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acknowledges norm at all), I also draw from the difference between their respective 
understandings of what contemporary drawing constitutes. This difference suggests 
a broad distinction between projectivity and process in drawing. I interpret such 
distinction to mirror Foster’s60 implicit division between the secondhand utilisation of 
existing style language (e.g. expressionism) and the initiation of a visualising 
language. I employ both Foster’s differentiation and the difference between 
projective and process-generated drawing to support my differentiation between 
the re-utilisation of style language and drawing-trait as invention of individuated 
style. I do not challenge either one – both exist. The question is, are projectivity and 
process-generativity mutually exclusive? 
 
Projectivity and process: Noun and Verb 
Hoptman declares – with a finality that encloses completely – that “drawing is a 
noun”, an autonomous entity (2002: 167). Despite a declared kinship with 
nineteenth-century conventions of drawing in the collection, she claims deviation from 
parallel formalist norms, saying that drawing has “burst the boundaries of [its] 
traditional definitions”, because its narrations and descriptions have denounced the 
“old criteria having to do with form, finish, and manner of execution, or by the 
designation of fine or avant-garde art”. She positions these aspects as liberating 
dynamics, declaring the autonomy of drawing as an encompassing art making 
process in its own right with her words, “drawing is all you need” (Hoptman. 2002: 
167). Hers is therefore an autonomy that relates to genre – assigning to drawing 
the status of separateness from conventional categorisation under either fine art or 
service discipline.  
 
Yet, had drawing only noun status, another form of autonomy is suggested. Such 
autonomy places the operation of drawing as purely in the objective world, outside 
the drafter, who can only employ norm and formula as appropriable language 
(2002: 167).  
 
As such, the formulae and norms of, for example, illustration, architectural and 
technical drawing, would completely pre-determine their outcome and 
recognisability as type. Yet, as we distinguish between types, we also distinguish 
                                                       
60 The Expressive Fallacy (Foster. 1999: 59-77). 
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between, for example, the illustrations of different artists. Although such distinction is 
possibly less reliable in the case of technical drawings, all the other sub-fields 
mentioned above recognise the individuated contributions of their drafters. The 
oppositional stance that Hoptman posits between process and projectivity implies 
that she endorses formulae and noun-status as the preferred form or manifestation 
of worthy contemporary drawing. I contest this notion, as I contest a noun-status of 
drawing as its only ascription. In process, (to my mind) the pre-determination of 
external norm or formulae is arguably, not definitely, absent. Norms inevitably 
become embodied and could therefore act as mediators in the genesis of a 
visualising language. More such mediators include socio-cultural context, the 
constructs of the body-mind, perception, and the unconscious. Likewise, these 
mediators can also come into play in projective drawing, as they do in the utilisation 
of language, thereby crediting such drawing with individuated qualities that can be 
attributed to specific artists. 
 
Indeed, Catherine De Zegher aligns drawing with memory, thinking, and ideas in 
The Stage of Drawing (2003). Memory, thinking, and idea would include the norms 
of drawing, as much as the norms it draws from society. She sees drawing’s 
processes as “a generative space of thought” (2003: 267), in which formulae or 
norm could mediate as much as the visibility of things and socio-cultural history and 
experience. Thereby, she implies that the labour and process of drawing are 
generative of thinking, and that this occurs for the duration of drawing. Drawing, 
she purports, “acknowledges the significance of fragmented moments of 
consciousness, of spaces of uncertainty” (De Zegher. 2003: 267). Who is to say that 
such fragmented consciousness is not indiscriminate and varied? Could the durational 
thinking that drawing generates not employ, misemploy, or unemploy all forms of 
mediation and interference, whether it entails formulae and norm, perception, 
conception, memory, or in-phase experience? To my mind, this chaos devises the 
flexibility and tolerance of drawing, while it also devises the generativity of process 
in drawing. Rather than consigning oppositionality or a complete division between 
projectivity and process, their possible generative capacity in intermittent or 
constant confluence with each other should be explored. I propose that in projective 
drawing, process cannot be absent, nor can projectivity be absent in process-
generated drawing, unless it is consciously discarded. 
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The drawings in De Zegher’s book, dating from the eighteenth century to the late 
twentieth century, highlight the kind of drawing that derives from reflection (De 
Zegher. 2003: 267). Reflection, surely, if not almost involuntarily, incorporates and 
utilises all facets of memory, concurrent experience, and the immediacy of 
perception. Both De Zegher and Downs et al. purport that, rather than focusing only 
on the appearance of objects, drawing also deals with thinking that occurs in a 
conscious sphere durationally, or while scrutinising the visibilities of lived ‘reality’, 
where they speak as determinedly of the enactions of an embodied unconscious. 
Added to these forms of mediation, the visibility of the field of observation 
contributes an obvious form of involvement, namely that of visual perception. Vision 
and sight, perceiving the visible while drawing, generates thinking in a process that 
conflates experience, norm, memory and the complexities of socio-cultural mediation 
through the process of doing.  
 
Indeed, in contrast to Hoptman, De Zegher does not denounce the drawing process 
as such an informative and formative participant, but rather acknowledges an 
intertwining and transitive generativity in the mediations of memory, thinking, 
seeing, and the labour of drawing, as does Downs et al.. De Zegher indirectly 
acknowledges a merged body and mind as being active in the drawing process. 
She declares, for example, the aim of the collection of drawings in her book to 
“reflect upon the ongoing processes of the mind that drawing evidences at every 
stage of its appearance” (2003: 267). Thinking during drawing, thinking generated 
through drawing and looking, in other words, at every stage of the appearing of 
marks: “always in the present tense, always becoming” (De Zegher. 2003: 267), not 
after the fact of thinking, nor after the act of scrutiny. Temporality as concept and as 
manifest in durational drawing is clearly involved here, as much as the mediations of 
memory, consciousness, and in-phase experience.  
 
De Zegher refers to the element that I refer to above as ‘socio-cultural mediation’. 
She explains it as contemporaneous context, as the spirit of the time, or (for 
example) the social or cultural realms within which a drafter draws. Such ‘spirit’ is 
entrenched in the mind space or memory of the drafter, a notion that is certainly 
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supported by Bourdieu’s habitus theory and Varela’s theory of embodied action.61 
The drafter inevitably translates such entrenchment into her drawing: “Drawing as 
an embodiment of contemporary spirit” (2003: 267). Added to this notion of 
embedding ‘social space’, or ‘the spirit of the time’ (as externality) into drawing, she 
implicitly acknowledges internality, the body-mind of the drafter and its miscellany 
of memory and in-phase experiencing. They constitute influences from the past and 
the present, such as a personalised history, norm, perception, and vision (and 
possibly a view there-of62) that contribute to the unfolding of a drawing (2003: 
269).  
 
The gestic as pre-meaning 
De Zegher and Avis Newman, the selector of the drawings for this book, delve back 
into the gestic63, to the “initial moment of tracing” to reflect on the origin of mark 
making (2003: 267), which mirrors my focus on drawing-trait in this thesis. De 
Zegher purports that the spatial movement of the hand in the act of drawing 
resembles the variety and range of dramatisation and the theatrical aspect of 
play-acting. In this acting out, gesture admits the unconscious and psyche of the 
drafter, and in its trace, endows the drawing with such mediation. By acting out, the 
hand creates64 what words cannot describe and what the eyes do not perceive. This 
phenomenon enunciates “the movement and moment in space anterior to what is 
                                                       
61 I explain these theories in Chapter 2. 
62 As will become clear later in the thesis, only once trait has irrupted, does it gain presence in the 
world of visibility, where the drafter interacts with trait too in recursive flow for the duration of the 
unfolding of the drawing. 
63 In the thesis I apply the words ‘gestic’ and ‘gesture’ to refer to the movements of the hand or the 
whole body as enaction, rather than expression of meaning, which could include the technique known 
as ‘gesture drawing’, although not necessarily so. A point of distinction would be the deliberate 
mindfulness inherent to gesture as technique or exercise, as opposed to its functioning in the realms of 
pre-language, in muteness or in the unconscious sphere where cognition also functions. I apply ‘drawn 
gesture’ in further discussions mostly as denoting conversion of such muteness into mark without 
mindful pre-consideration or pre-deliberation. 
64 I understand the conversion of the gestic into trace to inscribe the legibility of the body, a facet of 
drawing that Norman Bryson (1983: 122) describes as “relegated to the category of the profane, of 
that which is outside the temple” and that “proposes desire, proposes the body, in the durée of its 
practical activity”. While this specific metaphor could be interpreted to allude to body as separate 
in a body and mind duality, his discussions (1983: 87-131) suggest a dialectical interchange 
between mindfulness and the corporeal in which the body (hand, eyes) proposes or hypothesises, 
while the mind responds and inhibits with antithesis or synthesis. Derrida posits such interchange in a 
more intimate bond between body and mind as the “hypothesis of sight” that comprises “believing 
and seeing, between believing one sees [croire voir] and seeing between, catching a glimpse 
[entrevoir] - or not. Before doubt ever becomes a system, skepsis has to do with the eyes. The word 
refers to a visual perception, to the observation, vigilance, and attention of the Gaze [regard] during 
an examination. One is on the lookout, one reflects upon what one sees, reflects what one sees by 
delaying the moment of conclusion” (1993: 1-3). Derrida equates the ‘hypothesis of sight’ with “the 
hypothesis of intuition” (1993: 60). 
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drawn and articulated in the trace” (2003: 267). From this, I surmise that mark 
emanates from a ‘mute’ place that invents. I also interpret De Zegher’s explanations 
and those of Downs et al. to fall within a postmodern framework that would 
denounce expression as a possible explanation for the irruption of drawing-trait on 
paper. If trait is not expressive, and does not represent any style language, it could 
possibly relate closer to the gestic and gesture. 
 
De Zegher refers to Giorgio Agambem’s explanations of gesture (2003: 268, citing 
Agambem, 1999: 78). Agambem defines gesture as the muteness that emanates 
from “the other side of language”. Such muteness originally gave rise to the 
development of speech and language. Gesture remains a potent supplement to 
speech that enhances articulation. This legitimates and confirms not only its intimate 
bond with language, but also its generative facility.65 Agambem asserts that, 
“gesture is not an absolutely nonlinguistic element” (1999: 78, cited in De Zegher. 
2003: 268), which implies that it is equivocally linguistic. Agambem explains that the 
human urge to exchange meaning produced gesture and language simultaneously. 
Gesture is language and language is gesture-with-voice. Gesture, according to 
Agambem, does not so much indicate gestural comprehension with a content of its 
own as a precedent to language. Gesture, he suggests, rather constitutes ‘the other’ 
of language. Gesture in speech signifies the muteness inherent to the advent of 
language. He explains gesture as a form of pre-meaning that has “its speechless 
dwelling in language” (Agambem. 1999: 78, cited in De Zegher. 2003: 268). 
Likewise, gesture in drawing regards in ‘blindness’66 as pre-meaning in vision or, as 
Derrida would have it, as the unbeseen, the unknown, in looking, as “reading listens 
in watching” (Derrida. 1993: 2). Drawn gesture,67 as a product of gesture, is borne 
by a generative intimacy between opposites – blindness and sight.  
                                                       
65  Hence the phrase ‘The mark of a silent language’ in the title of the thesis.  
66 Derrida (1993: 3) states, “A hand of the blind ventures forth alone or disconnected, in a poorly 
delimited space; it feels its way, it gropes, it caresses as much as it inscribes, trusting in the memory 
of signs and supplementing sight. It is as if a lidless eye had opened at the tip of the fingers, as if 
one eye too many had just grown right next to the nail, a single eye, the eye of a cyclops or one-
eyed man. this eye guides the tracing or outline [tracé]; it is a miner’s lamp at the point of writing, a 
curious and vigilant substitute, the prosthesis of a seer who is himself invisible”. Thus, the nature of the 
relationship between gesture, perception, and trace in drawing becomes clear. 
67  As I also explain in the Glossary (Addendum B), I apply this phrase specifically to distinguish trait 
from ‘gesture’ as physical gesticulation before its appearance as mark on drawing surface, and from 
the technical application in drawing of the word ‘gesture’ as line ‘type’, suggesting ‘gestural line’. 
‘Drawn gesture’ s specifically the line, trace, or stroke that irrupts from gestic conversion and 
enaction, which could be any type of line in drawing, such as for example, ‘gesture‘, ‘contour‘, 
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Dialectic 
De Zegher connects gesture and the self by concluding that gesture is a primeval 
feat of self-awareness and that, as trace on paper it demonstrates a bond between 
drafter and world as externality (2003: 274). She also identifies a dialectical 
relationship – interplay between oppositions, such as between participation and 
differentiation. Gestural mark, by demonstrating this bond, discriminates (and 
defines) simultaneously by omission, by marking only a fraction of such bonding. As 
opposing forces, marking and omission, bonding and separation beget signification 
for the duration of the act of drawing as the drafter demonstrates “sensations 
beyond language” through gesture (De Zegher. 2003: 274). The process of turning 
gesture into trace is the genesis of meaning and it captures this meaning in a 
continuous present.  
 
De Zegher purports that the twentieth century return to gesture mirrors an 
“eighteenth century intuition that gestural language was the true means of original 
expression and verbal language was a late and limited manifestation of it” (2003: 
274). She cites Julia Kristeva who asserts that gesture, as “a preverbal symbolicity” 
introduced into language the notion of “pre-meaning” as a dissident 
(nonconforming) aspect that positions “the subject and its verb” on unequal footing. 
The conception and conversion of sense from gesture to speech, to language, or to 
writing, created, and continue to create, expanding structures of language and 
systems of cerebration (Kristeva. 1989: 305-306, cited in De Zegher, 2003: 274).  
 
In Drawing Now, Between the Lines of Contemporary Art (2007), Downs et al. also 
mention a contemporary tendency towards direct employment of the gestic in 
drawing. Such a tendency continues to sustain both “the performative and the 
speculative” in contemporary drawing (2007: ix-xx). This debate acknowledges that 
the process of drawing contributes to its content, a concept that it describes as 
performative. Performativity implies that the labour of drawing becomes the subject 
matter. Downs et al. emphasise process in acknowledging drawing as “becoming 
rather than being” (2007: xii). They play on a dichotomy between appearance and 
                                                                                                                                                          
‘organisational‘, ‘lyrical’, ‘structural’, ‘implied’, ‘constricted’, ‘blurred’, ‘aggressive’, ‘mechanical’, 
‘dumb’, or ‘eloquent’ line. 
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disappearance that remain immanent in drawing and that function as a self-
generative impetus during the ‘doing’ or labour of drawing. Their view resonates 
with De Zegher’s notion of participation and differentiation as opposing but 
generative forces in drawing.  
 
The view that generativity emanates from oppositional or contradictory forces 
recalls the concepts of dialectical interplay and infraconscious and infralinguistic 
complicity in the interactivities between habitus, field and practice that Pierre 
Bourdieu formulated (1998: 79-91). It also resonates with the concepts of visibility 
and invisibility that Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1968: 246-248) formulated as well as 
with Derrida’s metaphoric discussions pertaining to interplay (‘duel’) between the 
visible and the invisible as a realising apparatus in drawing (Derrida. 1993: 45-
53).68  
 
Downs et al. (2007: xii) virtually demonstrates a similar dialectic. They apply John 
Berger’s explanation of how drawing unfolds in process through a generative 
dialectic between appearance and disappearance. In this context, I interpret the 
word ‘appearance’ to refer to both the exterior manifestation of object, and to the 
advent and development of drawn display on the drawing surface, in other words, 
its ‘gradual becoming apparent’. By alluding to the convergence of these two 
meanings in one word (both in ‘unfold’ and in ‘appearance’), Downs et al. succeed in 
reflecting the drawing process itself in verbal terms: 
Drawing plays with appearance; it oscillates between seeing, thinking, 
remembering and imagining, controlling and being controlled as the image 
emerges. It is continuously and simultaneously shifting itself in the course of its 
making (2007: xii).  
 
Berger (2004: 112, cited in Downs et al. 2007: xii,) explains how generativity 
emanates from opposing forces, “Drawing works to abolish the principle of 
Disappearance, but it never can, and instead it turns appearance and 
disappearance into a game [which] can never be won, or wholly controlled, or 
adequately understood”. According to Berger, three aspects typify the drawing 
                                                       
68 Derrida acknowledges Merleau-Ponty’s contributions to these insights (1993: 52 -54). I explain 
these concepts and their relevance in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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process, namely observation, idea, and memory. Each of these aspects “speaks in a 
different tense” and each temporal space requires “a different capacity for 
imagination”. Memory occupies the past, observation and labour occupy the 
present, and idea occupies the future. These temporal elements generate the 
drawing through a continuous interchange between one another, thus constituting a 
process in drawing that generates the gradual appearance of drawn display 
(Downs et al. 2007: xii).  
 
If, as I mention above, appearance also implies the ‘look’ of something, or the visual 
information that something projects, the drafter conducts in simultaneous observation 
and inscription a complex process that encompasses practical and theoretical 
reasoning, thinking, idea, memory, the somatic, action, cognition69 and recognition. 
The capacity for memory that the drafter can accomplish through observation aids 
durational generation of idea, which in amassed form could constitute the advent of 
imagination. The drafter cites memory in all forms of drawing processes, not only in 
observational drawing. The drawing process assembles images from a variety of 
sources, from fantasy to memory and personal history, and even in processes of 
rigorously representational drawing, the drafter unconsciously recalls and cites such 
sources. In this way, the gradual appearance of the drawing is the result of 
fluctuations, subliminal dialectic, and convergences between thinking, imagining, 
seeing, labouring, and remembering that all activate simultaneously and in-phase 
with the act of drawing. Contrary to Hoptman’s declaration of drawing as a noun, 
Downs et al. therefore implicitly pronounce drawing to be a verb too, alighting on 
the temporality and spatiality of the labour and the fields of reference of the 
drafter as inescapable influences on the advent, process and outcome of a drawing 
(Downs et al. 2007: xii). 
Extended review of literature 
To situate the thesis relative to other studies on drawing, I discuss here some of the 
texts that have direct and indirect bearing on its development. I provide here only a 
very broad outline of a number of additional terrains of study in which drawing 
plays a pivotal role.  
 
 
                                                       
69  Refer also to the Glossary (Addendum B) for Varela’s definition of the concept. 
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Visual perception: difference 
Drawing plays an important role in scholarly investigations of visual perception and 
representation. John Willats, for example, provides insight regarding 
representational systems in pictures. His contributions incorporate a wide range of 
referencing, reflecting intersections in the fields of art historical, linguistic, 
psycholinguistic, and positivist cognitive and perceptual studies. In Art and 
Representation (1997), he claims the formulation of a new and exact terminology for 
describing such systems.  
 
Willats arrives at his lexis by drawing a distinction between the marks in a picture 
and the features of the scene that these marks represent. This notion, which I construe 
as the difference between the drawn image and the field of observation (see 
Illustration 10, Addendum A), will play a key role in the thesis. However, Willats 
positions a drawing-centred impetus as pivotal, while in contrast, I will position a 
drafter-centred impetus as interface in the development of drawing skill. The 
distinction that Willats draws between the features of the field of observation and 
the marks in drawing enables him to analyse the development of drawing skill in 
very positivist terms. He concludes, for example, that the various functions and 
consequent diversity in the nature of representational systems are accountable for 
the developmental changes that occur in children’s drawings. This thesis explores the 
‘diversity in the nature’ of representational systems. 
 
Grapheme / primitives 
In an article titled Ambiguity in Drawing (2006) Willats suggests that particular 
drawing systems or denotation systems that prevail in perception result in the 
ambiguities of drawings. He asserts a further distinction, namely between the 
“picture primitives in drawings and the marks used to represent them” (Willats. 
2006: 8-9). Patrick Maynard also asserts this distinction in Drawing Distinctions 
(2005: 95-108). This distinction presents a workable framework for understanding 
the gravity of the notion that drawing constitutes invention, which I propose.  
 
Willats purports that, “The primitives of a system are the smallest units of meaning 
available in a representation, and in pictures the denotation system define the 
relations between scene primitives and picture primitives” (2006: 8). This definition 
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of ‘primitives’ corresponds with my understanding of the word ‘grapheme’ in relation 
to drawing. To my mind, grapheme indicates the drafter’s unconscious or perceptual 
distinction between mark as physicality and mark as abstraction. The drafter 
conceives grapheme and applies it to present an abstraction as mark or unmark. 
Perception, conception, and marking occur in simultaneity. Physical mark making, as 
product of this form of conception, marks an invention. My idea of what trait 
constitutes also rests on such a distinction and the ‘relations between’ the drafter’s 
perception, conception and making the mark points towards where I perceive trait 
to originate from, as well as to the purposes of its functioning. The notion of the 
simultaneity of these processes asserts the notion of a possible further distinction that 
I assert in the thesis. Such distinction lies between presentation and representation. 
 
Drawing as a constructive process 
In Drawing Distinctions: the Varieties of Graphic Expression (2005), Patrick Maynard 
presents an enormously wide appraisal of drawing in systematic and philosophical 
terms. He references a spectrum of drawing practices ranging from the earliest 
drawings by humans to the intricate procedural diagrams that modern technology 
uses in an effort to “argue the great importance of drawing and to advance our 
understanding of it as an autonomous activity” (Maynard. 2005: xv). He tracks the 
“course of drawing” in its developmental phases from the first marks a child makes 
to the drawings of “masters”. In the process, and by considering the practical uses of 
drawing, Maynard conceives drawing as “a tool-kit of devices” that we apply and 
use to distinctly construct for multiple purposes and reasons (2005: xvii).  
 
Of particular interest is his repudiation of the notion of representation as the 
mechanical simulation of visual appearances. The concept of drawing as a ‘tool-kit’ 
containing a myriad of different tools that serve diverse purposes inherent to 
different categories of drawing also suggest numerous and various forms of 
constructiveness inherent to drawing. This idea dismisses the notion of representation 
in drawing as mere imitation of the visible world as its only value or purpose. He 
states that “drawing is a constructive process, where – as is clear from drawing 
practices – the instruction to ‘imitate appearances’ is useless” (2005: xviii). This 
notion relates to the significance of trait – its role in the constructive processes of 
invention. As I explain above, to my mind, emulation constitutes imitation of style 
 63 
language, which, in the context of learning to draw, reflects little more than 
mechanical regurgitation, which indeed “is useless”. I will argue that, in contrast, the 
unforeseeable irruptions of trait represent visible evidence of the constructive 
facilities of drawing. 
 
Drawing as knowledge 
An understanding of drawing as constructive of knowledge rather than imitative of 
visible appearance comes to the fore in an article published on TRACEY, an online 
journal of contemporary drawing research (http://www.lboro.ac.uk. 2006). Patricia 
Cain explores the role of embodiment in the construction of knowledge through the 
drawing process. Cain asserts that she could “identify that knowledge which 
accumulated during the process of drawing occurred in a manner which led from 
‘not knowing’ to ‘coming to know’, and was less to do with problem solving and more 
to do with problem finding” (2006: 2).  
 
As I initially did in my efforts to understand trait, Cain sets out to “equate” drawing 
to “modes of thinking” (2006: 2-3), which also refers to a specific subfield in 
educational psychology known as Thinking Styles.70 Such an equation, however, 
would suggest visible resemblances between the specific characteristics that the 
different Thinking Styles entail and manners of drawing. As Cain rightly points out, 
such a comparison can only prove to be limited, since it would merely serve to 
“indicate how drawing might be identified in relation the context of its use, whereas 
both artists and architects use drawing styles out of context” (2006: 2), and, might I 
add, each one uses them differently.  
 
With the certain knowledge that any reasonably gifted or proficient drafter can 
draw in any style, albeit by means of imitation and emulation of style, I also 
rejected this equation. Moreover, as I will explain in Chapter 7, the neatly 
compartmentalised categories of Thinking Styles, each rigidly limited to specific 
characteristics for particular styles, also suggest a form of determinism that refutes 
the unforeseeable nature of trait irruption and the ambiguities it brings to the 
languages of drawing. In the tertiary drawing studio, the application of Thinking 
                                                       
70 Robert Sternberg explains, “They [thinking styles] are ways in which we organize our cognitions 
about the world in order to make sense of the world” (1997: 150). 
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Styles would imply testing a group of student drafters to determine their Thinking 
Styles and expecting each individual drafter to draw according to his or her ‘style 
of thinking’. Such a facilitatory methodic would presuppose conscious thinking as 
prescriptive script for drawing, rather than the in-phase initiation and cerebration of 
thinking in interplay with the unconscious. 
 
Cain’s shift in thinking from problem solving to problem finding in relation to 
drawing is significant to this thesis. It indicates the generative processes of drawing 
as the seat of knowledge acquisition and generation as much as the seat of skills-
development in drawing. The significance of drawing in a comprehensive visual arts 
programme involves the generation of skilled drawing as much as the generation of 
critical, inventive, and constructive thinking that forces the boundaries of the 
different categories of drawing. Therefore, rather than defining problems at the 
outset, which would, as Cain points out (2006: 3), involve a process in which all 
directives for resolve would also be pre-determined, drawing processes constantly 
find and create problems for the duration of its progress. Moreover, drawing 
speculates, rather than verifies – it remains open-ended, rather than completely 
resolute, hence its capacity for constant renewal and adherence to fallibilism. 
 
Although Cain refers to it as ‘enactivism’71 (2006: 5-31), she also finds in Varela’s 
notion of enaction a feasible basis for understanding the processes of drawing that 
are complicit with the phenomenon of ‘not knowing’ before setting out on paths of 
revelatory discovery through the labours of a practice. Cain (2006: 5) refers to a 
parallel in processes of writing that Galbraith explains in Writing as a Knowledge-
constituting Process (1999), and in Knowing what to write: Conceptual Processes in 
text Production (1999), which also supports the methodology I adopt for writing this 
thesis (see above). Galbraith, according to Cain, asserts a “’knowledge constituting’ 
                                                       
71 Please see footnote 25. It should be ‘enactionism’, ‘enactionist’, or ‘enactionistic’. Varela 
deliberately uses the neologism ‘enaction’, which he formulates, as opposed to ‘enactment’ or 
‘enactivism’ to clearly denote a fusion between perception and action, which together, when fused, 
becomes responsible for unpremeditated utterance (as action) that is characteristic. In contrast, 
‘enactment’ suggests the subject’s subjective interpretation, representation, and imposition of existing 
or embodied codes and languages as they relate to production. The difference, which admittedly is 
difficult to distill, resides in the difference between ‘embodied action’ and ‘enaction of embodiment’, 
and ‘enacting embodiment’. In other words, ‘embodied action’ also occurs during ‘enacting 
embodiment’. Therefore, people ‘perform’ the same acts, such as making blind contour lines, 
differently (see Illustrations i(a) & i(b) above). This concept supports the difference between enaction 
and performativity, as I will apply it in the thesis. 
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or ‘dual-process model’” that can account for the covert “decision-making lying 
behind what seems like a spontaneous process” (2006: 5; Cain quoting Galbraith. 
1999: 139).  
 
It transpires that the drafter can find knowledge in the residues of experience that 
supplement, through embodiment, experiential cognition. According to Cain, 
Galbraith assumes that problem solving, as initiator of action, cannot access such 
tacitly stored knowledge. Moreover, such tacit knowledge is not stored in an 
identical way from one writer to the next – it spreads itself over the discordant 
rhythms of the individual writer’s divided self. Therefore, the generation of 
knowledge has to rely on the ‘dispositional dialectic’ that a divided self has to 
conduct in and through experiential cognition. Galbraith locates such a generative 
and dispositionally regulated “dialectic between the writer’s implicit disposition and 
the emerging text” (2006: 5; Cain quoting Galbraith, 1999: 46). Similarly, I will 
describe such a generative relationship between the self, the process of drawing, 
and the emerging drawn display. 
 
In Chapter 4, I will find and relate this generative pathway as one of more such 
layered and crossing paths between drafter, drawing, and seeing. This relationship 
implies the omnipresence of the drafter, who remains pivotal in creating new form. 
The drafter regulates this production of new form from within and it leads, rather 
than follows its maker (Cain. 2006: 5; quoting Galbraith, 1999: 141). This notion 
resonates in Varela’s theory of self-originativity that I mention above and discuss in 
the thesis in relation to drawing. 
 
Drawing and cognition 
In an article titled Eye Movements in Portrait Drawing (2001, August), by John 
Tchalenko, he focuses on those processes that enable artists to transfigure the visible 
world into visual images. Tchalenko comments that, although they put a great deal 
of research into visual processes and into perception of finished artwork, cognitive 
psychologists, and art-historians neglect the actual “picture production process” 
(2001, August: 2). Employing a positivist and quantitative methodology, he 
painstakingly describes his documentation of an artist’s eye movements during 
drawing, which he compares to the artist’s eye movements while not drawing. He 
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records (or documents) these eye movements with the aid of an “eyetracker”, which 
entails a head-mounted device that delivers a detailed video image of the pupil of 
one eye (2001, August: 4).  
 
Tchalenko offers five conclusions drawn from his meticulous observations. Firstly, 
visual information is captured systematically – “detail by detail” (Tchalenko. 2001, 
August: 11), each element being essential to a production that progressively adds to 
a preconceived whole. Secondly, the depiction's evolvement effectively determines 
the drafter’s movements. Rather than responding to stimulus, the drafter consciously 
controls her actions to serve an artist-centred purpose. “Thus his next glance at the 
model is for the purposes of advancing whatever he is drawing at the time”, states 
Tchalenko (2001, August: 11).  
 
Thirdly, Tchalenko concludes that training and experience has an effect on technical 
and observational dexterity, since only a practiced artist that participated in his 
study demonstrated specific eye and eye-hand skills. His fourth “remark” concedes 
that his reduction of the drawing process to mere “eye and eye-hand skills alone” 
does not provide enough grounds for fully understanding the drawing process. This 
is so, because other artists would produce completely different drawings, even if 
they were to draw the same model in the same style (realism) (Tchalenko. 2001, 
August: 11). This insight also directs my focus in this thesis while it outlines my 
perception of trait.  
 
Finally, Tchalenko suggests that, apart from the fact that all drawing lines are 
constructs, each individual artist’s conscious preferences and dispositions will prevail 
to affect the product. Although he does not explore the artist’s unconscious mind, 
Tchalenko, in his final observation, remarks that although the realist artist’s reactions 
are dominated by the visual input to the retina, more complex forms of mediation 
interfere during the drawing process (Tchalenko. 2001, August: 11). In another 
article, Tchalenko acknowledges that scientists only partly understand why the eye is 
in constant motion during drawing. The sharp movements of the eyes 
(“microsaccades”) remain a mystery. Thus far, scientists apparently have been 
unable to discover a relationship between the functioning of microsaccades and our 
ability to see (Tchalenko. 2001, November: 4).  
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Drawing and education in South Africa 
A particularly South African context, where I also intend the thesis to be of some 
value, offers little, if any, literature on drawing and education, thereby providing 
an obvious need for such inquiry. The educationist theory of Curriculum 
Responsiveness originated in South Africa (Griesel. 2004: 1-16) and, although it 
remains unimplemented, it holds very relevant and appropriate ideas that promise 
solutions to a very dire situation. Although the theory does not specifically relate 
drawing as subject discipline in its possible applications, I will focus on Curriculum 
Responsiveness as a particularly appropriate approach to teaching drawing 
(Griesel. 2004: 1-16). Of specific significance in Ian Moll’s explanations of a 
responsive approach in teaching, is his acknowledgement of the individual as centre 
of experience in the practicing of any knowledge discipline. The relationship that he 
sketches between individual, cultural heritage, and knowledge discipline (subject), 
once again finds a parallel in the drafter (individual), world (cultural environment), 
and drawing (knowledge discipline) relationship. The teacher’s responsiveness to 
these components also implies sensitivity towards the interactivities that would sustain 
such a relationship. Implicitly, responsiveness in a mediatory context is a form of 
interaction in itself – it entails empathetic interactivity between student and teacher 
that facilitates the student’s enactionist engagement. As a relationship that is 
generative of learning, the alliance between individual, cultural, and subject 
responsiveness find their parallel in the generative structure that Pierre Bourdieu 
poses.  
 
Drawing instruction 
An influential text on drawing instruction is of particular relevance and merits a 
mention in this review, because I align concepts regarding facilitation in the thesis 
with the approach that Betti and Sale assert. Drawing: A Contemporary Approach 
by Claudia Betti  (1997) offers a facilitatory system that emphasises the above-
mentioned constructive processes of drawing. It utilises the basic elements of 
drawing as devices for representation in drawing – reminiscent of the ‘tool-kit’-
concept that Maynard proposes. Drawing as a versatile and constructive process 
that supports and configures thinking, knowledge, and invention through the labour 
of drawing shapes their approach to drawing instruction. The internal logic of Betti’s 
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system supports the particular ways individual students process, store, recall, 
assimilate, and produce visual information that shapes their drawings. Betti and Sale 
(1997) advocate an open rather than closed system in a postmodern framework 
that delineates the scope of knowledge disciplinary (or ‘subject-specific’) practice, 
for example, in their accommodation of multiple solutions to the drafteric problems 
they pose. They regard all possible solutions as being of value, rather than a single 
optimally ‘correct’ solution that would enforce conformation to any one existing 
dogma, aesthetic norm, or style language.  
 
1.4 Conclusions 
 
I conclude that literature on drawing generally articulates its functions as a 
constructive process versus drawing as mimesis, or as a process in which the visible 
world is imitated. Such constructive processes locate in perception and cognition. 
Consequently, I can position the various investigations that the thesis will conduct in 
relation to drawing and cognition, visual perception, education, and drawing as 
constructive process. Its contribution will firstly lie in the links it proposes between 
individuation and drawing’s constructive functions. Secondly, it will contribute in 
terms of a possible realisation of these functions through the facilitation of 
individuation in drawing. These notions indicate the path forward for this thesis. 
 
I draw from this chapter some of the conclusions that will become central to the 
thesis. Although I draw to begin with from the relevant literature on drawing the 
notion that in drawing, gesture (body) and thinking (mind) relate closely, it is the 
writings of Varela, Bourdieu and Merleau-Ponty that expand my understanding on 
the relationship between gesture, phenomenon, and computation. The implication 
that the cerebral (mind) and the somatic (body) are interdependent as generative 
forces in drawing indicates a relationship between drawing-trait and body-mind 
that involve a subject–object relationship. By extension, this relationship requires 
understanding of subjectivity, objectivity, and action.  
 
Whether gesture is trace, or compels trace, I perceive in the action of trace making 
(drawing) a body-mind fusion, which suggests that gestic conversion merits a 
feasible explanation of perception’s role in trait formation. If the drafter turns the 
gestic into trace as new form, it suggests an urge in the drafter to gesture, which 
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entails body as much as mind as constructive partners. A complex ‘simultaneity’ is 
involved in gesture that includes experiential cognition, the computational processing 
of both input and output, and the concurrent lived ‘reality’ of the agent. Gesture 
‘indicates’ outwards, while also deriving from lived ‘reality’ (as construct) to realise 
as indication. An interactivity, or reflexivity, between the drafter and her 
engagement in lived ‘reality’ seems evident in such simultaneity. To support these 
explanations, I quote Varela (1991: xv-xvi): 
We hold with Merleau-Ponty that Western scientific culture requires that we 
see our bodies both as physical structures and as lived, experiential structures 
– in short, as both ‘outer’ and ‘inner’, biological and phenomenological. These 
two sides of embodiment are obviously not opposed. Instead, we continuously 
circulate back and forth between them. Merleau-Ponty recognized that we 
could not understand this circulation without a detailed investigation of its 
fundamental axis, namely, the embodiment of knowledge, cognition, and 
experience. For Merleau-Ponty, as for us, embodiment has this double sense: it 
encompasses both the body as a lived, experiential structure and the body as 
the context or milieu of cognitive mechanisms. 
If the drafter turns gesture into “‘the other’ of language that concerns itself with the 
unsayable” (De Zegher. 2003: 274), namely into drawn gesture, the process would 
also entail interaction in a very intimate, hidden sphere – either ‘from’, or ‘towards’ 
the unconscious, or both. At this point, I can place this interaction only between the 
drafter’s unconscious and the experiential cognition that the concept of embodiment 
upholds. What becomes clear from these reflections is that the physical act of 
gesticulation that produces a mark, although it evokes meaning, has its material 
genesis in the individual drafter. 
 
If the intimacy between the drafter and her language schemata is involved in 
constructing trait, converting the gestic into drawn gesture as ‘extroversion’72 or in 
conversation with world, – the carrying outwards of internality that reveals inner 
intimacies – is also of concern in the process of drawing. I conclude that, were drawn 
                                                       
72 I use the word ‘extroversion’ because it has ‘version’ in common with ‘con-version’, and ‘vers(e)’ in 
common with ‘conversation’. I play on the innuendo that ‘conversion’ insinuates a ‘transitive’ or ‘in-
between version of self’, while ‘conversation’ insinuates a ‘spoken version of self’, and ‘extroversion’ 
confirms both as an ‘outer version of self’, a play that underpins the concept of simultaneity that I 
want to convey. 
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gesture not meant as a communicative mediator with intention that sources and 
carries back and forth between, to and from the inside and the outside, it would not 
have been necessary to draw in the first place.  
 
Notwithstanding these notions, I must emphasise again that trait in drawing and its 
genesis intrigues me and constitutes the focus of the thesis, rather than the semantic 
value of trait as a language, the meaning of which invites interpretation from the 
outside. At this point, I understand the act of drawing to integrate (or incite) 
experiential cognition, the conscious, and unconscious of the drafter, and world. This 
confluence results in trace (trait) production, rather than in the ‘picturing’ of meaning, 
as ‘meaning’ would pertain to language and discourse. Bryson explains that, “What 
we have to understand is that the act of recognition that painting galvanizes is a 
production, rather than a perception, of meaning” (1983: xiii). I do not construe 
drawing-trait as meaning (e.g. expressive or descriptive meaning) that emanates 
from the individual, but rather as pre-meaning.  
 
The notions above delineate the focus of the thesis, which occupies a passage 
between the unconscious and the conscious, but nonetheless inside the drafter. To 
more effectively delineate and clarify the focus of the thesis as drawing-trait, it is 
perhaps necessary to equate voice and its particular sound, timbre, or acoustic 
quality with drawing-trait, and to equate spoken (voiced) language with a drawing 
as object, or as a culmination of trait and trace, which as an objective arrangement, 
conveys meaning, rhetoric, or discourse. Voice, its resonance, and its utterance locate 
in the individual body-mind, and therefore voice is individuated.73 Voice 
appropriates and employs tone, speech, and word as language – its semantics and 
meaning – which sustains discourse or rhetoric. Discourse centres in the objective 
world and in the play of signifiers. In looking for the genesis of trait, my concern 
must necessarily focus on the durational “experience and cognition” (Varela. 1992: 
42) as I understand it to occur in the act of drawing. This constitutes the “basic, 
perceptual modalities” (Varela. 1992: 42) that are involved in the making of a 
characteristic mark. 
 
                                                       
73 There is no way that one person’s voice can issue from another person’s mouth, but they could 
speak one another’s language. 
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Avis Newman boldly expresses the self-as-being74 as ‘I’ immanent in drawing: “to 
gesture outwards is not only the ‘I exist,’ but ‘I exist in relation to someone else’” (De 
Zegher. 2003: 274). I see ‘I’ (‘self’) as the ‘intimacy’ between experiential cognition, 
inner schemata of understanding and embodiments that drawing as practice carries 
outwards as embodied actions. Avis Newman’s words evoke ‘I’ as a ‘first person 
voice’ in an address outwards, as trait in drawing, while also alighting on the notion 
of ‘I’ stating the ‘self’ in responding to and in addressing ‘you’. In a simultaneous 
perception of other and of self, the ‘I’ states itself in a relationship of equity and 
communion between ‘I’ and ‘you’, in which both enter the bridge of mutuality75 in 
being to meet the other in the middle76. I construe this as self-consciousness revealing 
itself in self-cognition and in simultaneous self-recognition of ‘you’, an enaction over 
and above an interactivity that reveals itself in such intimacy.  
 
The drawn mark as gesture, and the drawing becoming itself, traces that delicate 
conversion into ‘extroversion’ as a coming-into-consciousness, so much so that the 
drawing becoming and the coming-into-consciousness of the drafter merge to unfold 
as one process. The drafter positions the specificity of self in the generality of social 
space and collectivity, affirming her existence while demonstrating her conception of 
being self in the social realm. She converses with an audience and with herself. In 
drawing, she conducts a continuous process of becoming and in the process projects 
the self, rather than illustrates a projection of self.  
 
                                                       
74 I draw this term from Francisco Varela’s discussions on the world versus the self as reference point 
(1992: 3-130). He concludes, “...but even when we could not find [self], we never doubted the 
stability of the world. How could we, when it seemed to provide the setting for all of our 
examinations? And yet when, having discovered the groundlessness of the self, we turn toward the 
world, we are no longer sure we can find it. Or perhaps we should say that once we let go of a 
fixed self, we no longer know how to look for the world. We define the world, after all, as that 
which is not-self, that which is different from the self, but how can we do this when we no longer have 
a self as a reference point? (Varela. 1992: 130). Like Merleau-Ponty, Varela finds a central 
mutuality of existence between world and self that proposes enaction as possible “middle way” 
(Varela. 1992: 217-235).  
75 I apply this word to refer to Merleau-Ponty’s (1968: 131, 227-228) (Evans. 2008: 188) concept 
of the laterally transcendental in perception. He often uses ‘flesh’, ‘chiasm’, and ‘reversibility’ as 
synonyms for the laterally transcendental. Also, see ‘Reversibility’ and ‘Reflexivity’ in the Glossary of 
key words (Addendum B). 
76 It is interesting in this regard to refer to Derrida’s telling of such reversibility, “Drawing comes in 
the place of the name, which comes in the place of drawing: in order...to hear oneself call the other 
or be called [by] the other”, and “From one blindness, the other. At the moment of the autograph, 
and with the most intense lucidity, the seeing blind man observes himself” (1993: 57). 
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This ‘projection’, I propose, rather implies an irruption77 that has its origin in 
unknowingness of the self, which is similar to pre-meaning, but speaks of the 
“recognition that it [the subject] can never be primary, transcendent, whole” (Foster. 
1999: 62). Despite the fact that the self, as Hal Foster asserts, “reveals that [it] is 
never anterior to its traces, its gestures, its ‘body’” (1999: 62), he explains further: 
Whether unconscious drives or social signs, these mediated expressions 
“precede” the artist: they speak him rather more than he expresses them. 
(Seen in this way, “the artist” is less the originator of his expression than its 
effect or its function – a condition that expressionism at once reveals and 
disavows). 
The notion of an enactionist irruption suggests a presentation of the sensing self by 
means of action or practice, such as drawing could constitute. The self in practice 
elicits enaction by and of the self as affirmation of her existence. In this sense, an 
alternative to the notion of illustrating a projection of the self would be constituted 
by an enaction of the self. Enaction, as embodied action, locates itself indisputably 
in the experiential cognitions78 of the individual engaged in activity (Varela. 1992: 
48-49; 172-180).  
 
‘Enactionist irruption’ does not mean expressionistic irruption. As I explain above, ‘the 
expressive’ in drawing suggests either expressionistic style language or the drafter’s 
emotional intent as blueprint (Foster. 1999: 59-77). In either case, these blueprints 
exist before mark or line complies to re-present them, after the fact, as it were – the 
fact, then, being the ‘I’. The ‘I’ involves the psychological, and biological, or ‘body-
related’ facets that do not appear as visible aspects in the mind.  
 
                                                       
77 As I explain in the Glossary (Addendum B), I intend the word to imply the unpremeditated ‘coming 
into being’ of the characteristic mark, which, as the thesis explains, appears on paper without having 
any visible precedent, neither in the drafter’s mind, nor in objective structures – in other words, 
‘blindly’. 
78 Varela states: “What implications does this cognitivist research program have for an 
understanding of our experience? We wish to emphasize two related points: (1) cognitivism 
postulates mental or cognitive processes of which we are not only unaware but of which we cannot 
be aware, and (2) cognitivism is thereby led to embrace the idea that the self or cognizing subject is 
fundamentally fragmented or nonunified. These two points [are] considerably intertwined” (1992: 
48).  
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I propose, therefore, that expression is re-presentational,79 similarly implying pre-
existing scripts written by memory and style language, which the drafter interprets 
and recounts. I interpret ‘enaction’ as an implicit and inherent impulsion that, with 
unscripted immediacy, marks itself as the self, not only as ‘presentative’80 of ego or 
personality, but as self-being inclusive of its unconscious, conscious, physical, 
biological, and psychological facets. I propose that the durational labour of 
drawing interweaves the self, a bond that necessarily produces trait.  
 
As became clear above, recent literature on contemporary drawing frames the 
various practices and manifestations of the field in a postmodern framework, which 
contends with a decentred self. The familiar word ‘self-consciousness’ suggests the 
self’s residence in consciousness alone – a single sphere of mental processing that 
conveniently evokes the supposition “that to be a self is to have a coherent and 
unified point of view, a stable and constant vantage point from which to think, 
perceive, [cognise], and act” (Varela. 1992: 50). Moreover, a self seems so close 
during drawing – a process in which both thinking and experiential cognition seems 
to occur in simultaneity – that it is easy to believe that consciousness and cognition 
alone orchestrate self-awareness. In fact, a self seems so entrenched in the act of 
drawing that the possibility of a non-existent self seems absurd. Similarly, a sense of 
self is so constant to us that its veracity seems to render unnecessary (if not 
unfathomable) the notion that its revelation requires a reflexive bending back onto 
itself.  
 
What sustains experiencing of the self in drawing? Varela asks, “What is the 
cognizing subject?” (1992: 50). Is the self centred only in consciousness, or only in 
cognition? According to Varela,  
Cognitivism runs directly counter to this conviction: in determining the domain 
of cognition, it explicitly cuts across the conscious/unconscious distinction. The 
domain of cognition consists of those systems that must be seen as having a 
distinct representational level, not necessarily of those systems that are 
                                                       
79 It is perhaps appropriate in this regard to refer to Derrida’s words, “It’s just that one must know 
[savoir], and so one just has to see (it) [voir ça] – i.e., that the performative fiction that engages the 
spectator in the signature of the work is given to be seen only through the blindness that it produces 
as its truth” (1993: 65).  
80 Rather than ‘representative’. 
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conscious. Some representational systems are, of course, conscious, but they 
need not be [conscious] to have representations or intentional states. Thus, for 
cognitivists, cognition and intentionality (representation) are the inseparable 
pair, not cognition and consciousness (1992: 50). 
Representation and experience intermingle on conscious and unconscious levels to 
shape a sense of self, which mediates in productive activities such as drawing. It is 
possible to cognise without necessarily being self-conscious. Similarly, we can be 
self-aware without conscious cognition. In other words, we can be unconsciously self-
aware, or self-awareness also incorporates the unconscious (Varela. 1992: 50-52). 
Indeed, Varela asks, “If cognition can proceed without the self, then why do we 
nonetheless have the experience of self?” (1992: 51). Experiential cognition, 
inclusive of its representational schemata, also plays a role in the constructs that 
constitute a self. 
 
Yet, Varela speculates, “if someone were to turn the tables and ask us to look for 
the self, we would be hard pressed to find it” (1992: 50). The self is divided, and 
this dividedness also manifests as continuous series of varied constructs – a physical 
organ does not house it, nor does the brain constitute the self. Bourdieu (1991: 39-
45) declares the self to be a social construct, suggesting that the objective structures 
of society and culture mediate in one’s idea of self. Although the self undeniably 
exists, we cannot find it in physical form. We draw from both the inside and the 
outside to construct a self, yet we perceive and experience it to exist on the inside.  
 
Therefore, the self is also divided between inside and outside – it does not constitute 
a “coherent and unified” entity “amid the furious storm of subpersonal activity” 
(Varela: 1992: 51). The notion that ‘subpersonal activity’ incorporates 
representational systems – schemata that orchestrate understanding and that both 
implore and shape intent, purpose, and meaning – warrants further exploration. 
“Unconscious symbolic computation” suggests the participation of “a computational 
mind”, while a “phenomenological mind” suggests the participation of “conscious 
experience” and “experiential cognition” in constructing the self (Varela. 1992: 52).  
 
How does the computational mind (which computes symbols on conscious and 
unconscious levels) relate to the immediacy of experience that a phenomenological 
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mind draws in? A ‘phenomenological mind’ includes sensorial involvement – seeing, 
touching, hearing, tasting, and so forth – in other words, it involves the domain of the 
body-mind. In drawing, cognition seems to be directed towards the field of 
observation in a way that intimately engrosses perception. Varela states that 
cognition “is directed towards the world as we experience it” (1992: 52), or as we 
live it – a lived ‘reality’. In drawing, we perceive movement, colour, surface, texture, 
tonal values, and so forth, perceptions that entail phenomenological experience. The 
drafter does not see the field of observation “as composed of subatomic particles” 
(Varela. 1992: 52).  
 
These ‘two minds’ – the computational and phenomenological minds – must surely 
have access to one another, since the drafter instantaneously creates the symbols 
that a computational mind purportedly processes and produces in conjunction with 
her body-mind. The notion of pathways that grant confluence between these two 
minds and body (mind-mind-body) so that we experience ‘understanding’ as a 
complex, yet unified phenomenon, emerges. Varela posits embodied action – 
enaction – as such reciprocal confluence (1992: 173), or a “middle way” (1992: 20-
21, 221, 228). Reciprocality between these ‘two minds’ and body employs and 
deploys embodiment by means of embodied action. Yet another participant is 
involved, namely action, activity, or doing (bodily labour) that orchestrates both 
transformation and production – such as the act of drawing constitutes. Through such 
action, enaction becomes cognition – cognition constitutes embodied action. The 
drafter perceives, understands, thinks, and makes a mark in simultaneity.  
 
The computational mind does not project its computations to organise or inform 
cognition, nor does the phenomenological mind project its experiences on the 
computational mind to determine computations. In other words, the subject does not 
reduce the world to awareness of it, nor is experiential cognition redundant in the 
subject’s understanding of the world. Between these ‘two minds’ and the body, a 
situated embodiment orchestrates a sense of mutuality that serves both. At this point, 
I propose that the computational mind and the phenomenological mind, with 
embodied action as reciprocality between them – a confluence that has a hand in 
constructing the self – also constructs the mark as presentation rather than 
representation. Enaction, as such a reciprocality, and as a notion that also represents 
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a middle way between subjectivism and objectivism, therefore suggests that 
drawing-trait does not only emerge or function as a form of address that displays 
the presence81 or absence of the subject. Nor does it only represent a discourse of 
the other (language). The notion emerges that drawing-trait82 originates from a 
place that directly presents before it complies with language.  
 
The credibility of such a notion and of the construct of a self as ‘immersed’ in trait, or 
of trait as an enaction of the self, requires further exploration. Is it so that drawing-
trait, as an enaction of the notion that ‘I exist’, is also rooted in the facility of 
drawing to convert pre-meaning into drawn gesture? If trait is borne by a conviction 
in the self, it suggests that trait is not expressive of the self, or of the ego, but that 
the self – an ever-elusive non-entity – becomes entrenched in drawing-trait not as 
projection, but as irruption. This notion leads to my perception that drawing-trait 
involves a self-presentational aspect that accesses pre-meaning, body-mind, and the 
reciprocal passages between the conscious and unconscious. Such self-presentation 
suggests itself as intimately interwoven with the ability to simultaneously access and 
construct meaning83 – a notion that supports the mediation of a ‘computational mind’ 
even on the unconscious level.  
 
As my research questions suggest, I seek the origin of trait in order to understand 
trait as individuated, drafter-centred emanation. Thereby, I hope to discover the 
significance of drawing-trait. I do not censure observation of the outer appearance 
of things (as a site of experiential cognition, or visual perception) in drawing. I 
rather explore the concepts of appearance, enaction, and performativity as active, 
yet merged, participants in drawing. I propose that the drawing act sustains 
interplay between the appearance of things and performativity to join and 
augment self-awareness, the labour, and the thinking of drawing. At this point, I 
hypothesise that such interplay manifests as trait or drawn gesture.  
 
                                                       
81 Note that I use ‘presence’ as opposite of ‘absence’, and not as the opposite of ‘difference’. This is 
not a reference to the ‘metaphysics of presence’. 
82 I refer here to drawing-trait, specifically, which does not mean or indicate drawing in general. 
83 I must stress that I base all further discussions on the assumption that interplay is constantly active 
between presentation and representation. In later chapters, I construe this interplay as similar to 
interplay between enaction and interaction. I do not declare drawing as purely enactionist or purely 
interactionist, nor do I position these notions as a negation of performativity in drawing. 
Performativity I associate with enaction. 
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As I explain in the Introduction, this thesis is also concerned with a perceived failure 
(in an educational context) in avoiding self-effacement and redistribution 
(emulation) of style language by student drafters. It is easy to recognise self-
effacement in drawings. Understanding the operations of self-assertion as the 
opposite of self-effacement in drawing, however, is not so simple. As is clear from 
the above discussion, self-effacement would prevent fruition of all the intricacies and 
intimacies of drawing that emerge from a divided self in enactionist engagement. In 
accordance with this notion, my inquiry into some of the literature on drawing 
suggests a versatile and generous complexity in drawing that indicates involvement 
of the drafter’s divided self in a fused body-mind. In summary, at this point, I 
propose that drawing involves enactionist (presentational) and interactive 
(representational) processes, both of which will structure the rest of the thesis.  
 
In the following chapters, I will further unpack these processes as inward- and 
outward-bound ‘intimacies’ between the drafter and her own drawing, which do not 
necessarily include exploration of the constructs of language that consolidate 
meaning. I suggest that drawing, as a system made up of trace and trait, reveals 
the hidden as the invisible. From the variety that drawing displays – its ranges from 
tenacious rigour to wild deviation – it is evident that it conveys a playful delight in a 
very human diversity that indicates the hand of the individual self.  
 
The conclusions above require a more expanded understanding of the theories of 
Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu informs about interactive processes in cognition and 
recognition. I also turn to Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who asserts “the body as the 
ground for experience” (Diprose. 2008: 8-9), and to Francisco Valera’s cognitivist 
formulations around enaction. I employ their writings to construct a framework for 
further inquiries into the nature, significance, and potentialities of trait in drawing. In 
such a diverse framework, I suggest that drawing can constitute pronoun, verb, and 
noun, composing a full sentence that renders drawing individuated, yet diverse, 
communicative, dynamic, generative, and layered in signification and meaning. In 
words, such a sentence would read I mark self. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
I MARK SELF: INTERACTION AND ENACTION 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Bourdieu’s habitus, practice, and field theoretical formation constitutes a generative 
structure. As I explain in the Introduction, the concept of the internalisation of 
externalities and the externalisation of internalities underpin Bourdieu’s theory of 
habitus. This concept deconstructs subject-object or agent-structure dualities. The 
purpose of this chapter is to relate drawing to these notions.  
 
Bourdieu’s complete volume of work is enormous and involves much wider 
explorations into the complexities of human engagement in social and cultural 
spheres. I focus here only on those aspects relating to the problem statement (see 
the Introduction) and in particular to cognition and perception in drawing. My 
discussions here, therefore, centre on habitus as perceptive facility of the drafter. 
This facility is also accountable for conception and improvisation in an interactive 
relationship of generativity with drawing as a practice, and with the wider field of 
drawing as a visual art. 
 
Another purpose of this chapter is to relate the concepts I identified in the previous 
chapter to enaction as embodied action and to the drawing experience. Such 
concepts include, for example, a circular ambit between the unconscious and the 
conscious, and between agent and structure. Enaction incorporates facets beyond 
the social, namely the psychological, biological, and physical experiencing of socio-
cultural interaction. As such, enaction includes cognitive processing, which also 
constructs a self. I relate these concepts to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of reversibility 
between subject and object in an attempt to explain the self as construct, thus 
adding consideration of the significance of body-mind and subject-object 
unifications. These unifications may eventually bring comprehension of the 
cerebrative processes proposed by Bourdieu, which comprise the unified subjective 
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doxic modality84 and somatic legibility in drawing. I propose that such unified 
modalities play a role in the forming of drawing-trait.  
 
The chapter, therefore, begins to pose the overarching questions: What is the 
genesis of trait, or where are the constructive playgrounds from which trait could 
possibly emanate? Answering this question could lead to understanding the 
significance of trait. 
 
2.1 The framework: definitions and relationships 
 
I derive the following explanation from Bourdieu’s expositions on the genesis of 
dispositions (1996: 181, 235, 238, 256, 264-267).  
 
Bourdieu’s perspective suggests that a person’s existence involves a number of 
forces. The unified mind and body stands in a dynamic spatial and temporal 
relationship to the world as ‘lived reality’. Many aspects of life present themselves 
as externally objective, impartial, or neutral configurations (for example, 
environment, culture, and society). Although a person lives temporarily in-phase with 
such structures, they are ‘objective’, since they surpass one’s temporal existence and 
they will presumably continue to exist and change beyond one’s own passage 
through time and life.  
 
Living through life entails reciprocality between person and the world, which implies 
that objective structures can shape a person’s life as much as a person can influence 
objective structures. In the life of an individual person, such reciprocality culminates 
into a continuous flow of chronicles, which tell time- and place-specific stories of 
unification between subject and object. For the individual, these chronicles become a 
private record, a personal history that is active on conscious and unconscious levels, 
and which orchestrates and articulates reciprocality as embodiment. The mind 
constantly consolidates these chronicles to enact fragments of them reflexively in 
day-to-day behaviour, engagement, and practices. In consolidating perceptions, the 
                                                       
84 The phrase suggests that the particularity of trait in drawing, for example, would be implicit of 
and influenced by beliefs that are entrenched in the unconscious self to the extent that the drafter is 
hardly aware of them on a conscious level. Please refer to the Glossary (Addendum B). 
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body-mind process experiences to recursively85 store them in their adjusted 
(consolidated) state as memory. Thus, each individual becomes the embodied locus 
of her own perceptions of lived ‘reality’. The contributions of life remain flexible 
and changeable constructs in the mind for future exemplification in all practices. 
Their storage is indeed not passive. They change constantly and form cryptograms 
for continual disposing of ‘self’. The self conducts, in this way, an empowering and 
affirmative form of self-governance. This crusade ensures continued progress 
through life. These cryptograms constitute complex schemas of dispositions, 
tendencies, inclinations, or proclivities to conduct practices in particular ways. 
However flexible these preferred ways, they become identifiable with an 
individual. As such, the dispositional self constantly partakes in external and internal 
ambits, which leads to the acquisition of ever more skill, competence, and ability. 
These aspects in turn feed back into the expansion of her experiential and internal 
realms. With the self as pivotal centre, these processes perpetuate reflexive 
circularity as internalisation and externalisation.  
 
Thus, the individual’s passage through life, her personal history, and her experience 
of all facets of environment, culture, and society, converge. This convergence 
articulates as habitus, which manages her behaviour, body postures, gestures, and 
ways of thinking. Pierre Bourdieu formulated the notion of habitus. 
 
2.1.1 Habitus 
In his theory of habitus, Pierre Bourdieu appropriates the Aristotelian notions of 
doxa and hexis (Bourdieu. 1996: 179). A dispositional self enfolds doxa and hexis 
as whole. Bourdieu describes hexis as  
…a certain durable organisation of one’s body and of its deployment in the 
world. Bodily hexis is political mythology realised, embodied,86 turned into a 
                                                       
85 Simon Blackburn explains recursivity as “a procedure that is applied once, and then applied to the 
result of that application” (2008: 309). 
86 The concept of ‘embodiment’ is entrenched in Bourdieu’s habitus formation, as is reflexivity. 
‘Embodiment’ includes a cognitive scientific sphere in the work of Varela and I derive later discussions 
in this chapter from his notion of ‘embodied action’. (I introduced ‘embodied action’ in the previous 
chapter). The simple notion that hand and eye affect trait (where ‘eye’ implies both sight and vision, 
and where ‘body’ represents physically experiential construct that effects the embodiment of 
knowledge), requires focus. In being (existence), the subject enfolds intellect and somatic, the non-
physical and the physical. As social space informs actions, so ‘body as the context or milieu of 
cognitive mechanisms’ informs gestic conversion that involves sight and vision. 
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permanent disposition, a durable way of standing, speaking, walking and 
thereby of feeling and thinking (Bourdieu. 1996: 352, note 51).  
 
Doxa, in a social context, constitutes the constructs of mind rather than those of 
body. Bourdieu explains, “Primary experience of the social world is that of doxa, 
an adherence to relations of order which, because they structure inseparably both 
the real and the thought world, are accepted as self-evident” (1984: 471). It 
realises in a broad spectrum of uniform principles in any given society, for example 
lore and myth, idiomatic sayings and wisdom, beliefs regarding ethics, morals, 
respect, disregard, and all that encapsulates “the given cultural norm” (Bryson. 
1983: 75). Society’s objective configurations engender systems of thought that 
people experience as innate and obvious. They regard such thinking as intrinsic to 
their way of life. The automatic recognition of such systems of thought serves as 
enabling guide to ensure confident and appropriate movement through life.  
 
The term Bourdieu formulated for dispositional ‘cryptograms’ or schemas of mental 
organisation is ‘habitus’ (1996: 179-180, 214-215, 352 note 34, 362-363 note 
81). Habitus is a system of understanding and practice that transcends the doxa and 
hexis, or mind and body duality. In other words, the body forms as much part of 
dispositional structuring as does mind.  
 
Bourdieu explains the origin (genesis) of dispositions in the individual as a complex 
process that involves dynamic interaction between the individual and for example, 
those linguistic, educational, political, social, and cultural structures that exist 
objectively in society (1984: 123). This interaction constitutes processes of 
socialisation and learning that, as I mention above, enable the individual to relate 
and function in an environment, a community, and a society. In the individual-to-
group and individual-to-environment (subject to object) relationships, the individual 
receives information, responds to it, and starts to attach value to objective structures, 
phenomena, or information of any kind (Bourdieu. 1984: 246-250). Moreover, 
Bourdieu purports that,  
The habitus enables ... an intelligible and necessary relation to be established 
between practices and a situation, the meaning of which is produced by the 
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habitus through categories of perception and appreciation that are 
themselves produced by an observable social condition (1984: 101). 
 
The input between individual and lived ‘reality’ is enormous. In all practices, it 
implies interactive dynamic between agent, practice, product, and world. It is 
various, complex and undergoes constant change. Therefore, it also implies constant 
cognitive reception and processing. This results in progressively accumulative 
integration of a multitude of evaluations, ideas, and information within already 
existing internalised organisational schemas. Such accommodations include processes 
of comparison, relation, and elaboration that, in a recursive fashion, fit their 
contribution into existing schemas. These processes recursively adjust and stack 
internalisations to create new schemas of organisation.  
 
Evaluatory processes, for example, result in the rejection or retention (Bourdieu. 
1984: 250) of values or beliefs. This happens to the extent that retained beliefs 
and disbeliefs exert influence on the individual’s behaviour. Once habitual, such 
behaviour turns into ‘characteristic’ behaviour. Bourdieu regards repeated 
manifestations of such behavioural characteristics as ‘disposition’. In this way, 
interaction results in the formation of dispositions. According to Bourdieu, dispositions 
become encoded87 in perception to direct and shape practices (1983: 313). 
 
Bourdieu formulates his definition of habitus in various ways. I repeat all of them 
here, because each formulation adds nuances that point to the complexity of 
habitus. In Outline of a Theory of Practice (Bourdieu.1977: 78), he defines habitus as 
follows: “Habitus is the durably installed generative principle of regulated 
improvisations”. In Reproduction (Bourdieu. 1977: 31-32), he explains habitus as 
“the product of internalization of the principles of a cultural arbitrary capable of 
                                                       
87 Embodied code, as inner consolidation, is of the utmost importance as formative and transformative 
apparatus in cognitive experience. This embodiment brings about understanding, or appropriation, 
and application of knowledge, as well as mode and manner in musculature employment. Bryson 
asserts that the “habitus may involve explicit cultural knowledge, such as codes of justice or articles of 
faith, as well as the patently enculturated domain of art, where this is socially institutionalised; it may 
equally involve implicit cultural knowledge that exists nowhere in codified form, but remains at a tacit 
level” (1983: 14). Tacit social and cultural codes play a role in material practices (such as drawing) 
to effect, even determine, modes or manner. Bryson asserts, “Habitus is understood materially, as a 
mode of practice” (1983: 174). Such codes would also be active during gestic conversion, during the 
process of converting pre-meaning into meaning in mode, a stylistic aspect of drawing that would 
include trait. 
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perpetuating itself after PA [pedagogic action] has ceased and thereby of 
perpetuating in practices the principles of the internalized arbitrary”. Here, and in a 
later publication, he defines habitus as “a system of durable, transposable 
dispositions which functions as the generative basis of structured, objectively unified 
practices” (Bourdieu. 1977: 33, 41, 47) (Bourdieu.1979: vii). In Distinction (1984: 
101-102), Bourdieu describes habitus as an “objective relationship between two 
objectivities that enables an intelligible and necessary relation to be established 
between practices and a situation”. He further defines habitus as that facility in 
humans that produces meaning and understanding “through categories of 
perception and appreciation that are themselves produced by an observable social 
condition”. In The Rules of Art (1996: 352, n43), he defines it as “a set of 
dispositions which incline agents to act and react in certain ways. The dispositions 
generate practices, perceptions, and attitudes which are regular without being 
consciously coordinated or governed by any rule”.  
 
From Bourdieu’s definitions of habitus, it is possible to surmise that habitus constitutes 
a deep-seated, unconscious array of personalised dispositions that function as an 
enabling system of perception and conception in the mind and in the body. The mind 
inculcates dispositions by drawing from those externalities that are characteristic of 
cultural and social spheres, from a socio-cultural habitus, as it were, where the 
individual interacts. As a result, generations transmit dispositional information 
(phylogenesis) from one to the next in a way analogous to the transmission of 
genetic information (ontogenesis) (Bourdieu.1996: 286). The mind inculcates 
dispositions continuously and concurrently with practices, always deriving them from 
its own subjective cultural and societal engagement.  
 
Dispositions therefore are always subject to development and change. Because the 
mind always applies and sustains habitus as a consistently characteristic perceptual 
framework, it accomplishes dispositional development and change through the 
subjective formulation or conversion of concurrencies between objective structures, 
in-phase experience, and personal history. Self-reflexivity is possible in formulating 
concurrent experiences, because personal history in itself, as a derivative and 
resultant location from where formulation springs, already contains (or is 
‘embodied’) and therefore pre-constitutes layers of formerly accrued dispositionally 
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assimilated formulations (Bourdieu. 1996: 286-289). The subject, therefore, is 
situated. 
 
Subjectivity emphasises infraconscious and infralinguistic complicity88 in formulating 
concurrencies between self and externalities (Bourdieu. 1998: 79). Subjective 
formulation could also constitute improvisation as conception in practices, by 
inference of a generative mobility forward, a physical and cerebrally based 
potential for proliferation of conception and inventiveness that suggests added 
dimensions to transformation. This dimension also adds potentialities for optional 
reactions and actions in formulations. As such, dispositional reactions and actions has 
the freedom of “the space of possibles”, which would comprise for example dissent 
from, compromise in or compliance with convention as arbitrary in the first place, thus 
enabling transformation or transcendence of institution (Bourdieu. 1996: 270-271).  
 
I employ these notions to explain differentiation in practices, as they would logically 
explain differentiation between practices. Bourdieu asserts, “...there are thus as 
many fields of preferences as there are fields of stylistic possibilities” (1984: 226).  
 
 Habitus and difference 
(See Addendum A, Illustrations 3, 9, & 10) 
Personalised habitus is accountable for difference in practices that also involve 
production, such as drawing. Differentiation in practices pertains to diversity in a 
practice (e.g. different ways of standing); it pertains to diverse practices (the 
difference between standing and sitting); it pertains to the finest distinction, namely 
individuation in a practice (differences in one way of standing between different 
individuals). As such, different ways of drawing exist; drawing differs from painting; 
and different individuals draw differently, as much as they perceive lived reality in 
different ways. The latter distinction also manifests in the difference between the 
drawn image and the source material (see Illustration 10, Addendum A). The 
difference between the drawing and the perception of individuals is of interest. I 
                                                       
88 I interpret ‘infra-‘ here to suggest ‘within’ or ‘below’ the sphere of inner conscious awareness and 
‘within’ or ‘below’ those systems of subjective, inner linguistic frameworks that construct meaning 
subjectively, rather than on the ‘outside’ or within the impositions of objective frames of language or 
lived ‘reality’. 
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point out trait,89 as a quality that displays as difference between the drawings of 
individuals in Illustrations 3 & 9, Addendum A. 
 
2.1.2 Field 
In Bourdieu’s thinking, the ‘field’ concept implies an external structure, a realm of 
practice, of production, and of objective relations. People participate and compete 
for position in a field (1996: 83, 100-103, 181, 231-234, 235) (1984: 226-230). 
It is a concept that entails influential dynamism in externalities – it constitutes an 
externally based mobilisation of forces in contrast to interaction with the internally 
based generative dynamic of habitus. Yet, field stands in an augmentative 
relationship to habitus. “The field of production”, says Bourdieu, is “a space of 
objective relations” (1996: 181).  
 
In secondary sources, field is often qualified as a “field of forces” (Harker. 1990: 
8). As such, I associate it with the pursuit and action of a game, rather than with the 
stillness and captivity of a fenced-in field. Bourdieu, in an interview with Mahar, 
emphasises that a proper understanding of field necessarily requires “thinking in 
terms of a system and relationships” and he explains that, “society can be seen as a 
system of fields within the social space”, a system that resembles “a planetary 
system, because the social space is really an integral field. Each field has its own 
structure and field of forces, and is set within a larger field, which also has its own 
forces, structures, and so on. As it develops, it is weaving a larger field” (Bourdieu in 
Mahar. 1990: 36. Emphasis PB).  
 
It is clear to me that Bourdieu’s concept of field constitutes interrelated territorial 
accruals that grow in dimension and extent in mobilised interplay between habitus, 
practice, and field. Social space encapsulates and integrates, for example, the 
artistic field, a field that incorporates the visual arts field and where, in turn, the 
field of drawing is located.  
                                                       
89 For Derrida, trait accommodates a range of meanings, such as feature, line, stroke, or mark (1993: 
2). I apply the term in this thesis to denote personalised features in drawing that includes line, trace, 
stroke, or mark, but also personalised applications of the conventions of drawing, such as 
composition, colour, subject, theme, or idea, and so forth. I must emphasise that my applications of the 
word ‘trait’ refer specifically to distinctive idiosyncrasies in drawing and, notwithstanding the 
exploratory and theoretical parallels that I draw between drawing and habitus, I by no means 
equate trait in drawing to personality trait that refer to human character or person.  
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If one applied such interactive reverberations to drawing, it would be reasonable to 
say that drawing, therefore, would weave a discursive network outwards in visual 
display and reference that could reach the fullest extent of the social space in which 
it is practiced. The components (or fields) of such a social space simultaneously 
weaves a network inwards that informs the field of drawing and the habituses of its 
practitioners. In metaphorical terms, these fields grow in reach and accrual to 
interconnect along diagonal, vertical, and horizontal lines or they spin in 
concentricity around a common axis, rather than moving separately in exclusionary 
circles.  
 
Habitus and the field of forces, both products of history, stand in interactive relation 
to one another. This relationship produces practice (production or action90), an 
activity that is centred in the individual (Bourdieu. 1990: 36). A dispositional urge in 
individuals to partake, to “struggle”, and “strategise” for position in the field, 
sustains this productive inter-dynamic. Bourdieu claims, “These struggles are seen to 
transform or conserve the field of forces” (1983: 312), because the agent conforms 
to norm, either rebels against it, or finds a compromise between the former two 
options.  
 
‘Struggle’ and ‘strategising’ are the operative verbs in the individual’s participation 
in the field (Bourdieu. 1996: 197-198). In drawing, such struggle comprises its 
labour as crossing point between the self and objective structures. Such labour 
integrates an aesthetic idiolect,91 technical competence, and creativity. The student 
drafter fights constantly for a balanced accomplishment in all these dimensions to 
avoid either superficiality or rejection from the field. Here in lies additional 
interchanges and strategising, namely those between the display of trace and 
                                                       
90 Philosophy distinguishes between practice and production. ‘Poiesis’ denotes ‘production’, “an 
activity which results in creating a product”. In contrast to this, ‘praxis’ denotes ‘practice’, suggesting 
“doing something” (PDP. 2005: 475 – 476). This contrasting of the two concepts also distinguishes 
‘practice’ as requiring ‘virtue’, and ‘poiesis’ as requiring ‘skill’. Skill requires practice and virtue 
requires knowledge. I assume a conflation of the two meanings in my interpretation of Bourdieu’s 
term ‘practice’ to enclose all these nuances and I apply it as such in the thesis, or as a generic term 
that enfolds production and practice. In Chapter 3, I explore the simultaneity and ambiguity of the 
two concepts as they manifest in drawing. 
91 Umberto Eco (1979: 271-273) identifies a corpus-idiolect comprising the aesthetic-, the work-, the 
movement-, and the period-idiolects, each positioning itself in a generative hierarchy of 
conceptualising paradigms that are accountable for individuated performances. 
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technique, and those between individual drawing practice and the field of forces. 
Such interchanges also involve evaluatory activities in critical reviewing and 
redrawing that would enable and increase possibilities of syntheses in drawing, an 
assumption that Bloom’s taxonomy of the cognitive domain confirms92 (Swebok. IEEE. 
2004; 1-8) (Bloom. 1956: 38, 39, 62-197).  
 
The difference between having to comply rigidly to a game-plan that dictates strict 
rules according to which the game must be played, and having to ‘struggle’ and 
‘strategise’ for position in the field as modes of interplay and engagement is 
important. The former option implies the dominance of objective structures in pre-
determining the modes of engagement by subjects. The second option implies 
interactivity in which influence between objective structure and agency is reciprocal. 
Activities of struggle and strategising imply that the engagement of the subject is 
one of reflexivity, subjectivity, and self-reliance that bring about open-ended 
development of adeptness and variability in her engagement in the field. In contrast 
to this, rules require development only up to the point where the subject 
accomplishes sufficient compliance with such rules. Were the subject to disturb or 
challenge those structures of the game that the rules protect in any way, such 
structures would reject her to ensure their continued existence and stability.  
 
 Dissent, compromise, compliance 
I interpret the relationship that Bourdieu describes between habitus and field as one 
that accommodates or facilitates development of both subject and objective 
structure. In contrast, the subject’s dogged obedience to the rules that objective 
structures pre-determine would result in the stagnation of both subject and object. 
                                                       
92 Benjamin Bloom (1956: 62-187) organised the cognitive domain into five categories for purposes 
of defining educational objectives in curriculum design. These five categories constitute knowledge, 
comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation – those abilities that are required in 
learning (1956: 201-207). They stand in a hierarchical relationship to each other and function 
recursively in intellectual development. It is, for example, not possible to comprehend without 
knowledge, to apply without knowledge and understanding, to analyse without application, 
understanding, and knowledge. Synthesis and evaluation, the highest orders in the cognitive domain, 
require knowledge, comprehension, application, and analysis. Synthesis and evaluation imply self-
reflexive and therefore heterodox deviations from conventions (however minuscule in terms of 
deformation). Synthesis, as a cognitive ability, lies on an equal level with evaluation (Bloom. 1956: 
185-187). Synthesis constitutes creation, where “the student originates, integrates, and combines 
conceptions into a product, plan, or proposal that is new to [her]” (Bloom. 1956: 162-164). In 
drawing, such a description would correlate with a drawing that is in no way a repetitive 
redistribution of existing form or the prevailing norms. As a framework for curriculum design, Bloom’s 
taxonomy withstands the test of time perhaps because it accommodates renewal. 
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The interactive subject engages by means of a generative habitus and its 
deployment effects objective structure, which indicates pliancy and dynamism. Thus, 
a subject’s participation in a field allows her habitus to generate innumerable 
strategies, because she has to respond to countless possibilities and configure 
constantly. I propose but three categories of such ‘innumerable strategies’, namely 
those of, for example, dissent, consent, and compromise. I see them as broad 
strategising categories with numerous subcategories that the subject can apply to 
varying degrees. In my discussions, I apply them to drawing in order to explain its 
potential for deviation from norm (see Illustration 8, Addendum A). 
 
It is possible to see the functioning of the field of forces as twofold. It entails partly 
objective structure, which represents as the constraints of convention and norm. If 
individual competes for position in these structures, she gains position and her 
habitus engages in interaction with conventions. This interaction also indicates her 
agency in engagement that represents the second component in the field’s 
functioning. This component entails self-conscious, habitus-based, involvement where 
transformation or conservation of convention would transpire in personalised 
qualities in practices. Bourdieu explains,. 
The probable future of a field is inscribed, at each moment, in the structure of 
the field, but each agent makes his own future – thereby helping to make the 
future of the field – by realizing the objective potentialities which are 
determined in the relation between his powers and the possibles objectively 
inscribed in the field (1996: 272). 
As such, the drafter, when engaging in interplay with the conventions and structures 
of drawing, contributes to either transformation or progress in the field of drawing, 
or to repetitive conservation of its conventions or style languages. 
 
2.1.3 Practice 
In defining habitus and field and their interrelatedness, the concept of practice 
defines itself, literally emerging in demonstration of its genesis. The struggles and 
strategies for position in the field constitute the very engineering of practice. 
Individuated positing and positioning becomes possible as a result.  
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Practice entails “a dialectical production, continually in the process of reformulation” 
(Harker in Mahar et al. 1990: 101). This conception of practice is particularly 
consistent with a flexible and open understanding of its mechanisms as opposed to 
an inhibitive, restrictive understanding that would rather support a notion of law-
bound redistribution of form (or norm). It centres the agent as generative 
manufacturer and practitioner who does not doggedly follow the rules of the game. 
Bourdieu’s deliberate deviation from ‘rule’ to ‘struggle’ and especially to ‘strategy’ 
in practice demonstrates a decisive break from structuralist logic, utilitarianism. It 
nullifies the notion of an agent as detached from objective structures in complete 
subjectivity (Mahar. 1990: 15).  
 
I propose that in drawing, no rule should impose itself in the processes of production 
and labour, but that the labour itself, in its cerebrative orchestrations, participates in 
generating new form. To “struggle and strategise” in practices imply self-reliant 
decision-making processes that might result in dissent from, compromise in or 
compliance with norm or convention, a difference that constitutes the irrefutable 
involvement of personalised choice and decision making in dialectical exchange 
(Bourdieu. 1998: 79-85). In the next chapters, Bourdieu’s notion of practice provides 
foundation for my explorations of drawing. 
 
2.2 A transcending and generative framework 
 
The above discussions necessitate explanation of the habitus, practice, and field 
theoretical formation as a transcending framework. This framework supports and 
explains the body-mind conflation that I have already begun to incorporate into 
discussions. The formation, its particular relational arrangements, transcends several 
dualities in conventional social and cultural theory. Such dualities include not only the 
body versus mind duality,93 but also agency versus structure, objective versus 
subjective, inner and outer, and unique (idiographic) versus universal (nomothetic94) 
                                                       
93 In a Cartesian framework, body and mind are separate, as John Cottingham explains in the 
Dictionary of Philosophy (2005: 153), “Perhaps the most controversial part of Descartes’s 
metaphysics, however, is the claim (made in the Sixth Meditation) that the nature of the mind as a 
pure thinking substance is entirely distinct from the nature of body, or extended substance, and hence 
‘it is certain that I am really distinct from the body, and can exist without it’”. 
94 ‘Idiographic’: “relating to the study or discovery of particular scientific facts and processes as 
distinct from general laws” (ODE. 2005: 861). ‘Nomothetic’: “relating to the study or discovery of 
general scientific laws” (ODE. 2005: 1195) 
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antinomies. In the following section, I explain Bourdieu’s erasure of such dualities in 
relation to drawing. 
 
Habitus, practice, and field: a non-hierarchical formation 
In his theoretical formation, Bourdieu centres habitus as originative, activating and 
bonding mediator between itself, practice, and field. In this way, Bourdieu locates 
the individual as centre of perception. He also locates the role of objective structures 
as a kind of framing device that can be both inhibitive and expansive or liberating, 
depending on the response habitus engenders. As we have seen, habitus can 
transform objective structures or conform to such structures by means of strategy and 
struggle. Objective structures, likewise, conform to habitus and practice. As such, the 
framing schemata of field are subject to change by habitus and practice. In such 
transformative interactivity between habitus, field, and practice, determinism is 
impossible, because both internal and external structures are subject to change. 
Dialectic and recursive interchange95 as generators of interactivity embed in 
processes of synthesis and in practices. If the modes of exchange comprise dissent, 
consent, or compromise, objective schemata cannot remain static. Habitus, therefore, 
sustains flexible and versatile armature in which cerebration and externalities 
converse on a reciprocal basis. Thus, objective structure (field) and subjective 
agency (habitus and practice) merge. So do body and mind (habitus and practice), 
and the universal (field) and the unique (habitus and practice). Not habitus nor field 
or practice enjoys supremacy in any of the planes of their interrelatedness. 
 
Habitus, practice, and field: a generative structure 
As a theoretical formation, habitus, practice, and field hold a dimension that is 
imperative to understanding its versatility and relevance to the problem statement. 
This dimension entails its generative function that locates internally in habitus and 
practice and with partial externality and internality in field. In his definitions of 
habitus, Bourdieu relates it directly to self-generative production in structured 
practices. The originative, mediatory, and generative aspects of the formation lie in 
equal measure in interactivity and interchange. As such, mobility between agency 
                                                       
95 ‘Recursive interchange’ suggests complicity between infraconscious and infralinguistic schemata of 
the habitus to structure meaning (Bourdieu. 1998: 79-80). See also the Glossary (Addendum B). 
Simon Blackburn explains recursivity as “a procedure that is applied once, and then applied to the 
result of that application” (2008: 309). 
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and structure dispels an artificial opposition between objective structures and 
subjective representations. Bourdieu applies the term “generative structuralism” to 
this notion. In its capacity as mediator, habitus describes a way of thinking and a 
manner of approaching problems to account for the genesis of the person. This 
conceives habitus, the perceptive and conceptive apparatus of a person, as 
accountable for her perception, her self-perception and for the practices and 
trajectory of her self in practices (Bourdieu. 1984: 100-102).  
 
Bourdieu’s habitus theory leads to the notion of generativist proliferation, which 
pertains to incremental expansion of proficiencies, intellect, and the self, as well as 
to expansion of objective structures. Habitus is a system. Bourdieu calls habitus a 
‘scheme’ of dispositions. Secondary sources on the subject puts forward several 
similar terms, such as ‘set’, ‘apparatus’ (Mahar, Harker & Wilkes.1990: 4, 10, 12, 
15), ‘schema’, and ‘structure’ (Codd in Mahar et al. 1990: 138) (Mahar in Mahar et 
al. 1990: 35). These terms suggest a regularly interacting or interdependent 
apparatus that, in the agent, consists of a multitude of dispositional components. In 
their functioning, such dispositions form a unified whole that conflates perception, 
cognition, and conception. These different dispositional components of the habitus 
function in equilibrium with each other when subjected to related forces of 
intellectual inquiry, practices, or physical activity. Thus, they coordinate to operate 
and perform vital functions in a productive or generative capacity, because they 
also have a purpose in common in productive activity (such as drawing). Dispositions, 
as varied generative components of this facility, function as principal, but also 
compounded, agents of classification, categorisation, and organisation. In the 
process, they produce understanding and direct practices that are identifiable with 
the set of dispositions that evoked them, yet variable. 
 
The above brings home the understanding that Bourdieu’s theories are ontological.96 
In his terms, the self is a social construct. It is necessary here to dwell a moment on 
the meaning of ‘ontological’ and my further applications of the word. I interpret it to 
suggest awareness of being in the capacity of being, which includes awareness of 
the being of self. As I mention above, this sense of self is inclusive of a situated and 
                                                       
96 See also ‘ontological’ in the Glossary (Addendum B).  
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embodied cognition.97 Its relation to time and space in a socio-cultural environment 
sustains embodiment. The self cannot shed the past, or history, of such cognition. 
Nonetheless, the self can, in the present, play out the spectre of an embodied 
cognition’s development and future. Compilations of accrued and current mental and 
physical event recursively influence the practices of the self, which it enacts 
continuously in ontological involvement.98  
 
Drawing and individual-centredness 
I would assume that the habitus of the drafter, in its interplay with drawing practice 
and field as a site of struggle and strategy, functions from the embodiment of the 
drafter’s experiential cognition and enables the drafter’s recognition in its references 
to the drafter’s own accrued history. I would also assume that the generative paths 
of the drafter’s habitus orchestrate convergent and associative connections between 
the immediacy of her in-phase perceptions and her memory. A consolidation 
between the two (experience and memory) brings forth conception and syntheses, 
which include evaluation (Bloom. 1956:163-165). The drawing competence she 
acquires in this way constitutes progressive levels of knowledge, understanding, 
application and analysis to enable syntheses that belong to her (Bloom. 1956: 62-
63, 89-91, 120-123, 144-145, 163-168, 185-187). As such, they reflect 
individuated, separate contributions. Her syntheses in drawn display therefore have 
genuine constitutive power that relates to her “full status and potency” as drafter 
(Bourdieu. 1984: 466-467), the products of which contain the potential of eventually 
“represent[ing] themselves as rare and worthy of being sought after” (Bourdieu. 
1977: 178).  
 
                                                       
97 “Embodied cognition”, Mark Johnson (1999: 119) asserts, “is the result of the evolutionary 
processes of variation and selection; is situated within a dynamic, ongoing organism-environment 
relationship; is problem-centered and operates relative to the needs, interests, and values of the 
organism; is not concerned with finding some allegedly perfect solution to a problem but, rather, one 
that works well enough relative to the current situation; and is often social and carried out 
cooperatively by more than one individual organism”. 
98 Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy (2005: 442) defines ‘ontology’ as “inquiry into, or theory of, 
being qua being”, in other words, being in the capacity or character of being. The ontological 
involvement that Bourdieu asserts as a determining factor in practices, I therefore interpret as 
inferring the complicity of self-as-being in practices. See also ‘ontology’, ‘ontic’, and ‘qua’ in the 
Glossary (Addendum B). 
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Diversity 
It becomes clear why a drawing class that comprises diverse individuals produces 
various and ever-changing ranges of individuated trait, unless they are taught to 
repress trait in favour of stylistic emulation or formula. We see why the drawing 
facilitator must assume that each drafter will utter the self in an individuated 
manner. Disposition manifests in people as consistently recurrent, yet evolving modes 
of mental and physical behaviourisms and habitual practices. This means that 
individual student drafters will also constantly adapt and change their 
understanding and syntheses. This concept contributes to the complexity of the 
educationally based drawing studio situation. Habitus as a basis for a facilitative 
concept and apparatus renders drawing practice quite fickle and volatile for both 
student drafter and facilitator. A range of habituses that cannot but produce 
diversity as ever-changing understandings of ‘reality’, produce diverse and ever-
changing drawings. This situation leaves the notion of a rigid, constant ‘reality’ 
impossible to accept as a gauge of quality and standard. To reduce lived ‘reality’ 
to formula would make the facilitator’s assessment easier, but it would destroy the 
potential creativity of the student drafters. 
 
‘Reality’ 
Bourdieu pronounces ‘reality’ to be that against which “we measure all fictions”, and 
cautions that this ‘reality’ constitutes the “guaranteed referent of a collective illusion” 
(1977: 13). In other words, ‘reality’99 is a construct. In visual imagery, it is a re-
cognised and re-assimilated perception; an illusion once removed from what was 
delusion in the first place, albeit a collective one. Individuated gesture in 
autonomous representations, as differentiated contributions, can never be mere 
recordings of perceptions that would only have to maintain the repetition of one 
unshakable100 ‘reality’ in imagery. In each drawing process that a student drafter 
                                                       
99 I also interpret this to mean that the images that student drafters produce would emerge from a 
sphere of mutuality, or “a coincidence” (Bryson. 1983: 13) between the conversions that their own 
habitus construct in drawn display, and ‘a collective illusion’ or ‘delusion’, as it were. Bryson confirms 
habitus as such a ‘mutuality’ in his words, “Culture produces around itself a ‘habitus’ which, though 
discontinuous with the natural world, merges into it as an order whose join with Nature is nowhere 
visible” (1983: 14). 
100 I refer to the notion of an absolute and unanimous visual experience that serves as unshakeable 
norm to which drawings should conform, albeit in various degrees of fidelity that depends on 
observational skill and accuracy. In sociological terms, this would relate to the notion that humans 
experience a drive to ‘naturalise’ a constructed ‘reality’, and in drafteric terms, that a range of 
possible fidelities exist between two extremes, delusional construct on the one end and absolute, 
immutable ‘reality’ on the other end. In other words, although cultural norm or social interactivity may 
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undertakes, habitus reiterates the past, but also iterates101 anew, upon which it 
changes and adapts to repeat again in new sequences of layered iterations, a 
dynamic flow in which both habitus and practice proliferate and evolve.102 Bourdieu 
explains that such habitus-governed practices tend to reproduce the memory of 
regularities in the original objective conditions, while adjusting to current habitus-
governed perceptions of external circumstances as continuously changing (1977: 
78).  
 
As individuated drawing never accomplishes a supreme state of completeness and 
since individuation evolves and develops along various levels of sophistication and 
skill (see Illustrations 8 & 9, Addendum A), individuated gesture can also not 
adhere to the notion of a ‘reality’ in stasis. In contrast to this, reproduction of style 
language demands adherence to a static ‘reality’. It demands from the drafter a 
representation that would dispel any possibilities of diverse syntheses.  
 
My interpretations above of Bourdieu’s habitus formation and its explanation of 
‘reality’, underpin the difference between utilising and creating style language in 
drawing that I discussed in the previous chapter. Creating style language entails 
diverse syntheses in drawing, while in contrast, the re-utilisation of style language 
constitutes stagnation – “which betrays false consciousness” (Foster. 1999: 59-60).  
 
We see that, in Bourdieuian terms, ‘reality’, as flexible phenomenon, sheds its 
powers of conformity and formula. If applied to drawing, these terms imply that the 
drafter’s syntheses can be as variable as her understanding of ‘reality’ (see 
Illustration 2, Addendum A). Moreover, such variable presentation promotes 
further proliferation of syntheses, because the processes of drawing contain the very 
                                                                                                                                                          
lead to a constructed ‘reality’, the drafter would attempt, in her imagery, to convert her construct to 
conform to a perceived Absolute Creation that has existed as unchangeable absolute since the 
beginning of time, or to a single Truth that is just as absolute and immutable.  
101 I try here to predict the role of enaction, a concept which I introduced in the previous chapter in 
relation to presentation and representation and on which I elaborate below. 
102 Here I hope to bring home the understanding of habitus as interactive facilitator in the drawing 
process. It creates a collective illusion, it fills a sphere of mutuality between lived ‘reality’ and mind, 
and it enables a mode of practice. Since it is encompassing, it functions to unify dualities. No seam, 
no join exists between the drafter’s mind and her grasp of visibility, between the labour of drawing 
and nature. Irruption of trait in drawing, could be seen as ‘natural’ in relativist and sociological terms, 
yet such terms do not explain “a view of the habitus from the inside” (Bryson. 1983: 17), as I noted in 
the Introduction. 
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workings of cerebrative diversity, in which the advent of creativity also resides. 
Cerebration is self-based, as is perception of ‘reality’.  
 
However, if the drafter perceives ‘reality’ as an unvarying phenomenon, it becomes 
constrictive with its edicts of fidelity – edicts that necessarily contain formulae that 
ensure faithful mimesis. In drawing, the “ritual repetition” (Bourdieu 1996: 180) of 
style language does not produce new language. Those past and concurrent 
assimilations, which entail “a critical systematization of acquisitions from all 
quarters” (Bourdieu 1996: 180), remain absent during the repetition of style 
language. Bourdieu (1996: 180) expresses the notion as follows:   
...a religious fidelity to such and such a canonic author (which inclines one to 
ritual repetition) ... is a forbidding of what appears to me the only possible 
attitude to theoretical tradition: an inseparable assertion of both continuity and 
rupture, through a critical systematization of acquisitions from all quarters. 
 
2.3 The unconscious: habitus as a facility that merges antimonies 
 
With his words “an inseparable assertion of both continuity and rupture”, Bourdieu 
(1996: 180) refers to the notion that the habitus logically dispels a number of 
antinomies. Bourdieu locates habitus in the unconscious mind. He asserts that such 
unconscious regulation (habitus) stretches through both physical and mental human 
practices. In Distinction: a social critique of the judgement of taste (1984: 466) 
Bourdieu asserts: 
The schemes of the habitus, the primary forms of classification, owe their 
specific efficacy to the fact that they function below the level of consciousness 
and language, beyond the reach of introspective scrutiny or control by the will. 
Orienting practices practically, they embed... in the most automatic gestures or 
the apparently most insignificant techniques of the body – ways of walking or 
blowing one’s nose, ways of eating or talking – and engage the most 
fundamental principles of construction and evaluation of the social world. 
 
Doxic modality (particular, self-directed modes in which a person thinks), and 
musculature, (particular modes in which a person uses her body (hexis)), function as 
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inseparable facilities. Such inseparability between body and mind erases more 
dualities.  
 
This transcending of antimonies pivots on habitus, which contains the schemata that 
regulate both perception and conception. Similarly, the same schemata are 
accountable for cognition and recognition. Without cognition, recognition is not 
possible, and vice versa. The same is true for perception and conception. These 
conflations achieve a greater subject and object conflation. Habitus, because of its 
non-hierarchical relationship with practice and field, unites subjective and objective 
structures.  
 
Understanding constitutes a modally transformative process that regulates the 
mobility between cognition and recognition. In his book Practical Reason (1998: 81), 
Bourdieu describes this merging process as the moment when the “embodied 
structures and the objective structures are in agreement, when perception is 
constructed according to the structures of what is perceived” and when that happens 
“everything seems obvious and goes without saying”.  
 
Bourdieu also professes here that it is to this experience of belief – to such 
agreement between the habitus and lived ‘reality’ – that one assigns supreme 
credibility. The agreement, as perfect fit, becomes tacit to the extent that one does 
not perceive it as a belief. It becomes embodied, to be spontaneously and artlessly 
enacted. It is therefore our understanding of the world – how we perceive and 
conceive it – that amalgamates us with world.  
 
As a drafter, I believe that such a ‘match up’ between inner structures of habitus and 
outer structures of habitus comes close to describing the experience of making a 
mark. Only in hindsight is it possible to understand that the making of a mark occurs 
in the complete acceptance of the mark’s contextual credibility, relevance, and 
aptness (if not its accuracy that, as an absolute, would not be possible in any case). 
The conscious knowledge that a ‘fit’ has occurred does not accompany the action of 
making a mark. Only once it has appeared, its fit is evident within context. For this 
reason, I think of specific forms of mark making in drawing as autogenous. They 
seem to irrupt without verification or before conscious verification. Mark making 
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seems to interface as habitus, or vice versa. Even the credibility of marks goes 
unchecked. On an unconscious level, the drafter seems to understand their credibility 
almost automatically. The conscious speculation that, if they are not credible 
immediately, they probably will be so at some later stage in the drawing occurs 
after the fact, if at all. In this sense, mark making is an activity that flourishes in 
unknowingness and that gains conscious knowledge through recursive accrual.  
 
The above-mentioned ‘fit’ (between conscious perceptions, unconscious perceptions, 
and objective structures) suggests a habitus both in the mind of the individual and in 
lived ‘reality’. Indeed, Norman Bryson says,  
Culture produces around itself a ‘habitus’, which though discontinuous with the 
natural world, merges into it as an order whose join with Nature is nowhere 
visible. If the context of animal species is the habitat, the habitus of the human 
species consists not only of the physical environment, but of a whole 
assemblage of maxims, morals, proverbial love, values beliefs, and myths 
which will ensure for the members of a given social formation the coherence of 
their experience, and will secure for them the permanent reproduction of the 
regularities of their cultural process (1983: 14).  
 
In Bourdieu’s account (1977: 164), the term doxa describes this process of 
understanding as conformity between internality and externality (between 
dispositional schemata and objective structures). It explains the moment of grasping 
something on a tacit plane, of understanding something in complete resolve and 
acceptance, because it coincides with existing or assimilated structures of cognition. 
If one considers the concepts ‘orthodoxy’ as conforming to doxa and ‘heterodoxy’ 
as dissenting or deviating from doxa into multiplicity, the particularity of doxa as 
intrinsically central concept becomes clear. Neither heterodoxy as concept, nor 
orthodoxy as concept would have been possible without doxa as central 
measurement. Doxa underpins doxic modality and refer to those schemes of thought 
and perception that external social structures produce in interactivity, but that seem 
so self-evident that people take such tacit understandings for granted. Doxa 
constitutes all those systems of classification that constrain cognition, but also 
produce dissent from or consent to the arbitrariness of their origin and foundations 
(Bourdieu. 1977: 164).  
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In a practice like drawing, the compliance of doxic and somatic modality to 
objective structures occurs to turn around upon it. In this reflexive way, drawing 
becomes the subjective enactions of the drafter. Doxic modality and somatic gesture 
occur as drawn gesture.  
 
In light of the above, it is clear that Bourdieu’s theory of habitus does not support a 
defined dualism between mind and body in which an exalted “unconscious 
mechanism” presides over a lesser bodily action, mannerism, or behaviour. Bourdieu 
posits his explanation of habitus as “a transubstantiated concept, a concept where 
the implicit dualism of mind and body are transcended so that even the body can 
be seen as a memory” (1977: 94). Likewise, mind, memory, and habitus occupy the 
brain, a bodily organ that also regulates sense-impressions such as sight, smell, 
tactility, hearing, and taste. Habitus, according to Bourdieu, constitutes “a socialized 
body, a structured body, a body which has incorporated the immanent structures of a 
world or of a particular sector of that world – a field – and which structures the 
perception of that world as well as action in that world” (1998: 81). Practices unify 
mindfulness and the somatic, which are entrenched in modal conversion. In the act of 
drawing, the hand largely moves without the conscious mind directing or 
commanding it to move. I assign the word ‘autogenous’ to marks that irrupt on the 
drawing surface in such a way and I relate it to habitus as incorporative body-mind 
that engages (through drawing practice) in interaction, but perhaps even more so to 
the notion of enaction.  
 
Although I will rely on the drawings in Addendum A to demonstrate it, I do not 
explore in any depth the ‘mechanics’ and nature of somatic modality and its 
influence on self-knowledge and self-transformation or in transfiguring one’s inner 
sense of self, but Richard Shusterman (2008: 15 – 48) confirms the body’s essential 
role in personal development. He conceives three fundamental branches, analytical, 
genealogical and pragmatic, in the field of ‘somaesthetics’, inferring a defined 
relationship between physical experience, practice, and the development of, for 
example, a mindful aesthetic awareness in his book Body Consciousness, A 
Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics (2008). He notes that,  
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Besides the traditional topics in philosophy of mind, ontology, and 
epistemology that relate to the mind-body issue and the role of somatic 
factors in consciousness and action, analytic somaesthetics also includes the sort 
of genealogical sociological, and cultural analyses that Foucault so powerfully 
introduced into contemporary philosophy and that has helped shape the 
somatic theory of Pierre Bourdieu and feminist theorists such as Judith Butler 
and Susan Bordo (2008: 23).  
Somaesthetics, he purports, “offers a way of understanding how complex hierarchies 
of power can be widely exercised and reproduced without any need to make them 
explicit in laws or to enforce them officially; they are implicitly observed and 
enforced simply through our bodily habits” (2008: 21-22). A connection, for 
example, could exist between the habitual bodily posture of the working student 
drafter, and  her perpetuation of an assumption that the facilitator represents 
authority. The drafter demonstrates her perception of the facilitator’s drawing style 
as exalted, on a higher level, superior, and therefore inevitably a sanctioned norm 
to be copied or mimed, in bodily posture. The student drafter ‘bows down to’ 
authority, she works in a lower, seated position, hiding behind her easel, refusing to 
put her whole body into gesture. When the facilitator criticises copying or self-
effacement, the body of the student drafter reacts in the form of tears, blushing, 
cringing in mortification, laughter of embarrassment, a hand furtively covering the 
mouth, a head that bows in shame, all consistent with somatic training that performs 
respect for authority. Shusterman asserts that,  
Any successful challenge of oppression should thus involve somaesthetic 
diagnosis of the bodily habits and feelings that express the domination as 
well as the subtle institutional rules and methods of inculcating them, so that 
they, along with the oppressive social conditions that generate them, can be 
overcome (2008: 22).  
This would relate to a mediator’s efforts to diminish the power of legitimised style 
by emphasising the power of trait to deviate, to renew, and to enhance creativity. 
Somaesthetics suggests also, however, an aesthetic already entrenched and 
therefore prescriptive in terms of gestic conversion, resulting in automatic conformity 
in mark making (Shusterman. 2008: 23 – 24). 
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Bourdieu dispels such potential pre-determinism by erasing antinomies between the 
universal and the unique, between body and mind, and between habitus and 
practice. If a drafter constructs a particular drawing so that its display and content 
is meaningful, recognisable, or viewable, it ceases to be particular despite its 
display of individuated trait. This is so, because it displays the enactions of the 
drafter’s habitus, which carries the influences of interchange with drawing as field 
and with the socio-cultural space where her viewing audience resides. The viewing 
audience and the drafter hold visual schemata in common. Although the drafter 
conforms, transforms, or deforms the conventions of such visual schemata to provoke 
connotative value, to interweave and invoke referencing even further afield, 
common ownership of it renders her work accessible to a wider audience (Bourdieu. 
1992: 75-77). Although gesture and trace in drawing can be individuated and 
specific to an individual, it is at the same time generalised as common language. 
Infraconscious and infralinguistic complicity in practices imply both the individuated 
and generalised nature of a person’s practices, because such complicity is also active 
on inter-linguistic and inter-conscious levels.  
 
2.4 Enaction 
 
Varela completely dispels any antinomy between perception and conception in 
practices, as much as between body and mind. In Chapter 1, a brief discussion on 
the divided self already indicated  “unconscious symbolic computation and conscious 
experience” as two components of cognition. (Varela. 1992: 52). According to 
Varela, these two aspects of cognition entail intentionality103 and consciousness in 
perceptual engagement and actions. Varela poses the following question: “How, 
then, if intentionality and consciousness are fundamentally distinct, does cognition 
come to be about the world as we consciously experience it?” (1992: 52). As I 
explained in Chapter 1, he poses a ‘middle way’ that also pertains to objectivist 
versus subjectivist views of the world.104 
                                                       
103 Mautner defines intentionality as “the property of mental phenomena whereby the mind can 
contemplate non-existent objects and states of affairs” (2005: 307). Mautner also cites Brentano, 
who defines intentionality as “the distinctive characteristics of mental phenomena” (2005: 307). 
104 I explained in Chapter 1 that, according to Varela, the objectivist view positions the world as ‘out 
there’, a preordained objective ‘reality’ with pre-given properties that a person recovers through 
cognition. Varela states that, “These exist prior to the image that is cast on the cognitive system, 
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Strongly akin to Bourdieu’s theories regarding interactivity, Varela poses this middle 
way as a confluence that enables “world and perceiver [to] specify each other” 
(1999: 172). Such a middle way implies a “mutual specification”, such as interaction 
would elicit, as active core between objectivist recognition and subjectivist cognition 
as deterministic pre-given. Cognition, Varela asserts, is neither recovery, nor 
projection. Both such recovery and projection make for representation. Rather, 
cognition is embodied action (1999: 172-180). The word ‘embody’ refers to his 
assertion that physical experiences, actions, or practices form and develop 
cognition. Cognition, therefore, is contingent upon the actions of the body. The body 
has sensory facilities and motor facilities, enabling it to impart motion. It has 
“sensorimotor capacities”. Cognition “depends on the kinds of experience that come 
from having a body with various sensorimotor capacities” (Varela. 1999: 173).  
 
The context within which cognition functions to be productive, therefore, does not 
only include the socio-cultural sphere, but also biological and psychological spheres. 
By using the term ‘action’, Varela intends “to emphasise that sensory and motor 
processes, perception, and action are fundamentally inseparable in lived cognition. 
Indeed, the two are not merely contingently linked in individuals, they have also 
evolved together” (1999: 173).  
 
Varela assigns the term “enaction” to a union between these two concepts. He 
formulates enaction as a process in which “perceptually guided action” encloses 
perception and “cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor 
patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided” (Varela. 1999: 173).  
 
The point of departure in his thinking shifts focus to a unified body-mind and, by 
extension, to the local situation of an individual’s perception. It would explain how 
the drafter, as perceiver, could conduct and funnel her traces in drawing. As such, 
his theory could possibly account for the legibility of the body (as idiosyncratic 
drawn gesture) in trace creation. He positions enaction as the body’s participative 
                                                                                                                                                          
whose task is to recover them appropriately (whether through symbols or global subsymbolic states)” 
(1999: 172). The subjectivist view, as opposite extreme, posits the possibility that the human 
“cognitive system projects its own world”, and that “the apparent ‘reality’ of this world is merely a 
reflection of internal laws of the system” (Varela. 1999: 172).  
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engagement in perceptual stimuli.105 Moreover, Varela (1999: 173) asserts that 
these local stimuli diverge and change constantly because of the perceiver’s activity. 
This notion, he says, shifts the reference point for understanding perception from a 
pre-given, perceiver-independent world to the sensorimotor structure of the 
perceiver, which locates itself in the way that the nervous system links sensory and 
motor surfaces. Varela asserts that this constitution forms the manner in which the 
perceiver is embodied, and it regulates how the perceiver can act and how 
environmental events can modulate her actions.  
 
Varela’s postulation offers divergence, changeability, and transformation as the 
elements that distinguish embodied action or enaction from objectivism and 
subjectivism (1999: 172-173). These elements constitute the capacity of trait to 
diverge in its transformations. This capacity enables deviation from norm – even 
when trait itself becomes norm. 
 
The oppositional contrasts I set between diversity in syntheses through trait and the 
redistribution of style language as well as emulation find a parallel here. Such 
parallel constitutes the representationist understanding of cognition that both an 
objectivist and subjectivist mind theory pose, in contrast to the presentationist 
understanding of cognition, which offers the flexible divergences of an enactionist, 
embodied cognition. The parallel acquires another dimension, namely that of stasis 
versus self-reflexive proliferation. 
 
2.5 Reversibility  
 
Bourdieu’s theory of how interactivity is sustained and Varela’s theory of enaction 
converge with certain aspects of the theories of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, particularly 
those that resolve antimony between an objective–subjective duality. Bourdieu 
acknowledges that habitus “fulfills a function which another philosophy consigns to a 
                                                       
105 Hence, the notions of in-phase experience (see the Glossary, Addendum B) and the presence of 
self (see Chapter 3). Varela relates embodied action to the notion of first-person events as the “I of 
the storm” as situated between “selfless minds and human experience” (1992: 57). He explains, “By 
first-person events we mean the lived experience associated with cognitive and mental events. 
Sometimes terms such as ‘phenomenal consciousness’ and even ‘qualia’ are also used, but it is natural 
to speak of ‘conscious experience’ or simply ‘experience’. These terms imply that the process being 
studied (vision, pain, memory, imagination, etc.) appears as relevant and manifest for a ‘self’ or 
‘subject’ that can provide an account; they have a ‘subjective’ side” (2002: 1-14).  
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transcendental conscience” (1998: 81) and he poses habitus as mediator in 
interactivity along a pathway back and forth between subjective and objective 
structures. I draw together interaction and enaction as genitive foundation of trait 
irruption.  
 
I emphasise the transcendence of a duality between object and subject, whether by 
interactivity, enaction, or lateral mutuality, because it challenges the (objectivist) 
notion that drawing should function as a passive recording of perceptions. It also 
challenges the notion that a drafter cannot change her manner of drawing, which, 
according to a subjectivist view, would be cast in concrete by genetic pre-
determination. Because of its acknowledgement of practice-based divergence, an 
enactionist view seems more appropriate as framework for explaining the foibles of 
trait in drawing. The enactionist approach, that Bourdieu, Varela, and Merleau-
Ponty frame, would suggest the origin of trait in the drafter as being embodied. As 
such, the drafter enacts through drawing, a productive activity of transformation, 
her conviction in self-as-being.  
 
Merleau-Ponty postulates the notions of reversibility, chiasm, and a lateral 
transcendence (‘flesh’) between object and subject to dispel a duality between the 
two. Distinguishing between the “visible” and the “nonvisible”, Merleau-Ponty alights 
on the “transcendental” as an eclipse between subject and object. He describes 
conception of the “invisible” as going beyond understanding objects as being in 
themselves to the nucleus of being that the self and environment hold as mutuality. 
This involves “suppressing the model In itself: there is no longer anything but 
representations” (1968: 226). He asserts that these representations, their “inevitable 
inconsistencies...and their lateral implication in one another are the ‘reality’, exactly: 
that the ‘reality’ is their common framework (membrure), their nucleus” (Merleau-
Ponty. 1968: 226). Reality, like the self, is a construct. 
 
This description of ‘reality’ echoes Bourdieu’s description of ‘reality’ as the 
consensual referent of a collective illusion. An object, in other words, represents itself 
when the subject views it. The subject’s vision represents her, and as such, her view is 
subjective. She sees the object in a way that is unique to her understanding of it, 
which carries the spores of her embodied personal history. “Being is their common 
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inner framework”, – a mutuality, a common existentiality that I interpret to reside 
between drafter, world, and the act of drawing. The drafter enacts the subjective 
and tacit understanding of this, without consciously knowing it, as “lateral 
transcendence”, as the “invisible”, a mutuality-of-being between herself and her 
subject matter (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 227-228).  
 
Merleau-Ponty assigns the term “flesh” to this “common inner framework of being” 
as a transcending mutuality, or nucleus, between seer and seen, and he associates it 
with his notions of “chiasm” and “reversibility”106 (Evans. 2008: 188). Merleau-Ponty 
asserts that such nucleus is active between seers and seen. He also turns it around, to 
assert that the seen sees the seer, or “our seeing objects can change into their seeing 
us” (Evans. 2008: 188).  
 
In a literal frame of mind, one could interpret this as Merleau-Ponty assigning a 
rather dubious ability to the objective world to see, as a form of physical merging 
between the visible and the observer. Merleau-Ponty suggests, however, a merging 
between the visible and the invisible on a subliminal level. I interpret this subliminal 
‘merging’ to indicate the observer and the seen as two interacting aspects of an 
inclusive but multiple ‘reality’. In such interaction, the seer does not recover the 
visible, nor project the visible. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty purports: 
The visible about us seems to rest in itself. It is as though our vision were 
formed in the heart of the visible, or as though there were between it and us 
an intimacy as close as between the sea and the strand. And yet it is not 
possible that we blend into it, nor that it passes into us, for then the vision 
would vanish at the moment of formation, by disappearance of the seer or of 
the visible. What there is then, are not things first identical with themselves, 
which would then offer themselves to the seer, nor is there a seer who is first 
empty and who, afterward, would open himself to them – but something to 
which we could not be closer than by palpating it with our look, things we 
could not dream of seeing ‘all naked’ because the gaze itself envelops them, 
clothes them with its own flesh (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 130-131).  
 
                                                       
106 The literary concept of chiasmus suggests the reversed order of words that also inverts their 
meaning, as for example in the phrase “to stop too fearful, too faint to go” (Evans. 2008: 188). 
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Existence, an intimate mutuality between viewer and world, acts with two-sided 
reciprocality, or rather, reversibility, between the two. In a rather strange fashion, 
Merleau-Ponty reflects this notion of reversibility in his words, “My body model of 
the things and the things model of my body” (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 131). Fred 
Evans explains that Merleau-Ponty wants to come as close as possible to enunciating 
an interactive exchange between the two that would eliminate subject and object as 
duality (2008: 185). This intimate exchange reflects the accomplishment of a total 
unification, a complete transubstantiation between subjective and objective 
structures. 
 
Mute and blind pivot 
My interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s notions suggests a plane of experience in 
looking at something in which the sense of being self recognises, or finds its match in 
the existence of world – the mutual existentiality between self and lived ‘reality’. 
This experience is mute. I perceive such muteness as a silent107 space, empty of 
thought, yet infused with a subliminal sense of mutuality. The seer cannot account for 
it in visible form, but only in cognition (and then not even in thought).108 I propose 
that the drafter can account for it in visible form only if she marks it in simultaneity. 
The point where reversibility pivots is where (and when) mark making occurs. Gestic 
conversion in drawing, I believe, activates and intensifies this ‘mute’ or ‘blind’ pivot, 
although it does not dwell there for very long. For the drafter, I propose, the 
activation of such mute pivot is self-originative mark making, and her pivot is blind, 
rather than mute. In other words, the drafter seeks to fill this void with visibility, 
rather than with audibility. 
 
In this sense, or rather, in this void, trace denotes self-as-being, but it does not dwell 
in one place very long, because once it occurs, the self reveals itself as static. 
Thereby, trace enters the sphere of a language of visualisation, going beyond 
blindness to show the self, rather than holding it in captivity or promoting belief in its 
                                                       
107 Hence the phrase ‘The mark of a silent language’ in the title of the thesis. 
108 To corroborate the interpretation, I quote Derrida (1993: 53): “The aperspective thus obliges us 
to consider the objective definition, the anatomico-physiology or ophthalmology of the ‘punctum 
caecum’, as itself a mere image, an analogical index of vision itself, of vision in general, of that 
which, seeing itself see, is nevertheless not reflected, cannot be ‘thought’ in specular or speculative 
mode – and thus is blinded because of this, blinded at this point of ‘narcissism’, at that very point 
where it sees itself looking”. In drawing, this space, empty of thought, enacts pure solipsism, pure 
narcissism – “to touch oneself, to see oneself, accordingly, is not to apprehend oneself as an ob-ject, 
it is to be open to oneself, destined to oneself (narcissism)” (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 249). 
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non-existence. “Nor therefore, is it to reach oneself, the self in question is by 
divergence...Unverborgenheit of the Verborgen” (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 249). 
Derrida purports:  
- I’ll agree that, at its originary point, the trait is invisible and the draftsman is 
blind to it, but what about afterwards, once the line has been traced? – Let’s 
look now at the second aspect. It is not an aftereffect, a second or secondary 
aspect. It appears, or rather disappears, without delay. I will name it the 
withdrawal (retrait) or the eclipse, the differential inappearance of the trait 
(Derrida. 1993: 53).  
 
‘Differential’ and ‘divergence’ are key concepts in this, as much as ‘being’ and ‘not 
being’. Trait must differentiate between appearance and disappearance, or 
between the hidden and unhidden. In order to appear, trait diverts from 
disappearance; to become unhidden, it diverts from the hidden. Trait diverts from 
self-as-nothing,109 to reveal the other of self – self-as-being.  
 
The reversible laterality that Merleau-Ponty defines, locates itself in the unconscious, 
as does Bourdieu’s interactive habitus and Varela’s enactionist cognition. As my 
discussion above suggests, drawing fulfills the role of a dialogical and two-sided 
engagement with the objective world that is furnished by the conscious and 
unconscious. Drawing (gesture as trace and trait) could be seen as an act that 
bridges the chasm between drafter and object. As such, drawing as a creative form 
of interchange or engagement between drafter and environment, constitutes an 
entwinement in itself.  
 
                                                       
109 The fundamentally nihilistic notion of a non-existent self is a view that Varela opposes radically in 
his discussions on the work of Minsky and Papert in cognitive science, because such notion denies 
human experience or embodiment as contributive and formative dynamic in the creation of both 
understanding and meaning (Varela, 1992: 105-130). Varela concludes that, “The deep problem, 
then, with the merely theoretical discovery of mind without self in as powerful and technical a context 
as late-twentieth-century science is that it is almost impossible to avoid embracing some form of 
nihilism. If science continues to manipulate things without embracing a progressive appreciation of 
how we live among those things, then the discovery of mind without self will have no life outside the 
laboratory, despite the fact that the mind in that laboratory is the very same mind without self. This 
mind discovers its own lack of a personal ground – a deep and remarkable discovery – and yet has 
no means to embody that realization” (Varela. 1992:  127). Self is essential to embodiment, 
embodied action, embodied cognition, and to self-reflexivity, as will become clear in due course. 
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2.6 Converging theories 
 
Varela acknowledges convergences between his theory of enaction and those of 
Merleau-Ponty that pertain to an eclipse between object and subject. Like Merleau-
Ponty, he positions the commonalities or legitimate convergences between sensory 
and motor systems of the body as influential participants in perceptually guided 
action. As I explain above, this implies a perceiver-dependent world and a world-
dependent perceiver (Varela. 1999: 173). Bourdieu does the same by conflating 
the doxa and hexis duality as one into his formulation of habitus – a habitus that 
mediates interactively between subject and object. Merleau-Ponty purports that 
humans contribute to the constitution of form in practices and interactions, while 
environment can determine behaviour.  
 
In The Structures of Behavior (1963: 13), Merleau-Ponty says, “The properties of the 
object and the intentions of the subject...are not only intermingled; they also 
constitute a new whole”. He says that it is impossible to determine which occurs first 
in exchanges of stimuli and responses. External influences always condition all 
movements of the human body and it is therefore possible to assert that behaviour is 
an effect of the milieu. This could be turned around,  
Since all the stimulations, which humans receive, have in turn been possible 
only by its preceding movements, which have culminated in exposing the 
receptor organ to external influences, one could also say that behavior is the 
first cause of all the stimulations (1963: 13). 
 
Merleau-Ponty adds to this, “the form of the excitant is created by the organism 
itself, by its proper manner of offering itself to actions from the outside” (1963: 13). 
Humans themselves choose the stimuli in the physical world to which they are 
sensitive. “The environment (Umwelt) emerges from the world through the 
actualization or the being of the organism” (1963: 13).  
 
Varela concludes that, in such an approach, environment embeds in perception and 
enforces constraints on perception. Perception also contributes to the enactment of 
the surrounding world. Therefore, enaction itself manifests as reversibility between 
subject and object. The person enacts self as the history of her interactions with the 
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surrounding world, while the surrounding world continues to impose upon her 
enaction. “Thus”, Varela states, “as Merleau-Ponty notes, the organism both initiates 
and is shaped by the environment. The organism and environment are bound 
together in reciprocal specification and selection” (1999: 174). 
 
As we have seen, Bourdieu’s concept of habitus occupies the convergence between 
dualities; habitus constitutes cognition, the facility that draws subject and object 
together. In practices, the person and her habitus are absorbed in her doing. 
Habitus is “present at the coming moment, the doing, the deed, the immediate 
correlate of practice which is not posed as an object of thought, as a possible aimed 
for in a project, but which is inscribed in the present of the game” (Bourdieu. 1998: 
80).  
 
2.7 Practice, temporality, spatiality 
 
With these words, Bourdieu poses the temporality of practice, the in-phase activities, 
as incorporative of both body and mind. For the duration of the act of drawing, for 
example, the gesture and trace that the body enacts, if ‘not posed as an object of 
thought’, is directly instrumental in its ‘look’ and visibility. If the muscles of the hand 
are tense, the enacted line will recount such tension. If the concurrent subliminal 
encounter is one of tension, such tension will show itself in enacted line. If the physical 
inclination or disposition of the body is one of rounded exuberance or harsh 
sparseness, one of ease and comfort, or injure and anxiety, the enacted line it 
produces will display traces of its disposition. The dispositional body is as legible in 
its tracings as is mind and thought. This notion suggests that the legibility of the 
habitus-governed body-mind displays itself as both individuation and signification in 
gesture, and its typicality relate trait.  
 
This connection between practice, temporality, and spatiality (the subject’s physical 
position in space) exists in relation to future: firstly as projection, (possibilities that 
might ensue from the practice) and secondly, as protension. Protension constitutes 
pre-perceptive anticipation, “a sort of practical induction based on previous 
experience, a relationship to a future that is not a future, to a future that is almost 
present” (Bourdieu. 1998: 80).  
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This understanding is of interest, because pre-perceptive anticipation also entails 
affiliations of credence. In drawing, the suggestive language of gesture is complex 
and stratified. The drafter may trace her interpretation of the outline of a three-
dimensional object as an illusion of that object on a two-dimensional surface. 
Although only two dimensions of the object might be visible in the drafter’s 
representation of it in image, the drafter (and viewer) ‘fills in’ a third dimension, 
because she perceives the third dimension automatically as an affirmation of her 
belief in this dimension. The hidden dimension is therefore insinuated as present in 
the image. Both drafter and viewer understand this dimension to be present.  
 
In a more complex example (but based on the same principle), the drafter could 
employ line that suggests what the viewer already knows. A mutual script, shared 
by viewer and drafter, already exists. The type of line that conveys aggression, 
lyricism, constriction, or whim, and so forth (Betti & Sale.1997: 155-159) can 
communicate these qualities only if the viewer can connect the expressive language 
of line with the corresponding form of the line. This constitutes what Bourdieu calls “a 
relationship of belief” (Bourdieu. 1998: 80) that would pertain to drawing as a 
language of visualisation.  
 
According to Bourdieu, belief, or credence – a wider sphere than the materially 
visible – is that which we accord to something we perceive. It constitutes the 
connotative in denotation, where the drafter leaves room for association or 
imagination, and where the viewer gains space for playing out her imagination. The 
two-dimensional inscription obtains illusionary three-dimensional qualities as well as 
wider expressive and enactionist (trait-related) meanings. Similarly, the viewer 
achieves understanding by recognising her own doxa and musculature in the doxa 
and musculature of the drafter.  
 
2.8 Self as trait 
 
Within this framework of pre-perceptive anticipation, it is possible to assume at this 
point that the variability of the drafter’s self could realise as trait in her drawing. In 
other words, the viewer can perceive or believe the drafter’s ‘self’ to be in the 
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drawing, because individuated gesture as irruptive from an “immediate correlate of 
practice” insinuates a self-originativity that precedes the visualising language that is 
drawing.  
 
Furthermore, in processes of gestic conversion, pre-perceptive anticipation and their 
affiliations of credence also become entrenched in cerebration and doxic modality 
that, with musculature, could account for trait in drawing. The following explanation 
of Merleau-Ponty relates:  
...no Wahrnehmer perceives except on condition of being a Self of movement. 
One’s own movement (mouvement propre), attestation of a thing-subject: a 
movement like that of the things, but movement that I make – Start from there 
in order to understand language as the foundation of the I think: it is to the I 
think what movement is to perception. Show that the movement is carnal – It is 
in the carnal that there is a relation between the Movement and its ‘self’ (the 
Self of the movement described by Michotte) with the Wahrnehment (1968: 
257).  
Because we know it in our-selves (the self), we recognise it in the other. However, as 
I suggest in Chapter 1, the quality that I construe as trait in drawing can also serve 
as script for re-utilisation by more drafters, in which case the individuated style 
language of a drawing would be representative and recognisable and its emulation 
would be possible. 
 
2.9 Conclusions 
 
Discussions in this chapter confirm the circular continuum between subject and 
objective structures that I introduced as interaction and enaction in the previous 
chapter. Now we see that forces in this circular continuum can flow in several 
directions. As I speculated in Chapter 1, the subject can influence the structures of 
the external world, while this dynamic can reverse itself so that objective structures 
can influence her actions. The continuum fuels itself in several ways in its 
circumnavigations along several ambits that, in fact, unify. Enaction, interaction, a 
lateral eclipse, or reversibility mobilise their orbits in circular continuity between 
subject, agent or perceiver and objective structures in lived ‘reality’, usually 
involving some form of practice or action as circumnavigator.  
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It is also clear that these mediatory dynamics, whether enactionist, or interactive, 
expand the mental capacities, abilities, and proclivities of the person to sustain 
learning and the acquisition of skills. It develops cognitive enaction in the process of 
sustaining it. 
 
This continuum constitutes the premise of the inquiry, namely “the internalization of 
externalities and the externalization of internalities” (Bourdieu. 1977: 72). In the 
first chapter, I concluded the drafter-centredness of trait. Human perception is the 
pivotal axis in the continuum that enaction and interaction conduct. Although I 
explore the implications of this notion further, I approach all further constructs with 
drafter-centredness as basis. An implication of this notion is that habitus generates 
practice and that all practices provide verification for habitus (Nash. 1999: 18, 19, 
20), an implication that I also apply to explain the self as trait, or trait as an 
enaction of the self in drawing. If habitus operates in the unconscious, I argue, trait 
formation is an unconscious act.  
 
In the context of this inquiry, the above notions suggest that the viewer should 
regard individuation in drawing practice as the product of interaction between 
habitus and the field of drawing (as component of the wider field of visual art). The 
explicit indication of interaction between habitus, field, and practice translates into 
the interaction between socio-cultural environment, drafter, and drawing practice. It 
also translates into the ambit that defines circularity inwards – namely between the 
self as a gauge against which the drafter measures trait as the other of the self – 
hence the notion that all practices provide verification for habitus, and equally, 
might I add, verification of habitus.  
 
The implicit recognition of the premise of diversity in a practice, as represented in 
the drawing practice and habitus of individual student drafters, also directs 
reflection towards gestic conversion and trait in drawing as the enaction of the self, 
who engages in a bid for recognition and the freedom to assert her voice, and for a 
conviction in the self-as-being. Such exploration promises to have some bearing on 
the significance of trait in drawing, since it examines the difference and variation in 
“the technical means whereby the changing nature of the real is registered” (Bryson. 
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1983: 15). The interest of the thesis is in this changeability and variety of 
individuation in drawing form, rather than in a history or understanding of society. 
The notion extends to the implied meaning of diversity in embodiment (as stated in 
the premise). Embodiment indicates multiple schemata of diverse dispositions (as 
both somatic and mental proclivities) that direct the inscriptions of the individual 
drafter.  
 
Theoretically, I accept that externality is internalised by means of habitus, cognition, 
or perception. I propose that drawing presents an authentic and visible 
externalisation of present and past internalities.  
 
In conclusion, it is possible to say that, in drawing (or individuated gestic conversion), 
the ‘Self of movement’, embeds durationally.110 This alights on temporality as 
imperative in relation to individuated drawing. It is only in the present time that both 
musculature and mind verify their simultaneity and instantaneous enaction. Trait 
cannot be a conscious object (or objective) of drawing. Rather it ‘happens’ or irrupts 
spontaneously, entering the world of visibility in an unpremeditated, abrupt way. 
Logically, it materialises only in the duration of the drawing act, and does not 
display as observable information on the object under scrutiny or as a pre-formed 
picture in the realm of idea.111  
 
A theory of mind that deals with a representationist processing of information – 
whether in objectivist or subjectivist stance – would therefore not account for the 
genesis of trait. Rather, a ‘middle way’, or the notion that cognition is experiential, 
and that it is an enactment of a body-mind that enfolds networks of understanding, 
which are recursively and progressively accrued through the physical and mental 
feats that living requires, would account for the genesis of trait. 
 
                                                       
110 Claudia Betti and Teele Sale in Drawing, a Contemporary Approach (1980: 31), also describe a 
relationship between time, presence, and movement in drawing. Although they do not relate it to the 
originativity and significance of trait, they do point out that the relationship is irrevocably part of the 
process: “The mark that records the movement of the artist’s implement, a two-dimensional movement 
in space, is the most basic feature of drawing, In addition to this spatial notation, drawings evoke a 
time response – the time required to make the movement that creates the mark. Time is also involved 
in seeing and in scanning objects in space. Think of the movement of your eyes as they dart back and 
forth, focusing and refocusing on different objects at different times as you glance about the room. 
So movement and time are two of the most essential features in making and looking at a drawing”. 
111 This understanding has obvious bearing on copying and mimesis, which I discuss in due course. 
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An enactionist (non-representational) theory of mind, such as Bourdieu, Varela and 
Merleau-Ponty assert, relates. Practice and enactionist cognition suggest direct and 
reflex self-presentation in drawing practices. Self-presentation (albeit a divided 
one112) pivots reflexively on cognition as nucleus of the self. The notion that trait in 
drawing, in other words, is not the representation of a pre-given world by a pre-
given mind, but rather the direct presentation of an actively enactionist self – self-
presentation – emerges.  
 
Divergence, changeability, and transformation – the facilities that set an enactionist 
theory of mind apart from the stasis of a representationist understanding of 
cognition – are imperative to solving the problem I pose. These facilities account for 
trait’s ability to deviate from norm. Direct presentation of the self necessarily implies 
both deviation and difference. 
 
Habitus, as a system of dispositions shaped by a multiplicity of environmental and 
experiential influences, is crucial in shaping the particular experiencing of drafters. 
It is therefore also crucial in shaping their ways of assimilating and converting both 
visual information and the pre-conceptual into mark as constructs.  
 
These conclusions give rise to the syntheses I formulate as foundation in the next 
chapter. In Chapter 3, I seek to explain the relationship between habitus and the 
self. I attempt to consolidate the habitus, enaction, and reversibility (or reflexivity) 
theories, as they would apply to drawing, and specifically to trait in drawing.  
                                                       
112 I do not suggest the immanence of a completely self-contained moment in the drawing act. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A MEASURE BETWEEN: SELF AS TRAIT | TRAIT AS SELF 
 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I draw a number of syntheses from the previous chapters that I pose 
as propositions in relation to drawing. These syntheses have bearing on the 
unfolding of the thesis and they underpin a central synthesis that I pose in Chapter 
6. This chapter (3) establishes the unconscious as the origin of trait formation.  
 
In an attempt to answer a question regarding what the relationship between the self 
and trait in drawing entails, my discussions centre on the following proposition: As an 
embodied habitus regulates body-mind modalities in practices, embodied action 
presents such modalities in enactions. If drawing entails enaction, drawing marks 
constitute materialised ‘flesh’ – the enactionist way in which the drafter perceives, 
experiences, and directly presents existence as mutuality, yet difference, between the 
self and her drawing mark.  
 
3.1 Trait  
 
Trait as individuated drawing form suggests the intimate relationship between 
drawing and the self that an enactionist theory of mind proposes. As persistent 
consistencies, discernable trait in the drawing of students reveals inclinations to work 
in certain ways that imply deep-rooted (though flexible) dispositions. On the face of 
it, such dispositions materialise as idiosyncratic mark making and style (see 
Illustrations 3, 8 & 9, Addendum A). 
 
Trait and the unconscious 
Bourdieu asserts that socially constructed dispositions always mediate in processes 
of art perception (1968: 589) (1996: 295-301, 313-314, 391, note 8). He also 
asserts that the process of making art is a human facility that “rests on cognition and 
recognition” (Bourdieu. 1998: 85). With this as prescience, and with the notion that 
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cognition and recognition constitute habitus, it follows that the habitus also regulates 
drawing. Bourdieu establishes that the involuntary tendency to work (practice) in a 
preferred way involve particularity in dispositional organising activities (habitus) 
that are so entrenched in the unconscious that the person remains largely unaware 
of applying them. We know now that, in drawing, such idiosyncrasies appear in an 
unpremeditated way, as though from the unconscious. This suggests an intimate 
connection between the unconscious enaction of habitus (as embodied entity) and 
trait as materialised enaction.  
 
In very general terms, the fact that it is impossible to deliberately teach 
characteristic qualities in students’ drawings supports the unconscious as genesis of 
trait. Although the teacher can encourage trait by positive reinforcement after 
irruption, the knowledge disciplinary content of drawing does not articulate trait as 
a defined element that forms part of its contents. This is so, obviously because trait is 
drafter-centred, but also in fact, because it logically manifests without precedent, a 
notion that I further unpack in Chapter 5.  
 
It becomes clear in the discussions of the previous chapter that a dispositional 
habitus constitutes individuation (difference). Moreover, habitus generates practices 
from an individuated unconscious. Its organising actions, as previously and 
concurrently assimilated properties are therefore accountable for characteristic 
distinctiveness in drawings113 (Bourdieu. 1984: 466). The concept of enaction as 
influential in gestic conversion, however, enables more distinctions within a 
generalised understanding of the unconscious that have bearing on the significance 
of trait – enaction constitutes deviation from norm. If both habitus and embodied 
action involve a unified body-mind, how does trait formation in drawing involve 
both body and mind? Answering this question would clarify intimacy between the 
self and trait. 
 
To answer this question, I pose gesture – a mute “primordial act of consciousness” 
(De Zegher. 2003: 274) – as a point of departure, because it implies inclusion of 
                                                       
113 In support of this, John Codd asserts the following in relation to the genesis and delivery of 
dispositions (habitus) and confirms the aptness of the path of inquiry: “They also enable the 
development of artistic competences and at the same time shape the manner of applying them” 
(1990: 145). 
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the multiplicity of how “the changing nature of the real is registered” (Bryson. 
19983: 15). 
 
3.2 Gesture as pre-conceptual in drawn gesture 
 
The enaction of embodiment involves gesture. I distinguish between ‘gesture’114 as 
issuing from the unconscious as pre-conceptual – or “preverbal symbolicity” (Kristeva 
cited by De Zegher. 2003: 274) – and ‘drawn gesture’. Drawn gesture, as the 
simultaneous irruption of gesture on the ‘outside’, manifests as traces on paper that 
result from those cerebrative processes that convert gesture (as primordial act) into 
drawing marks. These cerebrative processes hold the key to the significance of trait, 
and answering the question above would necessitate their unpacking. Drawing 
marks (whether in complex groupings or stripped to their most basic grapheme) tell 
of the musculature evident in facture.115 The somatic merges with the immateriality of 
perception in gestic conversion as material inscription of self. Such inscriptions, as 
signifiers of individuation, would reveal the potency of a personal voice.116 
                                                       
114 I perceive ‘gesture’ to be the same as the ‘grunt’, which is the primordial act of consciousness that 
relates to the origin of speech and language. 
115 ‘Facture’ refers to the hand-made quality of something, or the mark of the hand in manually 
created objects. It is interesting to recall the word ‘manufacture’, in which ‘manu’- derives from 
‘manual’, or ‘manus’ (Latin for hand), to be joined with the notion ‘facture’, which denotes both 
production and manual labour. 
116  Umberto Eco’s concept of an aesthetic idiolect that he explains in A Theory of Semiotics (1979: 
271-273) supports the notion of such a personal voice. In the context of drawing, an aesthetic 
idiolect would comprise those stylistic variants that an individual drafter uses consistently, but without 
stagnation or stasis in any visual art practice. Eco assigns the shaping or the coming into being of an 
aesthetic idiolect to an inner scheme, a corpus-idiolect, of interrelated structural relationships 
between subject and object, a system of underlying competences that situate themselves in the 
person’s mind. Eco’s “inner system of underlying competences” reminds of Bourdieu’s concept of 
habitus as “a system of durable, transposable dispositions which functions as the generative basis of 
structured, objectively unified practices” (Bourdieu. 1979: vii). Eco asserts that a particular 
configurative arrangement in these structural relationships that actualises as the distinguishing 
attributes of drafteric form activates during the act of making art (Eco. 1979; 271). My construal of 
the formation of individuated gesture and its significance in drawing facilitation, I believe, carry the 
genesis of that which contribute to the external manifestation of such internally stratified processes, 
or what Eco calls an “underlying competence” (1979: 272). As Bourdieu emphasises the entrenchment 
of habitus in perception and in practices, placing them in irretrievable relationship to each other and 
to self, Eco relates competence to practice by stating that “the individual performance of an 
underlying competence” constitutes an “idiolect”. Eco identifies a corpus-idiolect comprising the 
aesthetic-, the work-, the movement-, and the period-idiolects, each positioning itself in a generative 
hierarchy of conceptualising paradigms as accountable for individuated performances. I interpret 
‘performance’ as largely synonymous with Bourdieu’s ‘practice’ or ‘action’ and with De Zegher’s ‘act’ 
as gesture in drawing (De Zegher. 2003: 267-278). Eco states pertinently that their collective 
cooperation allows for individuated performance (Eco. 1979: 272). He also states that “competences 
allow performances and that performances also establish new forms of competence” (Eco. 1979: 
272). With these words, Eco clearly indicates an implicit developmentally cerebrative process that 
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3.2.1 Enactionist and interactionist drawn gesture 
The concepts of interaction117 and enaction118 lead me to distinguish (in theoretical 
terms rather than in discernable quality) between ‘enactionist’ or ‘enactioned drawn 
gesture’, and ‘interactive drawn gesture’ in drawing. I propose that, while some 
facets of discernment and doing in drawing or in making a mark can and do 
interactively and unconsciously cite socio-cultural habitus and personal history, 
pursuing an argument for interaction as wholly accountable for trait, could not bear 
out. In support of this notion, Norman Bryson asserts that such an argument would 
end up in tracking and endorsing an evolutionary redistribution of the Essential 
Copy (1983: 15-16). Society and culture cannot entirely explain how the individual 
drafter’s labour in drawing and particular “registration of reality” (Bryson. 1983: 
14-16) – as individuated physical and sensory involvement – influence her drawing. 
 
Discernment and doing in drawing can also enact embodiment directly and 
unconsciously. Indeed, Jacques Derrida states that drawing constitutes more than one 
point of view that “cross paths, but without ever confirming each other, without the 
least bit of certainty, in a conjecture that is at once singular and general” (1993: 2). 
In an interpretation of my own, I associate “conjecture” with trait, and “singular” as 
inferring enaction, while “general” indicates the structures of visual language that a 
socio-cultural situatedness maintains interactively to ensure understandability. 
Agency, therefore, implies an additional facility that is individual-centred. 
 
I propose that interaction and enaction continue the embodiment process in-phase, 
while the drafter simultaneously enacts already assimilated embodiments. This 
suggests that the drafter directs her drawing partly by tacit memory and partly by 
self-originative enaction in “unconscious execution” (Derrida. 1993: 48) to convert 
the gestic into marks that have no precedence or conscious specularity before 
irruption. Habitus and enactionist cognition would underpin both and both would 
irrupt durationally in the temporal labour of drawing.  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
resonates in Bourdieu’s generative structure. Eco’s corpus-idiolect resembles Bourdieu’s habitus 
formation in its compliance with body and mind as continuity. 
117  In the Bourdieuian sense.  
118 As Varela defines it. Please see, Chapter 2, under ‘Enaction’. 
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My proposal above suggests that, on the one hand, (the drafter’s) enactionist drawn 
gesture relates the “immanent tendencies of the game in her body, in an 
incorporated state: she embodies the game” (Bourdieu. 1998: 81). This embodiment 
realises through embodied action in trace.  
 
 Interactionist drawn gesture 
On the other hand, it suggests that drawn gesture cites and references “a socialized 
body, a structured body, a body which has incorporated the immanent structures of 
a world or of a particular sector of that world – a field – and which structures the 
perception of that world as well as action in that world” (Bourdieu. 1998: 81). Such 
marks would display spectres of past interactivity in the field of forces and in social 
space, the forces of which influence the drafter’s durational enaction in drawing. To 
understand “the technical means whereby the changing nature of the real is 
‘registered’” (Bryson. 19983: 15), however, requires more. As should be clear, I 
believe that enaction supplements this interactive aspect of the forming of trace. 
 
 Enactionist drawn gesture 
I propose that enactionist drawn gesture arises from that place in the body-mind of 
the student drafter that is largely unblemished by conscious stylistic affectation or 
deliberately appropriated aesthetisation. In other words, trait as enactionist drawn 
gesture materialises, I believe, when no deliberate, conscious effort to conceal or 
repress it interferes. This is so exactly because primordial gesture is borne by an 
unpremeditated and subliminal desire to communicate the meaning that preverbality 
wishes to symbolise. It is body-mind; it is intellect and body as one (Bryson. 1983: 
122). Similarly, interactionist drawn gesture arises from a place in the mind of the 
drafter that has absorbed the forces of the field into the unconscious, beyond 
conscious control, yet habitus-governed. Moreover, if interaction between habitus 
and field continues for the duration of drawing, it incorporates both enaction and 
interaction into drawn gesture. As such, drawn gesture can be both reflexive and 
immediate, both unchecked mental and musculature enaction and interaction.119  
 
                                                       
119 ‘Trait’ refers to drawn gesture, and ‘drawn gesture’ includes enactionist and interactionist drawn 
gesture, unless qualified by either one. Both trait and drawn gesture are part of world, or of outside 
structures. Please refer to ‘trait’, ‘trace’, and ‘drawn gesture’ in the Glossary (Addendum B) 
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I propose that an interchangeability, rather than dividedness, prevails between 
enactionist and interactive gesture in a unifying action that irrupts as drawn 
gesture.120 I base this proposal on the interchange that unifies body and mind. It is 
possible to distinguish between drawn gesture and marks that have precedents in 
objective structures, where such precedents determine the material appearance of 
their (re) making. The drafter reads such marks as text. If she replicates them, the 
dialectic I describe above does not occur. Rather, the drafter conducts a monologue. 
One voice remains quiet, and it is usually the enactionist one.  
 
 Projective drawing 
Also distinct from drawn gesture, is ‘projective’ gesture – gesture that the drafter 
pre-conceives in the conscious mind to trace ‘as idea’, ‘from memory’, or ‘from 
imagination’. These traces also bear no precedents, and nothing prevents them from 
irrupting in enactionist or interactionist drawn gesture.121 Even in ‘projective’ drawing, 
the labour-based process of illustrating pre-conceived ideas will produce 
characteristic mark making. Thus, the process of doing continues progressive 
renewal, which results in imagery that does not necessarily fit their blueprint or 
formula perfectly. In other words, the self continues to embed in interchange 
between the drawing process and the schemata of meaning in the process of 
drawing projectivity. The self does not take flight during projective notation. This 
notion answers the question whether projectivity and process-generativity are 
mutually exclusive that I pose in Chapter 1.  
 
 Derivative drawing 
The possibility remains, however, that trait-embedded drawn gesture of another 
artist could serve as field of observation in processes of derivative mark making. 
This would produce a re-interpretation of marks that already exist in an established 
paradigm or scheme of meaning. For the drafter who engages in derivative 
drawing, there could be no ‘punctum caecum’ where pre-meaning and the self meet 
                                                       
120 Here, in particular, the word ‘gesture’ denotes pre-meaning, while ‘drawn gesture’ denotes 
gesture as mark. In contrast to ‘gesture’, ‘drawn gesture’ denotes already irrupted mark. As such, it is 
part of objective structures, of world, unlike ‘gesture’, which denotes pre-meaning.  
121 It must be noted, however, that projective drawing does not shun formula. Yet, I base this 
proposal on the notion that the drafter as centre of cognition dominates in this distinction, and that 
she will apply dissent, consent, or compromise according to her system of embodied dispositions. 
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to simultaneously create trait and allow it to venture forth in new schemata of 
meaning that enfold the experiential engagement of the self. 
 
Yet, I must note that even in derivative drawing the possibility that the drafter can 
interpret self-reflexively remains. The main contrast that I distinguish is between 
mechanical copying of style-language and self-reflexivity in drawing.  
 
In my construal of gestic conversion as convergence between habitus and embodied 
action, I propose that the irruption of individuated drawn gesture (trait) functions 
beyond conscious control of the will or “beyond the reach of introspective scrutiny” 
(Bourdieu 1984: 466). In-phase enaction would therefore result in marks that could 
be artlessly unstructured, and even ‘wrong’. They would not yet bow to critique, or to 
meaning. Therefore, a conscious desire to conform to any rule or dogma would not 
have manipulated them. Such rule or dogma could constitute the formulae of 
representation, realistic accuracy, descriptiveness, or any institutionally authorised 
styles.  
 
If interactionist drawn gesture acknowledges the inhibitive edict of convention, 
‘enactioned’ gesture responds in dissent from such edicts, or in self-reflexive 
compliance and compromise, which also constitute forms of deviation or dissent. I 
propose that divergence from norm has its roots in such responses. Because of self-
reflexivity, even compliance or compromise are never pure, never a completely 
exact repetition. Interactionist drawn gesture is always reliant on the influence of 
enactionist drawn gesture, and vice versa. The confluence between enactionist and 
interactionist drawn gesture that I propose above indicates simultaneity and 
interchange between the two, which the labour of drawing brings about. Apart from 
its properties of conversion, therefore, drawn gesture also holds potential for 
deviation (or even subversion) that challenges convention and norm.  
 
I must emphasise that not all drawings must (or even could) only consist of trait as 
‘enactioned’ drawn gesture, but rather that self-originative and interactive marks, as 
theoretically distinctive types of gesture, can also relate dialectically. This process 
contributes to a generative dynamic that occurs for the duration of the drawing 
process. Moreover, drawn gesture as trait seats itself in the stylistic aspect of 
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drawing, but drawing style does not comprise trace only. It also comprises non-
trace, or erasure and ground as ‘unmarking’, which I discuss in due course. The 
idiosyncrasies of enactionist and interactionist drawn gesture manifest in drawing 
form as unconsidered deformations of formal elements, conventions, and content of 
drawing, because they also derive from idiosyncrasies in disposition.  
 
3.3 The self 
 
Trait and the self as nucleus of cognition 
Enactionist and interactionist drawn gesture, I propose, irrupt from the same realm 
of the ‘unbeknownst’ in which one is self and which frustratingly yields neither a true 
nor a full picture of the self. The intermittent and sparse glimpses of the self that this 
unbeknownst affords one in personally experiential engagement in life leave in 
their wake awareness of an enormous but concealed void. If the self constitutes a 
void, such a void would also compel continued delving that would give form and 
coherency to its mystery. With this unspecified void as incentive, the desire to grasp 
and denote the ever-present, yet ever elusive, haunting remainder122 of the self, 
trait becomes a self-affirmative enaction  – a small grasping gesture that attempts to 
fill the void. In this way, the drafter continuously, but never conclusively, inscribes the 
self.  
 
The self-as-being versus the self-as-nothing 
Considering the above, it is possible that self-as-nothing in opposition to an 
achievable self-as-being is a fundamental dialectical impetus that compels the 
production of trait and the act of drawing. From the above discussions, I surmise the 
unconscious as basis or source of enaction and interaction, which implies self-
reflexivity, with the self as pivotal point of return in any form of productive practice. 
Thus, this relationship between the self-as-nothing and the self-as-being underpins, 
paradoxically, the union between trait and the self.  
 
                                                       
122 If trait, as inscription, constitutes the self, it constitutes a materialised, ‘enactioned’ self in the 
world. Such inscription, however, leaves the rest of the self behind in the unconscious – still not 
inscribed; yet unrevealed, therefore non-existent. Thus, the ‘remainder’ of the self stays unbeknownst 
to the act of drawing. 
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A simple comparison demonstrates another reason for associating the self and trait. 
When comparing the work of different drafters, trait emerges as the difference 
between the works of two or more drafters (see Addendum A, Illustrations 3 & 9). 
Similarly, the self emerges as the difference between two people. If I want to deny 
the existence of trait in drawing, and by extension, the existence of self, I would 
have to find only resemblance rather than difference between the works of two or 
more drafters. I would have to say that all drafters could have made all drawings, 
which would simply not be justifiable against the volume of evidence to the contrary. 
The self is a gauge, albeit an unstable one, against which we measure our existence 
in the world (as ‘other’). Thereby, we affirm the existence of both the self and the 
world. Trait is a gauge against which the drafter measures lived ‘reality’ as there – 
existing – while she simultaneously confirms her own existence. Similarly, the self is a 
gauge against which the drafter measures trait as the other of the self.  
 
Moreover, if the disturbing spectres of solipsism, narcissism, and subjectivism appear 
when the drafter does this, forcing her to remove the self from the equation, surely 
the equation would also disappear. In this case, would the world not disappear with 
the equation? (Varela. 1992: 130). The drafter enacts the self, or her personally 
experiential awareness of her self. This irrupts as trait and its enaction augments her 
drawing. Were the self absent, would the drafter draw? Do we not look as much for 
the self as we do for the world when we draw? Varela speculates: 
And yet when, having discovered the groundlessness of the self, we turn 
toward the world, we are no longer sure we can find it. Or perhaps we should 
say that once we let go of a fixed self, we no longer know how to look for the 
world. We define the world, after all, as that which is not-self, that which is 
different from the self, but how can we do this when we no longer have a self 
as a reference point? (1992: 130).  
 
In support of this and in order to understand the ‘self’ in ‘self-originative’ drawn 
gesture, Bourdieu too offers clarification that has particular bearing on self-
reflexivity in practices. Habitus as a schema of dispositions tells a personal history 
of identity-construction that poses self-identity as construct. This construct is 
continually organised by an inherent habitus, which in itself contains the information 
that would be formative and informative of self-perception.  
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Habitus generates and enfolds the state of being singular in one’s person; it 
regulates the shape of individuation in practices; its responsibility for distinctiveness 
in a person and her practices is a given. In the individual, habitus constitutes a 
singular and identifiable “manner of thought or a permanent mode of thinking” 
(Bourdieu in Mahar. 1990: 33-35). This mode of thinking accounts for an individual’s 
“active intention and inventiveness in practice” (Bourdieu in Mahar. 1990: 33-35). 
More importantly though, Bourdieu describes the notion of habitus as central to his 
efforts “to describe and analyse the genesis of one’s person” (Bourdieu in Mahar. 
1990: 33), in other words, one’s self.  
 
As related in earlier discussions (see Chapter 2), habitus tells of the genesis and 
evolvement of habitus in a social sphere. The person it inhabits, therefore, reflexively 
constructs a socially defined sense of self.123 To reiterate, one’s understanding of the 
self is a construct, continuously engendered by and inherent to habitus. The habitus 
contains information concerning the being of self, its locus. It pivots back to itself in 
understanding, utterance, enaction, or ‘practicing’ of the self.  
 
The same schema of dispositions that direct and shape practices (such as drawing) 
not only forms the person’s idea of self, but also her conduct, and physical 
application of the self. If this does not entail the “registration of reality” (Bryson. 
1983: 14-16), it at least partly explains particularity of manner in drawing. 
Nevertheless, while habitus is central in self-construction, it also grasps those 
formations that constitute its existence and its development recursively and 
reflexively. Therefore, self-reflexivity emerges as imperative in practices. 
 
The self-reflexivity immanent in the relationship between the self, habitus, and the 
world, collapses the self and habitus into one, as much as it collapses agent and 
structure into one. The void that constitutes unawareness of the self (or the self-as-
nothing) diminishes through practices. The individual person becomes personally and 
experientially aware of the self (the self-as-being) through the fused mind-body 
schemata of understanding that habitus holds and enaction entails in practices.  
 
                                                       
123  Embodied action involves the biological and psychological spheres in such a construct. 
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Synthesis 
The self of the drafter assumes position in the drawing through mind and hand – in 
other words, through enacting directly her interactively entrenched habitus. What 
one could perceive as two processes and two locations, become one – a place and 
process locating simultaneously inside and outside, producing its individuated traces 
in-phase with the self and her personally experiential engagement in drawing. With 
reference to the question above: How does trait formation in drawing involve both 
body and mind? – this is how a conflated body and mind orchestrates the formation 
of trait in drawing. 
 
Proficient drawing contains a culmination of idiosyncratic qualities uniquely 
affiliated to the drafter as individual. The drafter accomplishes this distinctiveness 
through the process of drawing – not through pre-planning. This notion suggests an 
identity as symbolic form that manifests in drawn gesture, an identity that is not 
outside, but entrenched in drawing-trait. It evokes an awareness of difference in 
doing so, and establishes (in individuated drawn gesture) a visually evident self-
revelatory path that implies self-reflexivity as active in durational practice. While it 
becomes a product of integrated and proficient practice, the student drafter’s 
drawing could therefore be seen as an ‘enactioned’ document of the self in 
conversation with the self, with lived ‘reality’, with a viewing audience, field, and 
with social space. The self, self-reflexivity, dispositional embodiment, and embodied 
action, to my mind, underlie individuated gesture in drawing.  
 
In the discussions that follow, therefore, I advocate an erasure of the body and mind 
duality in drawing too. Such erasure acknowledges the in-phase, concurrent and 
correlative involvement of somatic and doxic modality and memory in shaping 
idiosyncratic, unpremeditated drawing traces. In the drawn mark, the trace, the 
eyes, and hand as extensions of both body and mind – as completely engrossed 
memory – reveals itself. A drawing mark possesses as much the strong impetus that 
facture and stroke (the hand-as-mind) creates, as it possesses the sway of innuendo 
that the mind-as-hand simultaneously interleaves. The flow and force of the trace 
relates everything that the viewer can see or conjecture about the drafter’s body: its 
absence and its presence, its particular way of moving, its manner of delivering a 
stroke that leaves trace in its wake, whether touching drawing ground or not 
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(Bryson. 1983: 117). From trace and trait, the viewer can ascertain or conjecture 
what and how the drafter has conceptualised behind the mark, that which is 
unknown or heretofore unseen.124  
 
3.4 Drawing as interface 
 
The self and reflexivity 
Merleau-Ponty draws a particularly intimate bond between self-affirmation and 
idiosyncrasies that appear in practices. Above, I demonstrate almost graphically his 
notion of reversibility in ‘hand-as-mind’ / ‘mind-as-hand’, suggesting that the 
unification of the gestic and meaning echoes unification between the ontic125 and the 
intentional self. He says,  
…this drawing together, by the subject, of the meaning diffused through the 
object, and, by the object, of the subject’s intentions – a process which is 
physiognomic perception – arranges round the subject a world which speaks to 
him of himself, and gives his own thoughts their place in the world (Merleau-
Ponty. 1962: 132).  
 
In Merleau-Ponty’s account, the drafter would not consider herself as supreme in a 
hierarchical relationship to the field of observation, nor would she regard the world 
as primary, or as an already fully determinate thing imposing itself as determinant 
upon her formulations. Rather, the drawing act of the drafter would be the chiasmic 
eclipse between the being of her self and the being of the object in a process of 
“drawing together...of the meaning diffused through the objects”. Simultaneously, 
for the drafter, the object would be, or exist as beseeching her scrutiny in a 
transitory disclosure of such simultaneity through the act of drawing it.  
 
                                                       
124 Eco’s concept of the aesthetic idiolect can be applied here, since it relates the musculature of 
mark making in the movement- and work-idiolects, while incorporating the aesthetic- and social-
idiolects too. Such systems explain those aspects of drawing that serve to direct the flow of 
individuated gesture as encoded and recognisable signs in its discourses with an outer, wider sphere, 
the social space of participation. 
125 Being; existing; the material existence of something that possesses outer appearance; the 
existential self, the phenomenological self. Please refer to the Glossary (Addendum B). 
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This intimate sense of mutuality between the drafter and her world evokes the sense 
that the act of drawing is the mutuality, the ‘flesh between’. The creative 
engagement between drafter and objectivity, the continual exchange in which the 
drafter converts her understanding of world into drawn gesture, becomes an 
individualistic way of being in relation to the world. This happens in a sphere of 
mutuality, an internal world externalised (and vice versa) in drawn gesture. This 
world is inherent to the drafter, hence Merleau-Ponty’s words, “physiognomic 
perception... arranges round the subject a world which speaks to him of himself” 
(Merleau-Ponty. 1962: 132). This sphere of mutuality represents the drafter’s 
particular hold on it. It is a world that belongs only to her. The drafter unconsciously 
implies this sphere of mutuality as immanent in the embrace of her body – “a 
process which is physiognomic perception”. The drafter is her body-mind and she 
enacts its grip in her traces. She grasps with her mind, eyes and hand the mutuality 
of being as much as she grasps for it through and in drawn gesture.  
 
Synthesis 
Therefore, I propose drawing as an interface, which constitutes the enaction of the 
self as the interplay (‘flesh’, ‘chiasm’) between the drafter as subject, her 
personalised history, and the external world. I also propose drawing as interface of 
the reversible effects of such interplay on drawing skill and habitus.126 In other 
words, such an interface could orchestrate development in the continuous in-phase 
engagement of the drafter.  
 
3.5 Development and meaning 
 
“Development by definition comprises continuity and transformation” (Slonimsky & 
Shalem. 2004: 91), both in the drafter and in her drawing practices. Those 
underlying processes of transformation that constitute development, anticipate the 
significance of trait in drawing. Drawing practice would serve as interface of the 
interplay between the habitus of the drafter and her participation in the field of 
drawing. Simultaneously, it serves as continuous enaction of a unified somatic and 
mental self that enacts embodiment and her notion of lateral mutuality. In this way, 
                                                       
126 This is not a repetition, but an application of the circularity that I found in the previous chapter. 
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drawing serves as action-based process (practice) that constructs meaning 
experientially. 
 
What I perceive as internal self-world – the self-as-being – that gains concreteness 
in drawn gesture, which becomes tantamount to the unknown intricacies of an 
individual self, Derrida calls “night”, “chasm” or “abyss” (1993: 41-45). Merleau-
Ponty calls it “chiasm” or “lateral transcendence”. Having its genesis in such 
diaphanous void, gesture (as drawing) interfaces between the void and lived 
‘reality’ and world, in an effort to uncover the meaning of this relationship. 
Individuated drawn gesture insinuates the existence of this relationship as a vast 
and complex realm that is both borne by and clarified through the labour of 
drawing. 
 
3.6 Trait as gesture 
 
Strangely, trait seems to originate from its own advent. It functions in that sphere of 
tension between the drafter and the world that creates the impetus and compulsion 
to draw. This compulsion has its roots in the primal desire to make something visible, 
to give it form in order to know and understand it. It is not only the object, but also 
the unknown internal self that attempts to become knowable. To give externality 
form in order to know it is tantamount to projecting the self or at least asserting the 
self in relation to objectivities, thus giving form to both internality and externality 
simultaneously.  
 
Synthesis 
I propose that the difference between the visible object and the drafter’s experience 
of it (her particular, but unconscious desire to grasp object as subject) compels 
idiosyncratic inscription. The drafter does not only desire expanded knowledge of 
the objective properties of her subject matter. She also desires experiential 
encounters with her own invisibilities and unbeknownst, with her self as the only 
possible originative source of that which could occupy the gestic and the self. That 
which self’s inner sense of being confines to invisibility can be drawn, and in 
revealing itself in drawn form, outer self (the one who stands with one foot in field) 
tricks her own inner self into exposure, thereby revealing habitus as the self. 
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Jacques Derrida offers support for this interpretation. According to him (1993: 45), 
the difference between the drawing and the object (this chasm entailing the 
unbeknownst) comprises two ambits. Firstly, the drafter’s memory of past 
observations, the “anamnesis of memory itself” (Derrida. 1993: 45), occupies it. The 
drafter processes past observations (and the anticipation of future observations) as 
image schemata or visual code that, according to Bourdieu, embodies perception, 
and which Varela suggests, we enact in embodied action. Here, Derrida’s notion 
certainly resonates with Varela’s concept of embodied action and Bourdieu’s habitus 
concept of a complicitous personal history. More importantly, it confirms the concept 
of interactionist drawn gesture. In other words, trait constitutes gesture that cites 
history while it irrupts involuntarily. 
 
The second ambit occupying the chasm is that which is completely and conclusively 
alien to the material world (Derrida. 1993: 44-45). I interpret this as relating to the 
notion of pre-meaning that is gesture, or the other of language (Kristeva. 1989: 
305 – 306 cited in De Zegher. 2003: 274). In drawing, gesture emerges as visible 
trace and trait, rather than voiced word, as a conversion of pre-meaning into its 
other. Enactionist drawn gesture, to my mind, transcends ‘muteness’ (Agambem. 
1999: 78 cited in De Zegher. 2003: 267-268) as pre-meaning in speech and 
language, which would be parallel to ‘blindness’ as pre-meaning in seeing. It 
designates that which cannot be seen or said, but is sensed nevertheless, such as the 
remainder of self. Enactionist drawn gesture, I propose, taps the self. 
 
Derrida (1993: 41-50) describes these notions as “the transcendental” and 
“sacrificial” of drawing. The transcendental he defines as “the invisible condition of 
the possibility of drawing”, which “could never be posited as the representable 
object of a drawing”. I interpret the “sacrificial” to be that which the drafter 
sacrifices to drawn gesture as new visibility. It constitutes what she consequently 
reveals of the self in conviction of the self-as-being. In its transcendental and 
sacrificial spheres, drawing becomes an operational system – a practice, an 
enaction that assists in making the self and its particular memory visible. In such a 
process, cumulative development of cognitive and re-cognitive competences (that 
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include conceptualisation and synthesis) would necessarily be active. In processes of 
mechanical reproduction, such development would not be active.  
 
3.7 Stasis 
 
Emulation opposes or denies an embodied self (Varela. 1999: 79). This means that, 
theoretically, the sacrificial cannot be a product of the remainder of the self, and 
enaction cannot be an involuntary uttering of embodiment. The self sacrifices nothing 
to drawn gesture in processes of copying, because the drafter simply replicates trait 
belonging to another creator, whether human or machine. The drafter re-enacts the 
embodiment of another artist. Such trait already relates their original maker’s 
idiosyncrasies. Reproducing it would constitute mere repetition of style language.  
 
Synthesis 
I pose such repetition as problematic, because I believe it would exclude those 
cerebral processes that convert ‘preverbal symbolicity’ into drawn gesture, as it 
would render unnecessary any desire to access the remainder of self. A self that is 
another, rather than the other of self, is already spilt. 
 
3.8 Emulation versus enaction 
 
Sacrificing the self to the drawing surface ‘in the first person’ – or as trait – leads to 
understanding trait as self-originative phenomenon. It irrupts as unpremeditated, 
almost involuntary reflex while the subjective mind focuses simultaneously on 
converting, and inscribing conception. In this way, drawing conflates intention, 
thinking and doing. Drawing sustains a generative interplay between ‘enactionist’, 
‘performative’ and ‘interactive’ gesture – interplay that spans the conscious and 
unconscious minds.  
 
Synthesis 
If it is so that drawing is the visuality of self-originativity, its significance in a three-
tiered relationship between the self, practice, and product seems central to self-
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reflexivity and self-generativity. Consequently, this notion poses drawing-trait as 
significant in creativity and in revelatory127 research.  
 
3.9 Facilitation: passage from unknowingness to knowingness 
 
Discussions in this chapter at least prepare the ground for facilitating drawing as 
self-reflexively cerebrative process. Although this would disturb the conventions of 
drawing facilitation as convenient re-distributor of style language, as a process of 
recording visual perception, or as a vehicle for illustrating observation and idea, it 
does not limit cerebration to the unconscious sphere alone. Rather, it positions 
drawing as a process in which the drafter stands central in enacting her unconscious 
self through trait, to reveal unknowingly before expressing knowingly.  
 
Synthesis 
I therefore propose trait as a visibility of the meaning that gesticulation conveys, 
and as being capable of carrying the subliminal from the covert to the overt.128 This 
facility of trait unifies a potential split between drawing as verb and drawing as 
noun, since it does not denounce or censure either one. If trait, as enactive129 of a 
disposition that occupies the unconscious, flows from invisibility to become visibility, it 
reveals and perpetuates reflexivity on the outside. Once out in the conscious or 
‘visible’ spheres, should the drafter engage recursively through sight with trait as 
visibility in itself,130 she will discover those structures that can also facilitate 
metaphorical cerebration, because the drafter has “neural mechanisms for 
metaphorically extending image schemas as we perform abstract conceptualization 
and reasoning” (Johnson. 2007: 141).  
 
                                                       
127 I apply the word ‘revelatory’ here in the specific context of art practice as research, a term that 
indicates a type of research methodology. Sullivan explains this form of research as “dynamic, 
reflexive, and revelatory as creative and critical practices are used to shed new light on what is 
known and to consider the possibility of what is not” (2005:191-192). It differs from conventional 
methodologies, because rather than being “linear, iterative, and confirmatory” as in quantitative 
studies, or as “cyclical, emergent, and discovery oriented” as in qualitative studies, it is self-reflexive 
and “revelatory” (Sullivan. 2005:191-192). I explore this notion further in the last two chapters. 
128 Covert to overt - or hidden to unhidden, the Verborgen to Unverborgenheit, or invisibility to 
visibility (Merleau-Ponty. 1968). 
129  I intend the application of ‘enactive’ here deliberately as either noun or verb, signifying both 
‘enacting’ and ‘enaction’. 
130 I perceive ‘self-generativity’ and amassment to be active in this practice in drawing, a practice 
that involves ‘drawing as generative partner’. 
 131 
3.10 Trait and process 
 
It is possible to posit drawing as a practice that unfolds, and that the self is 
intimately complicitous in its unfolding. Rather than only employing – in detached 
analytical or logical reasoning – the computational mind, drawing employs the 
intertwined computational and phenomenological minds, which draws not only 
embodiment in, but also the body. Therefore, in drawing, the drafter does not pre-
conceive knowingly or cogently the outcome of a drawing. For the duration of her 
labour, her drawing unfolds with expansive recursivity. Each trace may incur dissent, 
compromise or consent by the self with trace, and with drawing as field. Those 
extended discursive probes implicit to participation in a field and in social space 
remain present for the duration of the drawing’s unfolding.  
 
In her exchanges with sight, site, and time, the drafter does not pose objectives that 
demand conformity to formulae. In each drawing, the drafter delivers herself anew 
to an unknown and unprecedented outcome in which the possibilities are endless and 
disclosure is never final or fulfilled. Such drawing practice does not consciously set 
as goal a visual ‘effect’ or a style language, because such projection would 
constitute a pre-determined outcome (with enclosed end). Such outcome, once 
accomplished, would remain captive as convincing proof of its conformity to a 
projected outcome (Bourdieu. 1998: 79-80).  
 
When starting a drawing, the drafter might derive at most a sense from former 
experiences that would pose inklings of what is to come, but she would not – could 
not – envisage its fulfilled form beforehand. This is so, because those multitudes of 
accrued visual schemata and in-phase sensibilities will always intervene again to 
enact experience, or reconstruct ‘reality’, but will do so anew and in unpredictable 
form. In this, drawing-trait cannot exist until the drafter creates it. Even in extremely 
realistic work, the drafter deconstructs ‘reality’, and the idea of ‘reality’, and 
through drawing, she constructs it once more through enacting her integrated 
interactions. For the drafter, one ‘reality’ does not exist as an end in itself in any 
current drawing: as there is no single ‘reality’, there is no supreme vision, not even of 
self. For the drafter, there is no essentialist veracity in the world. There is no single 
end to a drawing; there is no single end in drawing. 
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Synthesis 
I propose that the student drafter should develop an empowered doxic modality of 
her image schemata as self-presentation. In a drawing course, the student drafter 
should have the opportunity to modify her image schemata incrementally and 
recursively. With each enactionist modification, the drafter strengthens a first person 
voice. By recursively building on or extending self-originative schemata of gestic 
conversions, she creates new form. I propose that the labour of drawing as in-phase 
and continuous generator of self-originative gesture, of enactionist trait, or of 
interactionist drawn gesture, can thus provide fertile ground for the genesis of 
creativity, developing along identifiable pathways that are activated by the 
process of drawing. I propose that this facility could verify itself in the visibility and 
language of trait. I attempt articulation of such ‘pathways’131 in the next chapter to 
further discover how trait formation in drawing involves both body and mind. 
                                                       
131 I apply ‘pathways’ as a figurative or abstract demarcation of processing in drawing, not as a 
literal mapping there-of. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
I MARK SELF AND SELF MARKS I: CIRCULAR PATHWAYS IN DRAWING 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
While the previous chapters speculated on the relationship between the self and 
drawing-trait, this chapter focuses on drawing in general terms. It continues to relate 
my perception of how trait formation in drawing involves both body and mind – a 
question I asked in the previous chapter. In simple terms, I need to know what 
happens ‘inside’ during drawing. As such, the self, as locus of creativity, and the 
articulations between the self, subject matter, the act of drawing, and the drawing 
as object form a framework for discussion.  
 
I propose that difference between the drawn image and the field of observation 
(whether actual objects or ideas), between image and trace, and between image 
and founding perception represent a number of experiential pathways in 
drawing.132 These paths also chart passages back and forth between the 
unconscious and the conscious in drawing, where drawing serves as crossing point or 
interface, and where enaction and the self operate. I attempt to map such pathways 
to unpack cerebration in the originative production and recursive processing of trait. 
In this, I utilise my own understanding of the drawing process, while at the same time 
I try to find some particularities of habitus in drawing.  
 
The facilitation of drawing necessitates acknowledgement that drawing in itself, (as 
interface for those ambits in the continuum that I established), interweaves several 
dualities. One such duality is between perception and conception in the mind of the 
                                                       
132  The relationships I refer to here are best formulated in the words of Bryson (De Zegher. 2003: 
152), in which we see the “convergence of three real-time operations: the artist’s visual idea, in the 
time of its coming into the world; the always present-tense work of the line in space; and the always 
ongoing work of viewing. A fusion between the artist’s mind, the artist’s hand, and the beholder’s 
Gaze: drawing as an art of presence and transparency”. 
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drafter. In such a framework, the facilitator would allow the in-phase drawing 
process – its facture, or labour – to produce new form.  
 
I position trait as new form, because it holds no visible precedent. (I only touched on 
this notion in a previous chapter, but it is elaborated on in due course). Drawing 
facilitation that encourages trait as new form, or at least new contribution, opens the 
possibility that student drafters can challenge or transform current or institutionalised 
norms. Such facilitation would implement the student drafters’ self-reflexive 
enactment of disposition in gestic conversion, which, I propose, can be held 
accountable for trait. Facture as the focus of facilitation would not only involve the 
realm of enaction, but would also permit a model for self-affirmative presentation. 
Discovery of those processes that constitute such enaction and presentation as 
deviation from norm, are of concern here.  
 
Ultimately, this chapter attempts a literal tracking of the advent of trait. 
Understanding the advent of trait will reveal the contrast between trait and 
emulation of style language. Thereby, I try to discover the exact point in the 
drawing process at which the student drafter turns to either self-originitivity or 
repetition. In Chapter 5, I will interpret this point in the terms that this thesis 
produces. This chapter, therefore, also provides groundwork for Chapter 5. 
 
4.1 A misleading divide in drawing 
 
Before discussing the pathways, I must clarify the drafteric application of a 
theoretical strand that evolved in the previous chapters. This entails a return to 
circularity, which I raised in Chapter 2.  
 
This side and the other side 
In Chapter 2, it became clear that practice, in Bourdieu’s terms, interfaces between 
internalisation and externalisation in the mobilisation of habitus. It would be wrong 
to assume that, in drawing as practice, such an interface entails two ‘sides’ – one on 
either side of the act of drawing – an ‘inside’ (internality) and an ‘outside’ 
(externality). One could easily assume that, in such a dualistic understanding of the 
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premise,133 both sides would provide ‘information’ that the drafter either represents 
or reformulates. Furthermore, were it so, the social referencing that Bourdieu 
explains would, in the drawing process, not provide information for underpinning 
self-originitive trait. We know now that an enactionist theory of mind tells it 
differently. If, on both sides, varying degrees of drafter-centred cerebrative 
processing occurs in interchanging reciprocality, presentation rather than 
representation occurs, because embodiment is also involved. Drafter-centred 
practice is the unifying factor, as I explained in Chapter 2 and in Chapter 3. 
 
I perceive this interchanging reciprocality to occur in the processes of drawing. On 
one side, (what I call ‘this’ side), the imposing and inhibitive restraints of arithmetical 
edict, observation, coherency, and stability reign. In representationist terms, it is 
therefore possible to construe this side as ‘information’. On the ‘other’ side, however, 
the surge and chaos of the somatic and the conscious and unconscious mind hold 
sway. This surge includes the ‘muteness’ that dwells in language, the gestures of the 
body-mind. It includes the fragmented ‘sensing’ of lateral mutuality that the mobility 
of the eyes produces. The splintered intermittencies of self-as-nothing as opposed to 
self-as-being contributes to this upsurge. One cannot construe the other side as 
‘information’ that can be ‘represented’ or ‘reformulated’, unless it irrupts as mark. 
Between these two sides, the strategising and struggles of habitus play themselves 
out. On this side, paradigmatic reason, the impositions of coherency, or rather the 
denotation of visual schemata, are always restraining the disorder and spontaneity 
of syntagmatic flow from the other side, and vice versa.  
 
Although the two sides seem to be in opposition to each other in the way I describe 
them here, an enactionist theory of mind says that they in fact intermingle in the ebb 
and flow of their interchanges. I proposed in the previous chapter that drawing 
interfaces to capture and resolve the oppositional stances that this plane of 
interchange (where remainders from both sides merge in ebb and flow) absorbs. 
Ebb tide carries its flow to the sea, leaving remnants from the land in its wake, while 
flow tide carries its waters to land, sacrificing creatures from the sea to the shores. 
As interface, drawing, in conjunction with the drafter, also entails a unifying factor. 
                                                       
133 I must note that the premise circumscribes circularity: the internalisation of externality and the 
externalisation of internality. 
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Presentation versus representation 
In accordance with an enactionist theory of mind, a fused this and other side 
suggests presentation merged with representation, conversion merged with 
interpretation. (As I explained in the previous chapter, I perceive trait to originate 
from such an enactionist space). 
 
Bourdieu asserts a confluence between perception and disposition. He argues that 
aesthetic codes, embodied in aesthetic dispositions, interconnect between the 
“conditions of artistic production” and the “conditions of artistic reception”. He 
maintains that this mediation occurs at cognitive and perceptive levels when he says 
that “painting... is a mental thing”, or when he refers to “the norms of perception 
immanent in the work of art” (Bourdieu. 1968: 594). By extension, a person’s innate 
ability to construct meaning (or information) visually134 in drawing occurs or stands in 
a transubstantive relationship to acquired sensibilities and dispositions to become 
embodied. An enactionist theory of mind asserts that from such embodiment, the 
drafter presents, rather than represents.  
 
Bourdieu’s model suggests that, in drawing, production entails dialectical 
interchange. Such dialectic comprises the infraconscious and infralinguistic 
interchanges ensconced in doxic modality (Bourdieu. 1998: 79). Additionally, 
interchange between visual schemata and syntagmata occurs. In these interchanges, 
the oppositional forces of dialectic are at play, thus creating complexities in modal 
processing that result in deviation from the norm, however marginal.  
 
Deviation 
It is the norm, for example, to give students real objects to draw in observational 
drawing. The visual inscriptions of the drafter observing and drawing concrete 
‘reality’ will necessarily deviate from such ‘reality’. The modal processing that 
drawing necessarily implies will always frustrate all efforts by the drafter to 
represent ‘reality’ with absolute accuracy, or to comply completely with its dictates. 
                                                       
134 Here, I refer to the ability known as visuo-construction that explains the cognitive and perceptual 
processes in which visual information is received and processed through complex cerebral activities of 
synthesis to make graphic representation possible. A number of such cognitive models for drawing 
processing exist (See Van Sommers, 1986; Guèrin, Fanny et al. 1999). 
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Visual inscription, in other words, can never resemble ‘reality’ completely. In this 
sense, deviation denotes varying degrees of subversion and of compliance to 
‘reality’. Because it can never be absolute, even compliance constitutes rather than 
contradicts deviation. In addition to subversion and compliance, compromise 
represents a modal result in visual inscription. The drafter reaches some form of 
compromise between subversion and compliance. Visual inscription, therefore, is 
necessarily transformative and developmental.  
 
As such (and in the terms that Merleau-Ponty and Varela posit), enaction and in-
phase labour in practices simultaneously and interactively not only add to skills-
development in that practice, but also to the expansion of dispositional embodiment 
that would sustain such practice. Such is the case in drawing practice too, and this 
reflexive and reciprocal expansion between habitus and skills-development entails 
integration between this side (the outside) and the other side (the inside), rather than 
a divide.  
 
4.2 Pathways 
 
In the following section, I discuss certain pathways that I have identified as 
instrumental in the merger between this and the other sides. The pathways that I 
propose comprise the drafter as centre in relation to trace and facture (labour), to 
subject matter, to founding perceptions, to image or display, and to visuo-
constructive ability and disposition.  
 
The movements of the drafter’s eyes map the pathways I identify. The drafter’s eyes 
move back and forth between mark making, and the field of observation 
(Tchalenko. 2001, August: 1-11). Norman Bryson describes the process as follows: 
The drawn line involves a constant shuttling back and forth between the sitter’s 
features and the corresponding mark on the surface, in a kind of zigzag from 
the point of the drawing tool to the point of observation, and back. The 
interplay between these two points is dynamic and mutually defining (De 
Zegher. 2003: 154).  
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These eye movements seem simple in their furtive probing; yet, the scope and depth 
of body-mind experience that they enfold are far more complex. I therefore create 
multiple categories of pathways as purely metaphorical constructs. I differentiate 
between them only in order to explain the complex layers of perceptualising and 
conceptualising flow that occurs during the act of drawing. 
 
I envisage these pathways to exist within the overarching “two different kinds of 
space” that the drafter occupies, according to Norman Bryson (De Zegher. 2003: 
154). The “surface of the representation” (this side) is visible from the outside. The 
drafter’s body-mind-based processes of conversion (the other side) are, however, 
not visible. These body-mind-based processes create “the depth of the represented 
scene” as trace.  
 
Apropos Bryson’s words above, this ‘interplay’ between the mark or the surface and 
the object perceived, is of particular interest. Its “mutually defining” facility – the 
notion that schemata enable labour while labour generates schemata – confirm a 
conflation between this side and the other side of the drawing act. This conflation 
defines drawing as interface between interior (the drafter’s body-mind, invisibilities, 
such as sensations, sensibilities) and exterior (paper, mark, visibility, and world). This 
can only happen for the duration of the act of drawing. 
 
I propose that this space of interplay envelops founding perceptions,135 which the 
drafter forms with each back and forth movement (“zigzag”). Bryson defines the 
founding perception as the fraction of a moment in which the drafter converts three-
dimensionality into two-dimensional form. The drafter does this along all the 
pathways I describe in this chapter – or rather; to my mind, these pathways 
constitute founding perception. Bryson also states that,  
As the draftsman’s eye travels away from the point of the drawing tool and 
toward the sitter, the work of observation is necessarily shaped by the line it 
                                                       
135 Bryson (1983: 118-119) describes the founding perception as the artist’s gaze into three-
dimensional space, the artist’s durational consulting with source material: “Yet the harmonic device 
that plays simultaneously on the three dimensions of the founding perception and the two dimensions 
of the canvas and the moment of viewing, this pattern of two against three is the underlying 
compositional figure of the realist tradition: composition under realism is this shifting of forms 
between two and three dimensions, subject always to the Gaze, the fused epiphanies, in which both 
sets of dimension equally participate: in the Gaze, the image is both the depth of the founding 
perception, and the flatness of the picture plane”. 
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leaves behind. The drawn line conditions or models the selections from the 
field of observation; it launches observation along a particular direction or 
path. And conversely, what is seen determines how the next line is to continue, 
in a perpetual and recursive interaction that unfolds in ongoing time (De 
Zegher. 2003: 154).  
 
4.2.1 A pathway between labour and schemata 
 
Schemata 
I employ the writings of Mark Johnson (2007) and Norman Bryson (1983, 2003) to 
clarify the relationship between the labour of drawing and visual schemata. In 
Bourdieuian terms, this relationship constitutes the schemata of habitus, and practice 
– in other words, the understanding and skills-development that drawing generates 
while employing them simultaneously. I argue that image schemata, which I perceive 
as a ‘substance’ of habitus, sustain enaction as systems of understanding that 
integrate drafter and lived ‘reality’. As embodied cognition, they function on the 
drawing surface as a pathway between labour and drafter. 
 
Johnson (2007: 136) defines ‘image schemata’ as “a dynamic, recurring pattern of 
organism-environment interactions”; as “precisely these basic structures of 
sensorimotor experience by which we encounter a world that we can understand 
and act within”. Johnson also draws interaction, enaction, and embodied action into 
his definition:  
The patterns of our ongoing interactions, or enactions (to use the term from 
Varela, Thomson and Rosch 1999), define the contours of our world and make 
it possible for us to make sense of, reason about, and act reliably within this 
world (Johnson. 2007: 136).  
 
For the duration of drawing, habitus facilitates interchange between image 
schemata and mark making. Habitus, as a pre-perceptive, cognitive, perceptive, 
and conceptive field of reference, harnesses the schemata of understanding that the 
drafter shares with others. These schemata enable recognition and communication 
between viewer and drawing.  
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Schemata as shifters 
Bryson asserts that such schemata function as “shifters” (1983: 117-119) between 
drafter and world. The drafter applies shared schemata to clarify a relation of 
comparison and differentiation between mark and world. In linguistic and 
mathematical terms, differentiation would comprise, for example, relative 
conceptions such as ‘similar to’, ‘equal to’, ‘smaller than’, ‘greater than’, and so forth. 
The drafter applies and employs her previously amassed visual schemata, drawn 
from personal history and socio-cultural environment as subjective constructs, in the 
same way as the structures of language and gesticulation assimilate them to make 
her traces recognisable to the viewer.  
 
Schemata as paradigm 
Norman Bryson (1983: 122) explains that visual schemata function in the same way 
that the concept of ‘paradigm’ functions in language. ‘Paradigm’ refers to the 
phenomenon in speech where two or more words form mutually exclusive choices in 
particular syntactic roles. In other words, it is possible to replace one word with 
another without disturbing the grammatical coherence of the sentence in which they 
appear. In drawing, similarly, visual schemata produce particular formations of 
marks that create “topographical” shape and form that is recognisable 
notwithstanding the nature of the line as trait, or of its grapheme, albeit to varying 
degrees (Bryson. 1983: 122).  
 
Schemata as generativity 
As a regulator of practices, habitus harnesses dispositional schemata to function 
generatively, helping the drafter to ‘make sense’ of her world. In the process, she 
creates new form, or synthesis. In The Meaning of the Body (2007: 135-154), Mark 
Johnson explains the assimilation of gesture (or gesticulation), physicality, into 
linguistic structures of understanding and communication. He relates the schemata of 
the habitus to describe a progressive pathway from phenomenal perception to 
metaphorical syntheses that provides explanation for a developmental path that, I 
believe, also manifests in drawing.  
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Three aspects of visual schemata 
Johnson emphasises three important aspects of shared visual schemata that 
orchestrate the genesis of meaning.  
 
 Body-related experience 
Firstly, image-schemata are partly responsible for the fact that we assign meaning 
to our bodily experiences. Our sensorimotor experience is continuous, and in such 
flow of visual ‘imprints’, sensory sensations or stimuli occur in repetitive patterns that 
eventually begin to specify meaning. Such meaning-structures in visual schemata, 
known as the cognitive unconscious (Johnson. 2007: 139), typically function below 
the plane of conscious responsiveness. They enable discriminatory understanding of 
the physical form of bodily orientation and experience (Johnson. 2007: 139). In 
other words, on an unconscious level, they centre body-mind diffusion as axiomatic 
point of reference in all ranges of human activity. The drafter seats such axiomatic 
reference in hand, eye, and mind, a relationship that delineates her capacity for 
visual reconstitution, formulation, and improvisation. Such capacity is infinite.  
 
To employ a very simple example, the concept ‘in’ and its opposite ‘out’ (as in 
‘located in’, ‘into’, ‘outside’) that she shares with her viewing audience would enable 
her to draw objects in containers in such a way that the container will overlap the 
object to reveal her location in space, her viewpoint or perspective. Johnson calls this 
type of image-schema the ‘container’ schema and suggests that it enables 
understandings of far more layered complexities pertaining to concepts of 
boundaries, which would demarcate interiors from exteriors. Interaction with or 
utilisation of various and specific types and sizes of containers will elicit various and 
specific applications, or possibilities for extended application (2007: 139), thereby 
co-extensively broadening systems of understanding, analysis, or application.  
 
There are numerous arrays of more such image-schemata, of which I explain a few 
here only in very brief terms. They comprise, for example, the centre-periphery, 
verticality, compulsive force, scalarity, and source-path-goal schemata (Johnson. 
2007: 136-138). I understand that habitus encompasses these schemata.  
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The centre-periphery schema entails our perception of ourselves as pivotal point of 
focus that recedes towards an undefined, vague horizon of “possible experiences 
that are neither currently in focus nor at the centre of our conscious awareness” 
(Johnson. 2007: 137). In other words, it comprises a horizontal field of tacit 
reference, of lateral awareness and extension, that always hovers around the self 
as locale of focus and that reaches through time into the past (memory) and possible 
future (anticipation).  
 
Our continuous physical encounters with forces that push and pull us provide us with 
schematic structures that enable our understanding of compulsion, attraction, 
rejection, flight, attraction, blockage of movement and more such “force dynamics” 
(Leonard Talmy, 1985, cited in Johnson. 2007: 137).  
 
Our ability to stand erect in the gravitational field of the earth forms and enables 
schemata of verticality, our understanding of ‘up’ and ‘down’, rising, falling, 
leveling, stability, and balancing. The verticality schema provides understanding of 
the kinaesthetic sense of our own motions through space. It also provides a tacit 
sense of bodily centrality that constitutes a sense of the position and movement of 
our body parts in relation to each other and in relation to spatiality. 
 
Our physical experience of rectilinear motion gives rise to the inferences we draw 
about straight-line movement and different inferences about curved motions and 
deviating motions that relate the source-path-goal schema (Cienki 1998, cited in 
Johnson. 2007: 137-138).  
 
The scalar intensity schema accounts for our qualitative experience. Because we 
continually monitor our own bodily states (hunger, coldness, warmth, thirst), we can 
discriminate between delicate degrees of emotion, visibility, audibility, taste, 
olfactory awareness, tactility, or temperature. These experiences shelter the 
foundation of our sense of the scalar intensity of such qualities. Habitus organises 
these experiences into the scalarity schema. In other words, because the qualities 
(blueness, darkness, anxiety) of our experiences vary continuously in intensity, we 
develop a scalar gauge that we apply to every aspect of our qualitative 
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experience (Johnson. 2007: 136-138), judging for example an irruption of marks in 
drawing as good, bad, inadequate, wrong, or right, and so forth.  
 
Cross-modal shifts 
A second aspect of visual schemata that Johnson (2007: 136-138) raises, is that 
these body-related structures of meaning generate cross-modal shifts that result in 
additional complexity in meaning. A body-mind that exists in time and space 
produces visual schemata to hold logic that enables transitive activity amongst 
schemata in relation to time and space.  
 
This logic in visual schemata sustains abstract thought and enables inference. The 
drafter will not only transcribe container and object as overlapping, but she will 
also recount them along common schemata of spatial understanding. They will 
recede or advance in spatial relationship to her; in perspective, or as she ‘sees them 
through space’, thus demonstrating the centre-periphery schema in conjunction with 
the container and source-path-goal schemata.  
 
The drafter transcribes the tacit senses that all the schemata afford her as, for 
example, gestural, organisational, perspectival, vertical, horizontal, or diagonal 
lines. In relation to each other, these lines encode infinite ranges of concepts such as 
penetration of the drawing surface or a contrary emphasis on its flatness, for depth, 
containment, boundary, distance and so forth. A drawn line could symbolise 
division136 between, for example, interior and exterior, thus delineating a boundary 
between space and object, between negative and positive, between object and 
ground. Its direction and gesture could imply movement or stasis, its curve or lack 
there-of, shape and volume. As such, the tacit senses of the drafter enter a material 
sphere on this side of the drawing act in the symbolic form of line and trace, while 
                                                       
136 Derrida describes the complex symbolic value that such ‘division’ may elicit, “One should in fact 
not see it ...insofar as all the colored thickness that it retains tends to wear itself out so as to mark the 
single edge of a contour: between the inside and the outside of a figure. Once this limit is reached, 
there is nothing more to see, not even black and white, not even figure/form, and this is the trait, this 
is the line itself: which is thus no longer what it is, because from then on it never relates to itself 
without dividing itself just as soon, the divisibility of the trait here interrupting all pure identification 
and forming...inaccessible in the end, at the limit, and de jure”, and “The outline or tracing separates 
and separates itself; it retraces only borderlines, intervals, a spacing grid with no possible 
appropriation. The experience or experimenting of drawing (and experimenting, as its name 
indicates, always consists in journeying beyond limits) at once crosses and institutes these borders, it 
invents ...this circumcision of the tongue, of language, to the death sentence” (1993: 53-54, 55). 
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they repeat, translate or artlessly enact, albeit it in an unknowingness, the logic 
innate in visual schemata.  
 
Such ‘enactioned’ ‘logic’ leads to the formation, development, and embodiment of 
metaphorical, homologous, analogous, or allegorical structures that relate the 
understanding of the viewer in common contextual reference. Johnson (2007: 279-
280) asserts,  
Human beings are metaphorical creatures. Conceptual metaphor is a nearly 
omnipresent part of the human capacity for abstract conceptualization and 
reasoning. There are other imaginative structures involved in abstraction, but 
conceptual metaphor shows up in virtually all of our abstract thinking. The 
power of conceptual metaphor is that it permits us to use the semantics and 
inferential structure of our bodily experience as a primary way of making 
sense of abstract entities, relations, and events. 
 
As such, the drafter can encode in her line-work an equally wide range of concepts 
such as dividedness, abjection, contradiction, ambiguity, and negation (to name but 
a few). The drafter’s facility for and experience of non-representational enaction of 
the unconscious mind in the drawing act enables her progression to symbolic 
enaction. As such, she provides, for example, metaphorical, allegorical, or symbolic 
information (subject, of course, to interpretation). This transitive action is possible, 
because she possesses those neural means for creating simile, for metaphorically, 
symbolically or allegorically extending schemata in the act of performing abstract 
conceptualisation and reasoning (Johnson. 2007: 141). In this way, the drafter 
erases a division between this side and the other side of the drawing act by means 
of embodied action, or enaction.  
 
With this explanation, Johnson (2007: 112) deviates deliberately from a 
“representational theory of mind”. The embodied mind does not operate on internal 
representations of ideas, concepts, or images that can represent external objects 
and events. A non-dualist understanding of body-mind pre-supposes an embodied 
mind that operates cognition as mediatory action, rather than mental mirroring of an 
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external ‘reality’137 (2007: 120). Johnson asserts that this explains how, “increasing 
levels of complexity within organisms can eventually result in the emergence of 
progressively more reflective and abstractive cognitive activities, activities we 
associate with the mind” (2007: 140).  
 
Body-mind realm 
Johnson’s third assertion converges with transubstantiation of body and mind as 
asserted by Bourdieu, Varela, and Merleau-Ponty. Johnson explains that visual 
schemata do not belong to either a bodily realm or a mental, cerebral realm. They 
constitute, in a complete unity, the contours of a body-mind realm. It is not viable to 
see visual schemata as purely abstract conceptualisations or only as a formal 
cognitive structure, because such view would deny its embodied origin and its 
physical dimensions of interaction. Nor is it viable to see the formation of visual 
schemata as a purely bodily or sensorimotor process, because it can never be 
devoid of abstract conceptualisation and thought (Johnson. 2007: 141). 
 
Johnson’s formulations around the functioning of image schemata serve to clarify the 
pathway between labour in drawing and the drafter’s employment of image 
schemata. Later in this chapter, I draw from them some conclusions that also support 
earlier discussions on interactive and enactionist drawn gesture. 
 
4.2.2 Pathways between schemata and object  
 
In her in-phase labour, the drafter sustains a number of interchanges. One of these 
operates between common meaning structures and object (as ‘field of observation’). 
A second one constitutes a pathway between visual cognition of object and already 
irrupted trait. Both paths generate transitive symbolisation as formulation. The 
following explanations therefore focus on the drafter’s observation of an object 
(subject matter) and of her own drawing as object. Both subject matter and already 
irrupted trait become fields of observation. 
                                                       
137 Merleau-Ponty (1968: 226, 227) states: “The content of my perception, microphenomenon, and 
the large-scale view of the enveloping phenomena are not two projections of the In itself: Being is 
their common inner framework. Each field is a dimensionality, and Being is dimensionality itself”, and 
“what replaces the antagonistic and solidary reflective movement (the immanence of the ‘idealists’) is 
the fold or hollow of Being having by principle and outside, the architectonics of the configurations. 
There is no longer consciousness, projections, In itself or object. There are fields in intersections”. 
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Token schemata 
As in the schemata-labour relationship I describe above, the drafter has little (if 
any) conscious notion of what the historical, memory-based exchanges between the 
viewer’s visual schemata and recognition would entail. The drafter does not 
consciously structure on paper the field of observation to conform to viewer-related 
understandability. Rather, she labours – on a tacit plane – the dialectic and 
complexities of her own experiential and unconscious cognition. By searching, 
researching, testing, and trying out token138 visual schemata (as languages that will 
enable recognition, while it enacts idiosyncrasy) she will discover the fluke of 
experimentation.139  
 
Token schemata relate the visual schemata that, according to Mark Johnson, (2007: 
136-138), also bring with them logic. They function as reason, judgment, and sense 
that enable inferences of deduction, supposition, conclusion, suggestion, insinuation, 
conjecture, and so forth. These schemata issue tokens as mutual cryptograms, 
symbols, and signs. It is possible to say that viewer and drafter have such 
configurations of code in common that enables the drafter to impart her vision.  
 
However, to effect communication that approximates paradigm (for example, an 
aesthetic paradigm) and the understandability it brings for the viewer, entails a 
dialectic that harnesses oppositional forces. On the one hand, the drafter offers 
token schemata, which have a curbing or inhibitive function. On the other hand, the 
drafter enacts the unruly syntagmata, the libidinous surges of somatic flow.  
 
                                                       
138  Like ‘deictic’, ‘token’ has its origin in deiknynai, meaning to show. ‘Token’ infers “an outward sign 
or expression”; a “symbol”; a “distinguishing feature”; “a small part representing a whole” (WNCD. 
1979: 1218). Refer to the Glossary (Addendum B)  for further explanation. I also relate ‘token’ to 
Derrida’s notion of the ‘sacrificial’ in drawing, which denotes that which the drafter sacrifices to 
visibility – an always-incomplete offering to the outside. I discuss this in more detail in the previous 
chapter. 
139  With ‘the fluke of experimentation’, I allude to Derrida’s phrase  ‘appropriation of excess’, which 
I interpret as creative extension beyond mere representation. To corroborate, I cite again Derrida’s 
words, “and experimenting, as its name indicates, always consists in journeying beyond limits” (1993: 
54) to infer experience, appropriation, and trait as invention beyond. I apply the word 
‘appropriation’ consistently to suggest the inclusion of self-reflexivity in creative extension. (See 
‘appropriation’, and ‘experience’ in the Glossary, Addendum B). 
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Dialectic and deviation 
The dialectic between token schemata and syntagmata resonates as interplay 
between cognition and recognition, ability and disposition, norm and deviation, form 
and reformation, repetition and self-originitivity. The pathways along which 
dialectical interchanges occur, amount to opportunities for enactions that accumulate 
recursively. As such, demonstrated formulation or formation (marks) comprises 
transformation. The generative facility of the Bourdieuian theoretical formation 
resides in these recursively dialectical interactivities.  
 
For the moment, I focus on the dialectic between the schemata that the drafter 
shapes recursively, and the schemata she shares with her audience. This ongoing 
discourse of opposition and generativity also forms the basis of deviation from 
norm. Although the decipherability of the drawing decrees its effectiveness in terms 
of communication and in terms of its enclosure into a realm of legibility, the drafter 
may challenge the norms of such enclosure. Although the encodings of the drafter 
must be decipherable and the decoding of the viewer always hovers in sanguinity 
while she works, it should not necessarily be a magnanimous or accommodating 
partnership. Whether the language and intent of the drafter be one of abstract 
display, of figurative description, of illusionistic waywardness, of pure sterile 
grapheme in analytical dissection, of symbol, metaphor or allegory, her own 
complexities which her image-schemata have accrued over time (and which in-phase 
practice continues to accrue and generate) can spell rebellion.  
 
Such ‘rebellion’ occupies two main spheres. The drafter’s enactionist conversions and 
formulations present approximate or recognisable resemblances and definitive 
differences between her vision and that of the viewer. They also present 
approximate resemblances and differences between image and object.  
 
In the act of drawing, dialectic between image schemata and object is dense, 
various, and deceptive. The mark making that irrupt from this dialectic deforms in its 
simulation. It de-essentialises and it grafts imperfectly. The enactions of the drafter 
can never fit the restrictive impositions of common visual schemata (that demand 
conformity as communicative enabler). This is so, because even her efforts to 
conform in these interchanges will display the conversions of enactionist modalities 
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as her embodied habitus orchestrates them durationally. Such enaction deforms in 
order to form. In tokenism, the drafter reduces, filters, and cites for the fulfillment 
her own agenda, which she enacts instantaneously. Resemblance is therefore never 
perfect (and for added reasons that relate to technicalities such as musculature, 
media, and surfaces). Rather, they absorb degrees of excess or underplay in the 
somatic modalities of the drafter.  
 
As such, resemblances (as imperfect ‘fittings’ between inner and shared schemata) 
reveal themselves as general differences, thus creating dialectics between possible 
degrees of resemblance and wayward difference. The drafter finds degrees of 
resolution between these two unstable poles. As such, habitus modifies, diverges, and 
transforms in its discourses of consent, dissent, and compromise. The closest the 
habitus of the drafter can come to visual materiality, is in this dialectical occupation 
between recognisability (approximate resemblances) and differences. For these 
reasons, individuated drawing form inevitably deviates from norm and it is never 
absolute, never resolved. 
 
Summary of the pathways 
The drafter enacts modal transformation recursively between numbers of ‘poles’ in 
the networks of experiential interaction that I summarise here as follows:  
 
Firstly, enactionist and interactionist interventions inform and amass visual 
construction and habitus. Such trans-actions inform the relationship between object 
and habitus in gestic conversion, and between image and habitus in gestic 
conversion, in both cases deploying the individuated nature of the body-mind in 
denoting these interchanges.  
 
Secondly, and in recursive relationship to the above, habitus informs and constitutes 
drafter-centred schemata. Drafter-centred visual schemata engage in dialectical 
interaction with shared visual schemata, conducting trans-active interchange from the 
other side (body-mind) to this side (drawing). In this way, the drafter forms 
‘tokenistic’ approximations on the interface, thus conflating this and other side as 
drawn gesture. Here, conversions realise in ‘grafting’, or ‘fitting’ habitus-governed 
inner schemata over shared schemata and vice versa – once again deploying the 
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individuated nature of the mind-body to denote the overlay as symbolic, as ‘the 
other’ of language, and the other of self. 
 
Thirdly, this ‘fitting’ or ‘grafting’ constitutes understanding. Understanding mobilises 
interchange between drafter and her habitus, drawing act and field, social space 
and viewing audience. The drafter conducts these interchanges along laden 
pathways of recursion and of return via the interface in a cyclical continuum, which 
amasses cerebration and enaction both from the inside outwards and from the 
outside inwards.  
 
4.3 Integration of pathways with habitus and enaction 
 
Pathways realise as difference 
The pathways between schemata and object, and between schemata and mark, 
deform in order to form. This notion suggests firstly that realism, as an absolute 
resolve between schemata and object, is impossible. Secondly, it suggests that no 
two marks in the in-phase drawing process are the same. Difference realises in mark 
making as contradiction, opposition, and distortion – general deviation from 
visibility as norm. As such, enactionist drawn gesture materialises as the difference 
between accumulating trace and the information that the drafter’s continuous array 
of glances140 offer in their readings of trace and subject matter.  
 
It is important, here, to visualise the significant differences that exist between a 
drawn image and its corresponding ‘lived reality’, which served the drafter as a 
field of observation (see Addendum A, Illustration 10). Upon doing so, conceive of 
those differences as visible materialisation of self-specific style or trait, as well as 
invented information. We, as viewers, see that recognisability141 displays itself in 
various forms and degrees of difference in drawing. No two drafters’ 
demonstrations are the same. According to Derrida, difference constitutes the 
                                                       
140 I call the back and forth movements of the eyes ‘glances’, to indicate that the resulting visions (or 
sights) do not exist as ‘mind-prints’ or ‘pictures in the mind’. It is nothingness, exactly the muteness that 
the drafter wishes to convert to meaning. It is not a representation of anything. Yet, Derrida calls it 
mémoire d’yeux, ‘eye-memory’ (1993: 54, note 2). 
141 Here, ‘recognisability’ refers to that which is made possible by shared schemata that the drafter 
offers as tokens, but also to recognisability that makes differentiation between the works of two 
drafters possible. 
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transcendental in drawing (1993: 41) and according to Bourdieu; the 
transcendental constitutes the habitus (1998: 81), which I related to Varela’s notion 
of enaction in the earlier chapters. Hence, I draw a direct relationship between self-
originative mark making and habitus, and the cognitive unconscious.  
 
If the drawing were not image, but rather wayward display only, the difference 
would be discernable between the drafter’s founding perception,142 and the drawn 
display. For the viewer, such access to the drafter’s experience would not be 
possible, even if such experience could attain specular form in the drafter’s mind.143  
 
Yet, comprehension of difference is possible, and can be applied to an 
interchanging pathway that I propose between drawn display and an ever-
changing continuum of experience144 that the drafter achieves in the splintered flow 
of observation and in the wayward whims of musculature, thought, and imagination. 
This interchanging circularity is not absent in representational drawing or in the 
making of figurative images, but constitutes another interfering window where 
enactionist conversion and formulation irrupt as trace. Even in so-called 
representational (realistic or naturalistic) drawing, in which stringent observational 
skill and acumen play strong roles, a pre-formed mind-impress (or ‘pre-print’) does 
not exist, and the same dialectic would handicap unambiguous perceptual 
recording. The endeavour of indifferent, purely objective recording of perception 
therefore becomes impotent (Derrida. 1993).  
 
Habitus and embodiment 
Conducting a practice in subjective complicity with the self or in an ontological 
context of infraconscious and infralinguistic complicity necessitates understanding of 
habitus as an embodied schema of dispositions that the drafter enacts in drawing 
practice as a conviction in (dispositional) self. Dispositions entrench themselves in 
cognition and perception to engender recognition and synthesis in practices, where 
                                                       
142 It does not occur as pictorial ‘eye’ memory. In Chapter 6, the founding perception is discussed in 
more detail. 
143  In this regard, I cite Norman Bryson (1983: 17), “there is no way to discriminate between what 
might indeed be a perfect registration of the view of the habitus ‘from inside’, and an imperfect 
registration, or to distinguish either of these from parody, or hallucination”. 
144  Please refer to ‘Circularity’ in the Chapter 2. 
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habitus functions in an embodied continuum. I suggest that this parallels with idea of 
the self, and with the ontological complicity that it engenders according to Bourdieu. 
 
Varela’s notion of enaction points to the genesis and development of perception 
and conceptualising as emerging from bodily and embodied mind in action and 
durational experience. The understandings above suggest that the very possibility of 
abstract conceptualisation and reasoning relies unequivocally on a non-dualist 
body-mind. Enaction seems to play the pivotal role of individuation in gestic 
conversion and it functions in the blind pathways – those that are not accessible to 
viewers – between schemata and labour, which encloses the drafter-centred 
founding perception. In linguistic terms alone, the meaning of the word ‘enaction’ 
infers a direct bringing into being. In itself, this suggests the individuated process of 
making the drawing, with nothing but glance between gesture and drawn gesture, 
and the hand-habitus action of the drafter herself. The labour of drawing (the 
‘manus’ (hand) and facture of ‘manufacture’, the process of making by hand) 
indisputably contributes to style and manner.  
 
Both a Varelan and a Bourdieuian framework, if applied to drawing, suggest that 
drawing practice demonstrates continuous enactionist experience in interaction with 
lived reality. Enaction in drawing explains a point at which abstraction, 
conceptualisation, and trans-actional145 symbolisation form in the cognitive 
unconscious before the drafter calls “upon disembodied mind, autonomous language 
modules, and pure reason”  (Johnson. 2007: 141). In this, enaction challenges a 
divide between perception and conception. Enaction differs from the concept of 
performativity by proposing a direct, almost involuntary irruption. In drawing, such 
presentation would suggest action without script, rather than performance according 
to script. To corroborate further, I cite Norman Bryson (1983: 142):  
Against the theory of pleasure Barthes and with even stronger emphasis Julia 
Kristeva propose a counter-term for which we will find no immediate 
equivalent in Marr: the disruption of quotation (plaisir) by bliss (jouissance); 
                                                       
145 I borrow this term from Downs et al. (2007: xvii), who cite Katrinka Wilson from an unpublished 
PhD-thesis titled Mimesis and the Somatic of Drawing: In the Context of 20th Century Western Fine Art 
Practice (Loughborough University, 2004): “What the performance implicitly tells us is that the 
drawing process enacts a simultaneous physical contradiction that, as Katrinka Wilson determines, is 
a transaction between appearance and thought”. 
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and at first sight, the aesthetic of disruption would seem to mark a rejection of 
the Marrian doctrine of art as repetition of that which has been pre-
established, and the emergence of the first stages of a theory of practice, of 
practical consciousness. 
 
In drawing, the genesis of conception in perception implies transcription that is 
irrefutable inscription. Enaction certainly centres body-mind fusion as axiomatic 
point of reference in drawing, a notion that I regard as foundational to the 
manifestation of trait in drawing. The incorporation of the body in enaction suggests 
the legibility of the body in drawing. It implies the genesis of idiosyncrasy in mark 
making as the irruption of a voice that is entrenched intimately, bodily, and 
irretrievably, though dynamic, in the individual who enacts it. Enaction in such mark 
making provides “a view from within”, “a first person event” that designates the 
“lived experience associated with cognitive and mental events” (Varela. 2002: 1).  
 
Moreover, while interaction points to the significance of experience that the drafter 
accrues in lived reality, enaction points to the significance of in-phase experience in 
drawing, alighting on the inextricability of the spatial and temporal in the labour of 
drawing and on the inextricability of the interaction between drafter and social 
space. The genesis of trait is seated in both enactionist and interactive gesture. Both 
emanate from the unconscious.146 Enactionist drawn gesture is more wayward in its 
libidinous irruptions, while interactionist drawn gesture displays the curbing of its 
learned reference more readily. The difference between enactionist and 
interactive147 drawn gesture, however minuscule, generates interplay in drawing 
that, I suggest, is pivotal in creativity. It sustains wide-reaching dialectic between the 
labour of drawing and convention. Such dialectic materialises as self-reflexive 
conversion and modality by the drafter that clarifies and generates meaning, while 
it deviates and transforms.  
 
                                                       
146 To emphasise the auto- and self-originativity of enactionist and interactionist drawn gesture and 
to distinguish between such marks and imitated marks, I ascribe the qualifying term ‘autogenous’ to 
drawn gesture. I apply the word to denote a conflation between ‘enactionist’ and ‘interactive’ drawn 
gesture.  
147 To reiterate, the distinction I made between the two was done purely for purposes of analysis, 
rather than to assert that this is observable in trait or trace. Below, I further explain the distinction 
under ‘Unifications in drawing’. 
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In envisaging the differences between ‘reality’ and image, it becomes possible to 
gain understanding of the visible materiality of individuated trait and the invisibility 
of its origin, which entails both the musculature of the body and the unconscious 
cerebrative facilities of the mind-body unification (enaction). Distinctiveness realises 
in individuation in drawing. Trait constitutes the materiality of individuation. I accept 
that such visible difference reflects that which has been unseen before and remains 
unseen unless drawn.  
 
If an individuated body-mind reveals as difference in style and manner, it also 
reveals as difference in intent, both of which shape the individual drafter’s constructs 
of lived ‘reality’, of the self, and of her drawing. A single, fixed grip on such 
‘reality’ remains as elusive as local colour.148 This is so because each viewing action 
or reference that occurs during the process of drawing foregoes, accompanies and 
remembers numerous actions of pre-viewing, viewing and reviewing and their 
corresponding irruptions of tracing. Habitus-governed readings move back and 
forth between subject matter and transcription, constantly reading both the object 
under scrutiny and the drawing, while dialectic runs along all their paths of 
interchange.  
 
Process and a multiple ‘reality’ 
Each viewing and reviewing action carries attendant facture and trace, each time 
subtly adjusting and applying a newly organised system of organising actions to it 
to construct notation anew. Improvisation (or synthesis) – not truthful replication – 
evolves constantly and in accordance with these actions. This happens during the 
processes of visuo-construction, interchange, and labour in visual inscription.  
 
The mark of the body-mind is not true – it automatically violates and disturbs. 
Hence, the drafter’s drive to re-organise with each ‘take’ or glance and, hence also, 
                                                       
148 As a result of the effects of light, the extent to which it is absent or present, it is not ever possible 
to perceive local colour. Only tonal colour is perceivable. Furthermore, Varela relates a study in the 
perception of colour to explain embodied action, in which he states, “for color indicators can be 
obtained solely on the basis of luminance and contrast levels. This simplicity betrays, however, the 
equally important fact that color is always perceived within a more encompassing visual context. All 
of the subnetworks work cooperatively; we never see color as an isolated item” (1992: 162-163). 
He concludes later, “We have seen that colors are not ‘out there’ independent of our perceptual and 
cognitive capacities. We have also seen that color is not ‘in here’ independent of our surrounding 
biological and cultural world. Thus color as a study case enables us to appreciate the obvious point 
that chicken and egg, world and perceiver, specify each other” (1992: 172).  
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the notion of dialectical interchange. The pathways I construct and explain above 
suggest that the amassing, chaotic readings of the eyes and the in-phase tracings of 
the hand are in constant dialogue with one another. They challenge the order that 
denotation and visual schemata impose on them.  
 
If disposition allows, such perpetuated re-organisation reflects the refusal to accept 
a single option, an inquisitive compulsion to reconsider and re-articulate, to 
appropriate or defy numerous options, to finish or disrupt, to perfect or to scar. 
Provoked awareness of more possible options in itself implies a retained history of 
homologous recognitions, a memory of previous and multiple structures, assimilations 
or organisations, all potent references whether homologous or analogous. This is the 
interactive, enactionist process of drawing.  
 
Dissatisfaction or satisfaction with any one specific organisation of the trace and the 
elements of drawing trigger an intervening response. Complete contravention might 
decrease or eliminate dissatisfaction or satisfaction, decrease or increase dissent, 
consent, or compromise. This side converses with the other side. In this conversation, 
inhibitive curbing constantly tries to silence the back-chatting, carnal, libidinous, 
somatic flow. Somatic flow, in turn, constantly seeks to disturb with its disorderly 
behaviour and manner, with its wayward mind, eyes and hand. This dialectic also 
merges body and mind as one in drawing. 
 
Likewise, dissatisfaction with any specific organisation of mental assimilations will 
trigger or demand contravention. Complete or varying degrees of contravention 
could eliminate or decrease dissatisfaction. In this way, contravention (as 
intervention) challenges even the code that guides method, as well as the dictates of 
aesthetic acceptability. Added to this is the always-present possibility that 
dissatisfaction might increase rather than decrease because of contravening 
responses, to trigger yet more rounds of intervention, which will defy or verify, 
disrupt or sustain, violate or respect. Such dialectic between satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction, between construction and destruction, between construct and 
deconstruct, could become in itself the object of drawing.  
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Furthermore, dissatisfaction, destruction, and deconstruction represent but a few such 
triggers of disturbance. The human mind and its embodied dispositions offer a rich 
diversity of such stimuli (as subcategories of dissent, consent, or compromise). Such 
stimuli trigger demonstrations of recursive enactions in any possible form. Bourdieu’s 
notion of ‘strategy’ and ‘struggle’ for position in the field, demonstrates its flexibility 
in the sense that dissent, consent or compromise constitute processes through which 
the drafter can demonstrate an infinite range of differences. In this sense, the 
drafter is agent or subject, “who, far from reacting mechanically to mechanical 
stimulations, respond to the invitations or threats of a world whose meaning [she has] 
helped to produce” (Bourdieu. 1984: 467).  
 
The act of drawing, if thought of as a process of literal and practice-based 
struggling and strategising, includes continuous interchanges. Such interchanges 
comprise those between possibilities and counter-possibilities, speculatively 
positioning, opposing and repositioning, marking, unmarking and remarking – 
continuous interchanges between somatic and doxic modalities and denotation or 
schemata. At any point during these processes, any arbitrary or non-arbitrary 
arrangement of mark making and unmarking may reveal themselves as a resolution, 
never as completely conclusive, but rather as the “hypothesis of sight”149 (Derrida. 
1993: 60), or the presupposed form of sight.  
 
Consequently, such a point does not necessarily signify closure, but rather may 
trigger the entire process within new sets of possibilities, ad infinitum. On paper, the 
process reveals itself in seemingly random arrangements of mark making and 
unmarking. Some areas may be densely inscribed; some may show straggling 
sparseness and some complete emptiness. Thus, they create altercations between 
creation and destruction that, as a fragmented yet amassed entirety, will convey 
meaning.  
 
                                                       
149 For Derrida, the “hypothesis of sight” comprises “believing and seeing, between believing one 
sees [croire voir] and seeing between, catching a glimpse [entrevoir] - or not. Before doubt ever 
becomes a system, skepsis has to do with the eyes. The word refers to a visual perception, to the 
observation, vigilance, and attention of the Gaze [regard] during an examination. One is on the 
lookout, one reflects upon what one sees, reflects what one sees by delaying the moment of 
conclusion” (1993: 1-3). Derrida equates the ‘hypothesis of sight’ with “the hypothesis of intuition” 
(1993: 60). 
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A drawing could be a direct inscription of completely self-generated exchanges 
between mind, eye, and hand, mirroring those mental processes beneath the visual 
interplay between idea and mark, conception and facture, vision, sight, and 
blindness. The drawing retains traces of every phase of these altercations, charting 
their history in a signifying tale that speaks fluently of ‘not-knowing’ and knowing, 
resonance and dissonance, the void of the ‘Verborgen’ and the form of 
‘Unverborgenheit’ (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 249). As such, drawing becomes a 
perpetual surveyor of itself, constantly contemplating its own potential for deviation 
and subversion, as much as it becomes a pursuit of self-as-being, a conviction in self. 
 
Blindness and muteness that offer nothing to mime  
These notions clearly mirror Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and practice as 
transubstantiating vehicles between body and mind that enable differentiation. 
Interaction and enaction, as operative verbs, suggest two central concepts. Firstly, 
they imply expansive interactive generative processing that, secondly, enables 
generative production. They are essential elements in those processes of cerebration 
that lead to trait. Benjamin Bloom positions synthesis as supreme in his hierarchical 
organisation of the cognitive domain (1956: 185-187). I believe it is such syntheses 
(improvisation or conjecture) that the drafter inscribes eventually as an aesthetic 
idiolect, which constitutes an encompassing and paradigmatic visual articulation of 
individuation (Eco. 1979: 270-272).  
 
The notion of enaction suggests that, when starting a drawing, the drafter’s mental 
image of what the drawing is going to look like cannot constitute any fully formed 
image or display of marks that would resemble the final drawn image as object. 
Accordingly, Derrida (1993: 2, 45-46, 68) says that trait strays from itself and from 
deliberation to display as traces of the muteness from where it irrupts, also 
insinuating an axiomatic muteness even in the processes of projective drawing. 
Whether ‘an idea’ or the visibility of objectivity serve as founding impetus for 
drawing, it remains implicit and anticipatory during the act of drawing. As 
perceived ‘visualisation’ or ‘image’ in the mind, it seems to recede to the ‘back of the 
mind’, or rather completely, as soon as pencil touches ground (Derrida. 1993: 68).  
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What astonishes is the fact that this pre-drawing ‘mental image’ does not exist or 
pre-exist at all, not as an enclosed finality, nor as ‘blueprint’ or ‘plan’. The 
particularities of its possible formation are evasive, refusing to reveal them unless 
the act of drawing sustains their appearance durationally (Derrida. 1993: 68). 
Although it is quite possible to conjure up some vague idea of what the drawing 
should look like, this idea usually evaporates the moment one starts drawing. It loses 
even its visibility-status of “eye memory”, or “idea memory” and mostly represents a 
measure of emptiness of mind that resembles a lack of understanding or a state of 
“not knowing”, or “blindness” (Derrida. 1993: 3).  
 
From gesture (or gesticulation) as preverbal muteness, to the appearance of its 
trace, dialectic develops between vacuity and the advent of trait. The objective 
visibility of things augments this dialectic further, creating equivocal dialectics 
between appearance as advent or as visibility, and disappearance as vacuity or as 
bareness of drawing surface. Vacuity counters the advent of trace, which with its 
own appearance counters disappearance. While trace attempts simultaneously to 
resemble objective visibility, it only manifests in difference that evokes, in the 
remainder of its potential resemblance, a hauntingly unattainable state. 
 
Not even a specular pre-image can predict or determine the ‘look’ of the trace that 
the in-phase legibility and understanding of the body-mind will bring to it. 
Reproducing such a pre-image (were it at all possible) would resemble mechanical 
copying, rather than generative drawing. The durational imperative in this 
perception of the act of drawing implies that a non-dualist body-mind enacts 
nonrepresentational structures of meaning. Johnson calls such structures patterns of 
“integrated interaction that constitute experience” (Johnson. 2007: 117).150 
                                                       
150 Mark Johnson (2007: 113 – 134) points out a foundational difference between the concept of 
embodiment of mind and the representational theory of mind: “Mind/body dualism often generates 
what are known as representational theories of mind and cognition. Representationalism in its most 
general sense...is the view that cognition (i.e. perceiving, conceptualizing, imagining, reasoning, 
planning, willing) operates via internal mental ‘representations’ (e.g. ideas, concepts, images, 
propositions) that are capable of being ‘about’ or ‘directed to’ other representations and to states of 
affairs in the external world. The technical term for this ‘aboutness’ relation is intentionality”. (See 
note 108 regarding ‘intentionality). He contrasts embodiment of mind as follows: “The key to this re-
conceiving of mind is to stop treating percepts, concepts, propositions, and thoughts as quasi-objects 
(mental entities or abstract structures) and to see them instead as patterns of experiential interaction. 
They are aspects or dimensions or structures of the patterns of organism-environment coupling (or 
integrated interaction) that constitute experience. The only sense in which they are ‘inner’ is that my 
thoughts are mine (and not yours), but they are not mental objects locked up in the theater of the 
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Mechanical copying does not allow such patterns to interfere in the drawing process, 
thereby under-informing the act of drawing. Therefore, mechanical copying limits 
the potential of the drawing to become new form, which would hold more 
dimensions of meaning than its founding state could predict.  
 
If trace is not knowable before its irruption, individuation pertaining to body-mind 
inscription are also not knowable before the act of trace irruption (Derrida. 1993: 
45). Meaning – the rhetoric of trait – reveals itself through drawing. The act of 
drawing also develops ideas recursively, building its becoming with gradual 
amassment. Even when in materially drawn form, knowledge and understanding of 
display remains open-ended, and never accomplish the state of finish or 
completeness that brings absolute closure.  
 
When the drafter stops working on it, the drawing represents a level of 
understanding that stands in direct relationship to the degree of labour-related 
inquiry that goes into it. Therefore, it is comparable to the field of observation only 
in materialised form, meaning that even if the drafter manufactured two or more 
versions of the same field of observation, the drawings would display once again 
differences between one another (see Addendum A, Illustrations 2 & 3).  
 
Trait in drawing is also individual specific in the sense that it will only materialise as 
far as the individual is willing to take it or is capable of taking it, which in turn 
depends on formerly integrated interactions, or as it were, already acquired 
knowledge, skill, or sensibilities (see Addendum A. Illustration 1). Therefore, it 
would be more truthful to say that the initial pre-drawn and tacit idea the drafter 
holds of the object of work serves as motivation for discovery, as excitant, because 
it is either unknown or at best unclear. It will evolve or reveal itself in more clarity 
through the process of drawing. The drafter accomplishes fuller comprehension and 
improvisation as new visibility of invisibility through the labour of drawing. 
 
As understanding transforms to become increasingly explicit as the drawn image 
emerges, the drawn display itself also starts to serve as a gradually emerging 
                                                                                                                                                          
mind, trying desperately to make contact with the outside world. As we will see, thoughts are just 
modes of interaction and action. They are in and of the world (rather than just being about the 
world) because they are processes of experience”. 
 159 
comparative measure. Now, this measure reflects the other of self, not another self. 
Thus, the display itself fulfills a crucial role in an interactive process between three 
components: visual construction and habitus in relation to field and accumulating 
trace, or the labour of drawing as image or display. This encompassing 
relationship151 enables re-conceptualisation and re-appraisals that the drafter 
directs towards the act of drawing, the context of the drawing and the evolving 
meaning of the image. In this way, the process of manufacturing starts to generate 
conceptual meaning and content, while it also responds, re-appraises and comments 
on its materialised enactions, technical development, and applications.  
 
As understanding or knowledge of the thematic material, whether material or 
immaterial, gradually increases as the drawing develops,152 its content develops 
beyond the thematic material’s phenomenal value. The evolving self-reflexive 
inquiry and constantly engaged dispositional exchange that are concurrent with 
irruption, inform the drawing exponentially and recursively. Understanding of the 
object of work (whether literal material object or imagined) becomes not only 
clearer or more accomplished in technical and visually descriptive terms, but it could 
simultaneously gain allegorical, conceptual or symbolic meaning through the 
drawing process, which engenders such significance by means of more amassments 
of dispositional interchange between habitus, practice and field.153 The dialectic 
between tacit understanding or knowing and the act of drawing intensifies 
experiential involvement.  
 
The production of drawing is one of interdependency between habitus, field, and 
practice. The cognitive, perceptual, and conceptualising interplay and dispositional 
dialectic that occur in conjecturing and counter-conjecturing, knowing and ‘not-
knowing’, or positioning and ‘unpositioning’, would not be possible without the 
cerebration that body-mind gesture engenders. Nor would it be possible without the 
experiential interaction that the act of drawing elicits.  
                                                       
151  A relationship of circularity, with reference to Chapter 2 (See ‘Circularity’). 
152 Varela states, “The central insight of this nonobjectivist orientation is the view that knowledge is 
the result of an ongoing interpretation that emerges from our capacities of understanding. These 
capacities are rooted in the structures of our biological embodiment but are lived and experienced 
within a domain of consensual action and cultural history” (1992: 149). 
153 Varela states further, “to reiterate one of our central points, the neuronal network does not 
function as a one-way street from perception to action. Perception and action, sensorium and 
motorism, are linked together as successively emergent and mutually selecting patterns” (1992: 163). 
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Unifications in drawing 
All the above pathways point at unification in drawing that transcends dualities. It is 
clear that, in the context of drawing, enaction challenges a divide between 
perception and conception, and between representation and presentation. Enaction 
of perception encloses conception, so that a ‘representation’ of what is to appear in 
trace, does not precede its irruption.  
 
These unifications are inherent to ‘enactionist’ and ‘interactionist drawn gesture’, a 
synthesis that I proposed in Chapter 3. An understanding of perception and 
conception, representation and presentation, as unifications rather than dualities, 
form the difference between enactionist drawn gesture and performativity in 
drawing. As I explain in Chapter 3, enactionist drawn gesture proposes a direct, 
almost involuntary irruption that would suggest unscripted action. Downs et al. 
(2007: xviii) states that, “The term ‘performance’ can sometimes indicate a mimetic 
representation that suggests a passive operation where the participant actualises 
something already determined”.  
 
I propose that, in drawing, enaction constitutes the simultaneous demonstration154 of 
process and of idea. Irrupting as trait, it has nothing to mime and it pronounces its 
own feat by marking the self as ‘I’.  
 
For this reason, I distinguish in the following chapters between ‘enactionist’ drawn 
gesture and ‘interactive’ drawn gesture as formative elements of trait. I retain the 
notion of interactionist drawn gesture, because as a drafter I can attest to 
‘remembering’155 (consciously or unconsciously) the styles of other drafters and to 
the unavoidable absorption or even conscious translation of those styles into my own 
work. However, it is seldom possible to recall such styles with accuracy. The drafter 
deforms them further through self-inscription, which constitutes, after all, the blind, 
mute, involuntary enactionist drawn gesture that I propose. Thereby, the drafter 
both sheds and adds in the ‘translation’ of remembered style. For the same reason, 
                                                       
154 I choose to use ‘demonstration’ deliberately, because it signifies an active and direct outward 
show of inner understanding. I contrast it in this to ‘representation’.  
155 I do not assert that such ‘remembering’ is pictorial or exists in the form of ‘mind print’, but rather 
that it comes from an understanding of the underlying methods, technical or otherwise, that could 
produce such style language. Moreover, such understanding comes from a tacit realm. 
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the drafter knows that, by transcribing style, she also internalises such styles156 to 
store them on some tacit plane in her mind where they could have a hand in forming 
or transforming existing dispositions157 that would eventually result in deviatory self-
inscription. 
 
4.4 Conclusions relating to facilitation 
 
Passage and development 
From Mark Johnson’s expositions regarding the enactionist and embodied cognitive 
unconscious, I extract an essential proposition of the thesis, namely that drawing 
constitutes a defined development from phenomenal appropriation to metaphoric 
enunciation. The pathway that the student drafter conducts from gesture to drawn 
gesture mirrors the cerebrative complexities that entail passage from description to 
enunciation and from simile to metaphor.158 
 
Trait and diversity  
The generative facility of habitus puts forward another concept that is crucial to 
understanding the approach to drawing facilitation that I propose in the final 
chapter. Understanding Bourdieu’s theoretical formation as a generative structure 
enables understanding that each student drafter integrates, applies and 
reformulates conventions in drawing differently, creating endless varieties of 
syntheses in a multiple understanding of lived ‘reality’. The variability of 
individuation in drawing stands in direct relation to the diverse range of individual 
drafters that comprise a drawing class at first year university level. For the 
facilitator, this situation represents complexities that demand the accommodation of 
all forms of diversity in her mediation.  
 
                                                       
156 Derrida remarks, “Yes, it [observation] associates scopic attention with respect, with deference, 
with the attention of a Gaze or look that also knows how to look after, with the contemplative 
gathering of a memory that conserves or keeps in reserve” (1993: 60). 
157 Regular or constant viewing of drawings do have influential visual impact on a drafter’s work, a 
phenomenon that Bourdieu describes as ‘cultivated habitus’ a notion that also suggests interaction as 
laterality. Bourdieu (1977: 78) says, “Habitus produces practices which tend to reproduce the 
regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while 
adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation, as defined by the 
cognitive and motivating structures making up the habitus”.   
158 In Chapter 5, I focus on this passage as the moment when invention occurs as mark making. 
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It becomes clear that an enactionist and ‘enactioned’ habitus in relation to drawing 
as field and as practice serve as conceptual indicators, if not tools, that will bring 
flexibility to the facilitator’s expectations of the range of drawings that result from 
her mediation. Diversity and versatility in this (and in the number of solutions to 
problem solving tasks she might set in her instructions) become a foregone conclusion, 
a predisposition in itself that could affect local response to norm, and that could 
effect deviation from norm on a wider level. 
 
Drawing also from discussions in the previous chapters it is clear that, along the 
pathways of perception and enaction that I describe, difference defines the self-
specificity of stylistic features.159 The pathways suggest how this happens. The 
product is trait. As such (and with reference to the facilitation of drawing), it 
becomes an imperative to understand that each student drafter’s dispositional 
modalities imply personalised or individuated assimilations.  
 
The drafter’s self-reflexive involvement in gestic conversion implies that either 
application (compliance or compromise) or challenging (deviation from) of the 
conventions of style will result in different degrees of self-specific stylistic features. 
Yet, even while compliant with norm in this sense, such stylistic features could 
underplay (efface) or assert the self-as-being.  
 
Although interaction could also play an inhibitive role if the drafter allows the 
imposition of the norms of legitimised formula, the point is that concurrent 
experience of social or cultural circumstances always forms schemata that are 
crucial and necessary frameworks of reference for the drafter in the construction of 
meaning. Such frameworks enable the drafter to extend her work into allegorical, 
metaphorical, and symbolic meaning by means of more complex denotation 
(Johnson 2007: 138).  
 
These understandings enable me to conceptualise trait as a vehicle for a seemingly 
forgotten capacity of drawing, namely that of facilitating the type of cerebration 
that cultivates and sustains creativity. I conclude that those cerebrative processes in 
drawing that engender individuation also engender synthesis, or possibly constitute 
                                                       
159 Enactionist drawn gesture. 
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synthesis, and that the ability to synthesise underpins creativity. The interchanging 
and dialectical paths along which interactivity and enaction mobilise themselves in 
the durational labour of drawing, namely those between the self and habitus, 
drawing as practice and the trace, image, or display as pivotal components in a 
generative conceptualising apparatus that draws recursively on the pre-conceptual 
and the durationally formed conceptual. For the facilitator, these notions should 
indicate the significance of trait. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
TRAIT AS INVENTION 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I secure the understandings that emerged from the previous chapters 
in a focused application on trait as invention. I employ the expositions of Derrida to 
unpack, firstly, the nature and secondly, the significance of mark as invention. If 
invention is integral to drawing-trait, I propose that trait significantly supports 
creativity. I chart the drafter’s deviation from emulation, a deviation that 
accomplishes invention. I relate how the facilitation of drawing can shift focus to the 
drafter’s ability to invent, rather than submitting to the order and stasis of memory. 
Bryson (De Zegher. 2003: 153) describes the effects of both the stasis of memory 
and the stifling dictates of academy in his words,   
Faced with a new scene and the task of drawing it ... the artist mobilizes the 
sum of schemata that have been learned so far. Testing those schemata 
against visual ‘reality’, the apprentice artist discovers a new aspect that he or 
she does not yet know how to resolve. Going through the repertoire of 
solutions housed in tradition, or in the pedagogy of the academy, the 
apprentice learns the new schema that is adequate to the present task, and 
adds it to the storehouse of acquired techniques. Learning to draw, then, is a 
process in which the dead hand of tradition lays itself over the unformed hand 
of the artist, and guides the line that it makes from the outside. To those iron 
protocols, all who seek to draw must submit in the same way and to the same 
degree.  
 
In this chapter, I shift discussion to answer the question of ‘how’ trait realises in the 
drawings of student drafters, and the problems it may present. 
 
I propose that, just as the drafter’s memory can internalise the dictates of academy, 
so can her memory internalise the visuality of trait. Both can become recipes for 
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repetitive application, both can become mere superficial and dictatorial style 
language. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the crucial purpose of this chapter 
is to delineate with reasonable accuracy the fine line that exists between habitual 
utilisation of style language and deploying the renewing facilities of trait.  
 
I also propose that the passage from the unconscious to the conscious that I discussed 
in the previous chapter constitutes the drafter’s subliminal drive to negate the self-
as-nothing,160 a negation that realises as an affirmation of self-as-being. Trait, I 
propose, marks self-affirmation. I base this proposal on the significances of 
Merleau-Ponty’s ‘ontic mask’161 and its ‘invisibility’ (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 227-229). 
In answer to the question that the thesis poses, this proposal also constitutes ‘the 
accomplishment of trait’ – invention – as the significance of trait.  
 
5.1 A pathway of development: from sight to vision 
 
5.1.1 Memory 
 
I proceed firstly to the mnemonic faculty of habitus. As the drafter forms syntheses, 
she commits to memory, and to habitus, her gains that are both mindful and skillful. 
Such gains, while continuing to consult with objective structures, also increasingly turn 
inwards. They become memory, which is essential to the generative facilities of trait 
formation. Eventually the interplay between memory and trait formation informs a 
visuality that becomes encompassing. Memory aids cerebration as much as enaction 
does, and enaction cannot function without memory (see Addendum A, Illustration 
2). 
 
The emergence of such a cerebrative memory in drawing, defines a path of 
development (see Addendum A, Illustrations 1 & 2). Eventually, the drafter can 
draw with progressively decreasing dependence on the inhibitive schemata of 
formula and norm, while focusing on the technical devices that relate to subject 
                                                       
160 Self, in the nihilistic terms of cognitive science, could be construed as non-existent because “it does 
not distinguish between the idea or representation of a Self and the actual basis of that 
representation, which is an individual’s grasping after a self” (Varela.1992: 107, 124).  
161 The ‘ontic mask’ refers to the material visibility of things, or their outer shell of visible materiality 
as indication of their existence.  
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content. The drafter conceives each mark as a generalised construct that sustains 
compliance to ‘universal’ understandability without destroying its aspect of trait. She 
conceives each mark as a unique entity in its own right, namely as the trace of 
synthesis.  
 
5.1.2 The turning point: conjecture and invention 
 
(See Addendum A, Illustration 8) 
As I explained in the previous chapter, I envisage a pathway between the labour of 
drawing and the drafter-centred schemata of understanding. In this pathway, the 
drafter unconsciously enacts embodied or tacit memory. The scrutiny of the will does 
not operate here. We know now that such enactions merge in the interface with 
concurrent gleanings from the field of observation and with gleanings from already 
existing trace. Embodiments merge with new inputs. The interface, a point of 
reflexive turning back and forth, must capture remnants of both. The marks that 
result emerge as new demonstrations of invisibilities – the invisibility of the self and 
the invisibility of the other that self recognises as resembling her own.  
 
The drafter’s marks become alternative and altered visibility – different, 
nonstandard, and diverse (see Addendum A, Illustration 3). For the drafter, her 
‘invisibility’ now reaches to an ostensible162 ‘reality’, the objectivity and visibility of 
which she has regarded all along with doubt and disbelief or with curiosity (Derrida. 
1993: 1-3). On the face of it, she starts to find her own vision more believable and 
she reveals it with skill and self-confidence. Her conviction in the self-as-being grows 
correspondingly. Beneath ‘the face of it’, in her unconscious, she deploys her 
unbeseen to find the unbeseen of the ‘other’ of self-as-being, something that has no 
“ontic mask” (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 229, also cited in Derrida. 1993: 52).  
 
                                                       
162 Simon Blackburn (2008: 263) once again provides clarity regarding this term, “A definition that 
proceeds by ostension, or in other words by simply showing what is intended, as one might 
ostensively define a shade such as magenta, or the taste of a pineapple, by actually exhibiting an 
example. It relies on the hearer’s uptake in understanding which feature is intended, and how 
broadly the example may be taken. A direct ostension is a showing of the object or feature 
intended, whilst in deferred ostension one shows one thing in order to direct attention to another, e.g. 
when showing a photograph to indicate a person, or a thermometer to indicate the temperature”. 
Please also refer to Chapter 2, ‘‘reality’’. See Illustration 2, Addendum A. 
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Thus, the drafter experiences a turning point in her approach to drawing. Instead of 
seeking norm and formula to dictate from the objective world, she begins to trust the 
constructs of her vision and self as sources that are more credible (see Addendum 
A, Illustration 8). She confidently senses the invisible in her as the invisible of the 
other and she deploys her drawing tool to grant visibility to both. Mark, therefore, 
orchestrates confluence between the self and the other. 
 
However, now she confronts blindness – rather than know the specular form of mark, 
other, or self beforehand, the drafter can only find specularity for this confluence in 
drawing-trait (see Addendum A, Illustration 4). She has no choice – she can only 
replace blindness with conjecture. Derrida offers the following description of such a 
turning point, a description that brings us full circle to the labour of drawing:  
Or more precisely still, he [the drafter] begins to represent a drawing potency 
at work, the very act of drawing. He invents drawing. The trait is not then 
paralyzed in a tautology that folds the same onto the same. On the contrary, 
it becomes prey to allegory (1993: 2). 
 
Pause, withdrawal163 
This invention requires a slight hesitation during which she anticipates self’s 
conjecture to irrupt instantaneously. It is clear that a strange overlapping of 
contradictory events occurs in this turning point. While the drafter anticipates, she 
also precipitates. While she willingly awaits the appearance of trait, the drafter 
allows the irruption of her marks to precipitate norm or formula (see Addendum A, 
Illustration 8).  
 
To ‘await’ irruption implies withdrawal or pause during the process of drawing. 
Indeed, the turning point I describe above brings hesitation, but clearly, it is 
hesitation filled with anticipation. For barely discernable moments, the drafter works 
                                                       
163 In the next chapter, I focus on withdrawal in drawing, where I discuss its nature in more detail. I 
also use the term ‘hiatus’ to indicate withdrawal. Hiatus literally occurs when the drafter lifts her 
pencil away from the drawing surface to leave no-thing, no mutuality, in its wake. Derrida purports 
that this occurrence resembles writing without seeing, when writing “gives itself over to anticipation” 
(1993: 3-4). Likewise, hiatus in drawing indicates a period of ‘not notating’, a period of waiting to 
think about what should happen. Yet, this event is not separate from irruption and should not be 
perceived as a dragged out period of passivity. During hesitation, the gestation of mark irruption 
continues. 
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“without the eyes” (Derrida. 1993: 2). Despite occurring ‘without the eyes’, these 
hesitations do not suspend the present, in-phase correlate of visual perception and 
observation. Rather, they engross the self deeper into the act of drawing, thereby 
intensifying the possibility of trait.  
 
These pauses, in other words, are still active in doing,164 but during them, the drafter 
subconsciously enters deeper into the amassments of her mind. During withdrawal, 
the drafter allows invisibility (the unbeseen, the unconscious, this layered sphere of 
her habitus) to direct the drawing. In this, she sustains a continuum in which trait 
carries the traces of its heritage and the spores of its future. The preceding chapters 
tell us that this simultaneous referencing of its past and anticipation of its future 
entails a self-generative facility.  
 
5.1.3 Trait as field of observation 
 
In previous discussions,165 I referred to trait as former invisibility that has become 
visible, sitting on this side. Once outside and literally visible, the mark gains 
objective status and gains new ‘invisibility’ (see Addendum A, Illustration 5). 
Because trait enjoys as much scrutiny as does the field of observation in predicting 
the advent of more traces,166 it also acquires phenomenological invisibility. As such, 
the drafter’s viewings of return set off another continuous series of responses and 
conversions that overlay and intermingle with references to the object (or to 
imagination). We know now that trait and trace are the constructs of her body-mind. 
Continual viewing and reviewing of such constructs generate and assimilate new 
constructs, all of which also emanate from her body-mind to irrupt on the drawing 
surface. Such a flowing continuum enables the advent, development, and 
actualisation of layered conjecture, imagination, and creativity (by no means an 
easy endeavour).  
 
 
                                                       
164 In Chapter 6, I explain in detail how withdrawal in drawing remains active in doing. 
165 See Illustration 10, Addendum A. 
166 Recall Bryson’s words quoted in Chapter 4, “... the work of observation is necessarily shaped by 
the line it leaves behind. The drawn line conditions or models the selections from the field of 
observation; it launches observation along a particular direction or path. And conversely, what is 
seen determines how the next line is to continue, in a perpetual and recursive interaction that unfolds 
in ongoing time” (De Zegher. 2003: 154).  
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5.1.4 Two possible pathways 
 
In such very active hiatus, the drafter could adopt two possible pathways – one of 
stasis in memory (see Addendum A, Illustration 8, Series 8.2), or one in which she 
engages in continuous “appropriation of excess”167 (Derrida. 1993: 47). I interpret 
‘an appropriation of excess’ to resemble Bourdieu’s notion of formulation as self-
presentation.  
 
In a Bourdieunian framework, as we have seen, the drafter interacts with external 
structures in dissent from, compliance with, or compromise between the self and the 
visible (see Addendum A, Illustration 8). In this way, she deploys trait in the 
unlimited innovation that it grants. Bourdieu describes a moment “when the 
embodied structures and the objective structures are in agreement, when perception 
is constructed according to the structures of what is perceived” and, at this moment, 
Bourdieu asserts, “everything seems obvious and goes without saying” (1998: 81). 
If, in drawing, self-presentation occurs as transformation, such transformation, 
Bourdieu purports, occurs within a space of potentialities that encloses “the 
possibilities of infinite invention it provides” (1996: 270) (see Addendum A, 
Illustration 7 & 8, Series 8.1). The drafter’s engagement entails a dialectical 
interplay between dissent, compliance and compromise, rather than opting only for 
one of these possibilities to the exclusion of the others. Such interplay constitutes 
generative engagement that, in drawing, would result in multiplicity and layered 
irruptions, or the appropriation of excess. In such a process, appropriation does not 
imply any form of derivation. 
 
In this process, the drafter begins to ‘see’ beyond the visible present. Her 
momentary withdrawals suspend visual perception of the object (or visualisation of 
idea) in an empowered, informed enaction of habitus through trait. As such, trait 
escapes the world of visibility until it gains it only in drawn form (Derrida. 1993: 
45-47). In the framework of habitus, I interpret the generative construction of trait 
itself as invention, but it is this form of trait – its conjectures that ‘see beyond’ – that 
                                                       
167 Derrida describes the ‘appropriation of excess’ as ‘seeing beyond sight’ or as ‘visionary’, namely 
the ability to think ahead or to imagine. He elaborates, “the (no)-more-sight..., the visionary vision of 
the seer who sees beyond the visible present, the overseeing, sur-view, or survival of sight” (1993: 
47). Trait in itself, because it is pure invention, is  such sur-view. 
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the facilitator should seek (see Addendum A, Illustrations 2, 5, 7 & 8). Trait 
becomes a sustained poetic language when the drafter develops the ability to 
uphold a habitus-governed continuum of dialectical interchange between the self 
and the visible as an objective structure (see Addendum A, Illustrations 2, 5 & 7).  
 
Appropriation 
Memory can take drawing into two directions. On the one hand, it can lead to a 
facility for the above-mentioned ‘appropriation of excess’. In such appropriation, 
the drafter’s cerebrative interchanges circle out – beyond mnemonic storage (see 
Addendum A, Illustration 5). If habitus comprises memory and generativity, it also 
comprises concurrent restoration and regeneration. These facilities of the habitus, 
when active in drawing as field,168 formulate and conjecture anew with each trace 
in each drawing endeavour. They do so, always retaining the reservation that both 
the memory of visible trait and trait as remnant of the invisible are subject to 
transformation. Drawing (practice) embeds the work of the hands169 in habitus, which 
restores anew to such practice the technical mechanisms it needs – the skill, and 
somatic play of it – which produce anew, rather than replicate (see Addendum A, 
Illustration 1).  
 
This notion of appropriation is consistent with the circularity that sustains self-
reflexivity (see Addendum A, Illustration 8). Finally, it stores in habitus the detail 
and generalities, “the selected, chosen, and filtered” (Derrida. 1993: 47), of that 
                                                       
168 One should keep in mind that, as I explained in the Introduction, field in cultural space is also 
enveloped in habitus, the habitus of culture and environment, and that this thesis does not 
acknowledge the subject–object duality. I repeat Bryson’s words, “Culture produces around itself a 
‘habitus’ which though discontinuous with the natural world, merges into it as an order whose join with 
Nature is nowhere visible” (1983: 14). Mark Johnson erases a duality between body and culture 
completely in the notion of ‘the cultural body’. He asserts that “our environments are not only physical 
and social. They are constituted also by cultural artifacts, practices, institutions, rituals, and modes of 
interaction that transcend and shape any particular body and any particular bodily action. These 
cultural dimensions include gender, race, class, aesthetic values, and various modes of bodily posture 
and movement” (2007: 277). Similarly, Merleau-Ponty’s notion of ‘flesh’ invokes the same lateral 
mutuality between body (as subjectivity) and culture (as objectivity). 
169 Derrida (1993: 4-5) says, “If to draw a blind man is first of all to show hands, it is in order to 
draw attention to what one draws with the help of that which one draws, the body proper as an 
instrument, the drawer of the drawing, the hand of the handiwork, of the manipulations, of the 
maneuvers and manners, the play of work of the hand – drawing as surgery”, The translator 
comments in a note: “Derrida is himself indulging in a certain jeu de mains by playing on the hand in 
manipulations, manoeuvres, and maniéres, as well as in the word “chirugie” – surgery – which comes 
from the Greek kheir (hand) and literally means the “work of the hands”” (Derrida. 1993: 5). 
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which is visible in lived ‘reality’ and that which is ontologically experienced in social 
space in the very correlate of its doing,170 to alter it as subjective memory.  
 
Habitus, with this capacity for changeability and flexibility, upholds its side of a 
pact in which it also reserves the right to change both itself and its assets. As such, 
the treasury of habitus becomes a body-mind sphere that does not restrict 
possibilities – a richly furnished source for future explorative probes – probes that 
should carry with them more possibilities for further amassment and transformation. 
It emerges then that what these probes unearth from habitus becomes, on their 
return journey to the crossing point, pure conjecture, inference, and speculation – 
invention.  
 
Stasis of memory 
On the other hand, memory can orchestrate stasis. The drafter might find in memory 
a pleasing recipe that could lead to repetition (see Addendum A, Illustration 8, 
Series 2: 8.2.1-6).171 In such a case, the drafter’s delivery becomes mannerist. If the 
student drafter channels memory wrongly, it could manifest as a plateau, or 
stagnancy.172 The student drafter, having achieved trait and having received 
approval for such idiosyncrasy in her work, consciously normalises it as style. She 
sticks to it to ensure continued approval and it becomes a safety niche. The student 
drafter terminates, in other words, dynamics of interplay and dialectic to repeat 
idiosyncrasy as a formula that brings acceptability. She mimics, in effect, herself. 
 
The personal voice (trait), as invisibility, does not offer the security and credibility of 
trace as prescriptive directive, or as visible objective form. It commands courage 
from the student drafter to suspend any norm in order to gain faith and trust in trait 
                                                       
170 I cite Bourdieu in Chapter 2, under ‘Converging theories’, “present at the coming moment, the 
doing, the deed, the immediate correlate of practice which is not posed as an object of thought, as a 
possible aimed for in a project, but which is inscribed in the present of the game” (Bourdieu. 1998: 
80). 
171 Illustration 8 (Addendum A) contains two series of drawings. The second series to a certain 
degree demonstrates mannerism or repetition, while it also demonstrates constructive characteristics, 
which I explain in the text that accompanies the two series of drawings. The two series, when 
compared to one another, demonstrates the difference between constant process-based renewal 
(series 1) and mannerism (series 2) clearly. 
172 To explain further, I also refer to Richard Shusterman (2008: 24): “In contrast to analytic 
somaesthetics whose logic (whether genealogical or ontological) is descriptive, pragmatic 
somaesthetics has a distinctly normative, prescriptive character by proposing specific methods of 
somatic improvement and engaging in their comparative critique”.  
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as materialisation of the self. If trait, or the legibility of one’s body-mind, remains 
unbeseen until its irruption, the uncertainties of such a prospect also create anxiety. 
Indeed, there is nothing to mime and the student drafter has to confront the 
understanding that the unbeseen “is there without being an object, it is pure 
transcendence, without an ontic mask”. If this means that visible objects, “are only 
centered on a nucleus of absence”, anxiety grows (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 229, also 
cited in Derrida. 1993: 52). ‘Reality’ – world – as nothingness is a daunting idea 
and is often met with resistance. The drafter “does not want to be done with 
mourning it” and therefore “begins to go blind simply through the fear of losing 
[her] sight” (Derrida. 1993: 48).  
 
 Obsessive description 
Often, the student drafter seeks consolation in two options. Firstly, she could 
compensate with obsessive descriptions of visible detail. The mnemonic faculty of 
habitus itself elicits a duel between the desire to capture every minute detail, and 
the desire to filter, select, and store information according to unconscious 
preferences.  
 
The duel poses yet another threat of effacement, where excessive detail could 
smother trait,173 should the drafter persist in exclusively seeking fidelity to capture 
visibility. The reading and faithful recording of visibility, in all its seductive and 
profuse detail, remains just that – a recording that attests only to the degree of its 
fidelity to visibility. Usually in such cases, the young drafter assigns to each detail 
the same degree of weight and importance, so that the most insignificant trifling of 
detail seizes complete absorption. Thus, the drafter assures her escape into 
consummate impartiality, and into an intense battle to keep both conjecture and the 
individuated modalities of hand at bay.  
 
Such escape constitutes effacement similar to that which I describe in Chapter 1, 
since it presupposes a hard and fast ‘reality’ ‘out there’ that exists independently 
from the drafter’s perceptual and cognitive capabilities or in-phase experience. A 
                                                       
173 Here, I refer to a situation in which extreme objectivity – a restrictive faith only in the ulterior 
visibility of things – effaces ‘enactioned’ gesture marks. Similarly, extreme subjectivity would realise 
in a smothering appropriation of expressionistic style language, or ‘expressive’ mark making, which 
would also efface ‘enactioned’ gesture marks. The discussion that ensues also applies to so-called 
‘expressive’ mark making. 
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‘hard and fast’ ‘reality’ that consists of pre-given properties dictates or determines 
the outcome of her drawn images. Thus, it stifles interactive play between the 
drafter, her habitus, and her observational and drawing skills and the visible world. 
In such engagement, she merely records her knowledgeable174 memory as a replica 
of the thin sheet of visibility that the objective world bestows.  
 
 The order of memory 
Secondly, the student drafter could fixate on “the order of memory” (Derrida. 
1993: 45-51) to regain security, but here, once again, habitus is the trickster. The 
phenomenon that arises in the drawing studio as a display of the sanitised order of 
memory needs to be carefully distinguished from the accomplishment and confident 
enabling capacity of trait.  
 
To reiterate the discussions in the previous chapters, the ‘accomplishment of trait’ 
comprises both generative and inventive interchange between traces as the 
conjecture of the invisible, and the somatic play of skill and dexterity. It comprises 
the intimate and generalised conversions of visibilities, yet does not exclude context 
or social space. Therefore, continuous, constantly active interplay between object 
and subject is crucial to the students’ drawing.  
 
Although habitus absorbs information on an unconscious level, its processes of 
filtering and selection can also function to organise such information systematically in 
the conscious in order to make it manageable. The only purposes of ordering that 
the drafter contains in the sphere of consciousness, are those of stability and of 
regulatory organisation reminiscent of rule-governed175 formula. In drawing, such 
ordering would lead to certain stagnation and the sterile face of perfection.  
 
                                                       
174 Please refer, Chapter 1, ‘Process versus projectivity; verb versus noun’, where I explain in a 
footnote that ‘knowledge of the concrete world, as preconceived idea, interferes with observation 
during drawing, so that a very realistic drawing projects such knowledge, rather than durational, 
experiential cognition of the field of observation’. The explanation above does not contradict this 
statement. Rather, it explains the difference between drawing what one ‘knows’ as opposed to 
drawing what one ‘sees’. Sight, rather than knowledge, involves experiential cognition, which elicits 
enaction. 
175 Above, I allude to the contrast between ‘rule’ as deterministic objective structure and the 
‘strategising’ and ‘struggling’ that Bourdieu proposes instead to explain confluence between agent 
and structure. 
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Habitual and formulaic practices meet with obstruction in the form of the in-phase 
generative and inventive faculties of the drawing process. Indeed, when trait turns 
into a repetitive pattern, it becomes deterministic, since it rests on a fallacious 
perception of ‘reality’ as a hard and fast entity of pre-given properties. It offers 
the young student drafter a niche of safety, but it leaves no room for interchange 
and exchange along the developmental pathways of drawing that I described in 
Chapter 4. Therefore, the order of memory can hardly bring forth amassed 
syntheses, let alone creative or recursive extension of syntheses. It misses the 
“unconscious execution” (Derrida. 1993: 48), the blindly spontaneous irruption of 
trait.  
 
Thereby, the flesh as the very “eclipse between the two”, the “phantom” between 
the visible and the invisible, eludes the drafter (Derrida. 1993: 48). The continuum in 
which traces recursively anticipate their successors176 disintegrates. In Bourdieuian 
terms, and to reiterate, the stasis of memory obstructs the generative facility of 
interplay between the internal forces of habitus, its consent, dissent, or compromise, 
and the external forces of field by means of practice. As a result, the drafter also 
does not develop the ability to sustain generativity in “the rhetoric of the trait” 
(Derrida. 1993: 56), nor does she accomplish any more “possibilities of infinite 
invention” (Bourdieu. 1996: 270). In cases like this, trait functions, or rather 
paralyses itself, “in a tautology that folds the same onto the same” (Derrida. 1993: 
2). 
 
5.1.5 Conjecture of the invisible 
 
Contrary to the stasis of memory, and to return to the alternative, we see therefore 
that drawing bears the potential for sustained conjecture of the invisible. However, 
in doing so, it distributes its attention between the invisible and the visible, albeit in 
varying, chaotic, or even conflictive degrees of balance, imbalance, and clashes 
between the two (see Addendum A, Illustration 4). Similarly, it spreads its 
                                                       
176 Once again, I refer to Bryson’s words, “..the work of observation is necessarily shaped by the line 
it leaves behind. The drawn line conditions or models the selections from the field of observation; it 
launches observation along a particular direction or path. And conversely, what is seen determines 
how the next line is to continue, in a perpetual and recursive interaction that unfolds in ongoing time” 
(De Zegher. 2003: 154).  
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attention between denotation and connotation, albeit unknowingly, and creates 
dialectical interplay amongst the two. These distributions are not even, precisely 
because they envelope enactionist drawn gesture in unifying interplay with 
interactionist drawn gesture to the benefit of all three players – the self, drawing 
and display.  
 
5.1.6 Visibility and invisibility: a generative duel 
 
Drawing can sustain interplay along all those pathways that ensure blind irruption, 
as well as generativity. In this, it demonstrates its ability to nurture the 
appropriations of trait that surpasses sight. To explain this, and to verify my 
assertion in the preceding discussions that trait is the invisibility of things, it is 
necessary to dwell a moment on invisibility in relation to visibility.  
 
I regard Derrida’s notion that the difference between object and image (see 
Addendum A, Illustration 10) constitutes ‘the invisibility’ an apt variation on the 
“possibilities of infinite invention” that Bourdieu asserts (1996: 270). As I explained 
in previous chapters, Bourdieu’s concept of habitus locates the source of invention in 
a body-mind that interplays in social space. I therefore understand habitus as the 
creator and treasurer of invisibility. Habitus appropriates invisibility by transforming 
it into visibility.  
 
Duel 
As generative facilities in drawing, it emerges that interactivity and enaction 
engage in a duel between the ontic mask (the visible), and the hidden face beneath 
the mask (the invisible). In this duel, the sword (as drawing tool) unmasks the ontic in 
order to reveal the hidden face beneath the mask. Such unmasking by a sword 
implies scarring. Indeed, the drawing tool leaves scars, yet they are revealing scars. 
The drawing tool deforms and wounds on the drawing surface. It does not preserve 
in minutest detail the hidden face of the ontic mask, nor does it seek to escape in the 
sterile impartiality of obsessive description.  
 
The imagery that this metaphoric application of ‘sword’, ‘sheath’, ‘mask’, and ‘face’ 
offers, bring some clarity to the constructs I pose in the thesis. The empty hollowness 
 176 
of a sheath, its inside, forms the negative shape of a sword, its non-visibility – the 
sword itself being its positive, its visibility. Similarly, the inside of a mask is the non-
visible negative of the face, or invisible spectre (ghost) of a face. This non-visible 
negative in itself is the visible positive of the back of the mask. In both cases, the 
comfortable fit of the visible positive into the nonvisible negative suggests an 
inevitable intertwining as well as interchanging reciprocity.  
 
The image recalls the Derrida’s “eye graft”: “Here is the second hypothesis then – 
an eye graft, the grafting of one point of view onto the other: a drawing of the 
blind is a drawing of the blind” (1993: 2-3). The image also recalls the fit between 
the somatic surge of the labour of drawing, and the norms of common schemata, in 
which the drafter inscribes ‘excessive’ layers of meaning in trait, that I discuss in the 
previous chapter. At the same time, the image indicates the appropriateness of the 
idea of chiasmus and dialectical interactivity as transitional or migratory path 
between the unconscious and conscious during the act of drawing. Derrida says, “But 
like all production, that of the abyss came to saturate what it hollows out” (1987: 
33). To ensure a smooth inter-filling fit or graft, the mask sacrifices matter to 
hollowness, which receives the corresponding materiality of the face and its convex 
planes. So too does the sheath in receiving its sword. These images project 
simultaneous interactivity, intertwining, reversibility, and chiasmus that, as metaphor, 
alight on the difference between Bourdieu’s conception of dialectical interactivity 
and Merleau-Ponty’s notion of chiasmus between subject and object. One is a 
migratory path back-and-forth, the other an instantaneous fit, graft, or drawing-
together, but both occupy a unifying middle way between extreme objectivism and 
extreme subjectivism.177  
 
In drawing, we see that the sword destroys the mask to scar the face, thus 
recreating the face by means of disfigurement that both inscribe the movements of 
the hand and shapes a new face, the other of its negative. As such, an interactive 
dialectic between destruction and construction is evident. The new face reflects the 
‘other’ of the mask’s negative rather than that of its front, which wore a completely 
                                                       
177 Both in meta-analytic terms and in terms of describing the moment of conjecture that creates trait 
- or that trait creates conjecture. 
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different face of duplicity. In this, I see ‘another’ (the duplicitous face)178 destroyed 
in interactive violence to reveal the other179 of the nonvisible negative, which as a 
mould would have engendered its positive again. While the image suggests both 
the dialectics of interplay and a mirroring chiasmus or reversibility, a third element, 
namely the nothingness, the diaphanous film between convexity filling concavities 
and concavity enveloping convexities, appears. This thin plane between the two 
surfaces of the negative mould and its positive casting meets each facing surface as 
an ambilaterality, which poses such a tight mutuality that the only form it can take 
on, is that of gridirons of line, of scarring as drawing. There in, for me, lies trait, 
both as invisibility and as ‘enactioned’ disposition of mind-body.  
 
Derrida proposes that drawing traces are the “absolute invisibility” – implying that 
the drafter becomes completely seduced by her own reach towards the invisible. In 
an about-turn that reflexivity orchestrates, the drafter becomes the hunted180 
(1993: 51-52). In the construct that I am trying to formulate here, the drawing (the 
scars left by the sword) becomes the ‘other’ of the invisible, rather than ‘another’ 
visible. There in lies the challenge and captivation of the accomplishment of trait for 
the drafter. The desire to find the other of preverbal symbolicity181 (gesture, 
invisibility, or the pre-conceptual) could become irrepressible, because its eerie 
strangeness, its otherness, brings forth the wonder of constant discovery.  
 
Although a drawing can materialise away from the visible to ‘recite’ another visible 
– the way one would recite verses written by another poet – such a drawing would 
merely redistribute style language without the drafter experiencing the wonder of 
gestic conversion. Drawing yields the other of self-as-being as the other of 
invisibility, which is invention. Drawing, therefore, should not abandon the visible 
completely, because the absence of visibility would render its unmasking 
                                                       
178 This description of ‘the duplicitous face’ as ‘another’ alludes to copying or the redistribution of 
style language in drawing. 
179 While ‘other’ refers to trait as the other of the gestic, of the ‘muteness that dwells in language’. 
180 Derrida (1993: 51) relates this as follows, “the draftsman would be given over to this other 
invisibility, given over to it in the same way that a hunter, himself in relentless pursuit, becomes a 
fascinating lure for the tracked animal that watches him”.  
181 As I explain in Chapter 1, De Zegher cites Julia Kristeva who asserts that gesture, as “a preverbal 
symbolicity” introduced into language the notion of “pre-meaning”. The conception and conversion of 
sense from gesture to speech, to language, or to writing, created, and continue to create, expanding 
structures of language and systems of cerebration (Kristeva. 1989: 305 – 306, cited in De Zegher, 
2003: 274).  
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unnecessary, impossible, and mute – there would be no cries of pain that elicit more 
probing or scarring in this duel of interplay, and alas, no rhetoric.  
 
In drawing, the invisible needs the visible, whether in the form of memory, in the 
form of the loss of that memory to the unconscious, in the form of subjective 
conception, or in the subjective experience of viewing, feeling, and touching an 
object. Experiential cognition entails, in drawing, arrays of founding perceptions182 
that the drafter experiences in a continuous flow. Each founding perception retains 
traces of its precedent, thus building on one another recursively as subjective 
constructs of the mind.  
 
Non-visibility 
If, at the outset of drawing, non-visibility, or ‘idea’, were to posit itself as subject 
matter, the lack of visibility that is typical of idea, gains visibility through trait 
irruption. In such a situation, trait formation engages in a duel with its precedents, 
thus bringing forth visibility as the other of both the invisibilities of preceding trait 
and of the self (see Addendum A, Illustrations 2 & 7). In this resides another duel. 
The subjective ‘reading’ by habitus of already irrupted trait, engages in a duel with 
conversions that continue to irrupt as trait. These irruptions display as partial 
restoration of the visible (already irrupted trace) and partial regeneration of the 
self as invisible.  
 
Bloom’s taxonomy of the cognitive domain (1956: 62-187) tells us that conception 
has to rely on perception in order to bring forth syntheses. Rudolf Arnheim, in his 
book Visual Thinking (1969: 27) says, “In the perception of shape lies the beginnings 
of concept formation”. This also suggests Varela’s notion of unifying 
interdependency between perception and conception. To experience the visible, 
means entering the sphere of its invisibility, upon which the drafter enacts her access 
to it as trait. Habitus interacts with the field of forces through practice in order to 
generate invention. In drawing, the invisible irrupts from unconscious memory of 
seeing the visible. The ‘nucleus of absence,’ upon which Merleau-Ponty consigns the 
                                                       
182 Bryson (1983: 17) defines the founding perception as the fraction of a moment in which the 
drafter converts three-dimensionality into two-dimensional form. The drafter does this along all the 
pathways I describe in Chapter 4 - or rather; to my mind, these pathways constitute the founding 
perception.  
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visible, pertains to the visible as a construct and experience of the body-mind, of 
habitus, of cognition, and unification between perception and conception. Once a 
construct, it is no longer an object. As a construct, it is “there, without being an 
object”. He explains this further by stating that; “One has to understand that it is 
visibility itself that involves a nonvisibility” (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 247, cited also in 
Derrida. 1993: 52).  
 
Middle way 
As such, drawing, by its oblique183 insistence on trait, seeks and finds a pathway 
between the lived ‘reality’ of the world as projective of “pre-given properties” and 
the “cognitive system projecting its own world”, where the appearance of ‘the real’ 
is “merely a reflection of internal laws of the system” (Varela. 1992: 172). It finds 
this in Bourdieu’s concept of interactivity, in Merleau-Ponty’s flesh, and in Varela’s 
concept of enaction.  
 
These three concepts have in common the notion of unifying activity amongst two 
poles that create a whole. This recalls my employment in Chapter 4 of the metaphor 
of the ebb and flow of the tidal movements of the sea to locate trait in the debris 
collecting on the shore, but emanating from both sea and land to illustrate an 
overlap in the middle. The debris that ends up in this overlapping territory 
represents trait, and the overlapping area represents the drawing ground as 
crossing point. Drawing acknowledges both the visible (the land) and the invisible 
(the sea) as sources of trait, thereby capturing this middle ground. It does so, right 
from the blindness of enactionist drawn gesture in a continuum of recursivity that 
eventually reveals.  
 
5.1.7 Lateral mutuality as impetus 
 
In the phenomenological terms of Merleau-Ponty, drawing produces a sense of self-
as-being that recognises (or finds its match in) the ‘beingness’, the existentiality of 
                                                       
183 ‘Oblique’, because in facilitating drawing, the forming of trait is never presented as the objective 
of a task. In its facilitation, emphases are on the drafter as individual and on drawing as knowledge 
discipline (see the last chapter). I also state in Chapter 2, under ‘Points of further focus’ that, 
“Although it can be encouraged by positive reinforcement after the fact, drawing, as a knowledge 
discipline, does not articulate trait as a defined element that forms part of its contents. This is so, 
because trait (or signature), in fact, manifests without precedent”. 
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lived ‘reality’. This happens in muteness, a space seemingly empty of thought, yet 
infused with a sense of affinity, that the drafter cannot account for in specular form, 
but only in mental recognition, and then not even in thought. The drafter gestures 
from this in-between plane.  
 
Between cognition, recognition, and the possibility of the gestic as specular form, a 
duel erupts. It is a duel between nothingness and something, which irrupts on paper 
as trait. This notion suggests that it is impossible to capture the essence (nucleus) of 
the visible. Therefore, trait departs from essence, and this departure already starts 
at the point of its founding. From there onwards, it generates the dynamics of 
amassment in deviating conversions that constitute a form of invention that surpasses, 
entirely, the visible. This evokes Derrida’s words, “It is like a ruin that does not come 
after the work but remains produced, already from the origin, by the advent and 
structure of the work” (1993: 65. Emphasis JD). Such initiative – the very founding of 
visual perception, however deeply hidden it is as simulacrum – is the point from 
where dialectical, reversible and enactionist chains emanate.  
 
The drafter wants to savour that point, and exactly because it proves to be blind, 
she cannot resist the possibility of seeing it. Therefore, she draws the mutuality 
between the self and world as she conceives or imagines it as hers alone, forming it 
in her own hand as a fiction, as her other. This phenomenological and experiential 
recounting of how trait forms in drawing, once again resonates in Derrida’s words, 
“that the performative fiction that engages the spectator in the signature of the 
work is given to be seen only through the blindness that it produces as the truth” 
(1993: 65).  
 
In drawing, the drafter experiences such a plane in which it becomes irresistible to 
blend the visibility, the tactility, and her common ‘aboutness’ as superimpositions on 
paper. In this experience, the drafter largely eliminates her distance from the visible 
world, her perspective, her viewing through space, to ‘level’ her with things on an 
‘aperspective’ plane, or on a plane without any perspective, a cavernous evenness 
of mutuality.  
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In the drafter’s experience, her being constitutes one element, lived ‘reality’ another 
element, and her irrupting marks on paper, a third. It must be evident here, that she 
would then turn to an objective formulation of a mute spot in her perception that 
“cannot be thought in a specular” (Derrida. 1993: 53) form and therefore is ‘blind’. 
The drafter could also construe this experience as a void, a nothingness to which she 
will never have access, unless she draws it. If she gave this nothingness a name, – 
invisibility – the drafter assigns some consciousness, some concreteness to it. She 
does this by drawing it (see Addendum A, Illustration 10).  
 
Thereby, the drafter transports this muteness and blindness to ‘superimposition on 
paper’ – to trait as inscription of self-as-being. The visibility of self-as-being is also 
unknown until it almost seems to shape itself, enact itself, on this plane without 
perspective. There, at the point of its origination, trait is no form, but rather a future 
form. The drafter cannot know it until she makes it a form of the here and now. 
Therefore, she wants to convert all of its ‘no-formness’ into specularity, thus giving it 
meaning only she can consign it. Yet, different viewers will interpret it in various 
ways.  
 
To reiterate, drawing seeks to retain the rhythm between visibility and invisibility, 
between the unconscious and the conscious, between the layered dispositions of 
body-mind. The ‘ontological’ in drawing practice implies incorporation of the visible 
and the invisible, as well as the self in relation to the world, and (through the act of 
drawing), world in relation to self. Complicity implies interplay between several 
accomplices in drawing practice, namely between unconscious and conscious, 
between a self-consciousness immersed in lived ‘reality’ and lived ‘reality’ immersed 
in self-consciousness. Complicitous reversibility184 between the being of subject and 
the being of object dispels their antimonial relationship.  
 
                                                       
184 Derrida (1993: 68) tells of the experience of drawing the self and the emergence of the self in 
drawing, literally in drawing a self-portrait and figuratively in drawing any other subject, “In the 
beginning there is ruin. Ruin is that which happens to the image from the moment of the first gaze. 
Ruin is the self-portrait, this face looked at in the face as the memory of itself, what remains or 
returns as a specter from the moment one first looks at oneself and a figuration is eclipsed. The 
figure, the face, then sees its visibility being eaten away; it loses its integrity without disintegrating. 
For the incompleteness of the visible monument comes from the eclipsing structure of the trait, from a 
structure that is only remarked, pointed out, impotent or incapable of being reflected in the shadow 
of the self-portrait. So many reversible propositions. For one can just as well read the pictures of 
ruins as the figures of a portrait, indeed, of a self-portrait”. 
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As drawing functions as interface between drafter and world, it also devises 
transitivity between the unconscious and conscious spheres. Accordingly, drawing 
harbours a desire to show the self, but it is hardly a conscious desire. Rather, 
drawing constantly maintains an underlying dimension, namely sensing the self as 
being. The self-as-being constitutes existentiality – not similarity or identity – in 
common between the self and environment.185 To show the self (through trait) as 
mutual with environment is not to comprehend the self as an object or as someone 
with a defined, static calligraphy who must consciously enforce it as signature. 
Rather, sense of self-as-being comprises “‘reflectedness’ (sich bewegen), it thereby 
constitutes itself in itself” (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 249). Trait as self-as-being 
embodies the self-reflexivity of drawing. This sense of self-as-being is what ‘I’, as 
drafter, allow to go into exile onto the drawing surface. As self-perception is a 
perception-of-being-self, so is trait. Merleau-Ponty says, “the self-perception is still 
a perception, i.e. it gives me a Nicht Urpräsentierbar (a non-visible, myself), but this 
it gives me through an Urpräsentierbar (my tactile or visual appearance) in 
transparency (i.e. as a latency)” (1968: 249-250). Trait reflects such transparency. 
In trait, self gets the closest to seeing or feeling the self, in other words, in 
accomplishing a sense of self-as-being. In looking for its own visibility, it achieves 
new invisibility on the condition that it perceives its visibility.  
 
As stated before, the accomplishment of trait, therefore, should never be the 
conscious object, or objective of drawing. As soon as it is either of these, it mimes 
itself. Trait irrupts in the unknowing of itself, or in what Derrida calls blindness and 
Merleau-Ponty, the blind spot (‘punctum caecum’). Trait is a ghost, the nothingness of 
invisibility, of being. As soon as the pursuit of this ghost becomes a conscious 
endeavour, it withdraws its flow and spontaneity to reflect only its closure upon itself 
                                                       
185 Merleau-Ponty (1968: 253) explains this as follows, “What I want to do is restore the world as a 
meaning of Being absolutely different from the ‘represented’, that is, as the vertical Being which none 
of the ‘representations’ exhaust and which all ‘reach’, the wild Being. This is to be applied not only to 
perception, but to the Universe of predicative truths and significations as well. Here also it is 
necessary to conceive the signification (wild) as absolutely distinct from the In Itself and the ‘pure 
consciousness’ - the truth as this Individual upon which the acts of significations cross and of which they 
are cuttings. Moreover the distinction between the two planes (natural and cultural) is abstract: 
everything is cultural in us (our Lebenswelt is ‘subjective’) (our perception is cultural-historical) and 
everything is natural in us (even the cultural rests on the polymorphism of the wild Being). The 
meaning of being is to be disclosed: it is a question of showing that the ontic, the ‘Erlebnisse’, 
‘sensations’, ‘judgments’ – (the ob-jects, the ‘represented’, in short all idealizations of the Psyche and 
of Nature) all the bric-a-brac of those positive psychic so-call ‘realities’ (and which are lacunar, 
‘insular’, without Weltlichkeit of their own) is in ‘reality’ abstractly carved out from the ontological 
tissue, from the ‘body of the mind’”.  
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in a meaningless repetition of its stasis, thus effacing self-as-being, the ambilateral 
mutuality it holds with self-as-nothing.  
 
As invisibility, however, the ghost must haunt its visibility “to the point of being 
confused with it” (Derrida. 1993: 51). I recognise in these words of Derrida the 
generative rather than repetitive facility of dialectical interplay. His words evoke a 
sense of a feverish chase forward that the ghost elicits in self-as-nothing to urge her 
on in her attempts to find her visibility in self-as-being. This haunt recalls the 
generative tension emanating between the waywardness of enactionist drawn 
gesture and the inhibitive curbing of interactionist drawn gesture.  
 
Through trait, the drafter recursively creates new visibilities upon new non-visibilities. 
As such, trait is “the singular body of the visible itself, right on the visible – so that, 
by emanation, and as if it were secreting its own medium, the visible would produce 
blindness” (Derrida. 1993: 51-52).  
 
What we never see first-hand, is the phenomenal essence of the visible, as we do 
not ever see local colour. Nor do we ever see first-hand the phenomenal essence of 
the drafter. It dies in the blind, mute pocket186 where trait is born. We see trait as 
‘the singular body of the visible’ or what remains of it in the sword’s scarification. 
The conscious can only speculate about the unconscious through conjecture. Its 
conjecture is gestic conversion – trait borne by the dialectics and confusion of 
consciousness trying to ‘see’ unconsciousness. In this way, unconsciousness comes to the 
fore and enters the visible world as a conjectured appearance.  
 
In the phenomenological relationship between visibility and invisibility, sight is a 
given, as it is in drawing. The drafter cannot retrieve a sense of the self from sight, 
visibility (and their opposites, blindness and invisibility), or from the ability to invent. 
Downs et al. states that the drafter cannot draw “without sight or hindsight, memory 
or consciousness of resemblance” (2007: xii). I uphold and acknowledge this in my 
construct of ‘interactionist drawn gesture’, which also involves recognisability187 as 
interactivity between habitus, practice, and field.  
                                                       
186 The ‘punctum caecum’ (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 247, cited also in Derrida. 1993: 53). 
187 Refer, Chapter 4, ‘Token schemata’. 
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At the point of making a mark on paper, however, the ambivalence inherent to the 
meaning of ‘appearance’188 mirrors an interesting and generative interplay 
between trait irruption and sight. This interplay exceeds dialectic between a “will to 
imitate” and a “will to invent”, a notion that Downs et al. also support (2007: xii). 
Who other than the self-as-being upholds either the will to imitate or the will to 
invent? An extra pathway of generative interplay – the appropriation of excess 
only the self-as-being can achieve – supports the centrality of sight in the drawing 
process. More importantly, however, it defines the significance of trait in drawing. 
Sensing and enacting an existential mutuality between the self and lived ‘reality’ is 
the necessary gateway to surpassing the invention that trait enfolds. Enaction of such 
mutuality turns the experience of drawing for the drafter into ‘self-as-lived-reality’. 
In such blind ‘sense’, which is an experience too, trait replaces self-as-nothingness. 
However, it also exceeds replacement.  
 
5.2 Conclusions 
 
This chapter leads to the conclusion that the self-as-being, with all its diverse facets 
and depths of complexity, presents those endless possibilities that can enrich 
invention. Embodied action brings forth in action also that which is not consciously 
remembered, but stored so deeply, that it is rather immured, embedded, 
entrenched, or absorbed completely in body-mind or in the ‘lie’ that is ‘self’. The 
wealth of what remains hidden or embodied drives the drafter’s urgent and 
constant refutation of self-as-lie or self-as-nothingness to find the complexities of 
self-as-being. Such complexities spill over the limits of invention. These concepts are 
enfolded in the construct I call ‘enactionist drawn gesture’. 
 
The appearance of something (including style language) may very well elicit a ‘will 
to imitate’189 it. In a previous chapter, I concluded, however, that the idiosyncratic 
                                                       
188 As I state in Chapter 1, I interpret the word ‘appearance’ to refer to both the exterior 
manifestation of object, and to the advent and development of drawn display on the drawing 
surface, in other words, its gradual becoming apparent. The drafter’s viewing of appearance of the 
field of observation and the gradual appearance of image on drawing surface, therefore, stand in a 
relationship of interplay. 
189 This is not in radical opposition to the views of Downs et al., but rather assert an interpretation of 
Derrida’s explorations that lie slightly off-centre from those of Downs et al. I cite above from an 
account of their interpretation of Derrida’s hypothesis of sight (Derrida. 1993). To clarify my 
deviation, I repeat Derrida’s clear assertion regarding the advent of trait, “Even if drawing is, as 
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gesture that the drafter intends as imitation in trace-form in fact invents, rather than 
imitates. Moreover, that which the idiosyncrasy of such gesture encompasses, its 
irretrievable affiliation to a belief in self-as-being, a self that is also unique in 
being, creates the flow of conjecturing marks. Such flow conveys the whole of trait, 
its invention, and its excesses (rhetoric). There proves to be only ‘nothing’, ‘the 
hidden’, ‘invisibility’, to imitate, a nothingness that is in fact the self, a self-as-nothing 
that is self-as-being. At the point of perception, conjecture yields drawn gesture. 
Thus, this clash between contradictory excitants190 urges a flow of drawn gesture. 
The gradual appearance of drawn gesture (which constantly insinuates more 
‘nothingness’ anew) constitutes the ‘disappearance’ that remains to be marked in 
order to appear. In my constructs, therefore, I replace (or augment possibly) “the 
will to imitate” with a ‘will to reveal the self’ or ‘a desire to show the self’, a notion 
that I discuss in the next chapter.  
 
5.3 Overarching conclusion: The genesis of trait 
 
It is now possible to summarise the main insight regarding the origin of trait that 
emerges from this chapter and the previous chapters.  
 
Trait in drawing does not represent. While it does not recover pre-given properties 
from the visible world, it also does not mirror a pre-formed picture of the world. 
Nor does an inborn and unchangeable genetic structure pre-ordain the 
particularities of its visibility. Yet, it exists, and its existence is, like that of the self, 
only ever perceivable as well as do-able in a measuring between something and 
nothing. As such, drawing-trait is borne by the body-mind experience of the world, 
which incorporates both interaction and enaction. 
                                                                                                                                                          
they say, mimetic, that is, reproductive, figurative, representative, even if the model is presently 
facing the artist, the trait must proceed in the night. It escapes the field of vision. Not only because it 
is not yet visible, but because it does not belong to the realm of the spectacle, of spectacular 
objectivity – and so that which it makes happen or come [advenir] cannot in itself be mimetic” (1993: 
45). My emphasis on trait, on idiosyncrasy, rather than on a generalised conception of the nature of 
drawing, directs my thinking into an interpretation that deviates very slightly from that of Downs et 
al. Moreover, the difference between “experience of cognitive mimesis” (Downs et al. 2007: xx), and 
‘enaction of embodied cognition’ constitutes my argument. This difference, to my mind, comprises the 
description of ‘trait’ as that which ‘proceeds in the night’ and that has nothingness to mime. 
190 The ‘contradictory excitants’ are self-as-non-existent, on the one hand, and a conviction in self-as-
being on the other. Added to this contradiction, the contradiction between appearance and 
disappearance as simultaneous process in drawing is involved, as is the unbeknownst and the known, 
and the unbeseen and the seen. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
TO SHOW THE SELF:  AUTO-DEIXIS 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
As an expansion drawn from the explorations of the previous chapters, I propose 
the notion of auto-deixis,191 a word I invent, and a concept I derive from the 
relationship between habitus, enaction, interaction, and the notion of trait as the 
product of embodied action. If trait constitutes the self-as-being in drawing, auto-
deixis frames trait and trace as autogenous enactions that manifest as a desire to 
show the self in drawing. I employ those theories I explored in the first five chapters 
to explain the significant status of trait in auto-deictic drawing, which also motivates 
its status in drawing facilitation. I derive the synthesis in particular from the notions 
of enactionist and interactionist drawn gesture.  
 
As such, the chapter continues an attempt to answer the question of how trait realises 
in drawing, while, in addition, it attempts to find answers to the question of how the 
realisation of trait is sustained in the educational studio situation. Answering these 
questions require understanding of the relationship between the theories that the 
thesis investigates and practices. To demonstrate this relationship, I propose a series 
of processes inherent to auto-deixis that I translate into broad outlines for task 
design in its facilitation. I provide illustrated descriptions of such processes and 
explain their realisation in practice. 
 
I propose that the processes mentioned above also distinguish drawing as a form of 
creative research with self-reflexivity at its core. I position convergences between 
the theories that I discussed before as foundation for conceptualising drawing as a 
self-reflexive research process.  
                                                       
191 Refer also to the Glossary (Addendum B). 
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Since all the previous chapters underwrite this chapter, it also draws significantly 
from preceding chapters, especially with reference to drawing-trait. Therefore, 
repetition is hard to avoid. The differences between an enactionist deconstruction of 
drawing-trait and the more conventional understandings (which are also more 
dismissive of drawing-trait) are deceptively small and often rely on reallocation of 
nuance only. This not only considerably complicates discussion, but also necessarily 
requires the repeated incorporation of terms and explanatory phrases that were 
newly formed within the context of the thesis. To an extent, a pattern-language has 
formed, which also reads as repetition. 
 
6.1 Auto-deixis as concept: a desire to show the self  
 
The words: ‘autogenous’ and ‘deixis’ 
‘Auto’ I derive from ‘autogenous’, meaning that gestic conversion originates from 
within. ‘Deixis’, from the Greek deiknoneí, meaning ‘to show’, refers to speech 
utterances that contain information concerning the locus of utterance, the self 
(Bryson. 1983: 87). 
 
I apply the word ‘autogenous’ to suggest the understanding that trait stems from an 
individuated body-mind or self. ‘Deictic’ suggests a desire to show the self192 by 
                                                       
192 Bryson (19883: 87 – 89), places the visual manifestation of the artist’s presence in a spatial 
relationship with her painting and with viewer in the classical posture known as “Eloquentia” that 
appeared in European paintings dating from medieval times and the Renaissance. Eloquentia shows 
a human figure as narrator, as orator, with his or her hands in positions that became canonic or 
formulaic standards. The left hand usually turns inwards, towards the body, while the right hand 
stretches outwards, gesturing towards the viewer. In order to elucidate my perception of visible 
presence and invisible presence (presence in absentia) in auto-deictic drawing, I will dare to deviate 
slightly from Bryson’s equalising assimilation of artist as present in which he posits the artist as the 
Eloquentia figure. The Eloquentia figure was intended to symbolise the artist as narrator, thereby 
rather allocating a role of aloofness to the artist. Not only was it never a portrait of the real artist, it 
also never revealed any trace of the artist’s own physical presence in the form of individuated mark 
making. Consistent with conventions of the time, knowing full well that the figure was supposed to 
symbolise him, the painter did not grace the figure with his own face, but adorned the figure with a 
tranquil, wise, but anonymous face, simultaneously defacing himself and elevating himself as serenely 
removed narrator, an imaginary luminary, separate from self. Ironically, and contrary to intention, in 
this way Eloquentia suggests that the maker of the painting, the painter, is not the narrator of the 
painting, in other words, the painting is not the site of its maker’s body. That elevated place belongs 
to some higher institution (the church’s voice with the artist as mediating rhetor of religious dogmas, 
for example), or to an abstraction in which the artist plays the role of a wise orator or preacher. The 
signification of the narrator’s gesture, painted in the polished, smooth technique and style typified by 
the total eradication of the anonymous artists’ personalised marks, not revealing any secrets as to 
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asserting self-as-being in the present time. As such, deixis occurs in the correlate of 
making the trace, in which ‘I’ mark self and self marks ‘I’. In such a process, the 
hidden self comes into play with the hidden ‘self’ of her subject matter. Through trait, 
the drafter inscribes this coming together,193 rather than describing the objective 
existence of her subject matter.194 Both enaction of self and the sense of an eclipse 
between the self and object dwell in trait irruption.  
 
According to the Oxford Dictionary of English, the Greek word ‘deiktikos’ and 
‘deiktos’ mean “Capable of proof”. The same source indicates ‘deiknunai’ to mean, 
“to show”. I draw from this the word “deictic”195 (ODE. 2005: 458). The English 
word ‘deictic’ relates to words and expressions “who’s meaning is dependent on the 
context in which they are used” (ODE. 2005: 458). A linguistic framework also 
reveals the coincidental elements of spatiality and temporality in relation to self and 
body in discursive exchange that recounts the desire to establish the speaker’s own 
spatial and temporal being (Bryson. 1983: 87-89). Such elements manifest in words 
that refer to the position of their speaker. Words like ‘near’, ‘far’, ‘here’ and ‘there’, 
for example, indicate the speaker’s relative position during speaking. In the same 
way, words like ‘now’, ‘then’, ‘yesterday’, ‘soon’ or ‘late’ contain information 
regarding relative temporality to their speaker’s position in time (Bryson. 1983: 87-
89). Words like ‘myself’, ‘me’, ‘my’, ‘mine’ recount the speaker as self, also implying 
added dimensions of the implied visibility of the speaker and her powers of 
possession, either of self or of objectivities. What they all have in common is their 
intrinsic acknowledgement of a “self-reflexive” speaker (Bryson. 1983: 87-89).  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
their isochronistic significations, mirrors my perception of the concept of self-effacement quite 
literally. The viewer learns about an artist twice removed, serenely masked in muted mark, literally 
defaced, and figuratively effaced. This indeed also points to the origin of a long and revered 
tradition of self-effacement in Western representational painting. With this deviation, I want to 
explain that, although auto-deixis does not refer to literal self-portrayal, it does reside in 
shamelessly exposed self-originative, auto-originative, and self-reflexive trace that irrupts in the 
correlate of its doing as trait. 
193 Please refer to Chapter 2, ‘The transcendental’, and to Chapter 5, ‘Middle way’, and ‘Lateral 
mutuality as impetus’. 
194 Please refer to Chapter 5, ‘The turning point: conjecture and invention’. 
195 I also explain the word ‘deictic’ in the Glossary of key words (Addendum B) to point out its 
connection with ‘token’ and ‘autogenous’ (Please refer). In my applications of the word, I intend it to 
denote the concept ‘to show’ (deiknynai), rather than ‘to say’ (deiktikos)  in a first person voice. I 
apply its meaning ‘to show’ as ‘showing in a first person mark’. 
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Drafteric equivalent 
I propose an equivalent in the context of drawing that invokes a subliminal 
‘attendance’ of the self in the labour of drawing as a desire to show self, which 
relates a subliminal recognition and assertion of self-as-being. To elucidate the 
notions of showing the self directly, as proof of the attendance of one’s own body 
and mind in a practice, the term ‘auto-deictic drawing’ would be apt. I propose that 
individuation in drawing constitutes the drafter’s autogenous desire, compulsion, or 
disposition to show the self-as-being. In the previous chapters, it became clear that 
such showing is about enaction of the self, a self-reflexive assertion and uttering of 
the self that realises as difference (rather than ‘presence’). The word ‘auto-deixis’ 
would literally translate as trait as proof of the unique (rather than similar) 
existence of self-as-being. 
 
Preliminary explanation 
The aspect of trait that auto-deixis brings forth, is a self in dialogue with self and 
other. In other words, it is a dialogue between self-originative action and both self- 
and world-reference. Trait becomes the other of the self in this dialogue. Thus, I 
describe interactive and enactionist drawn gesture as ‘auto-deixis’, ‘auto-deictic 
gesture’, and ‘auto-deictic drawing’. Auto-deictic drawing is drawing that realises 
through embodied action.  
 
6.2 The concepts and processes that frame auto-deictic drawing: a summary 
 
In this section, I summarise a number of constructs that I derive from the explorations 
in former chapters. These concepts underpin the formation of trait, which is the main 
objective of auto-deictic drawing. I propose, therefore, these constructs as a 
structural framework for the facilitation of auto-deictic drawing.196  
 
Cerebration 
The previous chapters lead to the understanding that cerebration constitutes 
interplay between habitus and practice that produces trait formation. Such interplay 
                                                       
196 Circularity (rather than linearity) structure the interrelatedness of these concepts. They bend back 
on themselves, which becomes apparent in my efforts to describe them with some semblance to 
linearity. Because this section also serves as summary, repetition is unavoidable. 
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unifies perception and conception. The understanding that perception and 
conception are not mutually exclusive follows logically. I base this understanding on 
the interfusion between perception and conception in trait irruption that I discuss in 
Chapter 4.  
 
Time and space: the in-phase aspect 
Three aspects are inherent to the unification of perception and conception – drafter, 
time, and space. Auto-deictic drawing functions in the physical, spatial, and 
temporal existence197 of the drafter. It is successful in the degree to which its marks 
articulate the difference of its drafter. The degree to which its marks articulate 
difference198 equals their distinctiveness to a self, and such a self is identical only to 
itself. Trait is not similar to the world it nevertheless portrays. The body-mind 
unification, which enfolds unification between perception and conception, relates to 
making the drawing stroke as it occurs in real time and with the drawing surface in 
spatial relation to drafter and trace.  
 
Drawn gesture and autogeny 
Flowing from such non-dualist understanding of body-mind, perception, and 
conception, the concepts drawn gesture and autogeny fuse enaction and interactivity 
into gesture. As the previous chapters explain, enaction and interaction relate so 
closely that it would be truthful to say drawing is a process that enacts all-pervasive 
interactivity, and that it interacts through enaction. The one becomes the other, 
interfusing completely through the labour of drawing, which supports the notion of 
drawing as interface between the self and the world.  
 
Gestic conversion and conversion 
Gestic conversion constitutes a cerebrative and transitive passage from unconscious 
to conscious, from the indistinct to the distinct, from invisibility to visibility, and from 
blindness to sight. Drawn gesture, as trait, is the materialisation of these passages. 
The concept of ‘conversion’ is crucial. It suggests a process of transforming the gestic 
                                                       
197 “Line can no more escape the present tense of its entry into the world than it can escape into oil 
paint’s secret hiding places of erasure and concealment. Drawing always exists in parallel to that 
other, permanently present time – that of viewing. For viewing, too, is condemned to the present, to a 
work of exploration that never quite ends – it is always possible, at a later date, that we will see 
more in the image than we see now” (Bryson in De Zegher.2003: 150). 
198 The notion of self-as-being resonates in Bryson’s expositions on the Gaze and the Glance (1983: 
87-131), which enfold the ‘presence of self’.  
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into mark that is enactionist and not representational. Mute or blind gesture199 is the 
object of transformation, not a picture in the mind. 
 
Irruption200 
The notion of irruption implies ‘conversion’. It indicates a phenomenon in which the 
materialisation of marks happens in an abrupt, eruptive way. If trait, as self-
inscription, comes into being in an unpremeditated way, no visible scripts can exist 
for trait – neither in the drafter’s mind, nor in objective structures. In the previous 
chapter, we saw that as soon as they start to serve as script in their visible form, the 
drafter runs the risk of falling into repetitive redistribution. In auto-deictic drawing, 
the aim is to avoid even this form of repetition. 
 
Trait 
As a phenomenon of invention, trait encapsulates, to my mind, all the above. The 
notions that trait has its genesis in the unconscious, in body-mind as the self, and that 
trait is therefore self-originative, form the core and foundation of auto-deictic 
drawing. 
 
The self as locus of utterance 
The self is the origin of self-originativity. A confluence of body and mind suggests 
self-originativity through enaction, where self takes an assertive stance in a 
conviction of self-as-being, thus not only asserting its unique existence in practices, 
but also developing the ability to surpass sight. Differences between the enactions 
of individual drafters emanate from individuated embodied habituses entangled in 
the labour of drawing to reveal and affirm the hidden self (or self-as-nothing 
proved as self-as-being).  
 
Self-reflexivity confirms the self-as-being 
Trait carries all these constructs along two main ambits in a dialectic that 
demonstrates reflexively. The first ambit comprises the possibility of self-as-being in 
opposition to the possibility of self-as-nothing (Varela. 1992: 105-110). The second 
                                                       
199 Tantamount to the ‘preverbal symbolicity’ and ‘pre-meaning’ that I discuss in Chapter 1 (Kristeva. 
1989: 305-306, cited in De Zegher, 2003: 274), the transformation from gesture to mark is 
comparable to the transformation of a grunt into word. 
200 Note that irruption relates two contradictory processes that occur in virtual simultaneity, namely 
anticipation and precipitation. 
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ambit comprises the self-originativity of gestic conversion. The drafter’s drawn 
gesture is identifiable with her body-mind as self. The two, gesture and self, reflect 
one another.  
 
Remnants of self and of world 
Nevertheless, self-as-being never accomplishes complete possession of itself in trait. 
Jacques Derrida suggests that emanations from a passage between the self and 
world are not complete or exact representations of the self as their origin, or of the 
world with which the self interacts. Rather, such passage more resembles a 
transaction201 between self and world, a process that involves trade and ‘sacrifice’ 
from both (Derrida. 1993: 41). Such a transaction as transitive action – also 
suggested by Downs et al (2001: xvii) – combines in drawing mere remnants of self 
and of the world.  
 
Trait, as inscription of the self, is therefore never complete, nor is experience, 
interpretation, or description of the world ever fulfilled. Both trait and experience 
sacrifice only partially, which becomes an incentive in drawing that creates the 
momentum that drives it forward. If invisibility, the unbeseen, is unattainable as full 
visibility, it remains for the drafter an ever-elusive [im]-possibility. 
 
Drawing divides 
Drawing traces divide.202 If each separate trace does not inscribe the self in 
complete containment, a single trace can never reveal the full potency of what is to 
                                                       
201 I borrow this term from Downs et al. (2007: xvii), who cite Katrinka Wilson from an unpublished 
PhD-thesis titled Mimesis and the Somatic of Drawing: In the Context of 20th Century Western Fine Art 
Practice (Loughborough University, 2004): “What the performance implicitly tells us is that the 
drawing process enacts a simultaneous physical contradiction that, as Katrinka Wilson determines, is 
a transaction between appearance and thought”. 
202 This is a deliberately ambiguous statement, since both ‘traces’ and ‘divide’ can be both verb and 
noun. Nevertheless, Derrida (1993: 54-55) says, “The outline or tracing separates and separates 
itself”. Here I allude to duels between appearance and disappearance, visibility and invisibility, etc. 
that also extends into presence and presence in absentia, self, and the other of self that appears as 
trait. Derrida’s words, “The linear limit I am talking about is in no way ideal or intelligible. It divides 
itself in its ellipsis; by leaving itself, and starting from itself, it takes leave of itself, and establishes 
itself in no ideal identity. In this twinkling of an eye, the ellipsis is not an object but a blinking of the 
difference that begets it, or, if you prefer, a jalousie (a blind) of traits cutting up the horizon, traits 
through which, between which, you can observe without being seen, you can see between the lines, if 
you see what I mean: the law of the inter-view. For the same reason, trait is not sensible”. This implies 
such a pivoting between two oppositional stances, behind the drawing tool’s blind tip, nothingness, in 
front of it, the advent of trace, its appearing takes it away from nothingness. On the drawing 
surface, it divides space from shape (e.g.), while it also divides appearance from disappearance 
and self from its other. This affords the irruption of trait (or vision) “from-since” the unbeseen, 
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come. This notion underpins the following concepts, while they reveal how trait 
materialises in blindness. 
 
 Memory: lost 
To notate a glance, the drafter also has to break that glance, thereby losing sight 
of the viewing object. The memory of what she saw also recedes almost 
immediately. These searching glances constantly try to capture such receding 
memories of sight. A single glance in itself marks203 the beginning of a form of 
searching ahead. Efforts to capture evaporating sightings drive this form of 
searching.  
 
 Blindness 
Although the drafter can therefore only notate the nothingness of sight, each 
notation anticipates further sight,204 just as its irruption into trait always promises 
insight while it invents. Both the effort to capture the fleetingness of sight and the 
promise of insight create the flow in drawing that makes the exceeding of invention 
possible. Such flow realises as Varela’s notion of the assertion of the self-as-being, 
as opposed to self-as-nothing (1992: 107).  
 
Derrida’s explanation of the role sight (or rather blindness) plays in the forming of 
trace in drawing supports the notion of ‘losing sight’ or of blindness in gestic 
conversion (1993: 45):  
                                                                                                                                                          
“before” and “from since”, being on either side of the “punctum caecum”. Bryson (De Zegher. 2003: 
149) citing Paul Klee, “A walk to a walk’s sake. The mobile agent is a point, shifting its position 
forward”, also touches on the ‘from-since’ 
203 Literally making a mark on paper – in other words, creating trace. 
204 Derrida (1993: 1-2) suggests sight that “presupposes” (the hypothesis of sight): “One is on the 
lookout, one reflects upon what one sees, reflects what one sees by delaying the moment of 
conclusion...The judgement depends on the hypothesis”. He continues to explain as follows: “No longer 
beneath each step, therefore, as I set out, but always out ahead of me, as if sent out on 
reconnaissance: two antennae or two scouts to orient my wanderings, to guide me as I feel my way, 
in a speculation that ventures forth, simply in order to see...”, and, “Here is a first hypothesis: the 
drawing is blind, if not the draftsman or draftswoman. As such, and in the moment proper to it, the 
operation of drawing would have something to do with blindness, would in some way regard 
blindness [aveuglement]. In this abocular hypothesis (the word aveugle comes from ab oculis: not from 
or by but without the eyes), the following remains to be heard and understood: the blind man can be 
a seer, and he sometimes has the vocation of a visionary. Here is the second hypothesis then – an eye 
graft, the grafting of one point of view onto the other: a drawing of the blind is a drawing of the 
blind. Double genitive”. I surmise from this that each glance carries the memory of sight and a 
subjective perception of concurrent sight, each presupposing the other in a clash that produces trace 
as ever inconclusive. Trace is a mere probe, a tentative search that can never find conclusively, 
truthfully, or accurately, yet continues to try. 
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Whether it be improvised or not, the invention of the trait does not follow, it 
does not conform to what is presently visible, to what would be set in front of 
me as a theme. Even if drawing is, as they say, mimetic, that is, reproductive, 
figurative, representative, even if the model is presently facing the artist, the 
trait must proceed in the night. It escapes the field of vision. Not only because 
it is not yet visible, but also because it does not belong to the realm of the 
spectacle, of spectacular objectivity – and so that which it makes happen or 
come [advenir] cannot in itself be mimetic. 
 
We know now that the moment the drawing tool strikes the drawing surface, a 
conflation of multiple influences mediate in the irruption of mark. Yet, trait is blind – 
its mediation is not in visible form in the mind – and it does not find its origin in the 
world. Apart from challenging the notion of mimesis and a representationist mind-
theory, Derrida’s assertions that “trait must proceed in the night” and that “it 
escapes the field of vision” capture the unconscious origin of trait, a dark and blind 
abyss in which the self as body-mind resides.  
 
The ‘blind’ (and mute) origin of trait also leads to the understanding that the 
difference between interpretation and enaction is pivotal. The drafter does not re-
act gesticulation in drawing merely to project the gesture. She enacts the self-
originative or personalised meaning that the self consigns to gesture durationally.  
 
Trait as difference 
Trait realises as difference. A transactional exchange of conciliation and trade 
between visibility (‘beseen’) and invisibility (‘unbeseen’) does not generate truth, or 
accuracy. As a result, the difference between the world and the drafter’s drawn 
enaction is vast. This difference between visibility and invisibility constitutes trace and 
trait as visibilities.  
 
Dialectic 
Dialectic as generative process is a recurring theme in the thesis. As I explained in 
Chapter 2, dialectic entails infralinguistic and infraconscious complicity between the 
drafter (habitus), drawing (practice), and world (field) (Bourdieu. 1998: 79-91). As 
such, dialectic between sophistry and primacy, participation and differentiation, 
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projectivity and process, expression and enaction, embodiment and schemata, 
blindness, sight and insight,205 visibility and invisibility, appearance and 
disappearance, between dissent, compliance and compromise can all be traced in 
the overarching dialectic between the self-as-being and the self-as-nothing. Each 
form of dialectic runs its course through processes of experiential cognition that 
enclose analysis, application, evaluation, and synthesis206 in gestic conversion.  
 
 Presence | absence 
A form of dialectic, namely one of presence and absence (Norman Bryson. 1983: 
116-119, 163-164), remains open to exploration in relation to auto-deictic 
drawing. In a linguistic context, the term ‘deictic’ refers only to the time concurrent 
with speaking, “the deictic present of practice”, meaning ‘in-phase’ with practicing 
speech (Bryson. 1983: 120). In a drafteric context, the same term would refer to 
that phase in drawing when the body is instrumental in its execution – in other words, 
the body is the hand’s touch on paper, which irrupts as difference. Bryson’s term 
would exclude, however, those times when the body is purported to be absent, 
when the hand withdraws to leave ‘nothing’ in its wake. Contrary to Bryson, I 
propose that such absence, however, also constitutes presence and that both 
presence and absence continue to orchestrate difference. 
 
The notion of a fused body-mind supports my proposal. The mind and everything 
implicit to mind cannot be absent from the somatic memory in trace making; and the 
desire to show the self remains behind in the withdrawal of the hand. The 
presence/absence dialectic, therefore, is pertinent to auto-deixis in a different way. 
Absence now starts to refer to a form of presence that recalls Merleau-Ponty’s 
concept of ‘flesh’. Interchangeability between presence and absence is equivalent to 
that between visibility and invisibility. Absence becomes an ever-present absence. 
                                                       
205 This is a reference to Derrida’s expositions of the process of trace irruption as being ‘blind’. “A 
hand of the blind ventures forth alone or disconnected, in a poorly delimited space; it feels its way, it 
gropes, it caresses as much as it inscribes, trusting in the memory of signs and supplementing sight. It 
is as if a lidless eye had opened at the tip of the fingers, as if one eye too many had just grown 
right next to the nail, a single eye of a cyclops or one-eyed man. This eye guides the tracing of 
outline [tracé]; it is a miner’s lamp at the point of writing, a curious and vigilant substitute, the 
prosthesis of a seer who is himself invisible. The image of the movement of these letters, of what this 
finger-eye inscribes, is thus sketched out within me” (Derrida. 1993: 3). I suggest that blindness 
accompanies the muteness of language that entails gesture. 
206 In this statement I recall Bloom’s taxonomy (1956: 62-197), but I must emphasise that I separate 
and apply such processes here in theoretical and analytical terms. By its very nature the process of 
drawing, one of chaos rather than sequential linearity, interfuses them. 
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Trace symbolises presence as difference, but areas empty of trace symbolise visible 
absence, which recalls the activity of the drafter in as material a way as does trace, 
and which equally orchestrates her presence as difference.  
 
This interchangeability becomes clear when one focuses on the gestural irruption as 
it occurs in drawing. When making a mark on a drawing surface, the drawing tool 
strikes the paper in the middle of a continuous movement of the hand. Before it 
strikes the surface, the hand anticipates its motion and when it lifts away from the 
paper, the movement of the hand continues, already carrying the conception of its 
next gesture.  
 
In this continuity lies a rhythmic altercation between a perceived ‘absence from’ and 
‘presence on’ the drawing surface of the drafter’s hand. While touching paper, the 
body is physically ‘present’ in gestural stroke, in its trace and on drawing ground. 
Before touching and when lifting away, the body is ‘absent’ from ground, but not 
from the stroking action, or the gesticulation, nor from mind. Yet, we know now that 
the self constitutes a confluence between body and mind. Therefore, the body-mind 
sustains this rhythm.207 The body-mind creates a continuum of absence and presence 
in which only the body (hand) becomes absent and then only when it propels trace 
into space. For the duration of its propelled state and its absent state, the mind 
carries body as part of the motion, while already knowing where it will go next. 
Rather than ever being absent, body therefore remains present in absentia, while 
mind remains present in absentia for the duration of trace irruption. Because it 
constitutes the body-mind, the self inserts into this continuum both its physical and 
mental dispositions. There are no breaks or pauses in dispositional insertion during 
these rhythmic interchanges back and forth. The conception of a stroke outside 
paper already anticipates the stroke by hand; the body’s knowledge of it precedes 
the stroke. The projection beyond retains body-in-mind in a simultaneous steering of 
hand that anticipates its next stroke.  
                                                       
207 Drawing can also be described as  touching that moves, or movement that touches, or movement 
that is touched, in order to feel self, a notion that underpins these descriptions. Self, touch, movement, 
as experience in drawing, recalls Merleau-Ponty (1968: 254-259), “But what I will never touch, he 
does not touch either, no privilege of oneself over the other here, it is therefore not the consciousness 
that is the untouchable – ‘The consciousness’ would be something positive, and with regard to it there 
would recommence, does recommence, the duality of the reflecting and the reflected, like that of the 
touching and the touched. The untouchable is not a touchable in fact inaccessible – the unconscious is 
not a representation, [is] in fact inaccessible. The negative here is not a positive that is elsewhere (a 
transcendent) – it is a true negative, i.e. an Unverborgenheit of the Verborgenheit”. 
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To reiterate, we see therefore that the withdrawals of the hand, its visible 
absences,208 between traces do not exclude the body from the drawing. Nor does 
the presence of the hand exclude the mind. The presence (trace) and the withdrawal 
of the hand precipitate, leave, and anticipate both mark and non-mark (ground 
between traces) as ‘difference’. Furthermore, the hand’s withdrawals are those of 
mind too, as will become clear in due course. Therefore, drawing marks constitute 
visible absence and visible presence.  
 
Visible absence, like visible presence, marks itself in real time. The body-mind 
unification that sustains drawing therefore merges the presence and absence duality 
that Bryson explains (1983: 116-119, 163-164), to converge as difference. As a 
result, ‘presence and presence in absentia’, or ‘visible absence’ and ‘visible presence’, 
seem to be more appropriate as descriptions of the phenomenon. Absence is 
presence, and presence is absence – culminating in difference. 
 
 Waywardness | inhibition 
The same argument that sustains the body-mind confluence and the 
presence/absence (as difference) confluence, sustains my proposal of 
interchangeability between waywardness and inhibitive dynamisms in mark making. 
The interchangeability I proposed between interactive and enactionist drawn 
gesture contains this interchangeability between wayward and inhibitive mark 
making. If the drafter sustains this dialectic, tension between waywardness and 
inhibition drives a cerebrative drawing process.  
 
As I explained in Chapter 1, effacement results from a drawing process in which the 
drafter regards the waywardness of the body (if perceived as a separate entity 
from mind) as wrong and the drafter deliberately inhibits it by imposing formula (as 
exalted properties of the mind) (Bryson. 1983: 87-131). The notion of interactionist 
drawn gesture deviates from emulative imposition. Rather, it purports interactivity 
between field and drafter. Field, in itself, is a flexible space of dynamic 
changeability. If the socially constructed, interactive self incorporates remnants of 
                                                       
208 Visible absence constitutes withdrawal and hiatus, as will become clear in due course. Please 
refer to ‘hiatus’ in the Glossary of terms (Addendum B). 
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socio-cultural norm, she can measure or reference her drawings against such norms, 
despite their deviations.  
 
The enactionist aspect of the self (which enfolds the sensory, temporal, and spatial 
immediacy of experience, of execution, and of visibility) adds an additional 
dimension to its expansion and its embodiment. This dimension includes the 
unpredictable diversity of a fused body-mind that suggests both individuated 
intellect and the somatic in the aesthetic209 that the self devises in drawing. It would 
be reasonable to say that such individuated aesthetic embeds in both the 
particularity of the self-specifying drawing process, and in the generality of cultural 
and contextual norm. Thus, it remains expansive and appropriative of both.  
 
Dialectic between presence and absence and between waywardness and restraint 
form the basis of my formulation of naissance and hiatus as confluent processes in 
auto-deictic mark making. I discuss this in due course. 
 
Recursivity and amassment 
Recursive amassment is a crucial concept in auto-deixis. The drafter engages in a 
layering of enactions, in which each new layer incorporates fragments of its 
precedents. In the same way, she stacks fragmented incidents of ‘lost sight’ to 
counter and replace blindness. At each point of pivoting back and forth, the drafter 
creates anew upon previous inventions, without replacing them. Once distended in 
her relentless journeying back and forth, becoming more and more swollen with 
signification, the drafter’s accumulations start to reveal trait as inscribable synthesis, 
an ‘other’ of self, rather than another self.  
 
In this, a path of recursive irruption becomes evident. As mentioned before, Simon 
Blackburn explains recursivity as “a procedure that is applied once, and then 
applied to the result of that application” (2008: 309). The result, therefore, 
articulates traces of preceding actions, the sum of which nevertheless represents new 
                                                       
209 Somatic aesthetics: The particular stylising “technologies of the self” that Richard Shusterman 
draws from Michel Foucault  to combine in the term ‘somaesthetics’ the notion of the body’s role in 
human understanding, appreciation and practice of aesthetics. He defines somaesthetics, an 
autonomous discipline, as “the critical meliorative study of one’s experience and use of one’s body as 
a locus of sensory-aesthetic appreciation (aesthetics) and creative self-fashioning” (Shusterman. 
2008: 15, 19). 
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form. Likewise, in drawing, upon each incident of marking, scope for reaching 
beyond the current founding perception opens up exactly because it dialogues with 
preceding irruptions, memory and the visual schemata210 that meaning prescribes or 
demands.  
 
Drawing and withdrawing occur in gradual processes of recursive conversion with 
incrementally more expansive and incisive articulations. Traces irrupt in unplanned, 
durational articulation, while the perspective that withdrawal brings continues to 
contribute in the form of articulations that also reference schemata.  
 
Incremental internal logic 
I interpret such recursivity also to relate the drafter’s development of an internal 
logic in the drawing too. She does this by placing each trace in augmentative 
relation to its predecessors, creating constructs that make sense to her. Although this 
augmentation develops gradually along a path that can also be rocky,211 the 
drawing eventually incorporates external schemata of meaning. The drafter creates 
a drawing-text that converses inwards and outwards, between trait and drafter as 
much as between drafter, viewer, and social space.  
 
Recursivity and invention 
Thus, the invention that trace constitutes also expands recursively. The ability to 
surpass invention that I explain in Chapter 5 develops through recursivity and its 
incremental additions. The notion of recursive expansion, however, also suggests 
looking back to what came before in durational drawing. This ‘looking back’ forms 
part of a withdrawal in gestic conversion. The drafter pauses to scrutinise already 
irrupted trace, which now resides in the world. The drafter needs to do this in order 
to assess the possibilities her traces offer in conjunction with knowledge, reference, 
and memory. In addition to in-phase trace, drawing as field212 affords reference 
                                                       
210 Norman Bryson recommends ‘schema’ as visual art-related equivalent of ‘paradigm’, which is a 
term that relates the same meaning in linguistics (1983: 122).  
211 This is a reference to Bourdieu’s concepts of ‘struggle’ and ‘strategise’ for position in the field as 
opposed to rule. A dispositional urge in individuals to partake, to “struggle” and “strategise” for 
position in the field sustains the productive inter-dynamic of practices. Bourdieu claims, “These 
struggles are seen to transform or conserve the field of forces” (1983: 312). I limit the concept’s 
application here to the struggles of understanding and technical execution in a drafter-specific 
context. 
212 In the Bourdieuian sense. 
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and dictates convention, which is never far from the drafter’s mind. She glances 
back to such memory too in order to measure and anticipate the next trace.  
 
Deviation 
In other words, the drafter measures against an existing personal history (ingrained 
in habitus as her disposition), remnants of which now dwell in current traces, and 
against a field that restricts with its conventions, yet is susceptible to change. She is 
familiar with all three – knowledge, reference, and memory – as varied forms of 
convention and her familiarity with these three spheres enables her to conform, to 
compromise, or to rebel.213 In order to challenge it, such familiarity with convention 
is crucial. Trait and the individuated creativity it implies, challenges convention 
automatically – thus challenge is as much part of the drafteric continuum as is mark 
making.  
 
Drawing as an interface that functions recursively, suggests that trait functions as an 
agent of constant renewal. The drafter brings about such renewal by means of the 
facility of trait to challenge convention and norm. These aspects also explain the 
significance of trait. Trait constitutes individuated creativity. 
 
6.3 The auto-deictic founding perception  
 
In this section, I discuss naissance and hiatus as enactionist, rather than 
representationist realisations of the founding perception. The “founding perception” 
(Bryson. 1983: 118) entails those fragmented fractions of seconds in which the 
drafter ‘reads’ or perceives the field of observation during drawing.  
 
Naissance and Hiatus 
As it is impossible to separate perception and conception in the drawing process, it 
is also impossible to divide glance and withdrawal in the experiential engagement 
of drawing. Nevertheless, for purposes of explaining the intricacies of drawing as 
complex interface between drafter and world, I distinguish here between glancing 
                                                       
213 This is a reference to Bourdieu’s field concept, in which the agent determines the nature of her 
participation. Bourdieu poses these possibilities (consent, dissent, compromise) in the struggling and 
strategising that comprise participation in a field (1998: 79-85).  
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and withdrawal as two processes enfolded in the founding perception. Hiatus, or 
withdrawal, does not necessarily indicate the physical withdrawal of the hand from 
paper, or of the eyes from the field of observation. Rather, I interpret hiatus to 
accommodate a ‘shifting-between’ in processing and in act, which conflates 
conception and perception in mark making. This ‘shifting’ that, contradictorily, also 
conflates, occurs between the ‘two minds’ that I discussed in Chapter 1, and it 
constitutes enaction and interaction on all those levels that I explained in the 
preceding chapters.  
 
Firstly, during her glances back and forth, the drafter perceives the three-
dimensional field of observation (and of the gestic, and of idea). She simultaneously 
conceives the irruption of her traces, which also occur in three-dimensional space. 
Secondly, and in a seemingly contradictory way, withdrawal (Derrida. 1993: 2) 
occurs during perception. I interpret withdrawal to entail momentary distantiation 
that brings conception as employment of the ability to transform perception (or 
idea, or the gestic) into articulated materialisation on a two-dimensional surface. 
Both these processes simultaneously irrupt as the conversion of gesture into drawn 
gesture.  
 
 The word: ‘naissant’ 
The meaning of the word ‘naissant’ suggests the idea of mark issuing from within 
(autogenously), a speculative and explorative initiating action. The Oxford 
Dictionary of English (2005: 1166) explains the word as “To issue from”, particularly 
inferring its Latin root nasci, meaning, “To be born”. ‘Naissant’ (or ‘naissance’) 
includes the meaning of its close relative, ‘nascent’, imparting the notion of a process 
just “coming into being and beginning to display signs of future potential” (ODE. 
2005: 1170). In auto-deictic drawing, the simultaneous action of looking, perceiving, 
conceiving, and tracing entails exactly that: the birth of trace-in-glance, from which 
flows glance-in-trace, to give birth to trace-in-glance again, perpetuating 
transformative chains of both drawing marks and glances back and forth between 
drafter, drawing, and world.  
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 Hiatus214 in naissant conversion 
Hiatus is pause; it is withdrawal and the pre-emption of re-drawing. Hiatus engages 
the embodied body-mind as much as does naissance, but its contribution to 
conversion involves memory and computation. It thinks, remembers, curbs, and 
gauges. What I propose as ‘interactionist drawn gesture’ gestates in hiatus. It 
enactionistically transforms three-dimensionality and gesture into two-dimensional 
inscription (drawn gesture). Its enactionist gestation, however, incorporates the 
naissance in irruption. As intertwined and single action, both naissance and hiatus 
convert glance into mark – hence, the concept of ‘naissant conversion’. 
 
Hiatus can result in turning away from imitation and emulation, while it can also 
result in turning towards such processes. In conjunction with naissance, however, it 
would rather choose the first option – turning away – while, at the same time, it also 
turns away from representing only the concrete or visible materiality of the object. 
To avoid imitation, it immediately returns to the unconscious, or to the invisibility of 
the self. Ultimately, hiatus and naissance invent together. Yet, hiatus engages in 
subjective recognition that ensures recognisability and outward interaction. It 
involves the schemata that the drafter shares with the viewer. 
 
Hiatus merges with naissant conversion in the continuum of discernments that the self 
conducts in dialectic between self-specification215 and generality. Neither hiatus, nor 
naissance can embrace complete impersonalised generality. Hiatus depersonalises 
only partly and only to assist recognisability of conversions.  
 
The articulations of naissance and hiatus 
The distinction I propose between naissance and hiatus mirrors and supports a 
distinction between wayward and restrained articulation,216 and between enactionist 
                                                       
214 Derrida explains the inseparability of withdrawal, the founding perception and trait in drawing 
as follows, “Blindness pierces through right at that point and thereby gains in potential, in potency: 
the angle of a sight that is threatened or promised, lost or restored, given. There is in this gift a sort 
of re-drawing, a with-drawing, or retreat [re-trait], at once the interposition of a mirror, an impossible 
reappropriation or mourning, the intervention of a paradoxical Narcissus, sometimes lost en abyme, in 
short, a specular folding or falling back [repli] – and a supplementary trait” (1993: 3). 
215  Enaction. 
216 Norman Bryson (1983: 87-131) identifies such a split that manifests mainly in temporality of mark 
making. Bryson frames a distinction between the “Gaze” and “Glance” in linguistic terms (as does 
Derrida (1993: 1)). Bryson positions, on the one hand, the “subversive, random, disorderly” behaviour 
of the Glance, and on the other hand, the “vigilant, masterful, spiritual” (1983: 93) behaviour of the 
Gaze. I want to suggest that the wayward articulations of enactionist drawn gesture are 
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and interactively drawn gestures. Such dialectic generates the articulations of auto-
deictic drawing, which, as a result, are speculative and without resolve. 
 
Self-affirmative reflexive articulation 
On the one hand, an unruly body-mind directs the probes of naissance. It is 
unthinking, intimate with the self, and irrupts from nothingness. It can also be 
wayward, because the processes of understanding and synthesis that it articulates 
are fragmented and chaotic. At each point of pivot in the eyes’ movements back 
and forth, a view is broken as much as it is captured. As a result, marks require 
positioning and repositioning that may or may not form coherency.  
 
These marks also articulate how their maker enacts her ‘state of mind’ or mental 
encounters during the time in which they irrupt. Apart from revealing the splintered 
flow of thought and sight, these articulations contain innuendos of palpable 
uncertainty, tension, unease, confidence, dissonance, resonance, insight, ease, 
pleasure, curiosity, mistrust or trust or whatever the concurrent inner encounter might 
be – typical of in-phase dealings between self-as-being and the material or 
immaterial world at the time of experiential engagement.  
 
The instant of their placement at once captures and creates their potential 
significance, each mark referring to its place in a chaotic and broken sequence of 
irruptions. The flow of marks (between reflexive naissance and disclosure) displays 
itself in such a manner that it exceeds essentiality and the stasis of closure. Instead, 
the marks suggest ambiguity and diversity in their auto-originative enaction of self.  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
approximate to Bryson’s Glance, and the restraints of hiatus (or interactionist drawn gesture) 
approximate Bryson’s Gaze. Bryson’s distinction between the Gaze and the Glance mirrors a 
distinction between an objectivist and subjectivist view. The Gaze holds the sterile distance of an 
objectivist view that refines its idealistic vision at a distance from the object under scrutiny, also 
without observing it directly or durationally. The Glance, however, involves temporality in its 
observations that implies in-phase sensory experience in practice that allows for subjective 
enactionist input. Theoretically then, an enactionist view would hold only for the Glance. The concept 
of interaction, as explained with regards to interactionist drawn gesture, however, draw the two 
together in auto-deixis, as will become clear in this chapter. Although the Gaze is not exempt from 
formulaic practices in drawing, it is not completely devoid of observation either. Rather, it observes 
and remembers, and in remembering, reduces, while in formulaic practices, observation remains 
mute, if not completely absent. In its hunt for the lasting form, the Essential Copy, it designs and 
regards formula as ideal. Bryson proposes a radical division between the two – he does not suggest 
the possibility of an interactive relationship or a dialectic between the Gaze and the Glance (1983: 
87-131), a relationship that I assert in auto-deictic drawing. 
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Such drawing often results in deformations and inconclusive deviations from the 
ideal, something that the viewing audience often perceives as ugly or bad drawing 
(if such audience refrains from delving into its connotative value, or fails to consider 
the context of its irruption217). In fact, however, it articulates the development of 
conversion and synchronisation between hiatus and naissance.  
 
On the other hand, hiatus brings perspective. Hiatus recursively constructs the 
internal logic of the drawing-text. In hiatus, the drafter performs. She consciously 
and unconsciously articulates those scripts afforded by drawings past, by personal 
history, by underlying competence and by field and social space. In hiatus, the 
drafter articulates enaction in relation to interaction. This ‘relational’ process of fuses 
trait as invention, which manifests as meaning (or an internal logic of the drawing-
text). Trait not only shapes it, but also gives it potency.  
 
The drafter conducts such incremental development in a flow of irruption and 
disruption that Derrida describes as the “rhetoric of trait” (1993: 56). Each gesture 
layers itself upon preceding appropriations and articulations, thereby amassing 
rather than subsuming.  
 
Self-erosive articulation 
The conceptualisation that engenders articulation between naissance and hiatus can 
be erosive of the self too. Self-effacement as disposition slowly wears away all 
signs of self-specific diversity that challenge norm. Conformation to norm becomes 
priority. When this happens, student drafters tend to work in an over-reductive 
manner or technique in which ‘corrections’ or more detailed and ‘refined’ layers 
destroy or reduce naissant conversions. Ironically, this could be a destructive rather 
than a constructive process if viewed in the context of what I envisage in auto-deictic 
drawing.  
 
Working in an erosive flow pursues the ideal accomplishment of absolute fidelity to 
norm, to the ideal as conclusive effect (Bryson. 1983: 120-122). It is uncompromising 
in its final resolve and seeks to eradicate any inaccuracies, any misjudgments in 
                                                       
217 In an educational context, for example, even drawing that is perceived as weak, constitutes a 
certain point in developmental progress towards the unbeknownst that, I believe, should remain 
open-ended in its promises of a future, rather than measuring it against the enclosure of an ideal.  
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subjective settlements between credibility and fidelity.218 Even if it does perceive 
the heterogeneity of the invisible in relation to the visible, it self-destructs before 
employing the invisibility as subject.219 
 
The relationship between these two categories of articulation can turn into a battle 
between self-affirmation and self-effacement, which constitutes the duel I discuss in 
Chapter 5. Self-as-nothing wins when and if self-effacement dominates. This battle, 
therefore, could be destructive.  
 
More often than not, student drafters seek to glean from a very evanescent and 
fragmented process the elusive, but ever enduring perfection, the security, and 
stability of the ultimate and only solution, the ideal (as ‘right’). In such work, hiatus 
brings the disposition to conform to acceptability, thus destroying the waywardness 
of naissance. Conformity denies a fruitful hiatus as interactive window of 
contemplation. It also renders the drafter mute in its conclusiveness.  
 
By masking the entire durational course of irruptive materialisation of their own 
idiosyncratic marks (as ‘wrong’), students often silence the urgency of their own 
voices. Contrary to this, they would extend and intensify cerebrative interchange if 
they allowed themselves to durationally experience both the act of drawing and 
self-as-being in its delineations of enactionist and interactionist drawn gesture.  
 
Auto-deixis as an alternative form of articulation 
In auto-deictic drawing, I propose that the drafter does not allow the serenity of 
hiatus to overpower the contribution of enactionist drawn gesture, nor does she 
allow hiatus to slip away. Gestic conversion in auto-deictic drawing articulates 
                                                       
218 Hence the ‘Gaze’, indicating “-gard” in “regard”, meaning “to arrest” (Bryson. 1983: 93) 
(Derrida. 1993:1). 
219 Bryson suggests complete obliteration or lasting imprisonment. The Gaze, Bryson says, captures its 
target with “violence”, a penetrating and destructive fierceness that freezes its victim into a defined 
and final stance; while the Glance “preserves and intensifies” the forceful attack of the Gaze, never 
completely attaching to it the limiting finality of perfected definition (1983: 93). The Glance gives 
life, while the Gaze freezes it. Bryson also points out the phenomenon of self-effacement. According 
to him, the self-effacing painter seeks to extort from the confinements of the Gaze the lasting form. A 
form that ‘lasts’, according to Bryson’s arguments, is temporally and spatially removed from the 
struggle of creating it. The Glance is active during the struggle of creating an image, while the Gaze 
takes place elsewhere and at a time removed from the immediacy of visual reading and capturing. 
This removal allows the Gaze to dominate the Glance, and indeed, it destroys the struggles of the 
Glance.  
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physical and mental understanding in enactionist drawn gesture. It presents 
knowledge of ‘body-mind-ness’ – its supple agility and its warm and bloody 
liveliness that relax the inhibitive curbing of hiatus.220 At the same time, auto-deictic 
flow does not seek to obliterate the curbing of external structures either. Rather, it 
seeks a merging between the two that asserts self-as-being and spreads her 
constructive drawing activity evenly.  
 
Yet, such endeavor is not conscious or deliberate. It relies completely on a 
celebration of trait and its unifying functions. The resulting articulations could range 
from competitive overpowering to quiet balance. It would present, however, new 
form rather than repetitive style language. 
 
The accomplishment of self-as-being 
 
 Self-engagement 
A moment of making a mark is a moment of self-engagement – a moment of 
entering Derrida’s abyss in a compulsion to expose it. It is neither neutral, nor 
removed. Rather, it suggests a localised confrontation that converts pre-meaning in 
enactionistic fashion. The traces that the drafter produces directly articulate the 
ephemeral fleetingness of her understanding. Each mark is isochronously221 
convertive, revelatory, and irruptive on the drawing surface as crossing point 
between internalities and externalities.  
 
 Durational engagement 
For the duration of the drawing, the present is continuous, always projecting into the 
future while referring to the past. Its course seemingly runs through all moments in 
time, always in isochronistic synchronisation with any viewing of the drawing. Self-
reflexive articulation in drawing almost seems to seek the assurance that at any 
unknown moment of being viewed in the future, the concurrency between 
                                                       
220 In Bryson’s terms, it comprises the immediate presence of the drafter’s exigency and exuberance 
in the Glance on the one hand. On the other hand, it entails the serenity of the Gaze (Bryson. 1983: 
87-131) that could also, in my mind, bring the necessary distantiation of hiatus, where interaction 
incorporates the embodied edicts of lived ‘reality’.  
221 Marks indicating that their irruption occurred during the same period, drawing, or virtually at the 
same time. They relate to each other in a clear and visually defined way. ODE (2005: 918) explains 
‘isochronous’ as “a line on a diagram or map connecting points relating to the same time or equal 
times”. All these concepts relate in this context. 
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discernment, conversion, and trace and the ineffaceable process of the drawing’s 
making, will endure in their allusions to more potential interpretations and 
disclosures.222  
 
 Unenclosed engagement 
The indefiniteness and immediacy of auto-deictic marks as enactions imply the 
possibility of attaching to them a myriad of potential interpretations at any other 
given point in time and place, whether by their own maker or by any other viewer. 
They convey the idea that ‘this is how ‘I’, the maker of these marks, mark the self, 
now and here in this drawn inscription of my mind-body encounters; in half-a-
second’s time, or tomorrow in another drawing, it could change to be unrecognisably 
different’. As a result, auto-deictic enactionist drawn gesture exposes itself with 
generosity to the drafter and the viewer, conveying the idea that both are free to 
perceive and interpret them in any way.  
 
6.4 Applications 
 
I describe here the main applications of auto-deictic drawing by amalgamating 
concept, process, and function. Although it effectively realises in a wider sphere, I 
focus on those aspects that lead towards framing auto-deixis as a self-reflexive 
research process, which I discuss in the section that follows. I provide examples of 
student drawings that also illustrate those applications I selected for description. I 
limit my selection to the development and learning on entry-level drawing. 
 
6.4.1 Process: development 
(See Addendum A; Illustrations 1& 2: Development; and Illustration 3: Trait) 
 
Previous chapters proposed that the formative processes223 of trait irruption grant 
passage in a transitional continuum between the unconscious and the conscious, 
between internalisation and externalisation, between cognition, conception, and 
                                                       
222 I wish to add to this, however, that if the desire to conceal self is a concurrent ‘state of mind’ of 
the drafter, such desire will also reveal itself coincidentally in mark making. Even then, however, the 
reigning norms of drawing should not conceal its encounter with such a self. 
223 I intend ‘formative processes’ to refer to both the development of the self, habitus, and to the 
development of drawing skill. 
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conjecture. I suggest that, in auto-deictic drawing, these passages sustain 
development, learning, and invention. Therefore, trait – as the core of auto-deictic 
drawing – is a gift for the facilitator. With trait as covert point of departure, she 
can engage the students in a developmental process that allows individual 
improvement.  
 
The integration of the concepts and processes I discuss above culminate in drawing 
constructive skills-development that eventually displays in diversity and fosters 
creativity. As such, it should gradually signify a visual eloquence in the utilisation of 
its ‘vocabulary’ and grapheme. Vocabulary and grapheme become consolidated in 
versatile visualisation and visible-making skills without turning mute in absolute 
resolve. Eventually, it integrates form, fluency, identity, and idiolect.224 
 
Significance 
Trait is therefore significant as interface between the self-as-being and the 
development of drawing skill. Along the road to self-confident practice, technical, 
observational, visualising, and inventive abilities grow. If trait becomes 
progressively affirmative of the drafter’s concurrent doing, skills-development 
inevitably develops gradually in a way that is subject to constant change. 
 
In practice  
All the drawing exercises in the illustrations (Addendum A) principally seek a direct 
route to the pre-conceptual by avoiding any opportunity for emulation. When 
instructing the students, I provide no examples as indications of standards, methods, 
or ideal. I deliberately avoid showing examples to also avoid direct imitation of 
gesture as a style language.  
 
The series of drawings in Illustrations 1, 2, & 3 illustrate a process of gradual 
development. To initiate this development in practice, I facilitate a series of gesture 
drawing exercises that train the student drafters in searching out underlying, hardly 
visible ‘movement’ in the subject matter, as well as underlying structure. I explicitly 
relate the concept of ‘gesture’ to a range of understandings. The students begin to 
                                                       
224 Eco (1979: 271-273) identifies a corpus-idiolect comprising the aesthetic-, the work-, the 
movement-, and the period-idiolects, each positioning itself in a generative hierarchy of 
conceptualising paradigms as accountable for individuated performances. 
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understand gesture as both the movement of the drafter’s hand and the movement 
immanent in the subject matter. Once they begin to grasp that they can sense, 
imagine, or understand such movement in the subject matter because of their own 
bodily experience of it, which they simultaneously enact by doing the exercises, 
gesture begins to facilitate additional and conscious understanding in its flow. 
Instead of integrating conscious pre-planning, they see, compose, and organise 
simultaneously. Since one is aware during physical activities of the structures of one’s 
body that enable and facilitate movement, the student drafter gradually starts to 
seek out the underlying structures of her subject matter during gesture exercises, thus 
continuing to exercise an interactive process of recognition between self and object. 
Since the exercises are quick, little time for conscious sourcing from memory exists, 
and the drafter must develop and run with a grapheme as she goes along. With 
repetition – a continuation of large numbers of quick drawings of the same subject – 
that serves only intuitive recognition and cognition, the drafter’s understanding of 
underlying structures and gestural description there-of, improve. Often this intuitive 
sensing does not immediately enter conscious levels of understanding, yet they 
become internalised, as Groups 1.3 & 1.4 of Illustration 1 (Addendum A) show. 
 
I further discuss the benefits of gesture drawing in the text that accompanies 
Illustrations 1, 2, & 3 (Addendum A).  
 
6.4.2 Process: drawing as generative partner 
As I explain above, the auto-deictic drawing process involves several dynamics of 
interchange, one of which is dialectic of erasure (disappearance) and mark making 
(appearance). This dialectic manifests as tension between drawing ground and mark 
making. These processes both form and inform themselves through the gradual 
accrual of mark making and unmarking. The processes that I describe here insinuate 
rather than pre-determine their outcome for the full duration of their unfolding.225  
 
                                                       
225 Derrida (1987: 240), remarks, “Within the generic structure that I’ve tried to formalize (it’s 
already not simple) the simulacrum of reference to the former model is affected with supplementary 
folds or deviations”. 
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Significance 
In the drawings that I include in Illustrations 4 and 5 (see Addendum A), the 
simulation that a mark conveys depends on the drafter’s characteristic manner and 
the way in which she deploys her body-mind. Because such deployment occurs in-
phase, the drafter develops skill through practice, while she simultaneously creates 
form without any precedent. The mark itself, the trace, never bars. It is never erosive 
or destructive of its predecessors; it never denies its genesis, or its heritage. As such, 
erasure acquires meaning in context. 
 
 Erasure 
 (See Addendum A; Illustration 4: Erasure and recursivity) 
 
In deliberate erasures (as unmarking), the drafter destroys. The drafter is intent on 
assigning to such areas the same value as areas without mark. As the drawing 
surface receives the traces of the self-as-being, it begins to involve its playmates in 
a game. The drawing surface begins to mock the self. It flaunts its power to unmark 
the self as present. Traces of the drafter’s erasures begin to read as damage, 
rather than absence. Thus, the drawing surface preserves her difference as 
unmarked. It preserves the drafter’s hand as different despite a desire to be similar. 
The drawing surface abandons the drafter to a state of spectral difference in 
deliberate erasures.  
 
In auto-deictic drawing, erasure simply unmarks rather than removes. The unmarked 
remains in spectral form, evocative of the memory of the erased marks. Eventually, 
they display as visibly discarded propositions. Thereby, drawing ground implies the 
drafter’s desire to be absent as the ‘other’ and therefore different. It projects the 
drafter in two states of being that function in altercating tandem with one another in 
a continuum of trace and erasure as marking and unmarking of a self that also 
enfolds self-acceptance and self-rejection, assertion and abjection.226  
                                                       
226 Bryson (De Zegher. 2003: 151) states the opposite, “Yet drawing has always been able to treat 
the whiteness of its surface in a fashion unique to itself, as a ‘reserve’: an area that is technically part 
of the image (since we certainly see it), but in a neutral sense – an area without qualities, 
perceptually present but conceptually absent”. I do not deny emptiness as neutrality in drawings, nor 
does Bryson deny the conceptual value of emptiness or of unmarking. I do insist, however, on the 
conceptual value and meaning that drafters consign to unmarking and to edges, for example, where 
drawn line meets emptiness, or divides shape from ground, positive from negative, and where such a 
transition signifies a floating weightlessness. In other words, the ‘emptiness’ of white paper would 
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In practice 
The exercise in Illustration 4 (Addendum A) deliberately incorporates several 
conflictive stances in which the drafter has to engage in such a way that she has to 
alternate as creator between stances in any one of the conflicts (fore and against). 
Above, I describe an obvious one between marking and unmarking, or applying line 
and erasure. More conflicts emerge automatically: one between fidelity to ‘reality’ 
(presence) and deliberate disturbance of such fidelity (difference); between stasis 
and flow; between capturing and destruction; and between ‘empty’ ground and 
‘filled’ ground. The automatic, almost logical, emergence of these conflictive 
situations force the drafter to follow the flow of the language that emerges from the 
drawing process, while she simultaneously position herself against it.   
 
The drawing is built up in several layers of different media and techniques that 
connote and signify both application (charcoal in slow contour line drawing) and 
destruction (eraser in blind contour drawing), marking (charcoal in slow contour) and 
unmarking (white conté in blind contour), and so forth. Upon completion of a 
drawing of the head from one angle, the drafter shifts to change her point of view 
in the next drawing of her head. In this way, conflict grows between the notion of 
‘capturing’ a true likeness and the elusiveness of such likeness in a drawing process 
that compels its language, facture, and flow in intimate complicity with the self. With 
each new layer of drawing or ‘undrawing’, the drafter equally disrupts previous 
lines and ground, thus creating unplanned grapheme that requires unforeseen 
response. If such response would include the desire to correct, for example, only the 
pointlessness of any effort to order the line-work would become evident. Creating 
order would only enhance disorder, thus further highlighting the generative dialectic 
between presence/absence and difference.  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
then signify a conceptual abyss or chasm, to name but one example. Drawing can do this without 
observing the “law of the all-over – the set of pressures deriving from the four sides of the surface” 
(Bryson in De Zegher. 2003: 151), without binding the entire drawing surface into a totality or 
without regarding the entire sheet of paper as constituting an imposing and inhibitive composition. 
Drawing can employ the emptiness of white surface both as “reserve” and as weighted with 
meaning, as ‘ghost marks’. 
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The purpose of the exercise is to sustain generative dialectic in recursive fashion. I 
further discuss the exercise as practical realisation of the theories that underpin 
auto-deictic drawing in the text that accompanies Illustration 4 (Addendum A). 
 
 Ground 
 (See Addendum A; Illustration 5: Ground) 
 
A second generative process that merits discussion involves dialectic between ground 
(disappearance) and mark making (appearance). The placement of the auto-deictic 
mark can immediately involve its ground as an active participant in signification. In 
such cases, ground becomes both explanatory and affirmative of the drafter, time, 
and place and their collective significations, as much as mark does.  
 
Mental discernment merges ground and mark into one on the drawing surface. This 
reveals the drawing ground as augmentative partner in the drawing process. 
Ground becomes an oppositional, but constructive co-drafter in the dialectic 
between appearance and disappearance. As in erasure, drawing ground receives 
trace as meaning, while it coextensively discloses the traceless areas as meaning in 
emptiness, in absence. Hence, a spatial relationship between negative and positive 
shape develops. This relationship also reveals as dialectic between presence and 
presence in absentia. 
 
In practice 
The student drafter, Thokozani Mpotsha (2009) made the series of drawings in 
Illustration 5, series 5.1 (Addendum A) in a lined notebook. Each turning of a 
page therefore literally hides a drawing on the preceding page, while it 
simultaneously presents the drafter with the clean slate that the newly opened page 
provides. In this way, the notebook creates a spectre of disappearance and 
appearance that mirrors the same dialectic in the drawing process.  
 
Such a literal experience of appearance and disappearance leads to a growing 
awareness of appearance, as it relates to making a line and disappearance, as it 
relates to empty ground. Soon, the drafter starts to play with disappearance as 
much as with appearance, a game that is evident in Thokozani’s deliberate 
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placement of one half of his face on the edge of one page and the other half on 
the nearest edge of the next page.  
 
This deliberate placement was in breach of the instructions, which involved blind 
contour drawing. As I explained in Chapter 1 (see note 52), in blind contour, the 
drafter may not turn her eyes to the drawing for the duration of applying a 
continuous line that describes both inner and outer contours of the subject (in this 
case, a self-portrait). For Thokozani, however, the drawing surface evidently 
became as self-affirmative as line-application. He almost seems to have attempted 
a rebellious disavowal and confirmation of both appearance and disappearance 
by spreading his face over two pages. Such a spread, after all, includes a space 
between two pages that widens or narrows, depending on opening any one of the 
two pages and closing them upon the previous or next pages. 
 
In order to explain further the constructive functions of this exercise as practical 
realisation of auto-deictic theory, I provide accompanying text to Illustration 4 in 
Addendum A, which also includes the work of two additional students (series 5.2: 
Nathan Gates (2008), and series 5.3: Emma Keet (2008)). 
 
 
6.4.3 Process: deviation, divergence 
(See Addendum A; Illustration 6: Deviation) 
 
 Concurrent revelation 
The drafter surrenders composition to recursive and concurrent revelation. In this 
process, trait – which has its mute, dumb, and blind hand in body as much as in mind 
– interferes with the ordered language of formulae, styles, or the codes of trend, 
and institutionalised aesthetic to dominate and change them as norms. In this, shifting 
emphasis to trait effects subversion from an entire history of accepted compositional 
and aesthetic formula. An enactionist understanding of trait (as invention) implies 
drawing marks as completely unprecedented configurations. This, in itself, functions 
as a mechanism of deviation from norm. Deviation is inherent to trait. 
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Significance 
If facilitation encourages trait, despite reigning standards and against the dictates 
of current trends, invention and deviation could develop to become constant and 
habitual dispositions. Understanding deviation as inherent to trait also defines a 
significance of drawing-trait. The student drafter parts with stasis to turn into an 
unconventional route in the narrow demarcation between self-effacement on the one 
hand and revelatory self-generative and self-originative drawing on the other 
hand. If trait is revelatory of the self as a changeable construct, trait cannot become 
limited or stagnant, because enaction constantly expands both trait and the self 
through practice.  
 
In practice 
In practice, the self as a changeable construct serves as the subject of the exercise 
that appears in Illustration 6 (Addendum A). This is accomplished through the 
layering of self-portraits in the manner that I describe above under Erasure (In 
practice).  
 
Since the first layer involves blind contour (see note 55), the drafter initially has no 
control over the placement of the first self-portrait, while it determines the 
development and positioning of further layers. Such layers involve slow contour. 
Slow contour differs from blind contour in that the drafter may look at the drawing 
while applying a continuous line to describe both inner and outer contours. In slow 
contour, therefore, ‘composition’,227 or the placement of the image in relation to the 
size and shape of the drawing paper, could be deliberate and considered. A 
conscious decision would determine where the drafter starts the continuous line. All 
contours would be drawn in relation to each other, thus creating credible 
proportions between parts, which would enhance the drawing in terms of 
conventional composition. In blind contour, this is not possible, and all the regarded 
parts of the field of observation loose their bearings.  
 
The unified process of producing this drawing involves oscillation between blind and 
slow contour, both of which then will always disrupt former slow and blind 
                                                       
227 Please refer to Addendum A, where I provide detailed amplification on the practical realisation 
of auto-deixis as concept, with particular reference to composition, in the text that accompanies 
Illustration 6. 
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placements and their recursive amplifications or embellishments. Thus, formal 
composition, for example, becomes an unlikely objective and the drafter has to 
leave it to the happenstance that the process sustains.  
 
6.4.4 Process: unfolding | enfolding 
(See Addendum A; Illustration 7: Unfolding | enfolding) 
 
A process-based drawing partly structures itself. It sustains its own development in 
both the recognition and the retention of unpremeditated and unpredictable 
denotation. As such, durational discernments and conversions in the act of drawing 
articulate a path of self-specifying and drawing-originative discovery, as 
Illustration 7 (Addendum A) demonstrates. The development of the drawings in this 
series constitutes conversion that unfolds upon itself, “withdrawing in memory of 
itself” (Derrida. 1993: 3). In the process, it generates its own course and its 
innovation. Derrida describes this process of ‘unfolding upon itself’ as generative 
impetus in retreat (hiatus, withdrawal, or presence in absentia), for the “intervention 
of a paradoxical Narcissus” (1993: 3), a solipsist eccentric, in which the intricacies of 
an individuated aesthetic idiolect interfere and each intervention brings its construct 
as ancillary trait.  
 
As a self-generative force, such unfolding occurs along fragments of viewing and 
reviewing, taking and retaking, searching and researching, marking and unmarking. 
All these fragments bring forth numerous surprising and seemingly irrelevant 
revelations and interfering patterns of conversion in between. Any one mark, at the 
instant of revealing itself, provokes in its making a riposte that will address itself 
both back to any one, or the mere memory of any one of its splintered forerunners 
and forward to unknown but possible successors, always heralding a known or 
unknown next, always implying the yet undisclosed in its innuendo.228 In this way, it 
creates its own paths and if the drafter allows, unknown directions for more 
discoveries open up.  
 
                                                       
228 “The outside mark on paper leads as much as it is led: it loops inward from the paper to direct 
the artist’s decision concerning the line that is next to be drawn, and it loops back out, as a new trace 
in paper, sewing the mind into the line, binding mind and line in a suturing action where the threads 
grow finer and tighter in the passage from the initial mark to the final outlines circumscribing the 
scene’s legible form” (Bryson in De Zegher. 2003: 154). 
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Significance in practice 
In practice, this series displays an integration of the processes of development, 
generativity, deviation, divergence, and self-reflexivity, above explained under 
6.4.1; 6.4.2; 6.4.3, and below under 6.4.5. The drawing itself becomes an active 
participant in a process that can lead to spontaneous, unplanned disclosure. 
Difference evolves not only between the works of individual students, but also 
between consecutive drawings of one student, as is very evident in the first group of 
drawings in Illustration 7 (Addendum A). In this way it demonstrates how trait 
forms, how its forming is synonymous with the durational forming of constructs, the 
development of such constructs and of figuring skill, and trait’s role in sustaining a 
generative impetus or drive in drawing. 
 
 
6.4.5 Process: self-reflexive articulation 
(See Addendum A, Illustrations 8 & 9: Self-reflexivity). 
 
The auto-deictic drawing process articulates in self-reflexivity. All conversions retain 
self-affirmative and self-empowering value, if not their entire visibility. Trait serves 
as a narrative of a uniquely situated history. All in-phase strokes or traces serve to 
affirm the physical and mental difference of their own maker in the drawing. The 
resulting volume of amassed drawing marks implies the difference of the drafter’s 
body-mind. It affirms the hand of the self-as-being as being in the act. The labour 
of such drawing claims the drafter’s difference by means of the temporal and 
spatial relation of trait to herself and to the viewer (Bryson. 1983: 89-116).  
 
Significance beyond 
In practice, the first year students produce a final series of self-portraits that 
combine the processes that I describe above under 6.4.1; 6.4.2; 6.4.3, & 6.4.4. 
Self-reflexivity is inherent to all these processes and they all serve the purpose to 
nurture and enhance self-reflexivity. 
 
Discussions on these processes lead to the notion that those competences that give 
rise to auto-deictic response in drawing can progressively develop into becoming a 
creative research process (see 6.6 below) that harnesses reflexive action. Once the 
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student achieves that, those cerebrative processes that assist and facilitate creativity 
in drawing can also support her further in reassigning such creative ability to more 
visual art making processes.  
 
6.5 The auto-deictic drawing process as a research process 
(See Addendum A, Illustration 7) 
 
Self-reflexive articulation implies the constructive processes of research. The dance 
between fragmented sight and impending full sight that I describe above becomes 
a generative play between searching, researching, and revelatory insight. Derrida 
asserts that drawing resembles the posing of hypotheses that may lead to unknown 
discoveries – the presupposition of sight (1993: 2). As such, naissant conversions 
function in “speculation that ventures forth, simply in order to see” (Derrida. 1993: 
2). As a form of searching ahead, ‘simply in order to see’, processes of searching 
and research come to mind. 
 
I propose that auto-deictic drawing holds what Slonimsky and Shalem (Griesel. 
2004: 90-94) refer to as four “strands of activity constitutive of academic practice”, 
namely distantiation, appropriation, research, and articulation. The generative 
relationship between naissance and hiatus that produces trait as new form, and the 
recursive processes of expansion that characterises auto-deictic drawing, lead me to 
find this parallel between drawing and research.  
 
Trait as invention constitutes new form, which in the terms of conventional research 
implies new knowledge. In the previous chapter, it emerged that trait irruption, in 
interplay with an ever-elusive visibility, sustains the advent of invention, as well as 
development beyond invention. In auto-deictic drawing, such invention entails an 
inconclusive resolve between subjective understanding of self in relation to the world 
and self in relation to mark. 
 
Distantiation  
I propose the notion of hiatus, as I explain it above, as parallel to the concept of 
“distantiation” in academic practices (Slonimsky & Shalem in Griesel. 2004: 91). 
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During hiatus, the drafter scrutinises trace as much as idea or field of observation to 
disturb the possibility of stylistic repetition. The notion of hiatus implies that the 
drafter’s experiential cognitive engagement simultaneously coordinates “cognitive 
distance” (Slonimsky & Shalem in Griesel. 2004: 91). Furthermore, as I explain 
above, hiatus entails momentary distances from the self and from trace, which 
enables contextual perspective.  
 
According to Slonimsky, this form of perspective – a judging or contemplation of 
understandings against a wider field of reference – constitutes distantiation in 
research. Slonimsky and Shalem (Griesel. 2004: 91) define distantiation as a “key 
condition of possibility for the conscious reflection on...established knowledge”. In the 
case of drawing, such perspective also entails a measuring of anticipated traces 
against establishments in the field229 and against other and better traces and 
drawings. Thus, this distance provides reference against which the drafter can 
gauge possible scope for making even finer distinctions for articulation and synthesis 
in drafteric terms. If hiatus, as small incidences of distantiation, anticipate and 
enable insertion of internal logic into the drawing-text (as it does of the self), it 
means that the drafter constructs a new frame for exploring subject matter. Such a 
new frame comprises new knowledge in conventional research. 
 
A new frame suggests new meaning. If trait is invention, it cannot be meaningless. 
The internal logic that the drafter develops reflexively in a drawing, suggests the 
constructive facilities of trait that would pose the resulting drawing as a new frame 
for meaning. Mark Johnson states that, “Meaning involves the blending of the 
structural, formal, and conceptual dimensions on the one hand and the pre-
conceptual, non-formal, felt dimensions on the other” (Johnson. 2007: 273). This 
explanation of the construction of meaning has bearing on the confluence between 
interactionist drawn gesture and enactionist drawn gesture that I proposed in 
Chapter 3. It is possible to frame this confluence as the merging between drawing 
technique, schemata, and construction on the one hand, and gesture and the self on 
the other hand.  
 
                                                       
229 In the Bourdieuian sense. 
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Appropriation 
Appropriation stems from distantiation, but it also represents the obverse of 
distantiation (Slonimsky & Shalem in Griesel. 2004: 92). I explained this application 
of appropriation in drawing in Chapter 5, under ‘Appropriation’. These 
explanations clarify appropriation as obverse of distantiation by contrasting it to 
the stasis and order of memory. Whereas distantiation serves to differentiate 
existing knowledge, appropriation serves to acquaint the drafter with new 
knowledge.  
 
Research 
Another element typical of academic practices that I discern in auto-deictic drawing 
is that of research. “Research is a form of distantiation and appropriation” that 
requires amongst other things, “interwoven operations” (Slonimsky & Shalem in 
Griesel. 2004: 93). In the drafteric terms that I formulated in the previous chapters, I 
construe interactionist drawn gesture as incidents of insight that the drafter achieves 
(and marks) through self-reflexive enaction and interaction, which entail ‘interwoven 
operations’.  
 
The thesis explains how dialectic and recursivity function in reflexivity (and in 
particular in self-reflexivity) to sustain drawing. Graeme Sullivan describes reflexive 
research practice as “a kind of research activity that uses different methods to ‘work 
against’ existing theories and practices and offers the possibility of seeing 
phenomena in new ways” (2005: 100). He identifies four types of reflexive 
practices – self-reflexive practice, reflection, responsiveness, and dialectic. 
 
 Self-reflexive practice 
According to Sullivan, self-reflexive practice,  
…describes an inquiry process that is directed by personal interest and 
creative insight, yet is informed by discipline knowledge and research 
expertise. This requires a transparent understanding of the field, which means 
that an individual can ‘see through’ existing data, texts, and contexts so as to 
be open to alternative conceptions and imaginative options (2005: 100 – 
101). 
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The traces that naissance produces, the information that the drafter reads in a 
glance, her field of observation comprising both her own past drawings and those 
of other artists, constitute the ‘existing data’ Sullivan mentions. The processes of in-
phase enactionist conversion would necessarily constitute alternative conceptions. 
We know now that drawn gesture per se constitutes alternative conception – not 
only an alternative to words, written text, or speech as the other of pre-meaning, 
but also invention as alternative conception to repetition.  
 
Above, I explained appropriation as immanent in naissance. I also explained 
distantiation as immanent in hiatus and I suggested that they play defined roles in 
effecting gestic conversion. I explained that the drafter applies them in simultaneity, 
yet poses them in relation to one another. Research, as ‘a form of appropriation 
and distantiation’ would therefore be inherent to drawing, a process that, as we 
have seen in earlier chapters, interweaves numerous forms of dialectic. 
 
 Reflection 
Derrida provides support for reflective processes in drawing – those of speculation, 
skepticism, anticipation, and memory (1993: 1-3). Glances probe speculatively and 
with skepticism, “as if sent out on reconnaissance” (Derrida. 1993: 2). In this way, the 
drafter notices, yet, she does not believe. She does not believe, because her own 
transformative contribution, trait, is not out there in the world, nor yet visible to her 
on paper. Notation brings partial credibility, which, although subjective, also brings 
the possibility of belief in a self-as-being.  
 
This enables the drafter to consider or reconsider more approaches that would 
result in approximate230 resolution. The drafter’s reflexivity elicits reflection, 
speculation, or anticipation. The wider sphere of reference that she draws in also 
involves meta-analytic focus (Sullivan. 2005: 101) in social space. Sullivan explains 
this notion as follows: 
Second, in responding to empirical understandings, a visual arts researcher 
will reflect on information gathered so as to review conceptual strategies used 
                                                       
230 ‘Approximate’, because, although the drafter may be engaged in problem-centred tasks in 
processes of enaction and interaction, she will not seek “some allegedly perfect solution to a 
problem, but rather, one that works well enough relative to the current situation” (Johnson. 2007: 
119). 
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and consider other approaches. This reflective practice is meta-analytic in 
focus and reveals the plurality of new views, much in the same way a gallery 
curator does when reassembling a collection so as to present a different 
reading of artworks (2005: 101) 
 
In the context of this thesis and its concern with trait formation, the visual 
schemata231 that I discuss in Chapter 4 provide the structures that facilitate ‘meta-
analytic’ focuses. As I explained in Chapter 4, drawing sustains a ‘drawing together’ 
of shared visual schemata and the deviations of trait. Notwithstanding the drafter’s 
own deviatory schemata – or trait – which she inserts into her drawing, she must also 
achieve understandability in order to communicate. Self-reflexive framing contains 
trait and visual schemata as permutations that emerge as new form. Sullivan 
identifies and defines this activity as reflexive practice in visual art practice as 
research (2005: 101).  
 
 Dispositional responsiveness to change 
He adds another dimension that pertains to dispositional development and 
embodiment. A reflexive practitioner, he purports,  
…will question content and contexts as problematic situations are revealed 
within particular settings. Issues-driven inquiry of this kind not only identifies 
problems, but also opens up areas whereby participants become responsive 
to potential change (Sullivan. 2005: 101).  
 
As a parallel to this notion, I propose that auto-deixis has the potential to challenge 
self-effacement as problematic issue in drawing. I believe that auto-deixis can help 
the student drafter to challenge norm. Once the drafter becomes aware of this 
potential for deviation, she becomes more ‘responsive to potential change’ in a 
wider context. She absorbs the concept of change as disposition – a disposition that 
                                                       
231 As I explained in Chapter 4, such visual schemata entails ‘image schemata’. Mark Johnson (2007: 
136) defines visual schemata as “a dynamic, recurring pattern of organism-environment interactions” 
as “precisely these basic structures of sensorimotor experience by which we encounter a world that 
we can understand and act within”. Johnson also draws interaction, enaction, and embodied action 
into his definition: “The patterns of our ongoing interactions, or enactions (to use the term from 
Varela, Thomson and Rosch 1999), define the contours of our world and make it possible for us to 
make sense of, reason about, and act reliably within this world”.  
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can also serve other visual arts practices. She starts to see the self-affirmative 
facility of auto-deixis – the particularity of her mind-body intervention – to bring 
about deviation from norm. Thereby she tests, practices, and verifies her own voice 
as carrier of change. As such, auto-deixis in itself becomes a form of questioning of 
the norm – be it the drafter’s own norms or the reigning norms of stylistic trends in 
general. 
 
 Dialectic 
The dialectic in which the drafter engages also sustains drawing as a reflexive 
research process that challenges stasis. This would comprise, for example, the 
syntagmatic flow of enactionist drawn gesture as opposed to the inhibitive curbing 
of interactionist drawn gesture.232 The constant dialectic in drawing between 
naissance and hiatus (intimacy and distance, drawing and withdrawal, absence and 
presence) that I describe above relates, as does the dialectic between appearance 
and disappearance that Berger233 describes. The drafter’s struggle to find likeness 
between image and the viewing object, a process that can only ever produce 
difference, provides further exemplary support.  
 
In auto-deictic drawing, these dialectical interchanges enable the drafter to reveal 
her dialogue with and in drafteric language and information – the drawing itself is 
evidential of the intensity, density, quality, and plausibility of the dialogue. Sullivan 
posits the capacity of the drafter for conducting such dialogue as another form of 
reflexive practice: “This means that significance of meanings derived form a process 
of inquiry is subject to debate and discussion as dialectic between the researcher 
and the researched takes place” (2005: 101). Once revealed in drafteric terms, the 
                                                       
232 I explain this notion in Chapter 3 as follows: ‘The concepts of interaction and enaction lead me to 
distinguish (in theoretical terms rather than in discernable quality) between ‘enactionist drawn 
gesture’, and ‘interactionist drawn gesture’. I propose that, while some facets of discernment and 
doing in drawing or in making a mark cite field and history interactively and involuntarily, other 
dimensions enact embodiment directly and involuntarily. Such interaction continues the embodiment 
process in-phase, while the drafter simultaneously enacts already assimilated embodiments. The 
drafter directs her drawing partly by recall or memory and partly by self-originative enaction in 
“unconscious execution” (Derrida. 1993: 48) to convert the gestic into marks that have no precedence 
or mindful specularity that precedes irruption’. 
233 Dialect assists generativity. As I explain in Chapter 1, under ‘Temporality’, Berger asserts, 
“Drawing works to abolish the principle of Disappearance, but it never can, and instead it turns 
appearance and disappearance into a game [which] can never be won, or wholly controlled, or 
adequately understood”, According to Berger, three aspects typify the drawing process, namely 
observation, idea, and memory. Each of these aspects “speaks in a different tense” and each 
temporal space requires “a different capacity for imagination” (Downs et al. 2007: xii, citing Berger 
2004: 112). 
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dialogue enters social space and the discourses and debates that social space 
affords the field, activate in reciprocity. This notion demonstrates Bourdieu’s concept 
of field in interplay with habitus and practice, an interplay that weaves a larger 
field of increasing amassments, circling outwards in an integral social space that 
returns or feeds back into field, practice, and habitus.234 
 
As we have seen, dialectic serves a generative purpose in drawing, both in 
enactionist and in interactive dynamics. Reflexivity is essential to the development of 
dialectic, and the enactionist aspect of ontological complicity235 in such development 
ensures multiplicity in outcome. Reflexive conversion, a process in which the drafter is 
central, produces enactionist, and interactionist drawn gesture, as discussed in 
Chapter 3. Sullivan corroborates this notion as follows:  
Reflexivity arises when the different elements or levels are played off against 
each other. It is in these relations and interfaces that reflexivity occurs. This 
approach is based upon an assumption – and implies – that no element is 
totalized; that is, they are all taken with a degree of seriousness, but there is 
no suggestion that any one of them is the bearer of the Right or Most 
Important Insight (2005: 101, citing Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2000: 249).  
 
Sullivan points out that a significant concept – namely that of its “emancipatory 
interest” (2005: 101) – results from such reflexive practice. Self-reflexivity as a 
form of questioning, as challenge and dialogue, affords ‘emancipation’ from norm in 
a new form that also displays enaction of “artistic, social, political, educational, or 
cultural change” (Sullivan. 2005: 101). To reiterate, an individual’s deviation from 
norm can expand into wider contexts that bring about change in more spheres of 
field and social space.236 
                                                       
234 As I explained in Chapter 2, under ‘Field’,  Bourdieu’s concept of field constitutes amassment of 
interrelated layers that ‘grow in dimension and extent in mobilised interplay’. Also refer to 
‘Recursivity and amassment’ in this chapter. 
235 Bourdieu explains enaction as emerging from ‘ontological complicity with infraconscious and 
infralinguistic structures’ (1998: 79-80). I explain the term in the glossary (Addendum B) and discuss 
its reach in Chapters 2, under ‘Relational thinking’, and in Chapter 5, under ‘Appropriation’ and  
‘Conclusion’. The notion acknowledges self-as-being – self and its habitus are inextricably part of the 
internalisation of externalities and the externalisation of internalities. 
236 In this regard, Richard Harker (1990: 100-101) explains that, “the addition of time [temporality] 
to objectivist formulations allows one to perceive the dialectical relations between objective structures 
and practices, thus providing a theoretical level which can account for change (including resistance)... 
practice cannot be reduced to either habitus or through habitus to objective structures, since historical 
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Articulation 
Slonimsky and Shalem (Griesel. 2004: 90 – 94) identify a fourth strand “constitutive 
of academic practice”. They define this component of research as ‘articulation’ and I 
interpret it to pertain to those notions of Sullivan regarding reflexive practice in 
research. Above, I explained this aspect of the research process under ‘The 
articulations of naissance and hiatus’ (please refer). The processes of naissance and 
hiatus that I describe above as ‘Applications’ constitute clarification on articulation.  
 
6.6 A comparison between auto-deictic drawing and emulation 
 
In conclusion and to return to trait as self-reflexive articulation, I can now define its 
weight against the repression of self-reflexivity in student drawing. I will now draw 
a comparison in broad and conclusive terms between auto-deixis as opposed to 
emulation of style language. 
 
Originativity 
Because auto-deixis is not conceivable on a conscious level until it exists, it is 
unpremeditated, eruptive in its irruptions. It brings to the surface gesture as the pre-
conceptual. It proceeds from this basis, allowing the mystery of its emerging 
spectacle to partake in shaping and reshaping its future or its flow of trace.  
 
In contrast, the emulation of style language requires a blueprint. Existing form 
prescribes, pre-determines, to enclose the image in fidelity to that existing form. The 
flow of its execution and its labour is therefore unavoidably systematic and 
repetitive. The drafter measures the drawing against its blueprint as norm and such 
measurement requires the criteria of emulative fidelity only. 
 
‘Reality’ 
Even when labour ends, auto-deictic form remains sinuous and unenclosed. In this, it 
recognises the myth of a single ‘reality’ and perceives it as subject to individuated 
reflexive interpretation. In emulative drawing, the only object is to draw in a similar 
                                                                                                                                                          
circumstances play their part in its generation. Nor can it be reduced to specific historical 
circumstances or forces, since the perception of these social forces is filtered through the habitus. We 
are left with practice as a dialectical production, continually in the process of reformulation”. 
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way to someone else, which, by extension, implies a similar vision of ‘reality’ 
between all student drafters. Ultimately, then, everyone sees ‘reality’ in the same 
way, implying as imperative in drawing the preservation at all costs of a constant 
‘reality’. In contrast, auto-deixis implies difference. 
 
Body-mind / constructive process 
Consequently, auto-deictic drawing relies on the continual changeability of the 
student-drafter’s body-mind gesture, her continuous flow of “thought-feeling” 
(Johnson. 2007: 273). In contrast, emulative drawing inhibits the drafter’s own 
body-mind by obeying traces of another’s body-mind. If drawing carries the pre-
conceptual to the surface and to conceptualisation, if it functions in this way to 
construct, emulation of style language would also inhibit its constructive function. 
 
6.7 Overarching conclusions: The significance of trait 
 
From the development of my arguments throughout this thesis, the significance of 
trait can be summarised as follows: 
 
The significance of drawing-trait constitutes invention – a form of invention that can 
only occur in the drawing interface, which involves the temporal and spatial 
presence of the drafter and her engagement in world. From nothing, it brings 
something, turning the no-meaning of the no-thing into the some-meaning of the 
some-thing. In this way, the drawing act distills the self’s engagement in lived 
‘reality’. Trait therefore provides marked evidence of individuated experiential 
engagement, both in lived ‘reality’ and in drawing itself. Trait provides evidence of 
the transformative processing that the drafter draws from such engagement.  
 
In its extensions, trait signifies the appropriation of knowledge, the development of 
understanding, and of application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation (Bloom. 1956: 
62-187) as constructive processes in a self-reflexive realm. These processes occur as 
an inherent wavering between the self-as-nothing and the self-as-being. This 
‘wavering’ of the drafter between these two poles, her skepticism, and speculation, 
fulfills an important function that enhances development. The drafter’s grasp for the 
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self-as-being facilitates passage from experiential cognition to drawn trait and 
from gesture to invention. The ability to invent underpins the development of 
creative ability. 
 
Those dialectic processes that sustain cerebration recursively between self-
originativity and practice-originativity develop the schemata of understanding that 
drawing-trait carries. The thesis shows that gestic conversion constitutes processes 
that change pre-meaning into visibility, and by extension, into understanding. In this, 
the body-mind of the self, the labour of drawing, drawing display, field, and social 
space generate in unification. I conclude that trait, as invention, constitutes new form 
as visible demonstration of synthesis. The complexity of such synthesis does not 
necessarily exceed that of the emulation of style language, but the diversity of its 
materialisations provide more potential for the development of creativity. 
 
A significance of trait resides in its capacity to deviate from norm, because it defies 
emulation of style language. The self-reflexivity inherent to those recursive and 
discursive pathways along which gestic conversion unfolds brings about diversity in 
conversion. Trait is difference and it articulates diversity in understanding and 
diversity in gestic conversion. It is diverse as a matter of course, and it integrates 
change. The norms of drawing influence, but do not constrain trait as new form. The 
same is true for an inhibitive adherence to resolute and perfect descriptive 
resemblance, which would be impossible were trait to describe it. (In this sense, the 
term ‘realism’, as ascribed to style in drawing, is deceiving). Difference becomes 
drawing in all its contradictory and various manifestations.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
THE FACILITATION OF DRAWING 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
My notion of auto-deictic drawing does not profess a radically new, unconventional, 
or revolutionary technique, method, manner, style, or form of drawing. Rather, it is 
meant to function largely in the facilitation of drawing at university level. Essentially, 
it proposes one shift in approach – a shift towards recognising the student drafter’s 
self-as-being. It is especially in such an educational context that it can open a 
generative, actively developing; yet consummate system of practice and 
knowledge. I present it as resolution to the problematic that the thesis poses – as a 
challenge to the repetitive redistribution of style language. Its facility and 
expansive capacity for individuated cerebration, its enactionist and interactive 
dynamics that create trait and its adherence to process in a non-representational 
framework makes the concept of auto-deixis ideal for application in the facilitation 
of drawing.  
 
In this conclusion, I arrive at a number of insights regarding auto-deixis that pertain 
to principles of mediation and facilitation.  
 
7.1 A facilitatory framework 
 
Individual responsiveness 
Trait brings to the drawing studio a diverse range of legacies comprising 
personalised constructs of socio-cultural habitat, history, heritage, and dispositional 
differences in thinking and doing. The student drafter – namely, her self as an 
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individual with a cultural legacy – thus opens the facilitatory framework to establish 
individual responsiveness as a cornerstone. Such facilitatory focus, which centres on 
the student drafter, finds support in Ian Moll’s theory of curriculum responsiveness 
(Moll in Griesel. 2004: 1-38). Moll defines ‘individual’ responsiveness as 
‘...responsiveness of the teaching entailed in the curriculum to the needs of the 
learner’ (Moll. 2004: 7). The needs of the learner involve, for example, the 
particular thinking styles237 and learning styles238 that the individual students prefer 
to apply in their processes of learning.  
 
Regarding the facilitation of drawing, however, I am of the opinion that such ‘style’-
models could also run the risk of becoming deterministic models for drawing. If 
employed as a facilitatory tool, the problem of determinism and prescriptive 
instruction in pre-conceived stylistic manner and content again raise their ugly heads. 
Because it encourages each student’s particular way of using abilities, it also 
predicts stasis, or a particular way of drawing as an ideal that the drafter should 
practice for a lifetime, once mastered. Even more problematically, the notion of 
                                                       
237 Robert Sternberg defines the concept of Thinking Style as ‘a preferred way of thinking’ or the 
manner in which a person ‘prefers to use abilities’, therefore he also calls them ‘mental preferences’ 
(1997:19, 134). Mental preferences interact in the learning experience (Sternberg. 1997:25-6, 
107-12, 145-6, 155). Mental preferences are personality-based rather than cognition-based; and 
they interface between ability and personality. An individual’s interaction with the environment 
shapes his or her mental preferences (Zhang & Postiglione 2001: 1333-1346). In turn, people also 
shape their environments – the influence, according to Sternberg, is ‘interactive and reciprocal’ 
(1997:153). The concepts of thinking styles and learning styles seem to resonate with Bourdieu’s 
theories in that they also identify interaction between individual, environment, and practice, 
specifically relating to the learning process. However, if they are not seen as cognition-based (as is 
habitus), but rather as emanations of ‘personality’, it would require a further and rather positivist 
study to explore their impact on enaction and interactivity.  
 
Although Sternberg expounds four points that suggest the modifiability of certain components in the 
learning process, they do not offer the unpredictable and open-ended, or irresolute aspects of 
enaction, as I perceive it to apply in auto-deictic drawing. He argues, firstly, that thinking styles and 
cognitive ability are two of the determining factors in a successful learning process (Sternberg 1997: 
133, 134, 141). Secondly, he asserts that the legislative style of thinking is more conducive to 
creative ability (Sternberg and Lubart 1999: 3-15). Thirdly, he confirms the modifiability of creative 
abilities (as is true of all abilities) (Sternberg and Lubart 1995). Finally, he maintains that thinking 
styles are situation-dependent and subject to influence from the environment (Sternberg 1997: 83, 
84). According to Sternberg, cognitive ability and thinking styles are also interactive (1997: 107, 
112). It could therefore be argued that drawing, a cognition-based ability, could interact with 
mental preferences, which in turn are shaped by environment. 
238 Learning styles can be described as the more or less consistent ways in which people perceive, 
conceptualise, organise, and recall information. A theoretical framework for learning styles proposed 
by Kolb provides for four types of learning styles: converging (preference for abstract 
conceptualising & active experimentation), diverging (preference for concrete experience & 
reflective observation), assimilating (preference for abstract conceptualising & reflective 
observation), and accommodating (preference for concrete experience and active experimentation 
(Sternberg. 1997: 145 citing Kolb 1974; 1978). 
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thinking and learning styles proposes an essentialist understanding of a unitary 
subject, which conflicts with the complex, dynamic embodied subjectivity I proposed 
by enaction and auto-deixis. 
 
Chapter 5 explains the fine line that divides durational self-origination (or enaction) 
from deterministic stasis. With auto-deictic drawing, I try to overcome deterministic, 
prescriptive facilitation. In order to assert it, the thesis attempts an explanation of 
the role that the unconscious and experiential cognition play in the genesis of trait. 
In contrast, Thinking Styles function only in personality, in ego, not in the unconscious. 
Sternberg explains, “They [thinking styles] are ways in which we organize our 
cognitions about the world in order to make sense of the world” (1997: 150). To 
‘organize one’s cognitions’, to my mind, is reminiscent of the ‘order of memory’. It 
implies the danger stasis holds for trait, a stasis in which trait could become also 
repetitive mannerism. Moreover, it is exactly the ever elusive and hidden that is 
revealed as surprise and that creates the wonder of a self-as-being, which the 
drafter continually tries to grasp in order to deny the self-as-nothing. Revealing the 
hidden, promises ever more hidden depths of unrevealed self. The range of un-
premeditated, diverse, and ever-changeable irruptions that such surprising 
revelation sets off in drawing carries potential for the development of creative 
extension beyond presentation. 
 
I interpret individual responsiveness to also imply that mediation should 
acknowledge the drawing and drawn contribution of the individual as meaningful 
and appropriable in its own right. Offering trait as an interactive bequest, the 
individual student drafter extends meaning communally, thus continuing interactivity 
into field and social space in a studio context. A mutual disposition (one that all 
student drafters bring with them) is one of interaction. In a group of student drafters, 
the meaning (and manner) of an individual’s contribution communicates and extends 
to others who will draw from it too. This being applicable to each student drafter, 
such interactivity between self and others becomes a facilitatory aid and tool in 
itself.  
 
The reflexive aspect of the habitus theory ensures that, while it develops and 
transforms the body of knowledge, it also influences the person. Task design in 
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drawing facilitation should therefore incorporate broad-based, non-insular 
problems, diverse but of mutual interest in order to be accessible, meaningful, and 
interpretable to a diverse range of individual student drafters. Tasks should bring 
about interchange between socio-cultural encoding and decoding. They should 
engage the students in issues and problems that relate the educational, cultural, 
psychological, and social contexts that they are experiencing and dealing with, 
without ignoring the legacies of heritage. 
 
The student drafter derives her particular needs from socio-cultural background, a 
context of the past, to carry them into the alien university-based context of the first 
year drawing studio. The facilitator should respond to the needs of the student 
drafter by guiding her along a new interactive pathway that will also proliferate 
into new enactions. In this new context, her needs could become a multi-faceted 
partner in an interactive trio, the other partners being the demands of drawing as 
discipline, and her successful participation and absorption into the new environment 
of institutionalised culture.  
 
 Responsive task design 
Task design enfolds considerations that include, yet exceed those of trend, volume, 
level, quality, and punctual delivery. In a South African context, such task design 
becomes particularly interesting and layered. A task dealing with the concept of 
‘transformation’, for example, could be dealt with on several levels of experience 
that mirror the multi-layered meanings of the word. Given the country’s history, all 
members of its society find transformation very relevant in the spheres of daily 
political, educational, environmental, social, and cultural experience. On a more 
personally individual (and psychological) level, the first year student has to deal 
with the transformative processes that accompany the transition from school to 
university – those of, for example, independence, self-reliance, self-discipline, 
accountability, and so forth. On the drawing-related subject disciplinary level of 
experience, the student has to begin to understand her own role in transforming her 
body-mind experiencing into a visible language that can effectively reach a very 
diverse audience. In terms of image making, transformation can be explored in the 
very literal terms of, for example, metamorphism or anthropomorphism. In this way, 
the broadness of the concept of transformation enables the student’s own 
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explorations into wider yet related themes and issues, such as the relationships 
between humans and animals, environment, and so forth. At the same time, the 
theme is wide open to strategies of execution that employ symbolism, metaphor, 
allegory, analogy, or homology as content. 
 
Designing a task in such a way that it will ensure the incorporation of the self, the 
self’s situatedness in the objective structures of current politics, socio-cultural and 
ecological environment and historicity, as well as the development of skill in the 
techniques of drawing, would bring about reciprocality in inter-cultural decoding. 
This is so, because, while drawing’s encodings would be self-reflexively diverse, 
common structures of visualisation would necessarily have to be deconstructed and 
reconfigured as a matter of course. In the particular situation that is South Africa, 
this notion becomes significant. 
 
Apart from technical skills-development in transforming idea into the languages of 
drawing – languages that now incorporate self-originitivity – such a task would also 
require effective research skills. Efficiency in all these spheres would be practiced 
without omitting or denying self-reflexive responses to the issues at hand. If the tasks 
pose broad, yet experientially relevant themes, they provide ample room within 
which the individual student can identify any number of possible strands of 
exploration, as well as the manner and medium of their realisation. With the added 
freedom of self-originitive mark making in the labour of drawing, process and 
content will carry equal weight as opportunities for creative practice and 
production. These considerations in task design promote the student’s development 
of self-reliance, innovation, and self-confidence. 
 
 Rhythms of learning 
In order to ensure the student drafter’s constructive interaction the facilitator should 
“adjust her instructional strategies to ‘the rhythms of learning’” of the individual 
student drafter (Moll in Griesel. 2004: 8). The facilitator should be sensitive to the 
“tensions and emotions of learning” as the individual student drafter experiences 
and enacts them (Moll in Griesel. 2004: 8). The facilitator should respond to the 
needs of individual student drafters by “teaching them in terms that are accessible 
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to them” and she should “assess them in ways that they understand” (Griesel. 2004: 
8).  
 
A ‘tension of learning’ that reveals itself repeatedly in the first year drawing studio, 
is indeed one of transition from a past sphere of interactivity to a new sphere of 
interactivity, a tension that also acts as a great equaliser. In Bourdieuian terms, the 
student drafter now enters a new social space, namely that of university level 
education, where she must struggle and strategise anew for position in the field. The 
student drafter enters first year still secure in experiencing and apprehending (and 
in many cases also drawing) her lived ‘reality’ through a system of beliefs. She 
functions within a habitus that she has accrued and internalised over eighteen years 
– just to find that her systems of beliefs are challengeable, if not inadequate. When 
confronted with new systems of belief, she finds that other and more ways of doing 
things exist.239 
 
The self, albeit a lost self (a temporary self-as-nothing), necessarily becomes an 
important focus in the first year drawing studio. The situation provides an ideal 
opportunity for introducing auto-deictic drawing, which places strong emphasis on a 
search for one’s own voice.  
 
The temporary abandonment of (and by) the self-as-being, which confronts all first 
year students, “entails learning”, because, “it also carries with it a crucial dimension 
of individual change. It entails the transformation of individuals” 240 (Moll in Griesel. 
2004: 11). In other words, it entails the enormous task of interactively integrating a 
profoundly different and alien externality. Such integration will influence the self-
as-nothing enough to reverberate in her drawing practices as the self-as-being. In 
this regard, it would not be far-fetched of the drawing facilitator to assume that 
                                                       
239 Lisa Delpit, as cited by Moll, relates this tumultuous and often traumatic experience in her words, 
“To put our beliefs on hold is to cease to exist as ourselves for a moment and it is not easy. It is 
painful as well, because it means turning yourself inside out, giving up your own sense of who you 
are and being willing to see yourself in the unflattering light of another’s angry gaze. We must learn 
to be vulnerable enough to allow our world to turn upside down in order to allow the realities of 
others to edge themselves into our consciousness” (Delpit cited by Moll in Griesel. 2004: 11).  
240 I intend here an allusion once again to the transformative aspect of the labour of drawing that 
Bryson purports, namely his expositions on “transformation through labour”, to alight on or connect 
trait as irruptive from the labour of drawing where processes of conversion occur that not only 
deviate from norm-bound style language, but also effect drawing skills-development and personal 
habitus. 
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everyone in a given group of first year student drafters could be “under-prepared” 
and therefore on equal footing with one another (Slonimsky & Shalem in Griesel. 
2004: 90).  
 
Moreover, their introduction to the principles and demands of auto-deictic drawing 
serves as a further equaliser. Since auto-deictic drawing deviates strongly from the 
familiar and known dictates of a usually single and privileged account of what 
should or should not constitute drawing form and content, it offers no style language 
to mime. The familiar past offers no recourse, nor yet does an open-ended, 
irresolute present. For a short while there in first year, the future seems darkly 
unknowable. In this too, all first year student drafters are at an equal disadvantage 
and, for the same reason, lost.  
 
The understanding that successful and productive performance requires self-
reflexivity and self-reliance does not seem to come easily. At entrance level, self-
reflexivity is still an alien concept, and self-reliance often seems to be even more so. 
Auto-deixis, with its refusal to be prescriptive and with its insistence on self-
originative specification, calls for discovery and articulation of a seemingly lost self 
or at least misplaced self-as-being, by shifting initiating impetus to the student 
drafter. Indirectly, auto-deictic drawing represents a practice-based explorative 
process that stimulates independent thinking and doing. 
 
The self-reflexive aspect, underpinned by the habitus theory, of the auto-deictic 
drawing process (that I describe in Chapter 6) provides a convincing motivation for 
individual responsiveness in an effective facilitatory framework. This aspect 
represents a radical shift in facilitatory approach. It offers potential solutions to 
problems regarding redistribution or derivation of style language. In any form of 
self-reflexive practice, trait is essential. For it to function effectively, it should nurture 
a desire to show the self, which boldly displays shortcomings and aptitude with equal 
willingness. As we have seen, both shortcomings and aptitude hold infinite potential 
for innovation.  
 
The thesis shows that self-reflexivity is inherent to the processes that form trait. Self-
reflexivity is inherent to auto-deictic drawing as an explorative or ‘research’ 
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process. Auto-deictic drawing implies that the drafter displays her desire to show 
the self in speculative practice. Speculative practice realises as new form through 
recursive interplay between cognitively experiential enaction and aesthetic 
disposition. Self-reflexivity always implies the self-as-being, process, and production 
(poiesis) – a trio that at least carries the potential for creating new form.  
 
Knowledge disciplinary responsiveness 
In a Curriculum Responsive framework, the facilitator’s responsiveness to drawing as 
knowledge discipline (Moll in Griesel. 2004: 5-7) forms the second component of a 
facilitatory framework.  
 
Apart from the technical and discipline-based processes that comprise the contents 
of drawing as a subject, I propose those processes that I discussed in Chapter 6 as 
points of focus that should underpin the facilitator’s responsiveness to drawing as a 
knowledge discipline. Such processes would include, for example, the cerebrative 
unifications of dialectic, the constructive proliferation of recursivity, and the 
divergences of invention. I propose two more processes – firstly, the construction of 
meaning through drawing, which I discussed under ‘Distantiation’; and secondly, 
auto-deictic drawing as a self-reflexive research process. In summary, I propose 
that the auto-deictic process produces revelatory knowledge. The sight-induced 
cerebrative flow of traces that the auto-deictic process creates proposes and 
hypothesises. Its introspective discourses and ambivalences create doubt, mistrust, 
and skepticism. This impels the drafter to question, both in distantiation and 
durationally. In auto-deictic drawing, withdrawal brings distance, while naissance 
articulates durationally in drawn gesture. In the processes of its consummation, it 
therefore includes four elements of academic practice, namely distantiation, 
appropriation, research and articulation, while the process by which it generates 
knowledge, is one of revelation. 
 
These discussions make it clear that the self needs the knowledge disciplinary 
aspects of drawing to reveal not only the self, but also the meaning of trait-as-the 
self. The auto-deictic drawing process functions as a form of direct “inter-animation” 
between the self and the world. According to Mark Johnson, (2007: 273) meaning 
emanates from such inter-animation as experiential engagement. The thesis explains 
 235 
that the conversion of gesture (as pre-verbal symbolicity) into meaning incorporates 
the musculature, the biological, psychological, and cognitive aspects of self-as-
being. These aspects engage with the technical, structural, formal, and conceptual 
dimensions of drawing. In this inter-animation between the self and process, the duel 
that I discussed in Chapter 5 acts as generative and signifying impetus. To a duel 
between the self and gestic conversion, it is now possible to add the practical 
technicalities of drawing. Such a duelist triad fuses experience, thinking, and doing, 
the intellect and the somatic, unconscious, and conscious, and perception and 
conception in auto-deictic drawing. While this duel (trial) engages in disordered 
organisation, it dispels dualities. As such, trait becomes central to process, construct, 
and meaning as a new frame of knowledge.  
 
 Shifts 
The accommodation of the above-mentioned processes brings about the shifts in 
drawing facilitation that I introduced in Chapter 1. These shifts, in turn, bring about 
an additional change, namely one from a closed knowledge system241 to an open 
knowledge system of constant renewal and self-generativity. While auto-deictic 
drawing creates a process of revelation, emulation of style language, in contrast, 
constitutes a closed knowledge system. A closed knowledge system remains in stasis, 
because it resolutely adheres to “canonical norms”, the rules of tradition, and to 
“collegially recognised authority” (Moll citing NCHE, 1996: 4, in Griesel. 2004: 12).  
 
In contrast, auto-deixis reveals the self-specifying body-mind of everyone. Each 
body-mind is inevitably distinctive. Thus, each individual student drafter contributes 
to a dynamic and ever developing, never stagnant whole. As such, diversity 
contributes to the dynamic development of the knowledge discipline. At the same 
time, it contributes to a progressive dynamic in collectivity, or to cultural capital242 in 
                                                       
241 Bryson (De Zegher. 2003: 153) describes (and criticises) the practice of drawing that would 
resort under a ‘closed system of knowledge’ as “all those myriad protocols of line” that “supplies a 
set of formulae that, as they are mastered and internalized by the practitioner, enable the 
transcription onto paper of something that precedes and drives the drawing ... First comes the source, 
... then its transposition into the image”. This represents a sequence “in which line is always 
secondary”, and “drawing exists as a body of techniques that lies emphatically outside the self. The 
actual learning process consists in slowly incorporating into the habits of the hand and the eye those 
forms of line that are housed in convention and tradition”.  
242 According to Bourdieu, ‘cultural capital’ presents itself in society in three forms. Firstly, cultural 
capital in its embodied form comprises those culturally transferred and acquired resources that form, 
enrich, and inform the self. Cultural capital also exists in objectified form as, for example, works of 
art. Embodied cultural capital empowers a person, through the enabling process of education and 
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a wider society. Auto-deictic drawing acknowledges diversity as contributor and 
defined element of visual art.  
 
Cultural responsiveness 
In terms of responsive mediation and facilitation, this characteristic of auto-deictic 
drawing presents the facilitator with an interesting situation. Responsiveness to the 
student drafter as individual member of any socio-cultural extraction logically 
implies cultural responsiveness. If, in other words, the facilitator responds to the 
individual student drafter, she responds as a matter of course to the individual’s 
cultural heritage and origin – individual and cultural origin cannot be divided. This is 
so, since the individual self also constitutes the complexities of the self as socio-
cultural construct. Since cultural specificity can obviously be associated with the 
individual, the difference is that the individual drafter is free to practice, reveal, or 
disclose her ethnocentric heritage in her particular manner of drawing. In the auto-
deictic drawing process the individual can cite or enact her personal history freely, 
thus ‘drawing in’ references to cultural specific background. In Curricular 
Responsiveness as mediatory framework, conflation between individual and cultural 
responsiveness is therefore possible. 
 
The facilitator must not collapse cultural responsiveness into knowledge disciplinary 
responsiveness (Moll in Griesel. 2004: 1-16). Drawing as a knowledge discipline – 
its devices as formal content that enables its practices – serves as enabling, but 
common denominator amongst culturally diverse drafters. In other words, as soon as 
the facilitator teaches the stylistic specifics of any ethno-centric drawing style as the 
language of convention that constitutes the Art of Drawing (as subject or knowledge 
discipline), the students will readily practice such style language as a convention that 
is specific to the knowledge discipline. Thus, a culturally diverse profile of student 
drafters would merely regurgitate a single cultural-specific style language “in two 
ways – conceptually as second-degree image-repertoires, or ahistorically in a way 
that betrays false consciousness” (Foster. 1999: 59-60). It would mean that the 
facilitator promotes or even enforces not only the emulation of style language, but 
also cultural insincerity.  
                                                                                                                                                          
social dynamic, to understand or appreciate cultural objects and through this process, cultural objects 
are ‘symbolically’ transformed into cultural capital. Once an institution recognises such capital held by 
an individual, it exists in its institutionalised form (Mahar et al. 1990: 10-15). 
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Auto-deictic drawing as process that centralises the ‘sincere’ consciousness of 
experiential engagement – the spatial and temporal labour of the individual 
student drafter – would function as a practice that is neutral in terms of socio-
cultural referencing. Its processes achieve this neutrality through their inherent 
accommodation and acknowledgement of diversity in production. This understanding 
alights on the significance of those shifts that auto-deictic drawing brings about both 
in product, and in the facilitation there-of. It demarcates the close relationship 
between auto-deictic drawing and its facilitatory framework. The way in which 
student drafters enact trait as syntheses in auto-deictic drawing also structures the 
way in which the facilitator should mediate drawing.  
 
The meeting between the processes of auto-deictic drawing and its facilitatory 
framework that emerges from discussion in this chapter orchestrates and encourages 
both the drafter’s consciously sincere and involuntary enactions as self-originative 
drawing-trait. A student body that is diverse in socio-cultural heritage would 
produce diverse style languages that would also freely cross-pollinate. The diversity 
of the student drafters’ enactionist and interactionist involvement would both 
anticipate and furnish creativity.  
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Post script 
 
The thesis regards the emulation of style language versus self-originative drawing-
trait. Its explorations focus on a very small window between drafter and world, 
which comprises the self’s fluctuations between the unconscious and the conscious; 
from the pre-conceptual to the conceptual; from the gestic to drawn gesture. Trait 
proves to be as elusive as the self is; the self as elusive as trait is. In drawing, as 
much as in this thesis, characteristic form hinges on such elusiveness. 
 
My contention is that trait, as self-originative drawing form, enfolds inventive yet 
dissonant rhythms between the unconscious and the conscious of the individual 
drafter, thereby yielding trait as difference. As such, trait orchestrates diversely 
proliferate, non-conformist drawing form. Difference renders drawing a constructive 
process that outweighs its emulative facilities. If trait presents as difference that can 
never know its face until irruption, difference signifies the intricate innuendos of 
every drafter’s body-mind.  
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ILLUSTRATION 1 
 
DEVELOPMENTAL PATHWAY 
 
This series of drawings illustrates a process of gradual development in the work of a student drafter. To compile this illustration, I selected key 
drawings from several series of drawing exercises, each series comprising up to twenty-five drawings. My selection purposely tracks the 
student drafter’s development over a month. In these drawings, the drafter’s references to objective structures are initially schematic. Her 
shifts from three-dimensionality to two-dimensionality (founding perceptions) become gradually more informed, less schematic, to show 
eventually a rounded head that sits well in its surrounding space. In the first drawings, the drafter creates a flat mask, thus illustrating her 
understanding of the head as a face only. The eyes of the mask are almond-shaped, the mouth harshly outlined to appear stuck-on and 
resembling a paper cutout. Gradually, these features change to become integrated, voluminous, and fleshy. Eventually, a fully perceived, 
rounded head replaces the mask so that the final group of drawings in the series shows self-portraits that differ hugely from the first group 
of self-portraits.  
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1.1.1 Line gesture 
 
A very early line gesture drawing that 
clearly shows schematic drawing of the 
eyes, nose, and mouth, stuck onto the 
mask-shaped face.  
 
 
1.1.2 Continuous line gesture 
 
A continuous gestural line begins to draw 
things together, advancing understanding of 
the features as integrated with face. This 
extends still, however, only to the face, while 
the face, as integral to head is not yet 
evident. The facial features are still schematic 
to a very large degree. 
1.1.3 Line gesture 
 
Centred awareness of the face as perception of 
head with the facial features as ‘stuck-on’ is still 
very evident in this drawing, although the line work 
shows less rigidity. The facial features, especially 
the eyes and mouth, are less schematically drawn, 
showing improvement when compared to the 
previous drawings. 
1.1.4 Line & mass gesture 
 
The mask is still evident, yet not as harshly 
outlined as in the first three drawings. The 
absent, or at least diminished, outline of the 
face begins to suggest an understanding of 
something beyond the face. Although the 
features still dominate, they are less 
schematic. The drafter starts to treat the 
inherent characteristic qualities of her facial 
features as subject, albeit not yet in a very 
skilled way. 
 
Illustration 1. Group 1.1. Catherine Benjamin. 2008. Charcoal on paper. Dimensions variable. 
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An awareness of the head and face as ‘whole’, and of the head as a continuous shape that extends beyond the facial ‘mask’ begins to appear in this group of 
drawings. The drafter starts to experiment with a three-quarter view, turning the whole head in space and drawing it from an angle other than frontal. She still oscillates 
between schematic drawing of especially the eyes and mouth, and more realistic drawing of those features. Schematic drawing becomes less prominent in the third 
drawing, while in the fourth drawing of this group less schematic outlining is evident. 
1.2.1 Line & mass gesture 1.2.2 Line & mass gesture 1.2.3 Line & mass gesture 1.2.4 Line & mass gesture 
Group 1.2 
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1.3.1 Mass gesture 1.3.2 Mass gesture 1.3.3 Mass gesture 1.3.4 Mass gesture 
 
In further discovering the masses of the head, the drafter progresses from mask to a rounded head and she begins to include the neck as integral to head. She now 
replaces schematic drawing of the facial features to draw them as integrated shapes. She begins to perceive the head as a complex, voluminous shape that consists 
of intricate planes fitting into each other, but arranged at different angles to one another in three-dimensional space. 
 
Group 1.3 
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1.4.1 Mass gesture 1.4.2 Mass & line gesture 1.4.3 Sustained gesture 1.4.4 Sustained gesture 
 
In these self-portraits, the shifts from three-dimensionality to two-dimensionality are generally better informed. Although traces of schematic drawing and the mask 
are still present, they do not dominate. The drafter understands the roundedness of the head and its intricate planes to the extent where she can also suggest them, 
rather than necessarily drawing them explicitly. All these self-portraits also seem to begin to convey information that reaches beyond the mere descriptive. In 
comparison to those in Group 1.1, these drawings are generally much advanced from where the student started out. 
 
Group 1.4 
 7 
ILLUSTRATION 2 
 
DEVELOPMENT: RECURSIVITY, AMASSMENT, ACCRUAL 
 
The interplay between memory, practice, and trait formation gradually informs an advanced visuality. Memory is essential, as is 
appropriation – both aid cerebration as much as enaction does, and enaction cannot function without memory and appropriation. 
 
These drawings, arranged here in different categories of line exercises, illustrate the concepts of amassment, accrual, and recursivity that 
materialise as the development of skill and technique. Amassment comprises accrual of, for example, visual schemata, aesthetic sensibilities, 
in-phase observational skill, in-phase problem-solving skills, technical skill, and control of medium. Additionally, the student accrues 
knowledge about the functioning of line in its spatially descriptive capacities and, in applying such knowledge through the drawing process; 
processes of analysis, synthesis, and evaluation follow logically. All these aspects, to name but a few, contribute to in-phase generativity 
that expands incrementally for the duration of the drawing process. Such generativity becomes clear in this series, where it materialises as 
difference between stages in the different categories, and between the categories themselves. Students produce numerous drawings in each 
category before developing a final series of self-portraits in which they combine these techniques arbitrarily (see ‘sustained gesture’ below). 
For this illustration, I selected only a small number of key drawings from the work of one student. The categories of different exercises, 
namely line-, continuous line-, scribbled line-, mass-and-line-, and sustained-gesture (Betti & Sale. 1997: 33-50), are arranged in the order 
that they were executed.  
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Illustration 2. Group 1. Categories 1 & 2. Line- and continuous-line gesture 
The differences between the first and last drawings in this group provide some visible evidence of a process of recursive amassment that 
occurs durationally in the process of drawing. The series relates a gradual progression from perceiving the head as mask-like face to 
perceiving the head as a whole that enfolds hair, neck, and so forth. The first two rows of drawings in Group 1 already show a diversion 
from focus on outer contours (outline) only. The second row shows the drafter starting to explore the inner planar structures of the head. This 
shift from outer to inner contours entails development from schematic description to observational drawing that sustains inscription. Through 
the intensified line work that accompanies such a shift, the drafter starts to create focus areas, which interact with their ‘opposites’ – white 
ground and more tranquilly drawn areas – to create the illusion of dimension and voluminous shape. This development carries added 
dimensions. In the last drawing, for example, the drafter begins to utilise suggestion by selective description and strengthened inscription. 
Outer contour is largely absent, yet it is possible to perceive the side planes of the head. By emphasising its inner planes, the drafter causes 
the face to advance, while the neck and hair recede. Thereby she ‘suggests’ those dimensions of spatial depth that the foreshortened side 
planes of the head represent. She ‘suggests’ outline in the region of the neck, leaves it out around the face, and picks it up again around the 
ears to drop it again until she touches some outline in the hair. Thereby, she also begins to integrate drawing ground (as ‘space’, ‘ground’, or 
‘background’) to assign it inscriptive value almost equal to that of line. All these factors testify to an understanding of the head as whole 
that improves gradually. The developmental progression that is evident in this series suggests that the founding perceptions that were 
involved in creating these drawings became gradually and recursively more informed. Gesture drawing, by its very nature, develops 
understanding of the movement of shape and it relates such movement utilising the movement of the drafter’s hand and body. The drafter’s 
gestural conversions, her in-phase labour, generate the additional comprehension that the technique brings about. Marlene Steyn, a first 
year student, made the series of drawings in 2008. All drawings are in charcoal on newsprint or cartridge. Categories 1 to 5 is size A5, 
while the sustained gesture drawings in category 6 are size A2.  
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2.1.1     2.1.2     2.1.3     2.1.4 
2.1.5     2.1.6     2.1.7     2.1.8 
 10 
Group 2. Category 3. Scribbled line gesture 
In this exercise (scribbled line gesture), students draw from the centre of a shape outwards towards its outer planes. The technique augments 
the understandings I describe in Group 1 above with an understanding of the (unobservable) inner dimensions of things, or with the hidden 
structures that create outer planes. In this way, founding perceptions (the drafter’s shifts between three- and two-dimensionality) become 
informed also by imagination, conjecture, or construct. In these four drawings, continued recursivity and amassment seem evident in the 
gradual amplification of line work both in terms of quality and of number, suggesting that each application (whether successful or not) builds 
on its precedent. 
 
2.2.1     2.2.2     2.2.3     2.2.4 
 11 
Group 3. Categories 4 & 5. Weight and mass gesture 
The concept of giving visibility to weight and mass is central to mass-gesture and mass-and-line gesture drawing techniques (Betti & Sale. 
1997: 41-45). In these exercises, the students had to rely on the drawing process (and specifically on line) to discover those marks that 
would communicate mass and weight convincingly. The exercise deliberately incorporates touch, tactility, as ‘drawing tool’. The students are 
encouraged to use their fingers, smeared with charcoal dust, to create the strokes that also suggest weight and mass. Touch as sensory 
experience creates an almost concrete (tactile) sense of mutuality between self and the material world. When touching something, the brain 
interchanges between perceiving self as touching object and object touching self, thus realising Merleau-Ponty’s concept of mutuality with a 
directness that is less perceivable through the other senses. Each row of three drawings in this compilation shows development in relation to 
its preceding row(s), while each individual drawing shows improvements on the one preceding it. Such development comprises the accrual of 
a number of different skills and applied comprehension, albeit in increments that vary. Progress from a generalised and apparently vague 
understanding of the masses of the head in the first row to more structured descriptions of such masses in the second row is quite clear. 
Although the ‘mask’ is less evident in this student’s work, the differences between rows 1 and 2 and between drawings 9 & 10 still show a 
degree of oscillation between mask and whole head. From the second drawing onwards, the drafter clarifies with more confidence her 
distinctions between mass and non-mass, and between weight and non-weight, thus engaging in a generative dynamic similar to one 
between appearance and disappearance. She improves her perception of dimensionality by integrating weight and mass with volume. She 
distinguishes between mass and non-mass, weight and non-weight by assigning to them corresponding distinctions between light and dark 
tones, thereby also beginning to incorporate tonal values (albeit arbitrary tones rather than real tones) in spatial relation to structure, 
shape, volume, mass, weight, and line. The improved integration of all these aspects becomes more evident in the last row of drawings in 
Group 3. 
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2.3.1      2.3.2      2.3.3 
2.3.4      2.3.5      2.3.6 
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2.3.10      2.3.11       2.3.12 
2.3.7       2.3.8      2.3.9 
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Group 4. Category 6: Sustained gesture: mass, line, continuous line, scribbled gesture combined 
Perhaps the most significant shift that the preceding gesture exercises bring about is an increased lenience towards ‘ugly’ drawing. These 
self-portraits show the drafter’s willingness to deface and destroy in order to discover and construct. The drafter has convincingly shed a 
former agenda of conformity. She deviates in these drawings from the inhibitive edicts of ‘good’ or popular drawing to produce 
remarkably revealing (albeit not pleasant) self-portraits.  
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2.4.1        2.4.2       2.4.3 
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2.4.4          2.4.5 
 17 
ILLUSTRATION 3 
 
INDIVIDUATION: DIFFERENCE 
 
It is easy to take individuated trait in drawing for granted, thereby failing to see its potential significance precisely because it is so intrinsic 
to the practice (in the same way that one perceives it to be integral to handwriting). Its relationship with an individuated body-mind, with 
habitus-as-self / self-as-habitus, accounts for the fact that, by means of mere facture and drawn gesture, it almost seems to incorporate a 
spectre of the imagination of the student drafter. The phenomenon fascinates precisely because of its ambiguous insinuations of dormant, 
undiscovered, unsayable, yet faceted meaning. In the first place, it foretells or at least promises discovery of an intricate yet elusive centre 
of a fellow human being. It also affords the viewer a glimpse of someone’s mind, which intrigues because of an implicit promise of accessing 
the complex minutiae of another person in a way that could throw some light on the viewer’s own unsay-abilities, or complexities of the 
unbeknownst to self about self. Individuated trait and a mysterious self-being, whether that of drafter or as projected by the viewer, seems 
interrelated as a mutual “unbeknownst” (Derrida. 1993: 45), a chiasmic reversibility between viewer and drafter, viewer and drawing. 
Added to this, the potential of trait to deviate from norm, its almost effortless prevention of the creative stasis of repetitive redistribution of 
form and norm designates its merits. In these very basic drawing exercises, a number of line techniques (serving as ‘common denominators’) 
bring about diverse applications. Despite instructions being detailed (and rather prescriptive regarding subject, method, medium, and 
format), enormous differences emerge between the object of drawing and the drawing itself. Although I utilise these differences to develop 
the students’ eventual understanding of how line functions as ‘language’ and in relation to other drawing elements, it is another form of 
difference that is of interest here. The differences between the students’ subjective applications of the different techniques become evident 
in an arrangement that enables comparison (see below).  
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These drawings clearly display individuated mark making that conveys varied interpretation, levels of understanding, and skill in 
application. Hence, my understanding that trait (as facture and gesture) seems ‘to incorporate a spectre of the imagination’ of each student 
drafter. This arrangement of the drawings also illustrates the potential of trait to deviate from norm and its almost effortless prevention of 
emulation. Both these aspects also suggest the potential of trait for generativity and development of proficiency in drawing. A horizontal 
comparison shows the differences between the drawings of individual students. A vertical reading shows characteristic consistencies (trait) in 
the drawings of individual students. All the drawings were made in 2008, using charcoal and the approximate size of each is A5.
3.1. Nathan Gates. Continuous line gesture.   3.2. Catherine Benjamin. Continuous line gesture.  3.3. Marlene Steyn. Continuous line gesture. 
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3.4. Nathan Gates. Mass gesture.      3.5. Catherine Benjamin. Mass gesture.    3.6. Marlene Steyn. Mass gesture. 
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3.7. Nathan Gates. Line & Mass gesture.      3.8. Catherine Benjamin. Line & Mass gesture.   3.9. Marlene Steyn. Line & Mass gesture 
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ILLUSTRATION 4 
 
ERASURE AND RECURSIVITY 
 
Trait, in its enactively presentational capacity, deforms, rather than recovering outer visibilities as perfect replicas. It cannot be said that trait 
re-projects a pre-formed, mindful version of itself. Derrida calls it blind, because it ‘cannot be thought in the specular’. It irrupts into 
becoming, rather to be the other of the mutuality it pursues. It presents the ‘other’ of invisibility to gain its own visibility. For brief moments, 
there in the chaotic non-linearity of drawing, the drafter guides her actions locally within an interaction between her sensory frame of 
reference and their relative connections in the unfolding of the drawing. As such, the unfolding drawing as object becomes a component that 
can also influence the dynamics of interaction and transformations between itself and the drafter. 
 
Drawing traces form in contradictory positing and in subliminal play between opposites (1987: 186-193). In forming trait, the drafter 
deforms. In the placing of a mark, the drafter displaces. In composing a drawing, the drafter enacts her splintered vision as decomposition. 
Every appearance implies disappearance; each irruption hides its implosion. Every mark she banishes to outer territory suggests another 
remaining, yet to be revealed or not at all. Her ductus is one of reduction and deduction, doxic simplification, and somatic legibility that 
read as stylisation, as trait, yet its reach stretches to excess and creative extension. Her deductions appear on the drawing surface as the 
remains of repletion in ductus, the remembered versus the forgotten (Derrida. 1987: 193).  
 
This drawing further investigates the concept of recursive amassment. They combine hiatus as pre-emptive to re-drawing, naissance, and 
recursive naissance and, in this way, increase focus on a drawing-centred and drawing-originative narrative. Blind and slow contour drawing 
techniques were used with charcoal, white conté and erasure as media. Such a narrative starts to turn away from representation or even 
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expression, to develop focus in a self-reflexive labour that turns back on itself as source material for incremental development of the 
drawing. The process comprises a continuous flow of irruption that is literally disrupted by erasure and layering, thus creating display that 
has no precedent in concrete reality, or in mind. Each gesture beyond disruption is layered upon preceding articulations, albeit disturbed 
articulation. In this way, the student drafter amasses rather than subsumes excess. Even when labour ends, auto-deictic form remains sinuous 
and unenclosed. In this, it recognises the myth of a single reality, rather perceiving reality as subject to individuated interpretation and as an 
unknown construct that becomes possible to disclose, rather than as veracity  beyond the labour of revealing it. With each drawing act and in 
each active interchange in drawing, the drafter invents both drawing and reality anew. By contrast, redistribution of form in drawing 
deliberately conceals its processes of labour to achieve final and irrefutable closure in its preoccupation with material reality.  
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Marlene Steyn. 2008. Untitled. Charcoal, eraser, white conté on paper. 
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ILLUSTRATION 5 
 
DRAWING AS A GENERATIVE PARTNER: GROUND 
 
In blind contour line drawing, the pathways between the drawing and the drafter are deliberately broken to disturb the drafter’s conscious 
incorporation of the drawing as partner and participant. In the process of revealing itself, the drawing cannot ‘talk back’ to the drafter, 
because she ignores it. The drafter does not challenge a drawn phenomenon, a visual fragment, as one proposition to counter it with more 
propositions, all of which require constant incidences of evaluatory judging and attendant decision-making processes. As a result, the 
drawing seems to form itself and, only once done, can the drafter read its language, the forming in which she had no conscious hand. The 
deliberate dismissal of the pathways between drafter and drawing, however, also emphasises their generative role, as well as the 
emergence of language on the outside.  
 
In this dialectic, the first infinitesimally small removal, withdrawal, or hiatus – as the site of the language of the other – also begins to play 
and continues to participate as a formative contributor. Blind contour line is at once intimate with and at a distance from the self – once 
outside, it seems, for a moment, alien. The line appears slowly, and its pace, in conjunction with the physical contact between hand and 
surface, force the revelation of empty ground as present and as signifying materiality too. As visibility, blindly drawn contour line can shock 
with its unfamiliar appearance. Therefore, it almost seems to reach out, trying to find a new intimacy in the wide aridity of drawing ground. 
The impositions of understandability and norm create degrees of disappointment, satisfaction, indifference, respect, or disdain that the 
drafter can now also ‘know’ and consciously experience in relation to naissance. This process could develop into drawing ground gaining 
equal value as line in denotation, as is the case in these series. 
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The errant ways of slow and blind contour drawing (Betti & Sale. 1979: 56, 150) serve as effective and interesting tools for challenging 
norm and convention. These techniques make it impossible to pre-determine conclusive form. The unpredictable movement of a ‘blind’ line 
over surface, which often slips off the drawing surface, dispels any formal or pre-planned compositional intentions. In blind contour drawing, 
the line roams anywhere, because the drafter does not look at the drawing surface and the paths her hand follows there. A constant struggle 
to remain on the surface enhances awareness of the drawing ground as a participant in the drawing process. The juxtaposition of blind and 
slow contour (and gesture in the second series) emphasises a contrast between them that concerns the differences in the ways in which they 
involve drawing ground. The tensions between line and non-line begin to generate flow in the development of a composition that gradually 
unfolds in without pre-meditation. This ‘tension’ emanates from the interaction between paradigmatic encoding (Bryson. 1983: 122) (line or 
mark that denotes the appearance of ‘face’) on the one hand, and those areas that constitute ‘nothingness’ or disappearance (white ‘space’) 
on the other hand. Line and nothingness, face and space, bounce off each other to disclose signification and new form, albeit in an 
unpremeditated way. The gradual appearance of both ‘face’ and ‘space’, and their particular positions in relation to each other, orchestrate 
rather unconventional composition. Composition, therefore, also bows to body-mind inscription rather than to formula or repetition of style 
language. The process of doing it also reveals the gradual unfolding of the series. Therefore, the drawing process becomes a generative 
partner. 
 
Refer also to the text that accompanies Illustration 6. 
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Series 5.1. Thokozani Mpotsha. 2009. Charcoal on paper. Self-book. 
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Series 5.1. Thokozani Mpotsha. 2009. Charcoal on paper. Self-book. (Continued) 
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Illustration 5. Series 5.2 & 5.3 
 
In the following two series of drawings by Nathan Gates (5.2) and Emma Keet (5.3), spontaneous, unpremeditated incorporation of trait is 
evident. After doing numerous drawings in the various line-types (Illustrations 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5.1) in which the students also become aware of 
the language of line, they have to apply it. Using blind and slow contour only, they must utilise these line-types to function according to their 
nature and ‘look’ in subject matter of their own choice. They may combine only two objects or ‘characters’ in a narrative or in any form of 
serial progression. In series 5.2, Nathan Gates very appropriately incorporates his characteristic manner (see Illustrations 3.1, 3.4, 3.7, 9.1 
& 9.3 and their accompanying text), which roughly comprises simplified and schematic figuration in rather diffident, even timid line, with 
improved confidence in a very interesting narrative on violence. In series 5.3, Emma Keet comments on consumerism. She chooses to use the 
more fluid slow contour line for the shopping trolley, which acquires an almost ominous presence in relation to the human figures, which she 
styles as doll-like figures. The continuous slow contour lines in which the shopping trolleys are drawn, suggest the seductive elegance and 
sophistication of the materialistic culture of shopping and constant acquisition. In contrast, the more static, stylised line in which she draws the 
human figures suggest their senselessness and powerlessness, triggering the notion that they are in fact the ones that are being consumed. 
During the preceding line exercises, both students unwittingly discovered their own ‘hand’ as versatile and flexible tool that can insert 
surprising meaning into line. Both students successfully started to use line for its connotative value. 
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Series 5.2. Nathan Gates. 2008. Pen and ink on paper. Untitled. 
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Series 5.3. Emma Keet. 2008. Pen and ink on paper. Shopping Trolley. 
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Series 5.3. Emma Keet. 2008. Pen and ink on paper. Shopping Trolley (continued). 
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ILLUSTRATION 6  
 
DEVIATION 
The strewn legerdemain of enactive marks implies their probable impotence in creating those structures that bring to drawing recognition 
and various degrees of conciliation with the viewers’ vision, or with normative visual schemata. An example would be a coherent application 
of the understanding of spatial relationships between the formal elements of drawing. More conventions of drawing, such as composition, 
proportion, foreshortening, perspective, and colour, would provide examples. It would not be wrong to doubt the facility of enactive mark 
making to reveal coherency in, for example, descriptive or figurative drawing. If the general assumption were that the conception of 
structured coherency in all the components and elements that usually comprise a drawing could not be possible in a process where the 
fragmentary, wayward accrual of enactive drawn gesture drives the formative unfolding of the work, it would not be off the mark. After all, 
we can argue that, were mark making its only purpose, and the unbeseen it’s only theme, all drawing and all of a drawing would consist 
only of series of local discoveries, traced in-phase with its labour, yet delimited by the four-sided frame of the drawing paper. Although I do 
not denounce the possibility of this as a very compelling option, it is important to consider that the form of drawing displays in multiplicity, 
which, by its very nature, asserts equity in accommodation of drawing form. In practice, flow in mark making struggles to construct formal or 
formulaic compositional coherency in-phase since the path of the drafter’s eye naturally wants to be irregular and unpredictable, its 
readings splintered between all its paths of movement. Enaction and interaction irrupts from the darkness of the unconscious and of memory 
forgetting itself. As a result, perception is fragmented and recognition is intermittent, chaotic, rather than comprehensive, rational or 
consistent with a framework that imposes meta-structure. Bryson asserts that, although a degree of understanding of coherency in 
compositional structure will emerge during the course of the drawing, it will attain conceptual spectacle and status only (Bryson. 1983: 121).  
 
One could argue that it would be exactly such ‘conceptual status’ that would also direct it away from the absolute resolution that pre-
determined composition impose, because it would not be able to determine conclusive form ahead of its development. Unconsidered 
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composition that is not ‘designed’ or ‘composed’ beforehand, if the drafter allows it to develop in-phase and in relation to the development 
of other aspects of the drawing, can indeed bring to the work surprise and fluke. It demands courage to allow a convention as structural as 
composition to disclose itself eventually rather than sooner, if at all, although it is quite possible. The interplay that I perceive between 
enactive and interactive drawn gesture provides the answer, an answer that resonates in the words of Derrida (1993: 56), “Wherever 
drawing is consonant with and articulated by a sonorous and temporal wave, its rhythm composes with the invisible”. 
 
In this drawing exercise, concurrent revelation of composition is an objective, rather than pre-planned composition. Another objective is to 
allow enactive invention to reveal the unfolding of the drawing, rather than the meta-structural conventions such as pre-meditated 
composition or perspective that would represent norm. The overall objective is to deviate from norm. Another exercise that deals with these 
objectives appears in Illustration 5. 
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6.1 Marlene Steyn (2008). Self-portrait. Size A1 cartridge. Charcoal, white conté, and eraser on cartridge. 
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ILLUSTRATION 7 
 
A SOLIPSIST ECCENTRIC: TRAIT UNFOLDS 
Unfolding | enfolding 
 
Group 7.1: In numerous drawings (brush and ink) of her own face, the student gradually generates the necessary skill, ideas, and specific 
drawing language that eventually forms the characterisation for a postgraduate illustration project. Her trait is consistently present, while 
each portrait is unique, because trait irrupts with resourcefulness and flexibility. In this way, she achieves an enormous range in variation and 
characterisation that unfold through process. In the work of an older student, the constructive development that is evident in Nathan Gates’ 
work between the line exercises in Illustrations 3.1, 3.4. 3.7, 9.1 & 9.7 and the series in Illustration 5.2, occur more quickly to become more 
evident from one drawing to the next. As a result, Aletta’s accruals are denser and wider, especially from Illustration 7.2 and beyond. For 
example, she spontaneously documents wayward thoughts and contemplative moments by indiscriminate insertions of extra, seemingly 
unrelated words and images (see 7.4 & 7.6). In 7.4, the Afrikaans word “Teken” (draw, sign, or signification) suggests not only a conscious 
awareness of process, but also of ambiguity as it manifests in word and in image. In 7.6, a definite narrative starts to unfold in the 
background and in a somewhat dissonantly comic relation to her in the foreground. 
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7.1 Aletta Dorfling. 2008. Self-portraits. Brush and ink. Sizes vary. 
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 7.2 Aletta Dorfling. 2008. Self-portraits (continued). Brush and ink.  
 
In these self-portraits, the student develops characterisation more. She notates ideas as they occur, even if in a splintered and unpredictable way.  
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7.3 Aletta Dorfling. 2008. 
Self-portraits (continued). 
Brush and ink.  
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 7.4 Aletta Dorfling. 2008. Self-portraits. Brush and ink. 
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 7.5 Aletta Dorfling. 2008. Self-portraits (continued). Brush and ink. 
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7.6 Aletta Dorfling. 2008. Self-portraits (continued). Brush and ink. 
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ILLUSTRATION 8 
 
SELF-REFLEXIVITY: A TURNING POINT 
 
Varying degrees of advancement and recession of naissance, hiatus, and recursivity are evident in these two series of self-portraits by first 
year students Marlene Steyn and Brandaan Huigen (2008). Although all traces irrupted in the durational labour of making the drawings, it is 
especially in Series 8.1 (Marlene Steyn) that the tendency to imitate trait as style language is successfully challenged. The drafter articulated 
relational referencing and incorporation of preceding mark making and of self as object, but she also maintained constant changeability. 
Varying degrees of compliance, with the field of observation and with former mark irruption, result in recognisability and coherency. Dissent 
from object and from marks resulted in variety, involuntary enaction, and in unprecedented form. Compromise between the two adds to both 
sides. Because of recursive amassment, naissance and hiatus become indistinguishable in terms of their inherent descriptive or signifying 
value. The drafter assigned all marks equal value, avoiding deliberate erasure of ‘mistakes’. As a result, the history of the drawings 
remained in the drawings to become part of their language.  
 
The second series (8.2) display a degree of comfort that the student found in his manner of drawing. Although the drawings clearly 
demonstrate levels of skill, pathos, and connotative value, they display less variation and progress in the labour of their execution from first 
to last drawing when compared with Series 8.1. Because the student engaged less in the dynamics that I describe above, a heightened 
degree of stasis is apparent in the series. 
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Series 8.1.  8.1.1. & 8.1.2. Marlene Steyn. Self-portrait. Charcoal on paper. Size A2 
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8.1.3 & 8.1.4. Marlene Steyn. Self-portrait. Charcoal on paper. Size A2 
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Series 8.2.  8.2.1 % 8.2.2 Brandaan Huigen. Self-portrait. Charcoal on paper. Size A2 
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8.2.3 & 8.2.4 Brandaan Huigen. Self-portrait. Charcoal on paper. Size A2 
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 8.2.5 & 8.2.6 Brandaan Huigen. Self-portrait. Charcoal on paper. Size A2 
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ILLUSTRATION 9 
 
HIATUS: WITHDRAWAL 
 
The idea of hiatus - a withdrawal that contemplates already irrupted trait and the field of observation - engages the drafter in continued 
naissance, but along an additionally augmentative path. Self-reflexive hiatus orchestrates recursivity - a shift back and forth between drawn 
gesture (irrupted naissance) and more gesture - thus protracting a ‘narrative’ of the drawing process itself. As I explain in the thesis, this 
process also develops into extended conversion recursively to enter a sphere where conversions begin to accumulate. In these early 
exercises, students combine two types of gestural line techniques, namely mass- and line-gesture. They combine the two line types 
interchangeably rather than systematically. The student drafters become aware of layered complexities in the ‘making’ of line, and in its 
languages of application and interpretation by engaging in technique-centred generativity and responding to the back-chatting nature of 
line. In this arrangement of drawings by two student drafters, trait displays once again as difference. In the second row (9.2), marginal 
development between the first and the last drawings is evident, while development is quite distinct in the first row’s (9.1) drawings. In both 
cases, however, the expressive and connotative languages of the drawings in the final rows (9.3 & 9.4) enter a sphere rich with connotative 
potential. 
 
To understand hiatus as self-reflexive distantiation, as a period during which the drafter draws from personal history and plots solution 
according to disposition, the differences between the degrees of construction in which each student draws, may enlighten. Nathan, for 
example, simplifies in schematic shapes: the egg-shaped head strongly outlined, the almond-eyes stuck onto the face. Stacey does not use 
schema. She integrates facial features, hair, and head as whole. Vertical comparison between the rows reveals more such differences in 
constructive sophistication, as well as trait as difference.  
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 9.1 Nathan Gates. 2008. Charcoal on paper. Size A5 (each)   
 
9.2 Stacey Doman. 2008. Charcoal on paper. Size A5 (each) 
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9.3 Nathan Gates. 2008. Charcoal on paper. Size A5 (each) (Continued)  
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9.4 Stacey Doman. 2008. Charcoal on paper. Size A5 (each) (Continued) 
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Illustration 10   THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FIELD OF OBSERVATION AND DRAWING 
 
Elizabeth Gunter. 2004. Elephant fetus. Charcoal on paper. 70 x 145 cm. 
Right: Photographic source material. 10x4 cm. 
Elizabeth Gunter. 2005. Baboon fetus. Charcoal on paper. 70 x 145 cm 
Right: Photographic source material. 10x4 cm. 
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ADDENDUM B 
 
Glossary of key words 
 
A number of key words form coherency in my discussions, although I do not always apply 
them strictly according to their specific scholarly or knowledge disciplinary conventions. In 
the hope of preventing confusion or ambiguity, I explain here such words and their 
specific meanings in the context of this thesis.  
 
Appropriation:  
To take possession of, or to internalise, and integrate, for example, information, 
knowledge, or skill into embodied action, or into one’s cognitive apparatus, to the extent 
that one can apply such knowledge or skill extensively. See also ‘derivation’ below.  
 
Autogenous:  
My application of the word has particular bearing on individuation in drawing. It 
suggests processes of gestic conversion that abstract from within, or from a body-mind 
that allows the pre-conceptual to surface as conceptual. In the sterile language of 
cognitive science, there is “no room for a truly existing self” (Varela. 1992: 107), which 
makes for a computational mind alone, rather than interacting phenomenological and 
computational minds. Autogeny in drawing, to my mind, opposes such a notion and, 
because the drafter cannot give up a conviction in ‘a truly existing self’, she bows 
constantly, in the labour of drawing, to an almost obsessive urge to reveal self. I 
interpret and apply generally the notions of ‘self-origination’ and ‘auto-origination’ to 
be enfolded in the words ‘autogenous’ and ‘autogeny’. Autogenous mark making implies 
‘enaction’ from within that presents self as ‘being’, rather than as replication or 
representation. 
 
Auto-deictic, auto-deixis:  
I invent this term in the thesis. The concept relates directly to my subjective understanding 
of autogeny in drawing (see above). The dialectic that is active autogenously during 
drawing between a potentially non-existing and existing, or between a hidden and 
unhidden self, constitutes in drawing, as I perceive it, an irrepressible desire to show self 
through the in-phase labour of drawing in which the involuntary forming of trait is 
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recognised to be enaction of body-mind. An experiential, practice based mediatory 
activity, such as drawing, seeing, or speaking is central to the notion. Without knowing it 
consciously, the drafter seeks, through idiosyncratic mark making (trait), to resolve a 
subliminal tension between an ever-elusive self and the possibility of no self at all. In 
principle, the notion is based in self-specification. 
 
Body-mind / mind-body:  
I use these terms interchangeably to replace ‘mind’ in acknowledgement of the 
involvement of both body and mind in perception and conceptualisation. It supports a 
non-dualist and non-representationist approach to understanding perception. I apply the 
word to denote Mark Johnson’s (2007: 117) explanation that also explains the body-
mind and non-representationist relationship: 
The key to this re-conceiving of mind is to stop treating percepts, concepts, 
propositions, and thoughts as quasi-objects (mental entities or abstract structures) 
and to see them instead as patterns of experiential interaction. They are aspects 
or dimensions or structures of the patterns of organism-environment coupling (or 
integrated interaction) that constitute experience. The only sense in which they are 
‘inner’ is that my thoughts are mine (and not yours), but they are not mental objects 
locked up in the theater of the mind, trying desperately to make contact with the 
outside world. As we will see, thoughts are just modes of interaction and action. 
They are in and of the world (rather than just being about the world) because they 
are processes of experience. 
See also ‘experience’, ‘non-dualist’, and ‘non-representationist’ below. 
 
Cerebrative, cerebration:  
I apply these words as synonymous to generative and generation. 
 
Cognition:  
In the context of my discussions, the word also envelops the notion of embodied action. In 
order to convey the intended meaning of the word appropriately, I cite Francisco Varela 
(1992: 172 – 173) directly,  
Cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that come from having a body 
with various sensorimotor capacities, and these individual sensorimotor capacities 
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are themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological, and 
cultural context. By using the term action we mean to emphasize once again that 
sensory and motor processes, perception and action, are fundamentally 
inseparable in lived cognition. Indeed, the two are not merely contingently linked 
in individuals; they have also evolved together.  
To my mind, such understanding of cognition would hardly sustain a computational mind 
theory, but would rather be closer to a phenomenological theory of mind that would 
completely enfold experiential human involvement. 
 
Deictic, deixis:  
In my application of the word, I relate it directly to its Greek origin of deiknynai, 
meaning to show, rather than deiktikos, which would suggest the verbal version of ‘show’, 
namely, to ‘say’ in a first person voice. I apply its meaning ‘to show’ as ‘showing in a first 
person mark’. I bind these meanings to indicate ‘self’ as that which the drafter shows as 
trait in drawing. The ‘desire to show self’, as I explain this notion above in relation to 
‘autogenous’, ‘auto-deictic’, and ‘cognition’, or embodied action, obviously relates. I 
intend the origin of ‘deictic’ (that it has in common with the word ‘token’ (deiknynai)), to 
bear significant meaning as underlying interactive logic that draws together those 
discussions around ‘token visual schemata’ and ‘auto-deixis’ in the thesis. 
 
Derivative:   
In my applications of the concept as it relates to drawing, its meaning suggests a direct 
and conscious transcription or transposition of existing drawn or visual forms into current 
drawing practice. I contrast this conceptually to ‘appropriation’ that implies, to my mind, 
‘taking possession’ to integrate or embed on an unconscious rather than conscious or 
mnemonic level. Derivation in drawing implies a removal that replicates, rather than 
presents autogeny directly. Derivative form would not constitute new form. See also 
‘appropriation’ above. 
 
Dialectic:  
Generally, I adhere to the Hegelian framework that the Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy 
(2005: 158) asserts,  
Hegel used the term dialectic to designate a process, which brings forth an 
opposition, between a thesis and an antithesis, which has within it an urge to be 
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resolved by a synthesis, a combination in which the conflicting elements are 
preserved and somehow reconciled. One example is the opposition between being 
and not being, overcome in its synthesis, becoming. Every synthesis will in turn bring 
forth a new opposite, and so on. 
I connect this notion with the notions ‘amassment’ and ‘recursiveness’ or ‘ recursivity’ in the 
drawing process. To clarify further, I cite from the same source the notion that, “The 
resolutions were conceived both as thought-processes in which two contrary concepts are 
absorbed into a new concept” (PDOF. 2005: 158), which has bearing on the concept of 
new form in drawing. 
 
I apply the word to imply the opposition that exists between self-as non-existent and 
self-as-being, an opposition that, to my mind, brings forth drawing trait as synthesis in 
drawing. This opposition realises in more opposition, such as that between marking and 
unmarking, and so on. In my constructs that pertain to the drawing process and its 
pathways and passages of recursive and discursive interchange, self is always present, it 
‘takes side’ or occupies position, in oppositional positing, and the syntheses always imply 
self-reflexivity, or visible presence of self in drawing, which constitutes trait. The 
oppositional positing that I envisage in such dialectic could be between contradictory or 
conflictive stances, such as between presence and absence, or between appearance and 
disappearance, construction and destruction, and so on. It could also be between 
propositional stances, as would be the case in clauses such as ‘what if’, ‘imagine if’, or 
‘suppose that’, which would propose, rather than enclose.  
 
Difference:  
I apply the word to suggest its general meaning as something displaying “characteristics 
that distinguishes it from another” (Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary. 1979: 315) 
(Henceforth indicated as WNCD).  
 
Discursive interchange:  
Rather than literally implying speech, or conversations, that the self conducts on a 
conscious level, discursive interchange, in the context of the thesis, suggests complicity 
between infraconscious and infralinguistic schemata of the habitus to structure meaning. 
In drawing, the structures of language also play a role in the creation and communication 
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of meaning, and the ‘grafting’ between the visible and the verbal occur on an 
unconscious level too. 
 
Diversity:  
Diversity denotes variability in identity – i.e. difference; variations in the mode in which 
identity is maintained; differing from one another having various forms or qualities. 
 
Doxic modality:  
‘Doxa’ in Greek means ‘belief’ and I apply ‘doxic modality’ (in gestic conversion) as 
implicit of and influenced by beliefs that are entrenched in the unconscious self to the 
extent that the drafter is hardly aware of them on a conscious level. ‘Beliefs’, to my mind, 
do not necessarily pertain to ‘truth’. I perceive doxic modality as different from conscious 
modality or from conscious, representable, or representational knowledge that one 
would for example draw from memory (See Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. 2008: 
105). I also distinguish such knowledge from ‘truth’. 
 
Drafter:   
A drafter is a person who draws. I apply this word consistently to avoid gender specific 
discrimination, and to avoid the awkwardness of the neutral but lengthy ‘draftsperson’. 
 
Drafteric:   
I apply the word to denote drawing related aspect, something regarding, or with 
reference to drawing.  
 
Drawn gesture:  
I apply this phrase specifically to distinguish trait from ‘gesture’ as non-irrupted or pre-
irrupted, physical gesticulation, and from the technical application in drawing of the 
word ‘gesture’ as line ‘type’, suggesting ‘gestural line’. ‘Drawn gesture’ indicates 
specifically the line, trace, or stroke that irrupts from gestic conversion and enaction, 
which could be any type of line in drawing, such as for example, ‘gesture‘, ‘contour‘, 
‘organisational‘, ‘lyrical’, ‘structural’, ‘implied’, ‘constricted’, ‘blurred’, ‘aggressive’, 
‘mechanical’, ‘dumb’, or ‘eloquent’ line. 
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Durational:  
See ‘in-phase’ in this glossary. 
 
Experience:  
In the thesis, I usually intend the word to mean, “The [durational] state of being engaged 
in an activity” (WNCD. 1979: 399), unless otherwise explained in a footnote.  
 
Enaction:  
Since I consistently intend the word as Francisco Varela (1992: 173) explains it, I cite him 
directly:  
The enactionist approach consists of two points: (1) perception consists in 
perceptually guided action and (2) cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent 
sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided. 
 
Facilitation, facilitator:  
These terms replace ‘teaching’ and ‘teacher’ in the educational system known as 
‘Outcomes Based Education’ (adopted in South Africa as educational 
principle/framework). The difference between the two ‘sets’ of terminologies constitutes 
the difference between imparting with knowledge, on the one hand, and mediating 
learner-centred knowledge generation on the other hand. 
 
Gestic:  
I intend the word to mean ‘the gestural’ as generic or collective. According to the 
Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1979: 478) the word denotes “relating to or 
consisting of bodily movements or gestures”. 
 
Grapheme:  
I apply the word to mean, in a drafteric context, a unit of a drawing or a drawn line 
that is made up of any number of such units characterising the line or drawing with 
relatively ordered or chaotic diversity in form. WNCD explains ‘grapheme’ as “a unit of 
a writing system” (1979: 497). 
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Hiatus:  
I apply the word in a way that is particular to the context of the thesis. In auto-deictic 
drawing, ‘hiatus’ implies a passage from the unconscious to the conscious without 
discernable pause or break in continuity. Although the hand might or might not be absent 
from the drawing surface during hiatus, mind-body remains present to sustain continuity, 
hence its inference of ‘presence in absentia’, or ‘visible absence’, which, in this thesis, are 
both perfectly intentional contradictions in terms. 
 
Individuation, individuate:  
I apply these words consistently to suggest the developmental dynamics and generative 
modes in which a drafter unconsciously maintains identity in drawing and which defines 
difference between the drawings of two or more drafters. 
 
Interaction, interactivity:   
I intend the meaning of ‘interaction’ as it is explained in WNCD (1979: 596), namely as 
“a mutual or reciprocal action or influence”, but I reserve preference for the concept of 
mutuality implicit to the notion, rather than that of reciprocality for reasons that should 
become clear in the thesis. I position past and current interactivity between self and 
socio-cultural environment as influential on the irruption of trait or drawn gesture in the 
drawing by such self, while I position enaction as body-mind irruption of drawing-specific 
trait or drawn gesture. Interaction holds a dual action or sphere of functionality, namely 
one as activity in the unconscious body-mind, and one as activity in the conscious body-
mind. 
 
In-phase:  
This phrase refers to durational doing and production in drawing, meaning the drafter 
produces as she practices and that her production is concurrent with practice, they occur 
simultaneously and for the duration of making a drawing. The phrase suggests 
temporality, time, and durationality in relation to the labour of drawing, as well as the 
experience of drawing. 
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Irruption:  
I apply the word consistently in relation to mark making in drawing. I intend the word to 
imply the unpremeditated coming into being of individuation in mark, which, as the thesis 
finds, appears on paper without having any visible precedent, neither in the drafter’s 
mind, nor in objective structures – in other words, ‘blindly’. Both the Webster’s New 
Collegiate Dictionary (1979: 607) and the Oxford Dictionary of English (2005: 916) 
explain the word as denoting an action of ‘breaking into’, or making a sudden, abrupt 
entry.  
 
Labour of drawing:  
I borrow the phrase from Norman Bryson (1983: 141) and I apply it variously and 
generally to include trace-creation, stroking, mark making, as wells as enactionist and 
durational irruption, and gestic conversion. I specifically intend the phrase to include or 
imply those cerebrative processes of practice that enable what Bryson calls 
“transformation through labour”. By extension, such transformation or conversion also 
implies, to my mind, deviation from the norms of style language, if interaction and 
enaction are immanent in such drawing practice. 
 
Mediation, mediator:  
In an outcomes-based educational system (OBE), these terms replace ‘teaching’ and 
‘teacher’. The inference is that, while a teacher imparts knowledge gleaned from 
‘objective structures’, a mediator facilitates student-centred learning. Also, see 
‘facilitation’ above. 
 
Mimesis:  
In this thesis, my application of the word implies ‘imitation’. Like Derrida (1993: 45), I 
believe trait in drawing cannot be mimetic, since it has nothing to imitate. It irrupts in the 
process of its making, and does not exist before its irruption in any form, not even as 
‘mind-print’ or idea-picture. 
 
Modality:  
By this term I mean “a particular form of sensory perception” (Oxford Dictionary of 
English. 2005: 1128) (Henceforth indicated as ODE) that, in drawing, would inhere 
habitus as enactionist and interactionist in mark making, thereby assigning meaning to the 
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mark as originative from fused realms of thought and physicality, each mark constituting 
gestic conversion inclusive of its hypotheses of sight.  
 
Mutuality:  
I apply this word to refer to Merleau-Ponty’s (1968: 131, 227-228) (Evans. 2008: 188) 
concept of reversibility in perception. He often uses ‘flesh’, ‘chiasm’, and ‘reversibility’ as 
synonyms. Also, see ‘Reversibility’ and ‘Reflexivity’ below. 
 
Naissance, naissant:  
“To issue from”, particularly recalling its Latin root nasci, meaning, “to be born”, and 
inclusive of the meaning that its close relative, ‘nascent’, imparts, namely a process just 
“coming into being and beginning to display signs of future potential” (ODE. 2005: 
1166, 1170). 
 
Non-dualist:  
The word refers to the belief that dualisms such as for example mind-over-body, form 
and content, concepts and intuitions, being and becoming (Blackburn. 2008: 104), and 
object and subject are misconceptions. Blackburn states that there are many 
“philosophers who insist that the way forward is to transcend these dualisms”. The belief 
challenges the notion that physicality and non-physicality, for example, are “two 
radically different kinds of properties belonging to the same brain or human being” 
(Mautner.2005: 170). See also ‘body-mind’ above. 
 
Non-representationist:  
Varela (1992: 173) explains a non-representationist approach as follows: 
The reference point for understanding perception is no longer a pregiven, 
perceiver independent world, but rather the sensorimotor structure of the perceiver 
(the way in which the nervous system links sensory and motor surfaces).  
I apply the word to denote such meaning. In other words, perception does not recover 
pre-given properties from the world; rather, it enacts the perceiver’s understanding of 
the world. The drafter is the locus of her perception and her conception or syntheses of 
that world.  
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Moreover, the habitus, functioning as a forceful coordination of dispositions during 
practices, could initiate a progression of actions towards accomplishing a goal (such as 
amassing and assembling marks to create a drawn image) without the brain in any way 
representing those actions or the ultimate goal in advance of accomplishing it. 
Autobiographical drawing marks do not exist in the mind, or in the outer world, until their 
making or their irruption on paper. 
 
Ontology:  
The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy (2005: 442) defines ‘ontology’ as “inquiry into, or 
theory of, being qua being”, in other words, being in the capacity or character of being. 
See also ‘qua”. 
 
Punctum caecum:  
Latin: blind spot. It refers to the very point between looking from the inside out – a view 
from within, towards the outside – or to the instantaneousness of perception, the point 
where sensory experience meets the world. Merleau-Ponty (1968: 247-248), explains 
that this ‘blind point’ exists between every visibility and invisibility. It constitutes “a 
ground which is not visible in the sense the figure is” and “... is born in silence under the 
Gaze ... hence, if one means by visible the objective quale, it is in this sense not visible, 
but Unverborgen”. In other words, it relates to perceptual awareness – when self is not 
literally seen by self, but is unhidden from self – when one is aware that ‘I’ knows about 
her own existence. Once again, I cite Derrida in this regard, “... of that which, seeing 
itself see, is nevertheless not reflected, cannot be ‘thought’ in the specular or speculative 
mode – and thus is blinded because of this, blinded at this point ...  at the very point 
where it sees itself looking” (1993: 53).  
 
Qua:  
“(Latin, insofar as, or in the capacity of). Commonly needed in philosophy to distinguish 
the powers or operation of one thing under one aspect as opposed to those under 
another” (ODP 2008: 301). To my mind, being in the capacity of being strangely denotes 
being being being, as in ‘existence is being’, ‘existence being existence’, or ‘being is 
existence’.  
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Recursive, recursivity:  
I intend the meaning that Simon Blackburn offers: “a procedure that is applied once, and 
then applied to the result of that application”, (2008: 309). In the thesis, I associate the 
same meaning with the word ‘amassment’. In contrast to ‘stratification’, which would 
relate the rigidity of layered ‘strata’, I intend the fluctuation, fluidity, and flexibility 
associated with amassment and recursivity. 
 
Responsiveness:  
Invariably in this thesis, I intend the word to refer to the meaning Ian Moll (2004: 3) 
formulates as “If someone or something is responsive, he, she, or it is responsive to some 
state of affairs by doing something: X is responsive to Y by doing Z”. The emphasis is on 
response that constitutes a form of action (doing). 
 
Reversibility:  
In this thesis, the term specifically refers to the notion of perceptual experience bending 
back on itself. In The Visible and the Invisible (1968: 254-257), Merleau-Ponty provides a 
primary example of reversibility. In the sensory experiences of touching and being 
touched, reversibility constitutes the interactivity (or interplay) between the two 
experiences. Such interactivity constitutes a continuous experience in which the sensation 
of being touched turns around upon itself to turn into the experience of touching, and 
vice versa. Both sensations unfurl in the same body-mind. He states, “reversibility is the 
idea that every perception is doubled with a counter-perception ... [touching] is an act 
with two faces, one that no longer knows who speaks and who listens” (Merleau-Ponty. 
1968: 264-265). He relates the same phenomenon to more sensory experiences: 
There is vision, touch, when a certain visible, a certain tangible, turns back upon the 
whole of the visible, the whole of the tangible, of which it is a part, or when 
suddenly it finds itself surrounded by them, and through their commerce 
[interactivity], is formed a Visibility, a Tangible in itself (1968: 139).  
In this way, he explains reversibility as “perception forms itself in the things themselves” 
(Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 264-265). He consigns the word ‘flesh’ to the same concept, and 
explains it further as “a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being wherever 
there is a fragment of being” (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 139 – 140). In other words, it 
brings personalised style and individuation to practices (and to their practitioners). 
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In other words, it may be better to explain ‘reversibility’ as the perceptual experience 
that articulates the pivot on which turns the ordinary and familiar experiencing or sensing 
of an inner versus an outer, an exterior existence versus an interior existence, or a sense 
of self versus a sense of other. 
 
Reflexivity:  
WNCD (1979: 964) explains the word as the concept of being “directed or turned back 
on itself”, and “relating to, characterised by, or being a relation that exists between an 
entity and itself”. Where reversibility indicates such relation between self and other, or 
between subjective and objective structures, reflexivity denotes pivoting (a hinging) 
between a being and itself, between subject and habitus, or self and perception. 
However, the concept of habitus, as perception in humans, does not exclude such a 
relation between subject and objective structures (reversibility). 
 
As I explain in the Introduction of the thesis, the word denotes the concept that 
perception turns back on itself, as it would, for example, in perceiving the self, in self-
awareness, or in gaining knowledge of self-as-being. Perceptual experiencing carries 
with it the information regarding knowledge of self and its existence – the locus of self. 
Essentially, such locus refers back to itself in understanding of self. While habitus is 
central in constructing the self, it also grasps those formations that constitute its existence 
and its development recursively and reflexively. Also, see ‘reversibility’ above. 
 
Token schemata:   
Like ‘deictic’, ‘token’ has its origin in deiknynai, meaning to show (please see above). 
‘Token’ suggests “an outward sign or expression”; a “symbol”; a “distinguishing feature”; 
“a small part representing a whole” (WNCD. 1979: 1218). In ‘token schemata,’ I intend 
all these meanings as they relate to drawing marks that emanate from a ‘graft’ between 
shared visual schemata and subjectively formed visual schemata. They are newly 
formulated enactions that the drafter sacrifices to visibility. These sacrifices are gifts from 
the self or from what could be nothing (the whole of self) until ‘becoming’. They reveal as 
drawing marks (small parts of a possible whole that, in the case of drawing, constitutes 
nothingness that becomes being), another contradiction in terms that is intentional and 
apt.  
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Trace:  
I invariably apply this term to refer to drawing marks in general, rather than to specify 
individuated drawing. As ‘trait’ (see below), trace could denote line, stroke, or mark. 
Although drawing trace can include trait, I do not intend ‘trace’ to denote trait to the 
exclusion of other marks (See ‘drawn gesture’ above).  
 
Trait:  
The word refers in particular to idiosyncratic elements of style or style language in 
drawing, particularly but not exclusively immanent in trace. The drafter could employ 
untraced, unmarked, or empty areas in idiosyncratic ways, which would also imply trait 
(as I perceive it). In this thesis, the word ‘trait’ refers exclusively to idiosyncrasies in 
drawing, not ever to idiosyncrasies of person or personality. Contrary to Derrida, I do 
not apply the word to imply a variety of meanings “from a trait or feature to a line, 
stroke, or mark” (Derrida. 1993: 2. Translator’s footnote) (See also ‘trace’ and ‘drawn 
gesture’ above). 
 
